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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the impact of Islamism in the Middle East and North 
Africa. In the name of Islam, Islamist groups have embarked upon a path of 
violence and terrorism. The primary objective of the thesis is to critically 
analyse the ideas, approaches and implications of Islamism. Firstly, by 
examining whether economic despair breeds Islamism or what is happening in 
the Middle East and North Africa, which is a revolt against its own decay and 
humiliation, has taken the form of a return to the roots of radical Islam. 
Secondly, the way in which few Muslim governments dare to challenge the 
Islamists on theological, political and economic grounds. Thirdly, the manner 
which this influences modernisation and development in the region? Fourthly, 
the way which regimes respond to the challenge? 
The second objective of the thesis is to analyse the compatibility of Islam with 
democracy. It is argued that Islam has difficulty absorbing the idea that 
mankind is destined to progress, and that innovation can bring improvement to 
life. This argument is further explored in the light of cultural, theo-political, 
and socio-economic issues. 
The thesis also provides a terminological definition of Islamism and 
Fundamentalism. It analyses the activities of Islamist organisations in the 
Middle and North Africa, and argues the potential threat, which they present. 
In this manner the circumstances of the Islamists religious justification for their 
actions are analysed. At the same time the thesis examines the complexities 
underlying the concepts of jihad, holy war, and terrorism. 
The thesis also analyses the confrontation between the rhetoric of Islamist 
activists and the reality of Muslim politics. It is suggested the growth of these 
extremist organisations may be linked first and foremost to the social and 
economic problems created by underdevelopment and economic stagnation. 
Moreover, it is argued that lack of good government and corruption, which 
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have characterised large parts of the Arab and Muslim world in the past few 
decades have played a significant role in this confrontation. It argues these 
hardships have led many ordinary Arabs and Muslims to embrace radical 
Islam, which offers them an escape from the difficulties of daily life, hope for 
social justice and the expectation that religion would provide the answer to all 
their aspirations. It is argued that the general trend of 'returning to Islam' aims 
to correct society in a step-by-step process to instil the values of the religion as 
a way of life, while the Islamist organisations have turned the phenomenon 
into a lever to fulfil their political aim through violence and terrorism. 
The thesis examines a country-specific case study of the activities of Islamist 
groups in seven countries of the region: Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Iran, Lebanon, 
Israel and Saudi Arabia. This approach enables conclusions to be reached that 
Islamism presents a genuine danger to the stability of many regimes in the 
region, and involves a tireless struggle to subvert government authority by 
employing terrorism aimed at destabilising and toppling the regime. 
The thesis concludes that in the likely trend of Islamist influence in the Middle 
East and North Africa, one would need to pay more attention to those variables 
that are in constant change in a period of rising Islamisation. 
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For the past 30 years 'Political Islam' has been a key feature of Middle 
Eastern political discourse. Those in power use it to bolster their legitimacy, 
and those in opposition as a language of criticism on a wide range of issues 
related to culture, the economy and society as a whole. 
It has become a commonplace to speak of "Islamic fundamentalism" as a 
threat to regional stability, if not a global threat to Western interests. In the 
West, the term rings immediate alarms because it arouses images of violence 
and fanaticism, which, despite their validity in particular contexts, distorts a 
complex phenomenon. Moreover, governments under domestic pressure from 
Islamic opposition groups appeal to Western fears of fundamentalism either to 
emphasize their claims to Western economic aid, and/or to avoid the 
challenge of democratization. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of 'Islamism' upon the 
Middle East and North Africa during the last three decades. A critical 
discussion in this area will offer an insight into the history of political Islam, 
regional politics and the effect radical Islamist approaches have had in 
destabilizing the whole region. Similarly, an understanding will be gained of 
the ways in which the ruling elite has approached their dealings with Islamist 
groups and how they have attempted to handle the violence and terrorist 
activities afflicted by the Islamists. 
The term 'fundamentalism' is itself controversial, thus, there is a need to 
define 'fundamentalism' and "Islamic Fundamentalism", and explore the use 
of possible alternatives. The diversity within Islam translates to diversity 
within the notion of fundamentalism itself. Once these problematic terms 
have been identified and discussed in depth the central focus of the thesis 
would be analyzed. 
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A country-specific case study of the activities of Islamist organisations in 
seven North African and Middle Eastern states- Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Iran, 
Lebanon, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, will be presented. The case studies will 
examine why Islamist groups have become disillusioned with state leaders, 
political systems, and what factors or events have influenced the growth of 
Islamist ideals. 
After examining the case studies, there are four relevant aspects that the thesis 
will analyse in order to discuss the impact of Islamist activities in the Middle 
East and North Africa. The first seeks to discover why there has been a 
proliferation of Islamist groups in the Middle East and North Africa from the 
1970s to the 1990s. The next aspect will examine whether Islamists perceive 
religion to be the solution to the problems that the Middle East and North 
Africa faces as a result of rapid change to society. Islamism and its effect on 
the operations of the state has impacts on modernization and the development 
of society, therefore the third aspect inquires as to what the implications are 
for modem life and development in the region. Finally, the attitude of the state 
and ruling elite towards Islamists, and government attempts at retaining 
control of society will be examined. 
It will conclude with reflections on the viability of Islamic groups that cluster 
and cohere as Islamist cadres. 
PART ONE: HISTORY OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
INTRODUCTION 
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Before discussing the role of Islam in the politics of the Middle East and 
North Africa, a preliminary observation has to be made, as well as some 
considerations regarding the character of Islam in that part of the world. 
First of all, in Islam there is no separation between the realm of the religious 
and that of political, or, as commonly stated in the West, between church and 
state. While all religions affect and are affected by the political, to a greater or 
lesser degree, Christianity early on claimed such a separation, expressed in 
the New Testament as "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and 
unto God the things that are God's". 1 The whole history of Christianity 
contradicts this statement, from the quarrel of the Two Swords in medieval 
times to the war of religions in the age of the Renaissance and Reformation, 
to the temporal powers of the Papacy and many other instances down to the 
present time. But, in Islam, there has never been such a disclaimer. Islam was 
political from the very first day, concerned with the governing of the religious 
community and with any and all political questions, as well as with dogma 
and religious problems. Over time, and in different historical and geographic 
context, the connection may have loosened, but it is always in the background 
and ready to reassert itself. 
The second question that arises, keeping in mind that Islam originated in the 
Middle East, is whether the form of Islam practiced in the Middle East and 
North Africa is any different from that practiced in Asia and else where. 
While one can expect that distance from the beginning and source of Islam as 
well as different geographic and cultural contexts in the areas affected by the 
spread of Islam might somewhat modify the character of the religion, the 
essential factors of differentiation between Middle Eastern / North African 
1 Matthew, chapter 22 verses 15-22, Revised Standard Version of the Bible. 
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Islam and Asian Islam are related to the historical circumstances in which 
Islam reached various countries. 
Factors Affecting The Impact of Islam 
Before discussing the role of Islam in the contemporary politics of the Middle 
East and North Africa, one has to recognize that it is determined, or at least 
affected, by three sets of factors: geography, colonialisation and population, 
which are sometimes intertwined. 
Geography 
The first factor is the way Islam came to being. From its birth in the Arabian 
Peninsula in the seventh century, Islam spread its political control through 
military conquest over the Middle East, Persia, North Africa, Asia and Spain 
with extreme rapidity. The Islamisation of the conquered territories, however, 
took place progressively, given the tolerance displayed by the Arab 
conquerors towards the religious beliefs of the conquered people, essentially 
various brands of Judeo-Christianity, considered worthy of protection 
(dhimma). This first phase in the spread of Islam is marked by a close 
relationship between the religion, the Arabic language of the conquerors and 
of the Qur'an, the fusion of the spiritual and temporal powers of the caliph, 
and consequently the intertwining of political and religious questions. 
In the second phase of the spread of Islam, the leadership of the Muslim 
community had passed from the hands of the Arabs into those of Turks from 
Central Asia, the Ottomans, following the destruction of the Abbassi 
Caliphate in Baghdad. It is during this phase that Islam really reached the 
South Asian subcontinent. The impact of Islam on South Asia was marked by 
somewhat contradictory factors. The first wave of Arab conquests in the 
Middle East and North Africa, along with subsequent Islamisation, was 
accompanied by a fair amount of toleration due to the fundamental closeness 
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of Islam to Judeo-Christianity. Moreover, the conquered Christians and Jews 
in the Middle East and North Africa found their Muslim masters more lenient 
in terms of both taxation and religious dogma than their previous Byzantine 
overlords, who practiced a different form of Christianity and persecuted them 
for that reason. 
European Colonization 
The arrival of European traders in the sixteenth century and later European 
colonization constitute the second factor that has had direct and profound 
effects on the place and role of Islam in the Middle East and North Africa. It 
is ironic that initially the first Europeans, the Portuguese, unwittingly helped 
the spread of Islam in the Indonesian archipelago.2 Their missionary zeal was 
so brutal and heavy-handed, and marked by a mix of crusading,. Iberian 
peninsula re-conquest spirit, visceral anti-Muslim feelings, not to mention the 
spirit of lucre and plunder, that they often succeeded in unifying the local 
populations under the banner of Islam, perceived as a barrier against such 
abuses. 
The Muslim Population 
The third factor that has affected the place and role of Islam in this region is 
the size of the Muslim population in various Islamic countries at the present 
time. With respect to population, there are three categories of countries. Some 
countries have an overwhelmingly Muslim majority. These include, Saudi 
Arabia 23.513,330 (100%), Egypt 70.712,315 (94%), Iran 66.622,704 (99%), 
Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, with a total population of 
231.328,092 million people, of which 203.568,721 million, or 88 percent, are 
Muslims; Pakistan, with a total population of 14 7 .663,429 million, of which 
2 Hall, D.G .E., A History of Southeast Asia, 4th ed., New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, p. 
231. 
14 
97 percent, 143.233,526 million are Muslims; and third, Bangladesh, with a 
total population of 133.376,684 million, of which 83 percent, 110.402,647 
million are Muslims.3 
The second category comprises countries like Malaysia, which has a bare 
majority of Muslims 11.380,704 out of 22.662,365 million, Lebanon and 
Nigeria. 
The third category comprises several countries with a Muslim minority. In 
India, the minority is nevertheless large in numbers, with 125.501,427 million 
geographically dispersed Muslims composing a mere 12 percent of the 
population. In the Philippines, the Muslims number 4.226,281 million, 
constituting 5 percent of the total population of 84.525,639 million; in 
Thailand, they are 2.369,467 million, 3.8 percent of the total population of 
62.354,402 million; in China, they are 25.686,074 million, or about 2 percent 
of the total population of 1,284.303, 705 million.4 In the case of Philippines 
and Thailand, however, the Muslims are concentrated in specific geographic 
areas and, in the case of Thailand, Muslims belong to a different ethnic group 
from that of the Buddhist majority of the population. 
All three factors discussed above- the spread of Islam, European colonization, 
and population patterns- have had a direct correlation with the behavior of 
Muslims and the role of Islam in the various countries mentioned. Looking at 
the record since independence, one can determine two periods regarding the 
role of Islam in the politics of Middle Eastern and North Africa. Following 
independence, with the exception of Pakistan, the leadership in most of these 
countries was essentially secular, concerned with problems of foreign policy, 
nation building, modernization, and development. Then, from the late 1960s, 
and in some places even earlier, one witnesses the alleged resurgence of 
Islam, the rise of Islamism. In point of fact, this was not the resurgence of a 
religion, which has always been there, but an attempt to interpret Islam 
3 Total Population of every country is found in The CI.A. World Factbook, which is found 
at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. Percentage of Muslim Population is 
located at: http://members.tripod.com/arabicpaper/country.html 
4 Ibid 
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holistically by using principles derived from Islamic teachings to guide 
politics and economics, as well as society in general. What attracted the 
attention of the West was, and still is, the political dimension, which used 
Islamic idiom instead of Western terminology and which distanced itself from 
Westernization while preaching reform. 
Revivalism or fundamentalism- whatever term one uses- is not a new 
phenomenon in Islam. It has occurred many times in the past centuries. The 
present conditions in the world, in terms of rapid change and modern means 
of communication and transportation, have given this resurgence a global 
character that it could not have had in the past. 
CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS ISLAM? 
Islam is an Arabic word which means: 'submission to the will of God 
(' Allah' - a shortened form of La' Ilaaha Illa 'llah, the One who alone exists of 
the Judaic 'I am that I am')', 'resignation', 'striving after the truth', the 
highest State of 'being', absolutely free from all opposites.5 Those who 
submit to Allah are called 'Muslims' and must believe and proclaim publicly 
that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger (Rasuul 
or Prophet) of God. On the other hand the word can be used to convey at least 
three different meanings: 
(a) Islam means the religion expounded by Prophet 
Mohammed and embodied in the Qur'an; 
(b) Islam is the subsequent development of the religion as a result of 
the work of eminent Muslim jurists and theologians and this 
includes the Sharia, the holy law of Islam; 
5 Qari, Mohammed Sarfaraz Husayn, Islam, Calcutta 1910, p. 2. 
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( c) Islam means not what the Muslims believe in or are expected to 
believe in, but what they have actually done through the Islamic 
civilization.6 
Translated from the religious plane, the term also means the establishment of 
a regime of social and economic equality and the abolition of all injustices 
and inequalities of privileges and wealth, which impede the fullest 
development of natural faculties and potentialities of human beings.7 
The Meaning of Islam 
"Islam" is derived from the Arabic root salaama - peace, purity, submission 
and obedience. In the religious sense, Islam means submission to the will of 
God and obedience to His law. 8 
Everything and every phenomenon in the world, other than man and jinn is 
administered totally by God-made laws, they are obedient to God and 
submissive to His Laws, i.e. they are in the state of Islam. Man possesses the 
quality of intelligence and choice, thus he is invited to submit to the good will 
of God and obey His Law, i.e. become a Muslim. Submission to the good will 
of God, together with obedience to His beneficial law, i.e. becoming a 
Muslim, is the best safeguard for man's peace and harmony. 
According to Islamic sources, Islam dates back to the age of Prophet Adam. 
It's message has been conveyed to man by God's Prophets and Messengers 
including Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. Islam's message has been 
restored and enforced in the last stage of the religious evolution by God's last 
prophet and Messenger Muhammad. 
6 Joommal, A.S.K., "What is Islam", The Muslim Digest, vol. 35, no. 10, 11, May-June 
1985, pp. 127-30. Also see Dorothea Selye Franck, ed., Islam in the Modern World, 
Washington, 1961, p. 3. 
7 UI Haque, Zia, "Islamisation of society in Pakistan" in Asghar Khan, Islam Politics and 
the State: The Pakistan Experience, 1985, p. 117. 
8 Maududi, Sayyid Abu Al-' Ala, Islam: Its Meaning and Message, in M. Tariq Quraishi 
(ed.), American Trust Publications: Indianapolis, Indiana, 1984. 
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The word ALLAH in the Arabic language means God, or more accurately 
The One and Only Eternal God, Creator of the Universe, Lord of all lords, 
King of all kings, Most Compassionate, Most Merciful. The word Allah to 
mean God; is also used by Arabic speaking Jews and Christians. 
The Purpose of Life 
A Muslim believes that the purpose of life is to worship Allah. Worshipping 
Allah does not mean we spend our entire lives in constant seclusion and 
absolute meditation. To worship Allah is to live life according to His 
commands, not to run away from it. To worship Allah is to know Him, to love 
Him, to obey His commands, to enforce His laws in every aspect of life (The 
Sufis may aspire to get closer to Allah), to serve His cause by doing right and 
shunning evil and to be just to Him, to ourselves and to our fellow human 
beings. 
Status of Human Beings 
A Muslim believes that human beings enjoy an especially high ranking status 
in the hierarchy of all known creatures. Man and woman occupy this 
distinguished position because they alone are gifted with rational faculties and 
spiritual aspirations as well as powers of action. Man and woman are not a 
condemned race from birth to death, but dignified beings potentially capable 
of good and noble achievements. 
A Muslim also believes that every person is born Muslim.9 Allah endowed 
every person with the spiritual potential and intellectual inclination that can 
make him/her a good Muslim. Every person's birth takes place according to 
the will of Allah in realization of His plans and in submission to His 
commands. Every person is born FREE FROM SIN. When the person reaches 
9 Dr. Juweidi, Darwish, Al Ahaadith Al-Qudsiyah, AI Dar Al-Namudijiyah, Beirut, 
2003, Ch. 13, p. 25. 
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the age of maturity and ifs/he is sane, they become accountable for all their 
deeds and intentions. Humans are free from sin until they commit sin. There 
is no inherited sin, and no original sin. The Prophet Adam committed the first 
sin, but he prayed to Allah for pardon and Allah granted Adam pardon. 10 
Salvation 
A Muslim believes that s/he must work out his/her salvation through the 
guidance of Allah. No one can act on behalf of another or intercede between 
him and Allah. In order to obtain salvation, a person must combine faith and 
action, belief and practice. Faith without doing good deeds is as insufficient as 
doing good deeds without faith. 
Also, a Muslim believes that Allah does not hold any person responsible until 
he has shown them the Right Way. If people do not know and have no way of 
knowing about Islam, they will not be responsible for failing to be Muslim. 
Every Muslim must preach Islam in words and action. 
Acceptance of Faith 
A Muslim believes that faith is not complete when it is followed blindly or 
accepted unquestioningly. Humans must build thier faith on well-grounded 
convictions beyond any reasonable doubt and above uncertainty. Islam 
ensures freedom to believe and forbids compulsion in religion ( one of the 
oldest synagogues and one of the oldest churches in the world are in Muslim 
countries). 
A Muslim believes that the Qur'an is the word of Allah revealed to Prophet 
Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel. The Qur' an was revealed from Allah 
on various occasions to answer questions, solve problems; settle disputes and 
to be man's best guide to the truth. The Qur'an was revealed in Arabic and it 
10 The Holy Qur 'an 2:36-37. 
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is still in its original and complete Arabic version today. It is memorized by 
millions of Muslims. 
A Muslim also believes in a clear distinction between the Qur'an and the 
Traditions ( called Hadiths) of the Prophet Muhammad. Whereas, the Qur' an 
is the word of Allah, the Traditions of Prophet Muhammad (Hadiths i.e. his 
teachings, sayings, and actions) are the practical interpretations of the Qur'an. 
Both the Qur'an and the Hadiths of prophet Muhammad are the primary 
sources of knowledge in Islam. 
The Prophet and the Sources of Islam 
The founder of this religious faith was Muhammad (sometimes spelt 
Mohammed) who was born in Mecca circa 571 A.D. and died in 632 A. D. 
He claimed to have experienced direct revelations from Allah through the 
Archangel Gabriel. These commenced in 610 A.D. and continued until his 
death. In all they number 114 units called Suras. Collectively they form the 
holy book of the faith, the Koran or Our'an, which means 'recitation', since 
the Suras are in metrical form. The Qur'an is the prime source, but there are 
two others. One is the Hadith (sayings), which is a collection of the actions 
and sayings of the Prophet, regarded as 'commentaries' on the 
Qur'an and recorded after his death. The other is the Sunna (traditions, which 
is the Prophet's day-to-day practices). The Islamic calendar dates from 622 
A.D., the occasion of Prophet Muhammad's Hiira (migration) from Mecca to 
Yathrib later renamed Medina (refuge), which gave him shelter until his 
triumphal return to Mecca in 630 A.D. 
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Introduction to the Five Pillars of Islam 
The Pillars oflslam and Application of Faith 
Islam is built on five pillars 11 , the first of which is a state of faith, the other 
four are major exercises of faith of which some are daily, some weekly, some 
monthly, some annually and some are required as a minimum once in a 
lifetime. These exercises of faith are to serve man's spiritual purposes, satisfy 
his human needs and to mark his whole life with a Divine touch. The five 
pillars oflslam are: 
I. Shahadah - the Creed, witnessing that Allah is One, and Muhammad is 
His Messenger. This statement of faith must be declared publicly. It should be 
a genuine belief, which includes all the above articles of faith. The witnessing 
of the Oneness of Allah is the rejection of any form of deity other than Allah, 
and the witnessing that Muhammad is His Messenger is the acceptance of him 
being chosen by Allah to convey His message of Islam to all humanity and to 
deliver it from the darkness of ignorance into the light of belief in, and 
knowledge of, the Creator. The statement of Shahadah in Arabic is: 
Ashhadu Ann Laa llaha Illa Allah Wa Ashhadu Anna Muhammad Rasulu 
Allah 
An English translation would be: 
I bear witness that there is no other God but Allah and bear witness that 
Muhammad is His Messenger. The word prophet does not appear in the 
Shahadah. 
2. Sa/at I Sa/ah- Prayer 
This is performed five times a day and takes this form: 
"In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Compassionate. 
11 Hadith Sahih Bukhari Vol. I, Book 2, No. 7. 
Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all worlds. 
The Merciful One; The Compassionate One. 
Lord of the Day of Judgment. 
Thee alone we serve, to Thee alone we cry for help. 
Guide us in the straight path. 
The path of those that thou hast blessed (the Muslims). 
Not of those with whom Thou art angry (the Jews). 
And not of those that goes astray" (the Christians). 
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This is also the first Sura of the Qur'an, al-Fatiha (The Exordium), and is to 
Muslims what the Lord's Prayer is to Christians. 
Praying to the Creator on a daily basis is the best way to cultivate in a man a 
sound personality and to actualize his aspiration. Allah does not need man's 
prayer because He is free of all needs. Prayer is for our immeasurable benefit, 
and the blessings are beyond imagination. 
In prayer, every muscle of the body joins the soul and the mind in the worship 
and glory of Allah. Prayer is an act of worship. It is a matchless and 
unprecedented formula of intellectual meditation and spiritual devotion, of 
moral elevation and physical exercise, all combined. 
Offering of prayers is obligatory upon every Muslim male and female who is 
sane, mature (15 years and over) and in the case of women free from 
menstruation and confinement due to child birth. 
Requirement of prayer: performing of ablution (Wudu), purity of the whole 
body, clothes and ground used for prayer, dressing properly and having the 
intention and facing the Qiblah (the direction of the Ka 'bah at Mecca). 
Obligatory prayers: Five daily prayers, the Friday's noon congregation prayer 
and the funeral prayer. 
Times of obligatory prayers: 
1. Early morning: After dawn and before sunrise. 
2. Noon: After the sun begins to decline from its zenith until it is about 
midway on its course to set. 
3. Mid-afternoon: After the expiration of the noon prayer time until 
sunset. 
4. Sunset: Immediately after sunset until the red glow in the western 
horizon disappears. 
5. Evening: After the expiration of the sunset prayer until dawn. 
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Highly recommended prayer: Those accompanying the obligatory prayer and 
the two great festival prayers - Eid ul-Fitr and Eid ul-Adha. 
Optional prayers: Voluntary prayer during the day and night. 
The Call for Prayer 
Made by a Muezzin (caller) from the Minar (Minaret) of a mosque. 
"Allah is most great!' Allah is most great! 
I bear witness that there is no God but Allah! 
I bear witness that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah! 
Come to the Prayer! Come to the Success"! And "Prayer is better than Sleep"! 
in the early morning prayer only. 
Prayer should be offered in its due time, unless there is a reasonable excuse. 
Delayed obligatory prayers must be made up. In addition to the prescribed 
prayer, a Muslim expresses gratitude to God and appreciation of His favours 
and asks for His mercy all the time. Especially at time of, for example, 
childbirth, marriage, going to or rising from bed, leaving and returning to 
home, starting a journey or entering a city, riding or driving, before or after 
eating or drinking, harvesting, visiting graveyards and at times of distress and 
sickness. 
3. Zakat (Zakah)- Obligatory Charity, or Almsgiving 
Once a freewill offering, but later made obligatory and prescribing fixed 
proportions of both income and capital gain. Obligatory charity is an act of 
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worship and spiritual investment. The literal meaning of Zakah is purity and it 
refers to the annual amount in kind or coin which a Muslim with means must 
distribute among the rightful beneficiaries. Zakah does not only purify the 
property of the contributor but also purifies his/her heart from selfishness and 
greed. It also purifies the heart of the recipient from envy and jealousy, from 
hatred and uneasiness and it fosters instead goodwill and warm wishes for the 
contributors. 
Zakah has a deep humanitarian and social-political value; for example, it frees 
society from class welfare, ill feelings, distrust and corruption. Although 
Islam does not hinder private enterprise or condemn private possession; it 
does not tolerate selfish and greedy capitalism. Islam adopts a moderate but 
positive and effective course between individual and society, between the 
citizen and the state, between materialism and spiritualism. 
Zakah is paid on the net balance after paying personal expenses, family 
expenses, due credits, taxes, etc. Every Muslim male and female who at the 
end of the year is in possession of the equivalent of 85 grams of gold (approx. 
US$1400 in 2002) or more in cash or articles of trade, must give Zakah at the 
minimum rate of 2.5% gross income. Taxes paid to government do not 
substitute for this religious duty. The contributor should not seek pride of 
fame but if disclosing his/her name and his/her contribution is likely to 
encourage others, it is acceptable to do so. 
The recipients of Zakah are: the poor, the needy, the new Muslims converts, 
the Muslim prisoners of war (to liberate them), Muslims in debt, employees 
appointed to collect Zakah, Muslims in service of foreigners in need of help. 
Note the obligatory nature of Zakah; it is required. Muslims can also go above 
and beyond what they pay as Zakah, in which case the offering is a strictly 
voluntary charity (Sadaqa). 
4. Sawm - Fasting 
Fasting is obligatory with a few exceptions (fifteen year-olds and under, 
24 
sickness, pregnancy, travel and sometimes battle) and occupying the lunar 
month of Ramadan. 
Sawm is abstaining completely from eating, drinking, intimate sexual contacts 
and smoking from the break of dawn till sunset. It is a matchless Islamic 
institution, which teaches man the principle of sincere love to God. Fasting 
teaches man a creative sense of hope, devotion, patience, unselfishness, 
moderation, willpower, wise saving, sound budgeting, mature adaptability, 
healthy survival, discipline, spirit of social belonging, unity and brotherhood. 
Obligatory fasting is done once a year for the period of the month of 
Ramadan, the ninth month of the Islamic year. Recommended fasting includes 
every Monday and Thursday of every week, three days in the middle of each 
Islamic month, six days after Ramadan following the Feast Day and a few 
days of the two months before Ramadan. Fasting of Ramadan is a worship 
act, which is obligatory on every adult Muslim, male or female if s/he is 
mentally and physically fit and not on a journey. Exceptions are: women 
during their period of menstruation and while nursing (breast feeding) their 
child, and also in case of travel and sickness for both men and women. 
5. Haii - The Pilgrimage 
It is a pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in a Muslim's lifetime and it is not 
obligatory upon every Muslim male and female who is mentally, physically 
and financially fit, but if unaffordable then contribution to the traveling 
expenses of somebody undertaking it is meritorious. It is the largest annual 
convention of faith on earth (in 2003: 2-2.5 million). Also, a Muslim may 
trade while perforimg the Haj. 
Peace is the dominant theme. Peace with Allah, with one's soul, with one 
another, with all living creatures. To disturb the peace of anyone or any 
creature in any shape or form is strictly prohibited. 
Muslims from all walks of life, from every corner of the globe assemble in 
Mecca in response to the call of Allah. There is no royalty, but there is loyalty 
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of all to Allah, the Creator. It is to commemorate the Divine rituals observed 
by the Prophet Abraham and his son Ishmael, who were the first pilgrims to 
the house of Allah on earth: the Ka'bah. It is also to remember the greatest 
assembly of the Day of Judgement when people will stand equal before Allah. 
Muslims go to Mecca to glorify Allah, not to worship a man. The visit to the tomb 
of Prophet Muhammad in Madina city is highly recommended but not essential in 
making the Hajj valid and complete. 
The Six Central Articles of Faith 
True piety is this: 
1. To believe in Allah, the One and Only God 
A Muslim believes in ONE GOD, Supreme and Eternal, Infinite and Mighty, 
Merciful and Compassionate, Creator and Provider. God neither has father 
nor mother, neither son nor was He fathered. None equal to Him. He is God 
of all mankind, not of a special tribe or race. 
God is Highness and Supreme but He is very near to the pious thoughtful 
believers; He answers their prayers and helps them. He loves the people who 
love Him and forgives their sins. He gives them peace, happiness, knowledge 
and success. God is the Loving and Provider, the Generous, and the 
Benevolent, the Rich and the Independent, the Forgiving and the Clement, the 
Patient and the Appreciative, the Unique and the Protector, the judge and the 
Peace. God's attributes are mentioned in the Qur'an. 
God creates in man the mind to understand, the soul and conscience to be 
good and righteous, the feelings and sentiments to be kind and humane. If we 
try to count His favours upon us, we cannot, because they are countless. In 
return for all the great favours and mercy, God does not need anything from 
us, because He is Needless and Independent. God asks us to know Him, to 
love Him and to enforce His laws for our benefit and our own good. 
2. Messengers and Prophets of God 
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A Muslim believes in all the Messengers and Prophets of God without any 
discrimination. All messengers were mortals, human beings, endowed with 
Divine revelations and appointed by God to teach mankind. The Prophets are 
those earlier messengers sent by Allah - twenty-eight in all of whom 
Muhammad is the last. The Holy Qur'an mentions the names of 28 
messengers and prophets and states that there are others. They commence 
with Adam and include Noah, Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, David, Moses, Jesus 
and Muhammad but vigorously deny the divinity of Jesus and denounce the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Their message is the same and it is Islam and 
it came from One and the Same Source; God, and it is to submit to His will 
and to obey His law; i.e. to become a Muslim. 
3. The Angels 
They are purely spiritual and splendid beings created by Allah. They require 
no food or drink or sleep. They have no physical desires nor material needs. 
Angels spend their time in the service of Allah. Each is charged with a certain 
duty. Angels cannot be seen by the naked eye. Knowledge and the truth are 
not entirely confined to sensory knowledge or sensory perception alone. 
4. Revelations and the Qur'an (The Books) 
A Muslim believes in all scriptures and revelations of God, as they are 
complete and in their original versions. Allah, the Creator, has not left man 
without guidance for the conduct of his life. Revelations were given to guide 
the people to the right path of Allah and sent down to selected people, the 
prophets and messengers, to convey it to their fellow mankind. 
The message of all the prophet and messengers is the same. They all asked the 
people of their time to obey and worship Allah and none other. Abraham, 
Moses, David, Jesus and Muhammad who were revealed their own book of 
Allah, were sent at different times to bring back straying human beings from 
deviation to the right course. 
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The Qur'an is the sacred book of the Muslims. It is the last book of guidance 
from Allah, sent down to Muhammad, peace be upon him, through the angel 
Jibraeel (Gabriel). Every word of it is the word of Allah, It was revealed over 
a period of 23 years in the Arabic language. It contains 114 Surahs (chapters) 
and 6666 verses. 
The Qur' an deals with man and his ultimate goal in life. Its teachings cover 
all areas of this life and the life after death. It contains principles, doctrines 
and directions for every sphere of human life. The theme of the Qur'an 
broadly consists of three fundamental ideas: Oneness of Allah, Prophethood 
and life after death. The success of human beings on this earth and in the life 
hereafter depends on obedience to the Qur'anic teaching. 
The Qur'an is unrivalled in its recording and preservation. The astonishing 
fact about this book of Allah is that it has remained unchanged even to a dot 
over the past fourteen hundred years. No scholar has questioned the fact that 
the Qur' an today is the same as it was revealed. Muslims till today memorize 
the Qur' an word by word as a whole or in part. Today, the Qur' an is the only 
authentic and complete book of Allah. Allah is protecting it from being lost, 
corrupted or concealed. 
5. The Day of Judgment 
A Muslim believes in the Day of Judgment. This world as we know it will 
come to an end, and the dead will rise to stand for their final and fair trial. On 
that day, all men and women from Prophet Adam to the last person will be 
resurrected from the state of death for judgment. Everything we do, say, 
make, intend and think are accounted for and kept in accurate records. They 
are brought up on the Day of Judgment. 
One who believes in life after death is not expected to behave against the Will 
of Allah. S/He will always bear in mind that Allah is watching all their 
actions and the angels are recording them. 
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People with good records will be generously rewarded and warmly welcomed 
to Allah's Heaven. People with bad records will be fairly punished and cast 
into Hell. The real nature of Heaven and Hell; is only known to Allah but they 
are described by Allah in man's familiar terms in the Qur'an. 
If some good deeds are seen not to get full appreciation and credit in this life, 
they will receive full compensation and be widely acknowledged on the Day 
of Judgment. If some people, who commit sins, neglect Allah and indulge in 
immoral activities, seem superficially successful and prosperous in this life, 
absolute justice will be done to them on the Day of Judgment. The time of the 
Day of Judgment; is only known to Allah and Allah alone. 
6. And His Qadaa' and Qadar (His Divine Decree and Fate) 
A Muslim believes in Qadaa' and Qadar which relate to the ultimate power of 
Allah. Qadaa' and Qadar means the Timeless Knowledge of Allah and His 
power to plan and execute His plans. Allah is not indifferent to this world nor 
is He neutral to it. It implies that everything on this earth originates from the 
one and only Creator who is also the Sustainer and the Sole Source of 
guidance. 
Allah is Wise, Just, and Loving, and whatever He does must have a good 
motive, although we may fail sometimes to understand it fully. We should 
have strong faith in Allah and accept whatever He does because our 
knowledge is limited and our thinking is based on individual consideration, 
whereas His knowledge is limitless and He plans on a universal basis. Man 
should think, plan and make sound choices, but if things do not happen the 
way he wants, he should not lose faith and surrender to himself to mental 
strains or shattering worries. 
Islam, therefore, is a religion encompassing both the spiritual and temporal 
aspects of life. It is a totality. Part of the central message of it is: (a) that there 
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is only one God; (b) that all men are equal; ( c) that man achieves dignity 
through knowledge. 12 
Islam functions as an integrative force, not only on the level of national 
sovereignty, but also to a certain extent on the international level by 
promoting organizational movement among all Muslim states. Muslim people 
are regarded as acting always and everywhere as Muslims and nothing else. 
This fundamentalism is considered a real possibility in all Muslim countries. 13 
Islam, however, by its very nature is diverse. It has spread throughout the 
world encompassing different ethnic groups and civilizations, speaking 
different languages, living in different environments and interpreting the 
world in different views. Thus, within this framework of diversity, ideas on 
how Islam is implemented in society are equally as disparate. It can range 
from total separation of religion from the state ( as in Turkey), to a secular 
government (like Egypt, Jordan, etc), which incorporates some religion, and a 
total Islamisation of the state, like Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iran, and Pakistan. 
This notion of variation continues through the ideas of the groups labeled as 
"Islamist". Some may act within the current political system in order to gain 
political participation or authority, while others may resort to militant means 
and the use of violence in order to create instability and/or an opportunity to 
gain power or influence. Butterworth and Zartman state that Islam's 
"manifestations are varied and contradictory, and no single expression can be 
taken as evidence of the nature of the whole" .14 To understand Islam, one 
must understand its diversity. 
12 Stoddard, Philip H., David C. Cuthell, and Margaret N. Sullivan eds.Change and the 
Muslim World, Syracuse, 1981, p. I. 
13 Karaosmanaglu, Ali, L., "Islam and Foreign Policy: A Turkish Experience", Foreign 
Policy, Vol. XII, No. 1-2, 1985, pp. 64-69. 
14 Butterworth, C. E. and Zartman, I. W. (eds.) "Preface" in the Annals of American 
Academy of Political & Social Science, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992, p. 8. 
30 
Islamic unity is not, however, directed against any country or any bloc. Islam 
is a religion of peace. It preaches tolerance, universal brotherhood and it does 
not permit its ideology to be imposed on others by force, just as it does not 
want other ideologies to be imposed on Muslims. Islam believes in the 
principle of peaceful co-existence. As most moderate Muslim intellectuals 
point out, there is really no reason why Americans should be hostile towards 
an Islamic renaissance. It is a religious phenomenon rooted in certain basic 
values that are not alien to the Judeo-Christian tradition; yet, instinctively, 
many Westeners are perplexed by this development. 15 
The present resurgence of Islam and the reawakening among the Muslims of 
the world is a welcome phenomenon. It should be regarded as a revitalizing 
force that could bring peace to a weary world and hope to a distraught 
humanity. It is not a religion that forces itself on others. The Qur' an explicitly 
reminds us: "There is no compulsion in religion" .16 
In spite of the fact that Islam is a religious phenomenon rooted in certain 
values which are common to the broad ideals of Judeo-Christian ethics, it is 
depicted as anti-Western, a religion of intolerance, a creed of violence and 
terrorism, uncompromising, and bent on conquering the non-Muslim world by 
jihad (holy war). Some actions of violent groups' such as the 'Soldier of God' 
(Jund Allah) and 'Party of God' (Hizbullah) have being misinterpreted by the 
West as the work of the entire Islamic world. The so-called threat of 'Islamic 
Fundamentalism' is most unfortunate and potentially dangerous for the 
emerging world order after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The vast 
majority of Muslim countries cherishes and value closer and friendly relations 
with the West, in particular with the United States. They are engaged in a 
major process of modernization, including technological, scientific, 
educational and economic development. 
When the Muslim world wants to recover its glorious past, it has nothing 
against any other religion or group. Islam is a religion of peace; it preaches 
15 Primary source: as a participant observer. 
16 The Holy Qur ·an, Sura II, Al-Baqara: 256. 
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tolerance, universal brotherhood and does not permit its ideology to be 
imposed on others by force. Islam believes in the principle of live and let live. 
Coercion is strictly forbidden in Islam. 17 If any individual or group indulges 
in acts of violence or terrorism, they are not true followers of Islam. Islam is 
noted for strict adherence to the rule of law. 
Islam was destined to become a world religion and to create a civilization, 
which stretched from one end of the globe to the other. Already during the 
early Muslim caliphates, first the Arabs, then the Persians and later the Turks 
set about creating a classical Islamic civilization. Later, in the 13th century, 
both Africa and India became great centers of Islamic civilization and soon 
thereafter Muslim kingdoms were established in the Malay-Indonesian world, 
while Chinese Muslims flourished throughout China. 
Islam is a religion for all people from whatever race or background they 
might be. That is why Islamic civilization is based on a unity, which stands 
completely against any racial or ethnic discrimination. Such major racial and 
ethnic groups as the Arabs, Persians, Turks, Africans, Indians, Chinese and 
Malays, in addition to numerous smaller units, embraced Islam and 
contributed to the building of Islamic civilization. 
The Islamic world remains today a vast land stretching from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific, with an important presence in Europe and America, animated by 
the teachings of Islam and seeking to assert its own identity. Despite the 
presence of nationalism and various secular ideologies in their midst, 
Muslims wish to live in the modern world but without imitating blindly the 
ways followed by the West. The Islamic world wishes to live at peace with 
the West as well as the East but at the same time not to be dominated by them. 
It wishes to devote its resources and energies to building a better life for its 
people on the basis of the teachings of Islam and not to squander its resources 
in either internal or external conflicts. It seeks finally, to create better 
understanding with the West and to be better understood by the West. The 
17 Ibid. 
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destinies of the Islamic world and the West cannot be totally separated and 
therefore it is only in understanding each other better that they can serve their 
own people more successfully and also contribute to a better life for the whole 
ofhumanity. 18 
In spite of the peaceful nature of the Islamic civilization, Professor Samuel 
Huntington of Harvard University predicts a cultural conflict and a conflict of 
civilization between the world of Islam and the West. He elaborates his views 
by pointing out the following: 
a) We are moving out of the era where the nation state is the central 
focus, although obviously it will remain the leading entity on the 
world scene. 
b) The conflicts among civilizations will be increasingly central: the 
West and Islam, Islam and Hindu civilization in India, Islam vs. 
Slav Orthodox Russian civilization, China and Japan as 
civilizations. These are going to be the major entities among which 
international relations will take place. 
c) A civilization is the broadest level of cultural identity a person has. 
Civilizations to a large extent are defined by religion. It is a much 
more absolute distinction than others. A person could be half 
French and half Arab, but it would be rather difficult to be half 
Catholic and half Muslim. This has been most obvious in Islamic 
countries. 
d) Islam is the strictest religion in the world outside of Christianity. 
There is no separation between religion and politics. Also, there is 
the feeling that the West, exploited, has abused the Muslim world 
and that some form of renaissance in under way. The conflict will 
take many forms. Yet one does not want to think of this as the great 
apocalyptic world war between Islam and the West. 
18 Islam: A Global Civilization, prepared by the Islamic Department of the Embassy of 
Saudi Arabia, Washington D.C. 1993 
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e) All the Middle Eastern Islamic states are increasing their military 
strength. There is this Confucian-Islamic connection between China 
and North Korea on one hand and Middle Eastern states like Iran, 
Iraq, Syria and Libya on the other hand. It is primarily a military 
connection, where the Confucian states provide weapons and 
weapons technology. 19 
Professor John L. Esposito has in contrast rendered great service to Islam by 
explaining the Islamic message in his various books. In one of them, The 
Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality ( 1992) he raised the questions: 
Are Islam and the West on an inevitable collision course? Are Islamic 
fundamentalists medieval fanatics? Are Islam and democracy 
incompatible? Is Islamic fundamentalism a threat to stability in the 
Muslim world and to American interests in the region? These are 
critical questions for our times that come from a history of mutual 
distrust and condemnation.20 
It's useful to quote Esposito's thoughtful and perspective remarks about the 
alleged Islamic threat: 
The West often reinforces the equation of Islam with dangers or threat, 
viewing the Islamic world with catchwords like 'militant Islam', 
Islamic fundamentalism', and 'terrorism'. Our selective memory then 
blocks our ability to appreciate the other side of the equation- the 
sources of Muslim images of the West in turn as the 'real' threat to 
them. Many in Arab and Muslim world view the history of Islam and 
of the Muslim world's dealings with the West as one of victimization 
and oppression at the hands of an expansive imperial power. Thus 
many counter that it is 'militant Christianity' and 'militant Judaism' 
that are the root causes of failed Muslim societies and instability: the 
19 Huntington, Samuel, 'The Next Battleground', Time, 28 June 1993. 
20 Esposito, J.L., The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, New York, 1992, p. 3. 
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aggression and intolerance of Christian-initiated Crusades and the 
Inquisition; European colonialism; the breakup of the Ottoman empire 
and artificial creation of modern states of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, 
Jordan, and Palestine; the establishment of Israel; Israeli's occupation 
of the West Bank and Gaza and its invasion and occupation of 
Lebanon; and the extent to which oil interests have been the 
determining factor in support for autocratic regimes. 
However, in principle if we condemn government repression of the 
opposition, cancellation of elections, and massive violation of human 
rights, then the same concern must apply to many current regimes, 
such as those in Tunisia and Algeria, where the results of the Arab 
world's first free parliamentary elections have been denied and the 
winners imprisoned. The track record of these governments on political 
participation and pluralism and respect for human rights we know 
already. 
For many Muslims, Islamic revivalism is a social rather than a political 
movement whose goal is a more Islamically minded and oriented 
society, but not necessarily the creation of an Islamic state. For others, 
the establishment of an Islamic order requires the creation of an 
Islamic state. In either case, Islam and most Islamic movements are not 
necessarily anti-Western, anti-American, or anti-democratic. While 
they are challenge to the outdated assumptions of the established and 
to autocratic regimes, they do not necessarily threaten American 
interests. Our challenge is to better understand the history and realities 
of the Muslim world. Recognizing the diversity and many faces of 
Islam counters our image of a unified Islamic threat. Our image of a 
unified Islamic threat lessens the risk of creating self-fulfilling 
prophecies about the battle of the West against a radical Islam guided 
by our stated ideals and goals of freedom and self-determination. The 
West has an ideal vantage point for appreciating the aspirations of 
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many in the Muslim world as they seek to define new paths for their 
future. 21 
It must be noted that any movement of Muslims based on the true spirit of 
Islamic principles or ideals cannot be a threat to the world; nor are there any 
reasons to haunt us with a new global conflict between the world of Islam and 
the West, replacing the East-West Cold War. Assistant Secretary Edward 
Dij erej ian supported this view in 1993. He informed Congress as follows on 
12 May 1993: 
Islam, one of the world's great religions, is not our enemy. What we do 
oppose is extremism and fanaticism, whether of a religious or secular 
nature. We part company with those who preach intolerance, abuse 
human rights or resort to violence in pursuit of their political goal.22 
Islam, it may be observed, is in agreement in opposing this violence and 
abuse of human rights as argued by Dijerejian. 
The Islamic Fundamentalists 
Before discussing the conflicts of the Islamic fundamentalists and others and 
the alleged 'danger' or 'threats' posed by 'Islamists', it is useful to examine who 
the 'Islamic fundamentalists' are? Obviously there cannot be a universally 
accepted definition of 'fundamentalists'. Broadly speaking the word 
'fundamentalists' may be categorized in two main ways: 
(a) As the word is understood or at least should be understood in accordance 
with the proper teaching and guidelines of Islam and (b) As the term is widely 
used to describe the current conflicts, real or imaginary, between Islamists and 
their opponents. 
21 lbid.,pp.211-217. 
22 Djerejian, Edward P., "War and Peace: The Problems and Prospects of American 
Diplomacy in the Middle East" (Address delivered to the World Affairs Council, Los 
Angeles, November 30, 1993.) 
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In accordance with Islamic fundamental principles, one may call a follower or 
mu'min a (genuine) Muslim who unconditionally and unequivocally believes 
and practices 'The Five Pillars of Islam': faith in one God: Allah; five daily 
prayers; almsgiving (zakat); fasting in the holy month of Ramadan; and the 
pilgrimage, once in a life time, to Mecca. To analyze the true significance and 
spirit of these fundamentals of Islam, they are not merely rituals. They are for 
self-purification and for acquiring the virtues as enjoined in the Qur'an and as . 
practiced by the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, as the 'Qur'an in Practice'. 
Therefore, all Muslims are considered to be fundamentalists. 
If any Muslim believes in these principles he or she cannot, indulge in acts of 
violence, terrorism, hijacking or any kind of action which goes against the 
universal principles of truth, justice, peace and universal brotherhood. If 
anybody in actual practice commits any such violation of human rights, he or 
she may be anything- nationalist, patriot, or believer in any 'ism'- but certainly 
he or she is not a true follower of Islam. In fact, by committing any such 
activities, s/he ceases to be a follower of the true spirit of Islam. Islam at the 
cost of its reputation, we may say, is a religion of peace, justice, tolerance of 
other religions, of universal brotherhood and peace. So the definition of a true 
Muslim or Islamic fundamentalist is completely different from what is 
currently used in the Western and non-Muslim world, whether by a serious 
scholar, or politicians, or by any news media. 
Islamic fundamentalists have been described and defined in many other ways. 
Thus, YousufM. Choueiri in his Islamic Fundamentalism argues: 
Islamic Fundamentalism is a vague term, currently in vogue as a catch-
phrase used to describe the militant ideology of contemporary Islamic 
movements. It is, however, adopted in this book to refer to Islamic 
systems of thought and political movements that emerged from the 
eighteenth century onwards in countries as far apart as Saudi Arabia, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and India. 
He continues: 
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However, not all movements designated 'Islam' is necessarily right 
wing or fascist. In Egypt, for example, Hassan Hanafi, Professor of 
Philosophy at Cairo University, leads a school of thought that calls 
itself 'the Islamic Left'. This particular instance only goes to show that 
political classifications have become a worldwide phenomenon, by 
passing local cultures or pure religious beliefs. It also serves to draw 
attention to the multi-faced attributes and specifications of Islamic 
ideologies. 23 
It is the groups that resort to militancy and the impact they have had on the 
Middle East and North Africa throughout the last three decades that this thesis 
will focus on in this research. As has been shown, the terms "fundamentalist" 
and "fundamentalism" are problematic due to the diversity that is apparent in 
Islam. Thus, the term "Islamist" will be used to describe the people who wish 
to use Islam to organize and guide society, and "Islamism" as the idea that 
Islam encompasses not only social life but also politics and economics. It is 
viewed as a total way of life. 
What is Islamism? 
Islamism can be interpreted as a theocratic totalitarian political ideology bent 
on establishing a puritanical Islamic state based on the literal ( as Islamists see 
it) interpretation oflslamic Sharia law. 
Though anchored in a religious creed, Islamists are a radical utopian 
movement closer in spirit to other such movements ( communism, fascism) 
than to traditional Islam. By nature anti-democratic and aggressive, anti-
Semitic and anti-Western, it has great plans. Indeed, spokesmen for Islamists 
see their movement standing in direct competition to Western civilization and 
challenging it for global supremacy. 
23 Choueiri, Yousuf M., Islamic Fundamentalism, Boston, 1990, pp. 9-10. 12. 
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Outside their own movement, Islamists see every existing political system in 
the Muslim world as deeply compromised, corrupt, and mendacious. As one 
of their spokesmen put it as long ago as 1951, "there is no {sic} one town in 
the whole world where Islam is observed as enjoined by Allah, whether in 
politics, economics or social matters".24 Implied here is that Muslims true to 
God's message must reject the status quo and build wholly new institutions. 
&o build a new Muslim society, Islamists proclaim their intent to do whatever 
they must; they openly flaunt an extremist sensibility. "There are no such 
terms as compromise and surrender in the Islamist cultural lexicon", a 
HAMAS spokesman declares.25 If that means destruction and death for the 
enemies of true Islamism, so be it. Hizbullah' s spiritual leader, Muhammad 
Hussein Fadlallah, concurs: "As Islamists we seek to revive the Islamic 
inclination by all means possible".26 
Seeing Islamism as the basis of a political system touching every aspect of 
life, Islamists are totalitarian. Whatever the problem, "Islamism is the 
solution". In their heads, Islamism is transformed from a personal faith into a 
ruling system that knows no constraints. 1They scrutinize the Qur' an and other 
texts for hints about Islamic medicine, economics, and statecraft, all with an 
eye to creating a total system for adherents and correspondingly total power 
for leaders. Islamists are revolutionary in outlook, extremist in behavior, and 
totalitarian in ambition. 
Revealingly, they vaunt Islam as the best ideology, not the best religion-
therefore exposing their focus on power. Whereas a traditional Muslim would 
say something like, "We are not Jewish, we are not Christian, we are 
Muslim", the former Malaysian deputy leader Anwar Ibrahim made a very 
different comparison: "We are not socialist, we are not capitalist, we are 
Islamic".27 While Islamism differs in its details from other utopian ideologies, 
24 Sivan, Emmanuel; Radical Islam: Medieval Theory and Modern Politics, New Haven; 
London: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 65. 
25 Keyhan, Tehran, Oct. 31, 1992 
26 Ash-Shab, Cairo, June 3, 1994 
27 New York Time, March 28, 1980 
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it closely resembles them in scope and ambition. Like communism and 
fascism, it offers a vanguard ideology; a complete program to improve man 
and create a new society; complete control over that society, and cadres ready, 
even eager, to spill blood. A good example of this would be Bin Laden's Al-
Qaedah network. 
Like Hitler and other dictators who exploited the democratic process to reach 
power, the Islamists actively take part in elections; too, which they have done 
dismayingly well. Islamists swept municipal elections in Algeria in 1990 and 
won the mayoralties of Istanbul and Ankara in 1994. They also have had 
successes in Lebanese and Jordanian elections. 
Once in power, would Islamists remain democrats? There is not much hard 
evidence on this point, Iran being the only case at hand where Islamists in 
power have made promises about democracy. In all other Islamist regimes-
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan- kingship and military leaders have dominated. 
But, even in Iran, there is an important catch: Parliamentarians must subscribe 
to the principles of the Islamic revolution. The regime in Tehran thus fails the 
key test of democracy, for it cannot be voted out of power. 
Judged by their statements, other Islamists are likely to offer even less 
democracy than the Iranians. Indeed, statements by Islamist spokesmen from 
widely dispersed countries suggest an open disdain for popular sovereignty.28 
Ahmad Nawfal, a Jordanian Muslim, says that: "If we have to chooce 
between democracy and dictatorship, we choose democracy. But if its 
between Islam and democracy, we choose Islam".29 Hadi Hawang of Partai 
Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in Malaysia makes the same point more bluntly: "I 
am not interested in democracy. Islam is not democracy; Islam is Islam".30 Or, 
in the famous words of Ali Belhadj, a leader of Algeria's Islamic Salvation 
28 Middle East Quarterly, March 1995 
29 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 1993 
30 Abbas and Magnum Photos, 1994, p. 137. 
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Front (FIS): "When we are in power, there will be no more elections because 
God will be ruling". 31 
This notion of variation continues through the ideas of the groups labeled as 
Islamist. Some may act within the current political system in order to gain 
political participation or authority, while others may resort to militant means 
and the use of violence in order to create instability and an opportunity to gain 
power or influence. 
It could be argued that Islamism was invigorated by the success of 
revolutionary Islam in Iran. It was also strengthened by the ability of Islamists 
groups to force the former Soviet Union out of Afghanistan and Israel out of 
southern Lebanon. Above all, however, Islamist reaction focused on declining 
social mores, and unrestrained Westernization, and the spread of drugs, 
alcohol and sexual promiscuity.32 Violence is a legitimate tactic for preventing 
close relations with infidels. Hashemi Rafsanjani, former president of Iran, 
has stated what every Islamist believes 'Islam is important because it is 
capable of defeating Western culture' .33 
Islamists portray Western civilization as aesthetically loathsome, ethically 
corrupt and morally obtuse. They whisper dark run modes of conspiracy, 
claiming that the West spreads its culture to weaken the Muslims and to steal 
their resources. They ignore the West's economic and cultural achievements, 
harping on its unemployment and pornography. To discredit secularist and 
reformist Muslims, Islamists call them lackeys of the Western powers. 
Islamists discern a strong crusading component to U.S. foreign policy. "The 
U.S. attitude is motivated by several factors, but the most important, in my 
view,' writes Umar at-Talmasani, the Egyptian Islamist leader, 'is religious 
fanaticism ... This attitude is a continuation of the crusader invasion of a 
thousand years ago' .34 
31 Le Point, August 6, 1994 
32 The Middle East: Myth & Reality, special report in World and I, New York, 1990, p. 37. 
33 B.B.C. World Service News, Auckland, 1994. 
34 Ibid, see note 28 above. 
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In sum, the more attractive an alien culture, the more Islamists fear it and 
fight it. A leading Iranian mullah declared that the main objective of the 
Islamic revolution is to 'root out' American culture from Muslim countries".35 
U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East has become a real sore point for 
Muslims in general and for the Islamists in particular. Analyzing the 
American political process and U.S. Middle Eastern policy, Paul Findlay 
writes: 'In respect to the Middle East policy, our government is not a 
superpower- not even a minor power- in its captivity to the pressures by a 
lobby devoted to the interests of a foreign government. Muslims have become 
increasingly aware of the power of the Israeli lobby, which to them appears to 
have "hijacked" the American government and subverted it to Israeli 
interests' .36 Other Americans who have experienced the power of the lobby 
share their view. To some Washington experts it is quite evident that America 
is unable to execute an independent American foreign policy in the interests 
of the United States. Former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy 
grumbled that American policy is controlled by Israel and its allies, whose 
approval is necessary before any action can be taken. Identifying Jordan as a 
friend in need of American assistance against outside aggression and 
terrorism, he acknowledged that this assistance could be provided only when 
we are able to persuade Israel that the security of Jordan is in Israel's 
interests.37 Donald McHenry, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 
expressed a similar opinion when he acknowledged that the Israeli lobby 
prevents the United States from freely pursuing its own national interests in 
the Middle East. 38 
Of all the problems in the region, none inflames public opinion more than the 
inability of Muslim governments to put an end to the suffering of the 
Palestinians under Israeli occupation. It is indeed a measure of how important 
35 'Between America and Russia', in Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1986. 
36 Finlay, Paul, 'The American Political Process and the U.S. Middle East Policy' in 
American Arab Affairs, 16, Spring, 1986. 
37 Haddad, Yvonne Y., The Muslims of America, New York, 1991, p. 223. 
38 Murphy, Richard, cited in ibid. 
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and potentially explosive this problem is that it hovers at all times over any 
discussion of the Middle East crisis. 
The majority of the people in the region blame the continuation of the 
problem on the United States. The latter is seen as Israeli's protector because 
it guarantees financial and political support and refuses to pressure Israel to 
come to the negotiating table 39, in good faith. 
Islam has brought comfort and peace of mind to countless millions of men 
and women. It has given dignity and meaning to drab and impoverished lives. 
It has taught people of different races to live in brotherhood and people of 
different creeds to live side by side in reasonable tolerance. It inspired a great 
civilization in which others besides Muslims lived creative and useful lives 
and which, by its achievement, enriched the whole world. But Islam, like 
other religions, has also known periods when it inspired in some of its 
followers a mood of hatred and violence. It is our misfortune that part, though 
by no means all or even most, of the Muslim world is now going through such 
a period, and that much, though again not all, of that hatred is directed against 
the West. 
One should not, however, exaggerate the dimensions of the problem. The 
Muslim world is far from unanimous in its rejection of the West, nor have the 
Muslim regions of the Third World been the most passionate and the most 
extreme in their hostility. There are still significant numbers, in some quarters 
perhaps a majority, of Muslims with whom the West share certain basic 
cultural and moral, social and political, beliefs and aspirations; there is still an 
imposing Western presence- cultural, economic, diplomatic- in Muslim lands, 
some of which are Western allies. But there is Al-Qaeda, Iran, and Iraq, and a 
surge of hatred that distresses, alarms, and above all baffles Americans. 
At times this hatred goes beyond hostility to specific interests or actions or 
policies or even countries and becomes a rejection of Western civilization as 
such, not only what it does but what it is, and the principles and values that it 
39 Haddad, op. cit. p. 223. 
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practices and professes. These are indeed seen as innately evil, and those who 
promote or accept them as the "enemies of God". 
The idea that God has enemies, and needs human help in order to identify and 
dispose of them, is a little difficult to assimilate. It is not, however, all that 
alien. The concept of the enemies of God is familiar in pre-classical and 
classical antiquity, and in both the Old and New Testaments, as well as in the 
Qur' an. And then came the great change, when the leaders of a widespread 
and widening religious revival sought out and identified their enemies as the 
enemies of God, and gave them "a local habitation and a name" in the 
Western Hemisphere. Suddenly, or so it seemed, America had become the 
archenemy, the incarnation of evil, the diabolic opponent of all that is good, 
and specifically, for Islamists, of Islam. Why? 
But why the hostility in the first place?! If we tum from the general to the 
specific, there is no lack of individual policies and actions, pursued and taken 
by individual Western governments, which have aroused the passionate anger 
of Middle Eastern and other Islamic peoples. Yet all too often, when these 
policies are abandoned and the problems resolved, there is only a local and 
temporary alleviation. The French have left Algeria, the British have left 
Egypt, the Western oil companies have left Iran- yet the generalized 
resentment of Islamists and other extremists against the West and its friends 
remains and grows and is not appeased. 
The cause most frequently adduced for anti-American feeling among Muslims 
today is American support for Israel. This support is certainly a factor of 
importance, increasing with nearness and involvement. 
Another explanation, more often heard from Muslim dissidents, attributes 
anti-American feeling to American support for hated regimes, seen as 
reactionary by radicals, as impious by conservatives, as corrupt and tyrannical 
by both. This accusation has some plausibility, and could help to explain why 
an essentially inner-directed, often anti-nationalist movement should turn 
against a foreign power. But it does not suffice, especially since support for 
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such regimes has been limited both in extent and, as the Shah discovered, in 
effectiveness. 
This revulsion against America, more generally against the West, is by no 
means limited to the Muslim world; nor has Muslims, with the exception of 
the Iranian mullah and their disciples elsewhere, experienced and exhibited 
the more virulent forms of this feeling. The mood of disillusionment and 
hostility has affected many other parts of the Muslim world, that the most 
publicized explanations- and justifications - of this rejection of Western 
civilization and its values have of late been heard. 
The accusations are familiar. The West is accused of sexism, racism, and 
imperialism, institutionalized in patriarchy and slavery, tyranny and 
exploitation. Some Western powers, and in a sense Western civilization as a 
whole, have certainly been guilty of imperialism, but is it really believable 
that in the expansion of Western Europe there was a quality of moral 
delinquency lacking in such earlier, relatively innocent expansions as those of 
the Arabs or the Mongols or the Ottomans, or in more recent expansions such 
as that which brought the rulers of Muscovites to the Baltic, the Black sea, the 
Caspian, the Hindu Kush, and the Pacific Ocean? 
Of all these offenses the one that is most widely, frequently, and vehemently 
denounced is undoubtedly imperialism- sometimes just Western, sometimes 
Eastern (that is, Soviet) and Western alike. But the way this term is used in 
the literature of Islamists often suggests that it may not carry quite the same 
meaning for them as for its Western critics. In many of these writings the term 
"imperialist" is given a distinctly religious significance, being used in 
association, and sometimes interchangeably, with "missionary", and denoting 
a form of attack that includes the Crusades as well as the modem colonial 
empires. One also sometimes gets the impression that the offense of 
imperialism is not- as for Western critics - the domination by one people over 
another but rather the allocation of roles in this relationship. What is truly evil 
and unacceptable is the domination of infidels over true believers. For true 
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believers to rule over misbelievers is proper and natural, since this provides 
for the maintenance of the holy law, and gives the misbelievers both the 
opportunity and the incentive to embrace the true faith. But for misbelievers 
to rule over true believers is blasphemous and unnatural, since it leads to the 
corruption of religion and morality in society, and to the flouting or even the 
abrogation of God's law. This may help us to understand the current troubles 
in such diverse places as Chechnya, Mindanao, Palestine, and Indian 
Kashmir, Chinese Zinkiang, and Yugoslav Kosovo, in all of which Muslim 
populations; are ruled by non-Muslim governments. It may also explain why 
spokesmen for the new Muslim minorities in Western Europe demand for 
Islam a degree of legal protection, which those countries no longer give to 
Christianity and have never given to Judaism. Nor, of course, did the 
governments of the countries of origin of these Muslim spokesmen ever 
accord such protection of religions other than their own. In their perception, 
there is no contradiction in these attitudes. The true faith, based on God's 
final revelation, must be protected from insult and abuse; other faiths, being 
either false or incomplete, have no right to any such protection. 
The movement nowadays called Islamism is not the only Islamic tradition. 
There are others, more tolerant, more open, that helped inspire the great 
achievements of Islamic civilization in the past, and one may hope that these 
other traditions will in time prevail. But before this issue is decided there will 
be a hard struggle, in which the West can do little or nothing. Even the 
attempt might do harm, as the Islamists see it support for dictators and 
Western influence, for these are issues that Muslims must decide among 
themselves. And in the meantime one must take great care on all sides to 
avoid the danger of a new era of religious wars, arising from the exacerbation 
of differences and the revival of ancient prejudices. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF ISLAMIC REVIVAL 
Introduction 
The current politicized Islam in the Middle East and North Africa is not a 
continuation but a reconstruction of the historical paradigms. In the pre-
modem era, there were two Islamic paradigms. One was of an integral state 
and society unified under the political and moral leadership of a charismatic 
religious leader; the other, of a society divided between state and religious 
institutions and differentiated political and religious elites, the latter being the 
custodians of the true Islam. The second tradition made room for purely 
secular monarchical concepts and a secular political culture. In the modem 
era, the historical Islamic paradigms have little influence on state formation. 
Even the avowedly Islamic states do not really hark back to the past but 
represent, for the most part, contemporary national states appealing to a new 
concept of national-state Islam. 
The Islamic revival is once again of urgent importance. Now, in the midst of a 
worldwide Muslim struggle over the role that Islam should play in 
contemporary societies, one is faced with compelling questions: How much 
does this revival reflect the desire to tum to a golden age of the Muslim past? 
How much is it a contemporary phenomenon? Indeed, what is the Islamic 
and, in particular, the Middle Eastern political heritage, and what is its impact 
in the present? 
Islamic Political Heritage 
The Middle Eastern Islamic heritage provides not one but two basic 
constellations of historical society, two golden ages, two paradigms, each of 
which has generated its own characteristic repertoire of political institutions 
and political theory. The first is the society integrated in all dimensions, 
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political, social, and, moral, under the aegis of Islam.40 The prototype is the 
unification of Arabia under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad in the 
seventh century. The Prophet brought together the Meccans who left their 
home to join his community, the Medinans who accepted Islam, individual 
Arabians who emigrated to Medina, factions of clans, converts made among 
the aristocratic families of Mecca, and various tribes in western Arabia; he 
unified a disparate and fragmented population into a single community. The 
Prophet functioned, on the one hand, as an economic and political leader and, 
on the other, as an exemplar of individual righteousness and morality. In this 
community, no distinction was made between religion and religious authority 
and the state and secular authority. 
The second historical paradigm is the imperial Islamic society, built not on 
Arabia or tribal templates but on the differentiated structures of previous 
Middle Eastern societies. By the advent of Islam, Middle Eastern societies 
had already been organized into differentiated tribal, state, and church 
institutions. After the Arab conquests, the early caliphate underwent a similar 
differentiation. Newly recruited client forces that were expected to be more 
dependent upon, loyal to, and obedient to their rulers displaced tribal armies; 
and administrative cadres drawn from the conquered populations replaced 
tribal chiefs. At the same time, the caliphate was transformed from the 
charismatic succession to the religious authority of the Prophet into an 
imperial institution and a regime governed not by religious norms but by laws 
of political survival. As the caliphate took on an increasingly secularized 
political identity, the religious heritage of the Prophet came to be embodied in 
his companions and their disciples and successors, scholars, and holy men. 
Eventually, the caliphs retained only a nominal role as the official 
representatives of Islam and the official fount of state and religious authority, 
while the Muslim populace came to be organized into schools of law, 
theological sects, Shiite communities, Sufi lineages, and brotherhoods 
40 Watt, W, Montgomery, Muhammad at Mecca, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1953; Muhammad at Medina, New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. 
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representing the legacy of the Prophet. 
Such religious groups were commonly independent of state regimes. Most 
withdrew from participation in government and were concerned with 
community solidarity, worship, education, law, personal morality, and the 
upholding of the symbols of Islam. While religious scholars maintained their 
aspiration for an ideal society in which state and community were integrated 
as in the time of the Prophet, they were not actually committed to bringing it 
about in practice. In return for state support, they commonly legitimised 
reigning governments and taught acceptance and submission to the common 
people. 
Thus, despite the common statement that Islam is a total way of life defining 
political as well as social and family matters, most Muslim societies did not 
conform to this ideal. They were in fact built around separate institutions of 
state and religion. 
The separation of state and religion yields a second image of the golden age 
of Islam. This image is embedded in the Ottoman Empire; it is an image of a 
world-conquering empire, establishing the dominion of Islam over all peoples 
and fulfilling the Islamic "providence" or "manifest destiny" to rule the world. 
This was a golden era of security, pre-eminence, and world domination. This 
was a golden age also because the Ottoman Empire upheld the true practice of 
Islam. It was the protector and patron, indeed the organizer and master, of the 
scholars and holy men who managed Muslim education, legal and judicial 
affairs, and Muslim worship.41 
The practical tradition of separation of state and religion also generated a 
socio-political theory. Muslim political theorists, such as al-Baqillani, al-
Mawdudi, and Ibn Taimiyya, devised a theory of the caliphate that 
symbolized the ideal existence of the unified umma, while at the same time 
allowing for historical actualities. The conclusion of their theorizing was that 
the state was not a direct expression of Islam but a secular institution whose 
41 Inalcik, Halil, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600, London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973. 
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duty it was to uphold Islam. The community of scholars and holy men were 
the ones who truly carried on the legacy of the Prophet.42 
In this tradition, the real of Islamic authenticity lies within the soul of the 
individual and in the relations of individuals to each other within small 
communities. This is the Islam that sees holiness and religion as incompatible 
with state power. Politics are expected to be violent and corrupt. The control 
of the state is justified only by conquest; obedience is legitimated by the need 
to submit, to minimize further warfare, and to prevent anarchy in society, but 
the state cannot embody a religious ideal. This renunciation of political 
utopianism may help explain some cases of acquiescence to patrimonial 
regimes and the relative weakness of democratic or other secular utopian 
movements in the present-day Middle East. 
The Non-Islamic Political Heritage 
This second paradigm allows for a differentiated non-religious concept of 
political authority. Alongside the Islamic concept of the caliph as the upholder 
of Islam, there is a concept of political rationality inherently valid in its own 
terms as a source of political behaviour. This level of political thinking, is 
expressed in the Persian political heritage in which the ruler is the shadow of 
God on earth and bears a divine authority independent of religion. He both 
upholds order and serves as a moral example to his subjects. Rulership and 
statehood, in a sense, serve a religious purpose apart from Islam and apart 
from the spokesmen of the religious establishment.43 
Furthermore, behind the formal and literary concepts of the state and the ruler, 
there were also working assumptions, axioms, and premises about the nature 
and organization of political power that did not reach the level of formal 
42 Ibish, Yusuf, The Political Doctrine of al-Baqillani, Beirut: American University Press, 
1966. 
43 Rosenthal, E.I.J., "On Persian Political Theory", Political Thought in Medieval Islam, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958. 
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theory but are nonetheless crucial to understanding Middle Eastern politics. 
One is that state power is not an expression of the total society but rather the 
prerogative of certain individuals or groups. Control of the state belonged to 
certain families, tribes, dynasties, or military castes. Not only did some 
groups rule over others, but also elites and subjects were of a totally different 
standing. Government was the prerogative of the one and not of the other. In 
the Middle Eastern societies, there was a caste-like bifurcation between the 
military elite and the subject population.44 
Thus, there is not one but two paradigms, two concepts of the Muslim golden 
age. One looks to a unified state and society under the leadership of the 
caliph, whose authority extends to all realms of personal and public concern. 
This is the integralist concept of Islam, and countries like Saudi Arabia and 
today's Iran would be good examples. The second, in both its classic and 
Ottoman versions, tacitly recognizes the institutional division between the 
structure of state and religion. These would include in today's secular states of 
Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. In this paradigm, Muslims look to the religious 
sphere for personal and communal fulfillment, to Islam as a personal and 
social ethos and not a concept or institution of the political regime. Finally, 
the differentiation of state and religion allows for an imperial and secular 
notion of the state and for the incorporation of Middle Eastern but not Islamic 
institutions and concepts into the theory, legitimation, and operation of 
political regimes. 
Islam in the Modern Era 
The modern era has brought a radical transformation of political and social 
institutions and inevitably of the ideas that shape, accompany, and reflect 
these institutions. There is a renewed struggle over the role that Islam should 
44 Gibb, H.A.R. and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1954 and 1957. 
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play in the constitution of contemporary Muslim societies. The role of the 
historical culture is being reconstructed by political struggle. There are two 
main arenas for the contestation over Islamic and traditional political values: 
the domain of the state, its definition, legitimation, and institutional 
organization; and the domain of the civil or non-state society. 
The Islamic States 
In the domain of the state, the avowedly Islamic states are a conspicuous 
minority. Only Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iran, Pakistan and more recently the 
Sudan today professes to be legitimated or regulated by Islamic norms. The 
contemporary Islamic states, however, do not simply return to either of the 
two traditional paradigms. Absent from contemporary political rhetoric is any 
appeal to the concept of the caliphate. 
Saudi Arabia and Morocco are in many ways closest to the traditional image 
of Islamic states and Muslim rulers. This is due to the continuity of pre-
modern regimes. The Saudi state was founded in the eighteenth century by the 
alliance of a religious reformer, deliberately copying the precedents of the 
Prophet, and a tribal chieftain, using allegiance to the principles of reformed 
Islam, as the basis of an integrated state. The Saudi state continues to use 
Islam as the basis of its legitimacy, reinforced by the seizure of Mecca and 
Medina in 1926, by control and patronage of the pilgrimage, and by the 
sponsorship of international Islamic educational, missionary, and political 
activities. Combining religious teachings with the formation of a polity 
transcending tribal groups, the Saudi state seems to repeat the early Islamic 
experience, but the community of the Prophet was based upon his sole 
leadership, while the Saudi state is based on a separation of authority and an 
alliance between religious and secular chieftains. While the Saudi rulers have 
tried to take on the religious aura of imams, there remains a lingering division 
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between political authority vested in the state and religious authority vested in 
the 'ulama'- the descendants of ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab.45 
The Moroccan regime is also based on the Islamic identity of the monarch, 
who is considered a caliph, an executor and defender of Islam, a personal 
descendent of the Prophet, a bearer of Sufi virtues, a charismatic holy man, 
and dispenser of baraka, God's blessing in the world. He is the high priest of 
the great Moroccan Islamic festivals such as the birthday of the Prophet and 
the celebration at the end of Ramadan. Like the Saudi regime, the Moroccan 
government is one of the few Middle Eastern or Islamic states to have 
survived the colonial era and the transition to the national state. It survives 
because the French helped preserve the monarchy as a vehicle of colonial 
control, while the sultans managed to maintain themselves as the 
personification of Moroccan national identity. While the sultan continues to 
bear the Islamic marks of legitimacy, his political power is actually based on 
the administrative strength of a modem territorial national state.46 
Similarly, Islamic Iran is not built on a return to past models but rather on a 
radically new concept of the Islamic state. The Islamic Republic of Iran is 
based on a modem type of national state, constructed between 1925 and 1979, 
on the same organizational bases and secular concepts as Turkey. It differs in 
that it was the one Middle Eastern country in which the religious elites 
remained a powerful social and political force antagonistic to the state elites; 
laid claim to direct political authority; and were able to mobilize mass support 
to overthrow the state. The Iranian Islamic republic, much as it is Islamic in 
identity, remains a national state in terms of its institutional bureaucratic 
structure and the kinds of political and economic policies it pursues.47 
45 Ochsenwald, William, "Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Revival," International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, 1981, 13:271-86. 
46 Halstead, J.P., Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 
1912 -1944, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
47 Keddie, Nkki R., Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Iran, New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1981. 
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Pakistan, despite its nominal Islamic affiliation, is also a modern national 
state. It originates in an Islam that has been defined in nationalist political 
terms but excludes both the personal and moral dimensions of Muslim 
religiosity. The leaders of the movement to establish an independent Pakistan 
were entirely secularised in their education and life-styles and had no 
commitment to Islam in the traditional personal or local communal sense. 
Their rhetoric was Muslim in form, but the content was wholly nationalistic. 
A nationalist concept of Pakistan expressed in religious and Muslim rather 
than in secular terms was necessary for various reasons. First, religiously 
based nationalism was the only rhetorical solution to the political dilemma of 
the Muslim elites of the Indian subcontinent. They used Islam to differentiate 
themselves from the Hindu Indian nationalist movement and to carve out a 
domain in which Muslim military and bureaucratic chieftains and Muslim 
merchant leaders would have a territory of their own and a more favourable 
opportunity to maintain their position in the post-colonial era. Second, Islam 
was essential to unify a population divided by tribal, ethnic, linguistic, caste, 
and local differences.48 
The Secular National States 
Apart from these cases of Islam refashioned, it is striking how little influence 
the historical Islamic traditions have had on modern state formation. The 
Islamic heritage is no longer invoked, is largely ignored, and sometimes 
expressly repudiated. In the great waves of state building that followed World 
War I and World War II, old empires were liquidated and replaced by new 
national states built around secular cultural identities. In Turkey, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, Islam was disestablished. It is no longer the 
officially supported religion of the state. Though these states sometimes give 
special consideration to Muslim symbols and Muslim practices, Islam no 
48 Binder, Leonard, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, I 961. 
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longer legitimates the state and no longer defines its social and moral vision. 
All of these states abolished the millet system and set up secular educational 
and judicial systems, which actually compete with the primary functions of 
Islam. Muslim religious life, in general, became separated from these 
institutions and flourishes as a differentiated element of the "civil society" .49 
The Turkish state was the most radical example of modem secularisation. The 
republic of Ataturk was founded on nationalist and republican principles and 
undertook a variable cultural revolution to liquidate the attachment of the 
Turkish people to their Islamic past. It included changing the script in which 
Turkish was written so as to make the Ottoman language inaccessible. 
Muslim religious organizations were disestablished, formal instruction of 
Islam was abolished, changes in style of dress were mandated, and a new 
legal code replaced the Shari'a. Perhaps the most important change was the 
increased scope given for the participation of women in public life. All of 
these transformations, including the idea of constitutional government, the 
standards of technical, social, and political modernity, and the concept of the 
total mobilization of society to reach its economic and political goals, were of 
European inspiration.50 
Furthermore, these states strive for secular national identities. The nationalist 
concept did not rise spontaneously from the people or the historical culture 
but came into being as the preferred doctrine of opposition intelligentsia in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The primary reason for the 
adoption of nationalism was that Middle Eastern intelligentsia wanted to 
reject the political dominance of an older generation of Ottoman imperial 
rulers and the moral dominance of Islam. Furthermore, nationalism served to 
articulate domestic opposition to European colonial rule precisely because 
Europeans accepted it as the basis of political society. Thus nationalism 
conveniently expressed the opposition of a new elite both to the older 
49 Lapidus, Ira M., History of Islamic Societies, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988, pp. 571-717. 
50 Robinson, R.D., The First Turkish Republic, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1965. 
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imperial and religious elite of their own societies and to their colonial rulers. 
For people who no longer belonged to the older order, and for whom the 
colonial political societies could offer only positions of subordination to a 
foreign elite, nationalism defined a new identity. 
With the formation of modern states and the commg of independence, 
nationalism was diffused from the elites to the masses. For these masses, now 
subject to new state regimes bent on the social and economic transformation 
of their societies, nationalism would again serve as a concept replacing 
loyalties to more parochial family village, and religious associations.51 
Still, nationalism is not an old-age concept but a modern synthesis of 
elements of cultural traditions that previously did not belong together. In the 
Middle Eastern past, national, ethnic, or linguistic identities had never been 
important bases for political solidarity. Before the modem era, Middle Eastern 
peoples defined political loyalty in terms of family, lineage, or tribal ties, in 
terms of religious affiliation, and in terms of service to the state. While 
Middle Eastern cultures recognized that there were important linguistic and 
ethnic differences between populations, these differences were never the basis 
of political action. 
Islamic Orientations in Modem Societies 
In the contemporary situation there is a subtle, if negative, role for Islam and, 
the historical political culture in shaping the general orientations, attitudes, 
dispositions, and practices of Middle Eastern states. The historical 
orientations within Islamic culture may affect the role of modern states in 
economic development. For example, an important strand in the Islamic 
tradition may contribute indirectly to the limited commitment of many 
contemporary Middle Eastern regimes to economic development. Both rulers 
51 Kushner, D., The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, London: Frank Cass, 1977. 
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and subjects often expect the state to be concerned with the maintenance of 
power and the exploitation of their populations, but not necessarily with 
economic development as the primary goal. These expectations may also 
reflect the traditional attitude of Muslim societies that high status is gained 
from education, piety, or power, to which money may contribute but is not the 
defining component. As opposed to European cultures, where the 
accumulation of wealth was the central value and was validated by high status 
for successful merchants and entrepreneurs, in Middle Eastern societies 
maintenance of power and religious piety seem to have been the dominant 
values. 
Furthermore, modern states can be seen as an expression of the historical 
separation of state and Islam. This separation allows the state to be a purely 
political and power-based entity. Stripped of its Islamic functions, the modern 
state no longer has a transcending importance as the locus of ultimate values 
and is no longer expected to fulfill the ultimate religious yearnings of its 
subjects and citizens. All hope of salvation has been concentrated in the non-
state realm, in the religio-civil community, and in personal piety. This leads 
again, in practice, to an acceptance of the state as necessary for political 
power, military security, and public order, but it removes the expectation that 
the state itself can be a source of worldly justice and dignity. Utopian 
expectations that the state can embody genuine secular democratic, socialist, 
or egalitarian ideals are also subverted. 
Islam and Identity 
While Islam has a limited role in the construction of contemporary national 
states, it has a pervasive importance in the constitution of civil society, society 
outside the state, and, therefore, a profound potential for the reconstruction of 
modern states in Islamic and neo-Islamic terms. Despite the success of secular 
national states, Middle Eastern identities have never been fully secularised. 
Rather Islam has been parochialised in national terms. Today nationalism is 
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the single most important bearer of Islam. For example, the concept of 
Turkish national identity includes kinship to the Turks of inner Asia, the 
Hittite ancestry of Turkish peoples in Anatolia, a history of the dominance of 
Turkish-speaking military elites, and also the historical allegiance of Turkish 
peoples to Islam. Latent Islamic identifications are the ultimate basis of 
Turkish national identity. In Turkey, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, though 
Turkish speaking, have not been accepted as part of the nation. What makes 
Turks, in the minds of many, is Islam, just as what makes Arabs for many 
Arabs is being Muslim. Much of the emotional power of nationalism in the 
Middle East is derived from the capacity of Islam to signify social solidarity 
and channel the force of Muslim faith into national commitments.52 
In some cases Islam enters into the formation of national identity in a more 
direct way. Since the nineteenth century, throughout North Africa, Islamic 
reformism has been particularly important in overcoming parochial, localistic 
identifications and creating a broader sense of identity among the populations 
of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. The reform movements created a new 
universal standard of religious values and religious practices; they stressed the 
importance of education, literate knowledge, and responsible commitment to 
Islamic social goals. These sentiments helped create a sense of commonality 
and political solidarity and became the basis of national identifications 
throughout North Africa.53 
Islam continues to define national identities precisely because it remains the 
basis of local community life and personal religious belief. There are strong 
trends in all Middle Eastern countries toward new types of Islamic communal 
activities. Ethnic associations, religious congregations, welfare associations, 
charities, discussion groups, educational organizations, women's groups, 
52 Piscatori, James, Islam in a World of Nation-States, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986. 
53 Shinar, P., "The Historical Approach of the Reformist 'Ulama' in the Contemporary 
Maghrib," Asia and African Studies, Jerusalem, 7: 181-210, 1971. 
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economic cooperatives, and paramilitary training organizations have become 
more common. 54 
Furthermore, even where Islamic movements are not strongly organized, 
Islam remains important as a personal or private religion. While it no longer 
regulates the public world, it continues to be vital to people's ethical and 
psychological needs. In highly secularised Middle Eastern societies, Islam 
becomes more and more a quest for meaning without being linked to political 
purposes. In these milieus, a new kind of Islamic community emerges, one 
that is based on personal piety rather than on commitment to political 
institutions, and an Islam of private belief and private social identity that is 
dissociated from the communal political matrix in which such identity was 
once embedded.55 
This reconstruction of Islam has an important implication for political and 
social behaviour. Firstly, Islam, especially in its reformist and revivalist 
versions, is the basis for a more fully self-disciplined and self-directed 
autonomous personality. The neo-Islamic movements seem to cultivate in 
their members a sense of social responsibility, moral dynamism, and an active 
engagement in the affairs of the society with a view to Islamising 
contemporary Muslim populations. They provide through religious identity a 
sense of dignity, self-esteem, and self-discipline. This focusing of individual 
loyalties upon religious values is a critical factor in mobilizing people for 
moral, social, and political action. 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, Islam is the basis of political 
opposition movements. These movements appeal precisely to the excluded 
elements in the formation of modem political states, to the petite bourgeoisie, 
and sometimes to workers, students, and rural migrants to cities; they have a 
new urban class base in contrast to the historically rural character of reformist 
54 Berger, Morroe, Islam in Egypt Today, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970; 
Kepel, G., Muslim Extremism in Egypt, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
55 Lapidus, Ira M., History of Islamic Societies, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988, pp. 551-70 and 879-917. 
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movements. They try to define the principles of a new Muslim morality by 
going back to the Qur' an and the Sunnah, but their idea is not to create a 
prescriptive program of detailed rules for behaviour but to find general values 
to allow people living in new social conditions to reorganize their daily lives. 
These movements also attempt to meet the need for social solidarity in 
disorganized populations. They build up extensive networks of cells or 
chapters and mosques, schools, clinics, clubs, cooperative workshops, and 
industries. Ultimately, they aspire to the creation of an Islamic state. 
Yet the goals of many of these movements are not, strictly speaking, political. 
The movements are not committed to particular institutions or to political 
principles such as democracy and equality. They are concerned rather with 
individual morality and ethical behaviour, and to them the state is simply the 
force that encourages or requires the people to adhere to Islamic norms. The 
true domain of Islam is still the righteous small community and the ethical 
individual. 
CHAPTER 3: THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
Before rushing to castigate as benighted, backward, and hopelessly illiberal 
those Middle Eastern peoples who long to govern themselves by religious 
laws and thus to ensure a higher level of communal moral decency, the 
modern Westerners would do well to pause and reflect momentarily on their 
own cultural origins. Though now almost universally rejected in the West as a 
valid description of the proper attitude toward government and its functions, 
the following admonition once held great sway among faithful Christians: 
Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For there 
is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been 
instituted by God. Therefore the one resisting authority goes 
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against what God has appointed, and resisters will mcur 
judgment.56 
Nor is it all that different from the injunction laid upon pious Muslims: 
Oh, you who believe, obey God and obey the Apostle and those 
charged with authority among you. If you disagree among 
yourselves about anything, refer it to God and the Apostle.57 
Not until sometime after Marsilius of Padua (c. 1275-1342) were Paul's 
strictures forsaken and the famous advice offered by Jesus about 
distinguishing between the things belonging to Caesar and those belonging to 
God raised to the elevated rank it occupies today. 58 Though of a piece with the 
prophet Samuel's dire predictions about the harsh demands a king would 
make upon his subjects,59 Jesus' suggestion is not consonant with the larger 
Old Testament teaching about the need for the faithful to let themselves be 
guided in all matters by God. Nonetheless, by the late fourteenth or fifteenth 
century, Westerners began to tum away from the notion that political authority 
is divinely inspired. Whatever the reasons for that change- deeper 
understanding of the base demands of politics on rulers, however honourable 
their intentions; convictions that political and temporal concerns differ 
radically from spiritual and moral ones; doubt about the existence of a divine 
or natural order- it finds a clear and all too familiar expression in the middle 
of the eighteenth century with Rousseau's famous, albeit completely 
unsubstantiated, assertion that "man is born free, and everywhere he is in 
chains".60 
56 See Romans Ch. 13:1-2, of the Revised Standard Version of the Holy Bible. 
57 See the Holy Qur 'an 4:59. 
58 See Matthew Ch. 22: 15-22, the Revised Standard Version of the Holy Bible. 
59 See Sam. 8:20-21, 1-9, the Revised Standard Version of the Holy Bible. 
60 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Social Contract, Book I, Chapter 1, published in 1762. 
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It is a major sentiment standing behind Western repugnance for political 
regimes that take their bearing from revelation, that is, for regimes that are or 
would be self-consciously Islamist. Convinced that natural human freedom-
and the equality that necessarily accompanies it- must be respected and 
preserved by a political regime if it is to be deemed legitimate, the West 
condemns those regimes that aim at instilling moral virtues and sacrificing 
human liberty for a higher goal. 61 Although particular actions- for example, 
Ayatollah Khomeini's sentence of death against Salman Rushdie- or promises 
of actions to be taken- such as the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front's 
declaration that once in power it would put an end to the democratic systems 
that allowed it to come to power- reveal all too clearly the lack of patience 
that Islamist regimes have for the freedoms and procedures that Westerners 
hold essential hallmark of good government, it is also utterly manifest that, 
precisely because those hallmarks are merely procedural, they are not the only 
guarantors of good government. 
For this reason, it is appropriate to mqmre why others pnze the non-
democratic and even non-liberal political rule that is to be found in the 
revelation-based politics. To this end, it is proposed first to consider the older 
Arabic and Islamic analyses of political regimes and their goals. Then to 
explain why, in a more recent past, thoughtful thinkers within that same 
cultural milieu called for independence while endorsing non-democratic and 
non-liberal regimes. Finally, I will suggest why thinkers today continue to do 
the same. There is no intent here to apologize for Islamist doctrines in the 
distant or recent past or in the present, for such apologetics would serve no 
purpose. If anything, my approach merely points to the failure in current 
Western analysis of political Islam to pay sufficient attention to the rhetorical 
transformations that arguments for something like an Islamic regime have 
undergone in the course of history as the character of the audience addressed 
61 Binder, Leonard, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 1-4; also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History 
and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992. 
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has changed over time and as the goal pursued by the various speakers has 
been altered. 
The Distant Past 
There is little need to insist that Islam offers as much practical as it does 
spiritual guidance to the faithful. Whether we look back to the community 
founded by the Prophet Muhammad while he was in Madina (622-30) or to 
the way it was continued during the two years after he returned to Mecca, 
whether we think about the tradition of the four rightly guided caliphs (632-
61 )- the first successor to Prophet Muhammad- or about the caliphs who 
guided the Umayyad (661-750), Abbasid (750-1258), and Spanish Umayyad 
(7 56-1031) empires, or whether we consider the princes and commanders 
who ruled the Arab and Berber dynasties in Spain and North Africa (1031-
1492) and the sultans who ruled the Ottoman empire (1453-1918), we see 
political rule linked with religion. From the very opening of the Qur' an and 
the plea that the Lord of the universe show the faithful the straight path to the 
assurance that He has made of Muslims "a balanced nation that [they] may be 
witnesses to people" and on to the promise that He will bring victory to those 
who enter His religion, the close link between Islam and power is evident.62 
During the Golden Age of Islam, referred to above, Islamic thinkers argued 
that Islam should be joined to politics. Nominally, of course, it was joined. 
The rulers were supposed to represent a continuation of the Prophet 
Muhammad's rule; they were his successors and, as such, something like the 
vicegerents of God. Yet, as noted above, there was a great gap between 
intention and achievement, between what was supposed to be and what 
actually was. Jurists, theologians, and philosophers sought in their writings as 
well as in their deeds to resolve this discrepancy. They addressed themselves 
to a small, but learned, audience, namely, to individuals schooled in the 
62 See the Holy Quran 1 :2-4, 5; 2: 143; 110: 1-2. 
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sciences of Islam (the sayings and deeds of the Prophet, jurisprudence, and 
theology), in grammar, poetry and literature, and in philosophical writings. 
The jurists and theologians strove to make revealed doctrine more apparent. 
With a jurist like al-Mawdudi ( c. 985-1058), this resulted in explanations of 
the qualities needed for a person to become a Caliph, the ways matters of state 
could be administered without infringing on revealed laws, or the conditions 
for military incursions to be in accordance with Qur'anic strictures. However, 
neither al-Mawdudi nor any of his fellow jurists raised the larger questions of 
whether it was appropriate to change political rule itself or how a wise rule 
might expand the liberty of his subjects. In the writings of a theologian like 
al-Ghazali ( 1058-1111 ), one finds a defense of doctrines of the faith and 
attacks upon groups and individuals whose thinking appeared to threaten the 
well being of the community. Even in his efforts to quicken religious faith, the 
emphasis is on particular issues- above all, on morals- rather than on how a 
ruler intend upon following in the path of the Prophet might best fashion his 
regime. Furthermore, in speaking about moral improvement, al-Ghazali 
dwells on personal endeavour; he does not allow that laws or institutions 
might shape moral conduct. 
For reflections on the goals of political life and how a regime might be 
structured to achieve them, one must turn to the philosophers. The best guides 
in such matters are Alfarabi (870-950), Avicenna (980-1037), and Averroes 
( 1126-98), not least because they dare to look back beyond the advent of 
Islam to the wisdom of Greece in order to suggest what can make political life 
best. In looking back, however, they never forget the importance of revelation 
and its influence on politics. 
Alfarabi draws attention to this new phenomenon in his Enumeration of the 
Sciences by setting forth two accounts of political science. Both presuppose 
the validity of the traditional separation between the practical and the 
theoretical science, but neither is adequate for the radically new situation 
created by the appearance of revealed religion. The first account puts forth a 
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political science that is simply practical.63 It begins abruptly, not by defining 
political science and its general scope or what it consists of, but by stating 
what political science investigates, namely, the distinctively human things: 
voluntary actions and ways of life. The investigation looks back to what leads 
to these actions and ways of life, as well as forward to why the actions are 
performed. 
The first political science thus provides a general overview of individual and 
civic human morality without ever leaving the immediate domain in which 
humans find themselves. At no point does it look beyond human beings and 
human things. This first political science also shows why political association 
is beneficial. In addition, it sets forth the general guidelines that thoughtful 
individuals can use to judge between different regimes. 
The second account of political science goes beyond the practical limits of the 
first without presenting a fully theoretical political science. Indeed, even 
though this political science is said to include the "theoretical and practical 
sciences", such exclusive attention is paid to what it has to say about actions 
that nothing is said about how it handles opinions set forth in religion.64 
Alfarabi designates it at first as political philosophy, explaining that it is 
limited to investigating general rules and to giving general descriptions or 
patterns for determining the voluntary actions and ways of life it investigates. 
This second political science starts, then, from where the first political science 
left off; it presupposes the investigations already undertaken by the first 
political science and moves from them to the formulation of general rules and 
patterns. 
From this sketch it should be manifest that neither the first nor the second 
account of political science in the Enumeration of the Sciences can lead to the 
kind of rulership or to the royal craft needed for the new phenomenon of 
63 Lerner, Ralph, and Muhs in Mahdi, eds., Enumeration of the Sciences in Medieval 
Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, translated by Fauzi Najjar, New York: Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1963, pp. 22-30. 
64 Ibid., pp. 104:16-107:4 
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revealed religion. Nor can either speak about the opinions or actions that the 
jurisprudence and theology of revealed religion address. Such a rulership or 
royal craft can come only from a political science that would both combine 
theoretical and practical sciences along with prudence and show how they are 
to be ordered in the soul of the ruler. This kind of political science would be 
more theoretical than the one first set forth in the Enumeration of the Sciences 
and go beyond the understanding of the sciences presupposed in the second 
one, an understanding that is based on what has preceded the Enumeration of 
the Sciences. 65 In his other writings- most notably his Book of Religion, but 
also in the Political Regime, the Aphorisms of Statesmen, and the Principles 
of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City- Alfarabi develops this 
broader political science. It speaks of religious beliefs as opinions and of acts 
of worship as actions, and notes that both are prescribed by a supreme ruler or 
prophet; for a community. 
Opening with a discussion of religion centered in political community, then 
moving to political science, the Book of Religion66 present Alfarabi's 
restructuring of political science. As in the Enumeration of the Sciences, two 
accounts are provided, but here they are preceded by an account of virtuous 
religion. It begins with a description of a supreme ruler whose goals are 
similar to those of the Prophets and an analysis of his prescriptions. The 
reason for everything done by this supreme ruler are tracked back to 
philosophy so incessantly that religion appears to depend on philosophy, 
theoretical as well as practical. Similarly, the art of jurisprudence, presented 
as providing for what the supreme ruler did not accomplish before his death, 
is portrayed as both dependent on practical philosophy and a part of political 
science.67 Obliged to say something about practical philosophy, Alfarabi 
65 Mahdi, Muhs in, in "Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Alfarabi's Enumeration of the 
Sciences", in The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, ed. J.E. Murdoch and E.D. 
Sylla, Dorrecht: B. Reidel, 1975, p. 137. 
66 Butterworth, Charles E., in Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. Ralph 
Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1993. 
67 Enumeration of the Sciences in Book of Religion, paras. 5 -10. 
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complies by again offering two accounts of political science. The deficiencies 
of the first resembles those that came to light in the Enumeration of the 
Sciences, but the second account provides what is needed by presenting a 
political science that can offer a comprehensive view of the universe and 
indicate what kind of practical acumen permits the one who possesses this 
understanding, either the supreme ruler or a successor endowed with all his 
qualities, to rule wisely. Able to explain the various ranks of all the beings, it 
also stresses the importance of religion for uniting the citizens and for helping 
them attain the virtues that prolong decent political life.68 This view of the 
harmony between good government and the activity of the Prophet finds 
similar expression in Avicenna's most extensive discussion of politics that set 
forth at the very end of the Metaphysics in his Shifa. 69 It differs from any of 
the accounts to be found in Alfarabi because Avicenna is silent on the 
different sorts of virtuous and vicious regimes, rulerships, and civic 
communities. He says nothing about what distinguishes them or how to bring 
them about. He is equally silent about what would cause each one to cease to 
exist and how each one might be transformed into one opposed to it. Political 
science for Avicenna, at least insofar as it is presented here, centers around an 
explanation of the political characteristics of prophecy and divine law. 
Nonetheless, the attention that he gives those two subjects leads him to raise 
questions fundamental to politics: the nature of law, the purpose of political 
community, the need for sound moral life among the citizens, the importance 
of providing for divorce as well as for marriage, the conditions for just war, 
the considerations that lie behind penal laws, and the goal of human life. 
Avicenna's description of the way the political community arises and the 
provisions made for it by a ruler as wise as a prophet shows why traditional 
Islamic political rule is praiseworthy and alludes to what is wrong with 
regimes that prize freedom, the purpose of wealth, or conquest rather than 
68 See Ibid., paras. 15-27. 
69 See Avicenna, Kitab al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, ed., G. Anawati and S. Zayid, Cairo: al-Hai'a 
al-'Amma li-Shu'un al-Matabi' al-Amiriyya, 1960, book 10, chps. 1-5. 
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adherence to moral virtue. To underline his purpose, Avicenna constantly 
refers to the ruler who sets down the laws he praises here as one who gives 
"traditional law" ( calling this lawgiver a sannin and his law sunnah) or as one 
who gives "divine law" ( calling this lawgiver a shari' and his law shar 'ia ). 
For reasons too involved to discuss here, Averroes perceives his task 
differently from either of his two predecessors. Seeing the pursuit of 
philosophy threatened in his day and saddened by the bickering between the 
proponents of different religions or sects, he attempts to show why 
philosophical investigation warranted by the divine law. In the most famous 
of his work, The Decisive Treatise, he likens the lawgiver to a physician: just 
as the latter strives to preserve the health or cure sicknesses of the body, so 
does the former for the soul.70 The lawgiver, like the physician, knows what 
preserves health and prevents sickness. He understands what good health is 
and how it can be achieved as well as how to preserve it. Because those 
whom he seeks to heal do not understand these things, he speaks to them in 
language they can understand. He no more enters into the details or the 
premises of his actions than the physician does of his. To gain the people's 
acceptance of his prescriptions, he uses whatever kind of speech the people 
can most readily understand- again, as does the physician. 
The problem, notes Averroes, is that many jurists and theologians do not 
understand that the lawgiver or prophet spoke indirectly and thus try to 
explain things to the people that only confuse them. By this analogy, Averroes 
shows why one cannot interpret all the words of the Prophet literally and 
points to the need for those so qualified to investigate the health and sickness 
of the soul as well as the ways to p,reserve or attain the one and avoid or repel 
the other. To do so is to understand the Prophet's goal with respect to the 
people for whom he legislated, for the Prophet's prescription are his laws, and 
they presuppose political community. Like Alfarabi and Avicenna before him, 
70 See Averroes, Kitab Fas! al-Maqal, an English translation by Hourani, George F., is to 
be found in Medieval Political Philosophy, 1963, pp. 163-86. 
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then, Averroes seeks to preserve philosophical inquiry because it provides the 
understanding and explanation of what is sound about that legislation. 
None of these philosophers explicitly rails against the rulers of the day, 
although Averroes does suggest on occasion that things are not as good as 
they might be in "these cities in this time of ours".71 Their goal is not to urge 
radical change or to cajole actual rulers to act better by offering advice about 
how to rule, but to show what goals are to be pursued by a good ruler and 
what conduces to the achievement of those goals. For them, the purpose of 
living together in community is to acquire the human excellences impossible 
to attain in solitary existence, and they investigate how the prescriptions of 
the prophet as well as the practices traditionally derived from them lead to 
these excellences. Because the goal of association is excellence, intellectual 
as well as moral, rule by one who has such excellence is preferable. Though it 
is admittedly difficult to find rulers so qualified, rule by such a one remains 
the standard. Similarly, the pursuit of excellence- not the pursuit of freedom, 
wealth, or conquest- remains the standard. The philosophers of the Arabic or 
Islamic distant past stand out as guides to that goal, guides ever cognizant of 
its arduous demands and abundant riches. Moreover, acutely aware of the 
intellectual and moral differences between individuals and the groups they 
constitute, these philosophers see no reason to expect much from popular 
government. 
The Recent Past 
Apart from Ibn Khaldun and perhaps Mulla Sadra, political reflection in the 
Arabic or Islamic tradition languished during the next six and a half centuries. 
Philosophical speculation was focused on metaphysical questions and issues 
of personal morality. When it did tum to politics, it usually took the form of 
particular advice to rulers and was directed to questions that would help them 
71 Butterworth, Charles E., Philosophy, Ethics, and Virtuous Rule: A Study of Averroes' 
Commentary on Plato's "Republic", Cairo: American University Press in Cairo, 1986, 
pp. 12-13, 87-88. 
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preserve their own reign. Only with the advent of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
( 183 7-97) does it turn to the larger questions raised by Alfarabi, Avicenna, 
and Averroes. 
Al-Afghani is troubled by the weakness that characterises the Islamic world in 
his day. Dominated by Western imperial powers, even in their own lands, 
Arabs and Muslim rulers seem to have lost all memory of the grandeur and 
greatness that were once theirs and to have no idea of how they might regain 
their former rank. His challenge to thoughtful Muslims, first formulated in 
lectures to university audiences and then distributed in occasional articles 
read by an educated few, won him the sympathy of Muhammad 'Abdu ( 1849-
1905). These two eventually joined forces to launch- from Paris, because no 
Arab or Muslim country would tolerate al-Afghani's presence- a short-lived 
journal known as al- 'Urwa al-wuthqa (The most solid link). In it, they argue 
vigorously for independence from foreign domination but see no reason to 
replace monarchic rule with popular government. It is their conviction that the 
Arab and Muslim populace are not yet sufficiently disciplined to govern 
themselves well and thus still need the tutelage of a ruler who will train them 
in the skills needed for self-government.72 Their total silence elsewhere in 
their writings about the possibility of future self-rule need not be taken as 
evidence that the promise here is no more than a diplomatic ploy to preserve 
the goodwill of otherwise sympathetic Westerners. Indeed, al-Afghani's 
generous concession to Ernest Renan that philosophy and religion must 
always be in conflict also strengthens the case for postponing democracy, for 
he makes it clear that Middle Eastern peoples will not soon be ready to 
forsake religious guidance.73 
The same theme is developed more extensively by 'Abduh. In fact, he bases 
his own political teaching on an attempt to explain the reasonableness of 
letting political life be guided by Islamic precepts. His famous Risa/at al-
72 "Madi al-umma wa hadiruha wa 'ilaj 'ilaliha" [The Nation's past, its present, and the 
treating of its ills], in al- 'Urwa al-wuthqa [The Most Solid Link], Cairo: Dar al-' Arabi, 
1957, pp. 13-21. 
73 Renan, Ernest, "L 'Islamisme et la science", Journal des de 'bats, 30 March, 1883. 
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tawhid (Treatise on unity) presents a coherent exposition of how Islam helps 
human beings to live together in society so that they may eventually attain the 
happiness intended for them by the Creator. 'Abduh focuses on the assistance 
that God offers mankind by sending prophets who show us how to get along 
in political community. By drawing our attention to something higher than 
self-preservation or immediate gain, they teach us how to work together 
without harming one another or causing evil. In learning to honour such a 
higher Being, we are prompted to love one another as fellow creatures of that 
Being, to control our desires, redirect our passions, and regulate our actions. 
Almost like another Alfarabi, 'Abduh explains what prompts the opinions the 
prophets ask us to believe, and the actions they urge us to perform. 
Whereas al-Afghani addresses his explanations to anyone who will listen, 
even to the supremely confident readers of the Journal des debats, his 
primary audience is those learned Near and Middle Easterners, Muslim or 
Christian, who suffer the degradation of imperialist rule. Even so, his 
references are primarily Muslim, and the past age of glory he recalls is 
distinctly one of Muslim hegemony. That tendency is taken further by 
'Abduh, with his emphasis on the soundness of living according to Islamic 
precepts; but the audience is still a learned one. With Hassan al-Banna (1906-
49), as with Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi (1903-80) before him, the audience and 
the teaching change radically. Both speak to the masses, al-Mawdudi in order 
to defend Islam and to show how easily it can be applied to all problems of 
daily life, al-Banna in order to reform Muslims and to awaken them to what 
they can be as self-reliant and fully conscious followers of their faith. The 
change in audience and goal are reflected in the quality of the arguments both 
offer, namely, ones far more rhetorical and hortatory than analytical or 
measured. 
Each sees a need for founding an Islamic political regime. Al-Mawdudi 
considers it the only rule under which Muslims can live freely and fully as 
Muslims and thus deems it essential that the Qur'anic provisions for personal 
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and communal virtue be implemented. For al-Banna, it makes no sense to 
deny Muslims the right to national liberation natural to all peoples; moreover, 
only a Muslim regime can fight against the atheism, pursuit of pleasure, self-
centeredness, and relentless profit seeking that he believes will destroy all of 
Western society. In addition, each is responsible for the formation of groups 
that seek to carry out the teachings of the founder. Yet whereas the Islamic 
groups patterned on al-Mawdudi's teaching arose almost accidentally, Hasan 
al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood from the very beginning in order 
to spread his call to other Muslims more readily and more efficiently. 
The Present Issues 
The spokesmen for Islamic government who succeed al-Mawdudi and al-
Banna share with them the desire to speak to a larger audience and the 
willingness to make popular arguments. But instead of railing against non-
Muslims and Western colonial and imperialist powers, these spokesmen 
denounce the Muslim rulers who came to power after Near and Middle 
Easterners were moved to act on the teachings of al-Afghani, 'Abdu, al-
Mawdudi, and al-Banna. Whereas al-Mawdudi and al-Banna simply ignore 
the philosophical teachings of the distant tradition on which al-Afghani and 
Abdu are only too happy to rely for guidance as well as for evidence of a rich 
cultural past, new spokesmen such as Sayyid Qutb ( 1906-66) and Ruhollah 
Khomeini ( 1900-89) dismiss the older philosophers as having been too 
influenced by a foreign tradition to be of any assistance in an authentic 
Muslim undertaking. Though they thereby demonstrate that they have learned 
nothing from Averroes' Decisive Treatise and its famous rebuke of al-Ghazali 
for this same error. They are not in the least concerned. Their goals are to 
defend Islam against the aspersions cast upon it by Westerners who have 
failed to understand its merits, to bring about a thorough moral change in 
Muslims themselves, and to achieve truly Islamic self-rule rather than an 
imitation of socialism, as in the Egypt of Nasser opposed by Qutb, or an 
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unbridled capitalist consumerism, as in the Iran of the Shah as portrayed by 
Khomeini. 
Now others too numerous to name follow the lead of Qutb and Khomeini. 
Even were one to add the names of Egypt's Shaykh Kishk and Mustafa 
Mahmoud, the list would still not be exhausted. All those now calling for 
Islamic politics share the desire to replace errant rulers who have failed to 
enforce or to abide by the teachings of Islamic divine law, the Shar 'ia, as well 
as to improve the material and spiritual well being of fellow Muslims through 
encouraging their close adherence to Islamic precepts. But despite 
opportunities for practical reflection afforded by current instances of Islamic 
rule in nations as diverse as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, these 
spokesmen have yet to set forth clear ideas about how Islamic government 
should function. Their rhetoric, addressed now more than ever to the 
unlearned masses of citizens, speaks of how these goals are to be reached 
without harming citizens along the way. It also ignores the major question of 
how to provide for prudent decisions once the goal of Islamic government has 
been reached. 
Yet, properly understood, it is against precisely this tendency to ignore 
procedural safeguards that Western criticism of political Islam is addressed. 
There are other objections, of course. The West is more concerned with 
safeguarding freedom than with providing for citizen virtue. That is partly due 
to a prevailing confusion about what ought to be called virtue, one that has its 
roots in the thinkers to whom one turns for guidance about classical 
liberalism. Though they teach us that the greatest goods are life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of either property or happiness, they have little to say about the 
pursuit of virtue. Similarly, the high regard in which one holds life and 
freedom leads us to look dimly on coercive inducements to virtuous conduct-
especially when those inducements threaten life or limb. 
To the latter kind of procedural objections, proponents of Islamic government 
have a ready answer: the penalties are meant to serve as vivid signs that there 
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are boundaries or limits that human conduct should not transgress, and before 
the divine law that calls for such penalties is instituted, Muslims subject to 
them must undergo a thorough moral reform. For such thinkers- and those in 
this path are only too happy to cite the teaching of Hassan al-Banna with 
approval- the basic preliminary to an official return to Islamic law must be a 
thorough moral reform of the citizenry carried out at all levels of society. But 
the Western criticism is not merely procedural, at least not in this sense. It 
goes deeper, for it raises the very question of whether moral improvement is 
the proper concern of government or not. Until at least the days of 
Muhammad Abdu, the philosophical foundations for considering moral 
improvement a proper concern of government were clear; since then, the 
cogent philosophical defense tends to have been rejected, but the theological 
one goes back to basically the same principles. 
Conclusion 
When all of these objections have been met, there is still another reason 
behind the Western criticism of political Islam. Whatever Western attitudes 
are today about imperialism and colonialism, it is clear that the West still 
considers itself as deserving to set the tempo for the rest of the world to 
follow. Patent as this is in the title and basic premise of Fukuyama's best-
seller or in Binder's acknowledged presupposition that the whole world- and 
especially the Islamic part of it- must become politically liberal, it also 
prevails in the analyses of those who seek to explain what is truly fearful 
about calls for political Islam. Shireen T. Hunter insists, for example, that we 
should not consider these calls or the movements they engender as aberrations 
"in the social, economic, and political development of the Muslim world" that 
will soon pass away but should rather be alarmed about "the fundamentalists' 
animosity toward the great-power domination of the present international 
order".74 To this there are only two replies. One calls for greater tolerance 
74 Hunter, Shireen T., "Islamic Fundamentalism: What It Really Is and Why It Frightens the 
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with respect to the basic presuppositions of those who look to religion for 
guidance and thus serves as an especially appealing rejoinder to the 
proponents of liberalism.75 The other, set forth here, points to the goals sought 
by those in favour of Islamism and argues for their validity both because they 
are part of a higher understanding of politics that Westerners once embraced 
and because the political liberalism the West now follows has not shown 
Islamists to be without benefit but merely difficult to achieve. 
PART TWO: APPROACHES, IDEAS AND PROBLEMS 
OFISLAMISM 
INTRODUCTION 
A summary analysis of the scholarly literature produced in the West about 
contemporary Islamic Fundamentalism- particularly in the Arab World- will 
show a considerable amount of anxious concern over the use of such terms as 
"Fundamentalism", "Revivalism, "Integrisme" and their equivalents and 
derivatives which refer to this religio-political phenomenon. The use in 
question is the legitimacy of transferring concepts generated by Western 
Christian experiences- especially Protestant experiences- to the presumably 
very different context of Islam, the Arab World and the Muslim universes of 
discourse and practice in general. 
CHAPTER 1: THE MEANING OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
The Terminological Debate 
One will now tum to a discussion of some representative examples of the 
terminological debates about Islamic Fundamentalism. Richard Mitchell, the 
West", SAIS Review, 6:189-91, 199-200, 1986. 
75 Abdul-Fadl, Mona, Islam and the Middle East: The Aesthetics of a Political Inquiry, 
Herndon: International Institute oflslamic Thought, 1990, pp. 38-39. 
75 
foremost American expert on, and historian of the Muslim Brothers 
Organization in Egypt, suggests that there is no real equivalent for a term like 
"Fundamentalism" in Arabic, implying the illegitimacy of applying it to 
Islam.76 Another specialist, struggling with the same terminological problem, 
seems it "unwise to bring preconceived categories to bear on these 
phenomena, especially when we are examining a non-Western religious 
tradition such as Islam" .77 John 0. Voll, in an otherwise excellent study, notes 
the reservations of some contemporary Muslims thinkers and non-Muslim 
(i.e., Western) scholars concerning the use of the concept "Fundamentalism" 
in any study of Islam, but then proceeds to retain the term, on the purely 
practical grounds of convenience, widespread use and the absence of a better 
alternative.78 Yousef N. Choueiri prefaces his first-rate book Islamic 
Fundamentalism with an observation that subverts the operative concept in 
his own title (Fundamentalism), as no more than a "vague term, currently in 
vogue as a catch-phrase used to describe the militant ideology of 
contemporary Islamic movements." He, like John 0. Voll, retains it only "for 
lack of a better word" after noting its Protestant origins. 79 
In the same dismissive spirit Lawrence Kaplan explains that although the term 
"Fundamentalism" "is imprecise and an over-simplification," still it 
"somehow managed to take hold".80 Similarly, the director of the massive 
Fundamentalism Project (sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences), Martin Marty, opts for a naive nominalism when addressing the 
terminological issue, and then concludes with much emphasis and plenty of 
76 'The Islamic Movement: Its Current Condition and Future Prospects', in Barbara Freyer 
Stowasser (ed.), The Islamic Impulse, Washington DC: Center for Contemporary Arab 
Studies, Georgetown University, 1987, p. 79. 
77 Ninian Smart, 'Three Forms of Religious Convergence', in Richard T. Antoun and Mary 
Elaine Hegland (eds.) Religious resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, 
and Judaism; Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Universit Press, 1987, p. 223. 
78 'Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan,' in Martin E. Marty and 
R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms Observed; Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press; 1991, p. 347. 
79 YousefN. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1990, p. 9. 
80 Lawrence Kaplan, (ed.), Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, Amherst, MA: 
The University of Massachusetts Press, 1992, p. 5. 
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capital letters that "SUBSTANTIVELY, FUNDAMENTALISMS HAVE 
LITTLE OR NOTHING IN COMMON WITH EACH OTHER".81 
In his influential book on Muslim Extremism in Egypt, Gilles Kepel reaches 
the following conclusion concerning the study of the Islamist phenomenon: 
It is not mere caprice to recall these elementary epistemological pre-
cautions, for few contemporary phenomenons have been so 
superficially observed and hastily judged as this movement. This is 
evident even in the terms used to designate it: integrisme musulman in 
France or "Muslim Fundamentalism" in the English-speaking world. 
These two intellectual tools were forged to interpret particular 
moments in the history of Catholicism and Protestantism respectively. 
There is no justification for such a transposition.82 
In a discussion with Dr. Ahmad Shikara (an Honorary Research Fellow at the 
Department of Political Studies) at Auckland University in the winter of 
1997, he insisted like Richard Mitchell, that (a) there is no real equivalent to 
the English term: "Fundamentalism" in Arabic and that (b) the Arabic concept 
now in very wide use- Usuli (Fundamentalist)- is no more than a recent 
translation into Arabic of the English original. In fact after agonizing over the 
terminological puzzle in the concluding chapter of his book, Kepel comes 
close to implying that somehow the Islamist phenomenon simply defies the 
categories of social science. 
In the same vein and for the same reasons explained by Kepel, thinkers and 
experts as divergent and different as Bernard Lewis and Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
conclude that the use of the term "Fundamentalism" in the Muslim context is 
81 'Fundamentals of Fundamentalism', Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
82 Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh, Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1984, pp. 223-224. 
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"most unfortunate and misleading" (Nasr),83 and that although the term is 
"now common usage" and "must be accepted" as such, "it remains unfortunate 
and can be misleading" (Lewis).84 
When addressing the same terminological question, an expert on modem Iran, 
Evrand Abrahamian, leaves us in a situation of unresolved tension, if not 
conflict. On the one hand he argues against transferring the term 
"Fundamentalism" to the contemporary Muslim Middle East on account of its 
origins in early 20th century American Protestantism, but then proceeds to 
point out how "Khomeini's own followers, finding no such term in Persian or 
Arabic, have coined a new word -bonyadgarayan- by translating literally the 
English term fundamentalism." Like Kaplan, he observes that somehow the 
term not only "stuck", but became very popular with the Khomeinists as "a 
self-advertising label claiming that they are the only ones true to the 
'fundamentals' of Islam, in sharp contrast to others who have been led astray 
by foreign concepts and historical misinterpretations of the Qur'an, the 
Prophet's Hadiths [traditions], the Shari'a [Islamic Laws], and the teachings 
of the Twelve Shi'a Imams." Abrahamian finds this situation "curious" but 
makes no attempts at explaining, (a) why Khomeini's followers should find a 
Christian term translated from a Western culture and language so expressive 
of what they actually believe and practice, and (b) why such a term did 
"stick" and become so popular with them. For an answer to these questions, 
one has only accident and randomness; somehow the "stuck" managed to take 
hold or "gain currency".85 But this all-too-easy transmutation of an outside 
observer's category like "Fundamentalism" to an exteriorised self-descriptive 
category of the insiders and actors themselves, is too serious a business to 
leave to mere chance. 
83 'Present Tendencies, Future Trends', in Marjorie Kelly (ed.), Islam: The religious and 
Political Life of a World Commuinty, New York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 279-280. 
84 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1988, p. 117. 
85 'Khomeini: A Fundamentalist', in Kaplan, 1992, pp. 109-110. 
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Another interesting radical view simply admonishes to drop altogether terms 
like "Fundamentalism" and its sisters when dealing with Islam, (a) on the 
general principle that one should never "apply words to describe people that 
they would not accept and apply to themselves," and (b) on account of the fact 
that "fundamentalism is not, never has been, nor ever will be a term used by 
most Muslims to describe either their own religious outlook or the religious 
outlook of other Muslims with whom they disagree".86 Barbara Freyer 
Stowasser summarizes this general position in the following words: "It is 
noteworthy that no indigenous word for 'fundamentalism' exists in Arabic, 
and that Muslims do not define themselves as fundamentalists or define others 
h 87 as sue ... 
While the intention behind this concern and anxiety over terminology is 
undoubtedly the laudable desire to achieve greater critical self-awareness, the 
actual debates and discussions remain quite disappointing. 
The Epistemological Legitimacy of Fundamentalism 
One would now like to argue broadly for the epistemological legitimacy, 
scientific integrity and critical applicability of such supposedly modern 
Western and Christian-derived concepts as "Fundamentalism" and 
"Revivalism" in the study of the contemporary Islamist phenomenon. One 
shall start with the now widely used Arabic term Usuli, as in "Usuli Islam" 
(Fundamentalist Islam), and the Usuli Islamic Movements ( details discussed 
in Part Five). 
To the dismissive argument that this term is no more than a recent innovation 
created to provide an Arabic equivalent for the original English concept of 
"Fundamentalism," one would reply that what is really important in this 
context is neither the origin of the term nor how it entered current Arabic 
usage, but what it actually says and does not say about its referent. One would 
86 Bruce B. Lawrence, 'Muslim Fundamentalist Movements: Reflections Towards A New 
Approach', in The Islamic Impulse, Barbara F. Stowasser, 1987, p. 18. 
87 The Islamic Impulse, P. 5. 
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also remind their interlocutors here, (a) that as Arabs are constantly 
introducing and deleting terms, concepts and categories into their vital socio-
political and religio-ideological discourses without much regard to whether 
these originate in the Islamic turath (heritage), European languages, colonial 
influences or contemporary experience; and (b) that while knowing something 
about the origins of any of these terms is undoubtedly instructive, fixation on 
"first meanings". 
On the other hand, one may not be aware of any deep aversion or even 
objection to the employment of the term Usuli and its derivatives and 
equivalents either by the Islamists themselves or by their mainstream critics, 
secularist detractors and sympathetic defenders and apologists. The by-now 
large and varied body of writing in Arabic on the Islamists, against them, as 
well as for them and by them, has witnessed many a sharp debate and polemic 
over all kinds of substantive issues of politics, doctrine and interpretation, but 
none over concepts like "Fundamentalism" and "Revivalism" and their 
applicability to the phenomenon. In fact this body of literature is particularly 
distinguished for its generous use of these very concepts in its expositions, 
criticisms, apologies, rebuttals and counter-rebuttals. For example, all the 
books, commentaries, summaries and introductions produced by the most 
prominent Egyptian compiler and editor of the texts of the armed 
insurrectionary Islamists, employ very liberally these concepts, their 
equivalents and derivates, in a very matter-of- fact way and without further 
apologies, hesitations or reservations.88 
The work of Hasan Hanafi, one of Egypt's most prominent and prolific 
intellectuals and thinkers, provides us with another good example. Shortly 
after the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981 Hanafi proceeded 
to employ all the presumably objectionable concepts of "Islamic 
88 Rifa'at Sayyed Ahmad, The Armed Prophet: The Rejectionists, published by Riad al-
Rayyes Books, London, Vol. One, 1991. And Rifa'at Sayyed Ahmad, The Armed 
Prophet: The Revolutionaries, Riad al-Rayyes Books, London, Vol. Two, 1991. 
In what follows, I will refer to these volumes in the study as (Vol. I) and (Vol. 11), 
followed by the page references. 
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Fundamentalism" (al-Usuliyyah al- lslamiyyah), and "Islamic Revivalism" 
(al-lhya' al-lslami), in his spirited exposition and sympathetic defence of the 
teachings, politics and practices of Egypt's Islamists. The Islamist publishers 
of his book prefaced it with their own approval plus an endorsement of its 
contents.89 Furthermore, Hanafi explains in his book that "Islamic 
Fundamentalism" means the search for Usus or foundations and then goes on 
to argue for the continued presence of a self-reinvigorating fundamentalist 
current in Islamic history, stretching from Egypt's present-day Islamists all the 
way back to the great classical jurist Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and his school. 90 
Hanafi's argument is obviously a blatant ex-post-facto rationalisation without 
any historical basis or merit, but it disposes of the misconception that the 
Islamists reject being called "Fundamentalists" or "Usu/is". 
More specifically and importantly, a term like Usuli (Fundamentalist) has 
classical Islamic precedent in its favour. It means the primary distinction of all 
classical Muslim theology, jurisprudence, and learning (both Sunni and Shi'i), 
between the fundamentals and/or basics of the Islamic religion, on the one 
hand, and its branches, and/or incidentals, on the other. To this day, the most 
important faculty of Cairo's al-Azhar University- Islam's most prominent 
centre of religious learning and training for centuries- is the Faculty of" Usu/ 
al-Din" ("The Fundamentals of the Religion"). In addition, the two most 
decisive interchangeable concepts that invariably keep appearing and 
reappearing in the books, manifestoes, tracts and documents of the Islamists 
are simply, Usu I ( fundamentals, sources, basics) and Usus (bases, 
foundations). Obviously, the reference here is to the Qur' an and the Prophet's 
Sunnah, or tradition, as the two primary pillars and foundations of the Islamic 
religion. 
Thus, one member of the team of four that actually assassinated President 
Anwar Sadat in 1981 (a cell of the famous Islamic Jihad organization), 
89 Hassan Hanafi, The Islamic Movements in Egypt (in Arabic), Cairo: al-Huda Islamic 
Publishing House, 1986. 
90 Ibid., pp. 9-12. 
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described his group's line of thought as "a fundamentalist salafi (traditionalist) 
call (da'wa salafiyyah usuliyyah) for a return to the understanding and 
doctrine of the good predecessors, in an age where corruption prevails" .91 A 
manifesto of the same Islamist organization entitled The Charter of Islamic 
Action; complains bitterly about the absence of Islam's "fundamentals" (usu!) 
and "foundations" (usus) from the contemporary life of supposedly Muslim 
societies.92 
The Charter explains that its purpose is "to show, clarify and recall the 
legitimate religious foundations (usus) and fundamentals (usu!) which should 
never escape the attention of any Islamic movement that is concerned about 
regulating all its affairs according to the True Shari'a and is committed to that 
end". The Charter continues: "These foundations are neither invented nor an 
innovation, but fixed axioms that no Muslim can ignore, let alone deny. But 
unfortunately some, if not most, of them have escaped the attention of those 
working in favour of this religion ... And as their absence has endured for a 
long time ... we thought it our obligation to present, or, still better, to show 
them . . . in an attempt to regulate the Islamic movement by its religious 
fundamentals, which if abandoned, all hope of victory would be lost" .93 It 
may add, also, that The document of Islamic Revival speaks clearly of the 
circumstances when "the return to Fundamentals and the call of the Truth and 
the Qur'an would become easy and quick";94 while Rifa'at Sayyed Ahmad 
describes the Islamic "Revival", in one of his many introductions, as "the 
recuperation of Islam's fundamentals (usu!) without any partiality to the 
theories and interpretations that we find in its history" .95 An organized 
Islamist group of Egyptians in Kuwait called themselves "Fundamentalists" 
(Usuliyyun). 
91 Vol. I, page 113. 
92 Vol. I, page 167. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Vol. II, p. 227. 
95 Vol. II, p. 53. 
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This is why everywhere in the Muslim world today, the Islamists not only call 
insistently for an immediate return to Islamic "basis" and "fundamentals", but 
also claim, believe and act as if they have done nothing except recapture and 
revive these very fundamentals. Furthermore, most Muslims hold strongly 
that only these fundamentals are really capable, (a) of organizing people for 
radical socio-political action, (b) of mobilizing the masses for the coming 
struggles and fights against internal and external enemies, and ( c) of 
providing a lasting and authentic solution to all the ills and problems plaguing 
present-day Muslim societies. 
In light of the above considerations it seems quite reasonable to conclude that 
calling these Islamic movements "Islamists" is adequate, accurate, and 
correct. To turn the question around by asking the semantic skeptics and 
conceptual nominalists what more does one need to call, in good scholarly 
conscience, such movements, organizations and factions: "Islamist"? 
Nonetheless, this defense of the concept should not be construed as an 
uncritical endorsement of all its sundry applications, implications, uses, and 
abuses. More specifically, calling these movements "Islamist" does not mean 
we accept at face value and indiscriminately either what they say about 
themselves, or what they claim about having actually succeeded in isolating 
and recapturing the basics and fundamentals of Islam. This last issue remains 
an open question, subject to further research. In other words, the question of 
what exactly it is that these movements and groups have isolated and 
recuperated, under the rubric of the fundamentals and basics of Islam, has to 
remain open for the time being. 
Similarly, the concept of Islamic "Revivalism" (al-lhya al-lslami) has 
classical precedent on its side, viz., the major work of Islam's foremost 
classical theologian al-Ghazali (often regarded in the West as the Augustine 
of Islam), entitled The Revival of the Religious Sciences. More important, 
however, is the appeal to the actual practices not only of the Islamists 
themselves, but of their Muslim critics, defenders and apologists as well. For 
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example, The Document of Muslim Revival, circulated by one of the Jihad 
groups in Egypt, speaks of the "Muslim Revivalist Phenomenon", the 
"Islamic movement of revival and Renewal", the "Resurrectionist 
Phenomenon", and the "call for renewal and revival by a return to the 
fundamentals of the umma". 96 
In addition, every active Islamist group today is convinced that it is in the 
process not only of going back to the basics and fundamentals of Islam, but of 
reviving them as well, after a long period of, let us say, hibernation. They are 
reviving them as active beliefs and efficacious practices in the lives of people. 
The same process, they claim, revives the hibernating Muslim masses by 
injecting into their lives, hearts, and minds the neglected fundamentals of 
Islam; this is simply their program of regenerating and revitalizing the 
individual and the umma (the Muslim nation or community) at one and the 
same time. They all strongly believe that without such a revival, no temporal 
or eternal salvation is possible either individually or collectively. 
Significantly enough the basic theo-political document of President Sadat's 
assassins is entitled The Absent Commandment, because- as the text makes 
clear- the intention behind it is not only to go back to one of the neglected 
fundamentals of Islam, viz., the duty of jihad, but also to revive it in text, 
consciousness and practice after a long period of absence and forgetfulness. 97 
Similarly, the phenomenon of sudden religious conversion and the 
accompanying sense of being born-again, which have traditionally 
characterized modem Protestant religious revivalism, are not foreign to the 
Islamists either. Hassan Hanafi describes in his book on The Islamic 
Movement in Egypt, how young men in touch with Islamist organizations 
and/or influenced by the fundamentalist currents in society, come to live in 
"fear and trembling" on account of their sins, their immersion in the life and 
activities of an apostate Oahili) social order, and their neglect of the primary 
religious duty of jihad. Then a sudden conversion sets in, continues Hanafi, 
96 Vol. II, pp. 199-243. 
97 Vol. I, PP. 127-147. 
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transporting them "from one state to another, as happens with Sufis [mystics] 
when the call comes through an accidental occurrence, a sheikh's call, an 
unknown voice, a cry of destiny, or a vision of the heart" .98 Thus, according to 
the same author, young people experience "a kind of sudden change which 
takes them from one state to another without gradation or persuasion: from 
corruption to purity, from unbelief (kufr) to faith, from Godlessness Oahiyyah) 
to Islam" .99 The Messianic and chiliastic orientations normally accompanying 
such revivalist experiences are not lacking either, and they are noted in 
Hanafi's book in the form of an awaited temporal and eternal salvation of the 
umma and the individual at the hands "of a savior, Mahdi, or reformer" .100 
One Islamist document emphasizes how the born-again experience "brings 
about a total and decisive break with a person's past", thus making "Islam the 
measure of all things for him" .101 
In addition the Arab world's Islamists choose their categories and concepts of 
"Fundamentals" and "Revival" carefully to distinguish themselves from 
secular nationalists and leftists. They generally shun terms like "nahda "/ 
"renaissance", "ba 'ath "/"resurrection" and "yakazah "/"awakening". In 
contemporary Arab politico-ideological discourse, the first couplet denotes 
the period of Islamic theological reform, intense latitudinarian scriptural 
reinterpretation and socio-economic modernization stretching from the last 
decades of the 19th century to the 1940s. Since the Islamists reject 
unequivocally and condemn unambiguously this phase in Arab life, they 
naturally prefer to speak of an Islamic "revival", "rebirth", "recovery" and 
"revival" in lieu of an Islamic renaissance or nahda. 
Again, the two terms "ba'ath" and "revival" carry the same literal meaning 
and derive their subliminal positive emotional charge from traditional Muslim 
teachings about the Day of Judgment (Yawm al-Ba'ath) and Allah's power to 
resurrect or revive, on that day "bones that had turned to mere dust". 
98 Hanafi, 1986, p.135. 
99 Ibid., p. 183. 
' 00 Ibid., p. 136. 
101 Vol. II, p. 226. 
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Nonetheless, the Islamists opt for "Ihya" (revival) because "ba'ath" has 
become hopelessly compromised by too close an association, and in all 
minds, with the ruling Ba'ath Party in Syria and Iraq. "Yakazah" is par 
excellence the secular Arab nationalist's variant of the concept of 
"awakening", as in Najib Azouri's Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe (Paris, 1905), 
and George Antonius' classic work, The Arab Awakening (al-Yakazah al-
Arabiyyah) (Philadelphia, 1939). 
Consequently, the Arab Islamists deliberately polarized their own variant of 
the concept of awakening, viz., "as-sahwa al-Islamiyyah", in spite of the fact 
that Yakazah and sahwa mean exactly the same thing, and imply, in all 
instances, a prior period of either nationalist or Islamic sleep and hibernation, 
as the case may be. Thus, The Absent Commandment referred to above, 
explains one hadith (tradition) of the Prophet as heralding "the return oflslam 
in the present age following this Islamic Sahwa (awakening)", and predicts a 
"brilliant future economically and agriculturally for those who participate in 
it". 102 Of some relevance here is, also, the Protestant origin of the concept of a 
religious awakening as in the "Great American Awakening" radiating from 
New England in the 1730s and 1740s, and the later repetition of the same 
phenomenon in the early decades of the 19th century, both in Germany and 
the United States. It is, perhaps, of some significance to mention in this 
connection that the classic theoreticians of the modern Arab 
Yakazah/awakening were mostly of Christian backgrounds and origins, quite 
closely in touch with and deeply influenced by the goings on, socially, 
politically, religiously and intellectually in Europe and the United States. 
Other terminologico-conceptual shifts and substitutions effected by the 
Islamists comprise the following: "Worldism" (al-Alamiyyah) in place of the 
socialist "Internationalism" (al-Umamiyyah) as in the sophisticated Islamist 
theoretical work which appeared in Beirut in 1979 under the title, The Second 
102 Vol. I, p. 128 
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Islamic World ism (al-Alamiyyah al-lslamiyyah al-Thaniyyah ". 103 Also 
included among these shifts are "Overturning" (lnkilab) and its derivatives in 
place of "Revolution" and "Revolutionary"; "Protest" (lhtijaj) in the place of 
liberal "Opposition" (Mu'aradah) as in the "loyal opposition"; "Action" and 
"Execution" (in the sense of carrying out orders), in place of Marxist 
"Practice" and "Praxis" (Mumarasah); "Umma" in place of the "Popular 
Masses"; "World Crusaderism" (al-Salibiyyah al-Alamiyyah) in place of 
"Colonialism" and "Imperialism"; "Jahiliyyah" in place of "Backwardness", 
"Underdevelopment" and "Dependency" 104 ; and "Revival", and its derivatives 
and equivalents ("Recovery", "Rebirth", "Return") in place of "Progress", 
"Development" and "Growth". One note of caution is necessary here. The 
above transitions and substitutions remain in a state of extreme fluidity and 
occur on highly contested territory, allowing for plenty of terminological 
exceptions, shifts of ideological emphases and the introduction of new wines 
into old conceptual bottles, and vice versa. It also continues to be true that in 
spite of all these changes the current discourse of the Islamists remains 
greatly indebted- often spontaneously and unconsciously- to the typical 
concepts, categories, analyses, styles, etc., that had dominated Arab political 
thought and cultural and intellectual life during the earlier more nationalist, 
secular and leftist decades. 
To add in passing that the Arab insurrectionary Islamists also mean to convey 
double meaning when they insist on being called Jama 'at (groups, 
communities, collectives) instead of the more common parties, fronts, 
organizations, forces, coalitions, etc. For them, all these currently familiar 
forms of political organization and association are foreign to Islam, divisive 
of the unity of the Umma and a manifestation of the progressive secularisation 
and pernicious de-Islamisation of Muslim societies in modern times. But 
above all the terrnjama'at is calculated to invoke the model and experiences 
103 Muhammad Abdul-Kassim Haj Ahmad, The Second Islamic Worldism, (al-Masira, 
Publishers), Beirut, 1979. 
104 Vol. I, p. 180. 
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of the early Muslim minority in the middle of a hostile and jahili Meccan 
society. The Muslims then like now- so the Islamist argument goes- were no 
more than a powerless, stateless, persecuted and excludedjama'ah (group or 
community) preparing for the later construction of forms of power and 
statehood that Muslims could properly call their own. 
Again, in light of the above considerations, it is quite reasonable to conclude 
that calling these contemporary Islamist movements "Revivalist" (in the 
strong sense of the word) is adequate, functional, and accurate. In fact what 
more does one really need to call such movements, in good scholarly 
conscience, than "Revivalist"? In this case, also, the question of exactly what 
it is these groups and organizations are reviving, should remain open for 
further research. 
The related concept of Islamists (al-Islamiyyun) deserves one last 
observation. Since there is no known serious objections to the use of this 
term either on the part of the Islamists themselves or on the part of their 
critics, defenders, and apologists in the Muslim world. The concept is very 
useful for distinguishing the activist, militant "true believer", and born-again 
Muslim from the ordinary Muslim who takes his/her religion for granted, 
viewing Islam as a matter of 'aqa 'id and 'ibadat ( a set of beliefs and specific 
acts of worship), plus a certain basic ethical code, inherited traditions, cultural 
conventions, and so on. In other words, it brings out nicely and accurately the 
difference between having fundamentals (which Muslims certainly do), and 
being Islamist. Of course the term "Islamist" has in its favour also the 
classical precedent of "Maqalat al-Islamiyyin" (The Theses of the Islamists) 
of al-Ash'ari, the classical Islamist opponent of the great latitudinarians of his 
age, viz., the Mu'tazilite School of theology. This point is of some special 
relevance here considering that Ibn Taymiyyah, the medieval theologian on 
whose teachings, texts and doctrines the Islamists depend and draw most, 
refers extensively to al-Ash'ari's work, praising greatly his strict orthodoxy, 
traditionalism, and piety. 
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In fact a still stronger case can be made for the term, considering that 
prominent Islamist leaders like Hasan al-Turabi of the Sudan (now the 
strongman and master of that country's ruling military-Islamist Junta) and 
important propagandists like Rida Idriss 105 use the term liberally for two 
purposes. First of all, they do so to distinguish themselves, their followers, 
organizations and movements from the vast majority of ordinary Muslims; 
and second, to identify certain other politically active categories of people, 
like socialists, nationalists, secularists, liberals and so on, as nominal, 
sociological, cultural and/or private Muslims, but certainly not as Islamists. 
Some Historical Comparisons 
The fact that one finds concepts originally derived from Catholic and 
Protestant experiences with the modern world and in it, both applicable and 
adequate to the Islamist phenomenon is neither accidental nor arbitrary. After 
all the forces that have been shaping and reshaping Muslim life for the last 
150 years or so are, in every instance, of European origin and provenance, 
such as: capitalism, nationalism, colonialism, secularism, liberalism, 
populism, socialism, communism, fascism, Marxism, modernism, 
developmentalism, evolutionism, the idea of progress, scientific knowledge, 
applied technology (both civil and military), modern nation-state building 
with all the attendant, structure, institutions and apparatuses, and so on and so 
forth. And since one knows by now that these forces respect neither political 
nor ethnic nor cultural nor religious borders and boundaries, why should 
anyone be surprised at the rise of politico-religious social movements, like 
Islamic Fundamentalism and Revivalism, which bear strong family 
resemblances to the original fundamentalisms and revivalisms generated in 
modern and contemporary Europe and the West in general, by the action of 
these same primary historical forces? 
105 Rida Idriss, Al-lnsan (Humankind), is a Paris-based Islamist Journal, published by 
A MANE editions (in Arabic), 1990, editorial on pp. 5-11. 
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Western scholars and Muslim thinkers and intellectuals have called the 
movement of Islamic reform of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, an 
awakening of a renaissance, a reformation, a liberal experiment, Muslim 
modernism, the liberal age of modern Muslim thought. Now if the religion of 
a social order such as the Muslim world can go through such a wide ranging 
and profound reformation; is there anything strange or mysterious about the 
occurrence of, let us say, a counter-reformation, as well as of a fundamentalist 
reaction to boot? In fact did not a counter-reformation of sorts raise its head in 
Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood, the mother of all Islamisms in the Arab 
world, was formed in 1928? It would be useful to digress for a minute here, to 
remind oneself in this connection that Egypt's bourgeoisie and nationalist 
capital came of age at the time of the 1919 Revolution against British rule, 
embarking immediately on an even more accelerated course of rapid 
modernization, secularisation and capitalization than the country had ever 
witnessed before. Any wonder now, why the counter reaction made itself felt 
at the end of that same decade? Furthermore, since the formative process of 
Islamic Modernism embodied in a single moment the element of a theologico-
legal reformation, a literary intellectual renaissance, a rationalist-scientific 
enlightenment of sorts, and a politico-ideological adjournment, it should come 
as no surprise if the overall Islamic counter-reaction should, also, define its 
self substantively as an anti-reformation, an anti-renaissance, an anti-
enlightenment and an anti-adjournment, all at one and the same time. 
Nonetheless, one should never lose sight of the fact that in the dialectics of 
history, counter-reformations are hardly ever either mere reactions or pure and 
simple restorations, for they are "reformations" in their own right, but on their 
own terms and within their own turf. In other words, when one speaks of 
counter-reformations, in these instances, the emphasis should fall on the 
"reformation" aspect of the process and equation, and not just on its "counter" 
side. The Islamic counter-reformation is no exception to this rule; for here 
also the past is really invoked not for its own sake, but for rectifying a 
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perceived rotten present and securing a precarious future. How successful 
such a counter-reformation can be in practice is, of course, a question of a 
different order. 
This whole issue has been obfuscated by the inherited hostile gazes of 
Christendom and Islamdom vis-a-vis each other, each regarding the other as 
the menacing Other per se, and as the anti-self par excellence; all on account 
of the long history of conquests and counter-conquests that have characterized 
traditional relationships between the two realms. However, this outward 
hostility, exclusion and otherness should not be allowed either to eclipse or 
distort a certain more basic and abiding truth. One shall try to explain 
meaning via the simplest and most convincing argument one can think of. 
The contemporary West prides itself on the Judeo-Christian tradition on the 
one hand and the Greco-Roman heritage on the other. Now, historically, 
theologically and in every other way possible, Islam is an offshoot and 
development of that Judeo-Christian tradition (it even conceives of itself as 
such), and is certainly far closer to the latter's two components than they can 
ever be to the unadulterated Greco-Roman heritage. In fact a more accurate 
regrouping of these categories would give us the Judeo-Christian-Islamic 
tradition on the one hand (with powerful affinities of every conceivable type, 
both positive and negative, among its constituents), and the Greco-Roman 
heritage on the other. Similarly, Middle Eastern Islamdom has never been 
innocent of the Greco-Roman influences, mediations and admixtures, as the 
standing enmity of the two realms seems to instantaneously suggest. After all, 
geographical Syria has more Roman ruins and reminders than Rome itself. 
Islam descended on Byzantium no less than on a culturally Hellenised 
Christian Middle East, while Hellenism underlay in varying degrees: the 
scholastic reason of Eastern Christianity, the scholastic reason of Islam, and 
the scholastic reason of Western Christianity (this is also the period of the 
greater Talmudic codification of Judaism). They all share Plato, Aristotle and 
Plotinus on the one hand, and Adam, Abraham and Moses on the other. 
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CHAPTER 2: COMPARING CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISM AND 
ISLAMISM 
The Syllabus of Modern Errors 
At a more concrete and comparative level, one would like to support and 
illustrate my general argument by taking up two particularly interesting 
instances, (a) the most important Christian fundamentalist document of its 
time, viz., The Syllabus of Modern Errors 106, issued by Pope Pius IX in 1864 
( after many years in preparation and drafting), and (b) the fundamentalist 
movement of Dominion Theology in the United States of America. 
One shall also draw on the teachings and preachings of Archbishop Marcel 
Lefebvre, the leader of the most prominent dissident fundamentalist Roman 
Catholic movement in Europe and the United States since the 1970s (now 
excommunicated). He vigorously combated the Papacy, church, theology, and 
clergy of the Second Vatican Council (1962) and after. Lefebvre's doctrines, 
views and criticisms are now available to the reader in two books, whose 
titles speak for themselves: They Have Uncrowned Him: From Liberalism to 
Apostasy The Conciliar Tragedy107, and Archbishop Lefebvre and the Vatican: 
1987-1988. 108 
For purposes of comparison one shall depend primarily on the documents and 
writings of Egypt's insurrectionary Islamists as compiled and published by 
Rif at Sayyed Ahmed; partly because their contents remain under-used by 
Western specialists, observers and commentators, but more importantly 
106 'The Syllabus of the Principal Errors of our Times', in G. A. Kertesz, Documents in the 
Political History of the European Continent, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968, pp. 
233- 241. 
107 Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, They Have Uncrowned Him: From Liberalism to Apostasy 
the Conciliar Tragedy, The Angelus Press Inc., Dickinson, Texas, 2°d printing, 1988. I 
will refer to this book in the thesis by the letter (U) followed by the page references. 
108 Father Francois Laisney, Archbishop Lefebvre and the Vatican: 1987-1988, The 
Angelus Press Inc., Dickinson, Texas, 1989. 
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because they represent the Islamists' ideas, teachings, analyses, plans, 
critiques, judgments, polemics and overall mind-set in their most pristine and 
unmediated form. As these documents and writings were never meant either 
for publication or unrestricted general circulation, but only for the internal 
organizational use of the Islamists themselves (recruiting and training 
members, ideological unity and self-clarification, etc.), they possess revealing 
qualities of radicalism, openness, authenticity, tactlessness and want of both 
honest and dishonest dissimulation that books, interviews, pamphlets, 
sermons and recorded cassettes (meant for the eyes and ears of the outside 
world and general public) necessarily lack. In other words, not having been 
moderated as yet by considerations of outward political circumspection, the 
tactical adjustment of limited means to forbidding ends and the restraining 
influence of temporary accommodation to hated existing realities, the 
contents of these documents remain raw, simplistic, unabashed and without 
the least trace of affectation. 
This comes out clearest in the Islamists' harsh and sharp polemics against the 
outside world, the encircling socio-cultural environment, as well as against 
each other. For example, The Absent Commandment, referred to in Chapter 
One, contains not only detailed refutations, critiques and negative evaluations 
of the theses and methods of all the other Islamist groups and organizations 
active in Egypt at the time, but also a general polemic against all of them as 
well. Furthermore, the records of the trials, interrogations and responses of 
President Sadat's assassins possess similar qualities, considering that the 
defendants spoke their minds and convictions fearlessly and with total 
frankness; knowing they were doomed men who had nothing to fear or lose, 
and believing unshakably in what they were doing and in the absolute 
rightness and final triumph of their cause. 109 
109 Rifat Sayyed Ahmad, Al-Jslambouli: a New View of the Jihad Organization, Cairo: 
Kabuli Publishers, 1988, (in Arabic). See also the same author's Why They Killed Sadat? 
The Story of the Jihad Organization: A Study and Documents in the Political Thought of 
Khaled al-Islambouli and Abboud al- Zamor, Cairo: Tounal Publishers and Distributors, 
1986, (in Arabic). 
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As an index or catalogue of the 80 heresies condemned by the head of the 
Roman Catholic Church, the Syllabus of Modern Errors is modelled, 
interestingly enough, on the war waged by an early Church father known as 
Epiphanius of Constantia (Cyprus) against the 80 pagan-inspired heresies he 
identified as plaguing the Church in the first three centuries of its life. More 
particularly, Epiphanius was vehemently reacting against Origen's legacy and 
the penetration of the Church by Greco-Roman culture, leading to the 
proliferation of all sorts of "grievous errors and vicious heresies," Arianism 
being the most prominent among them. The point to keep in mind in this 
connection is the implication that the Syllabus was similarly a product of Pius' 
vehement reaction and valiant struggle against the renewed pernicious 
penetration of the Church by the pagan culture of European modernity, 
leading again to the proliferation of another set of 80 "most grievous errors, 
vicious heresies and depraved innovations" threatening the life of 
contemporary "Christendom". 
The publication of the Syllabus aroused the most violent debates and polemics 
in Europe. In fact liberal Europe regarded it, then, as a declaration of war by 
the Catholic Church on modern society and civilization, leading to an 
intensified general Kulturkampf against the Papacy, particularly in Bismarck's 
Germany. 
The Syllabus, along with the introductory Encyclical letter, the vanous 
Consistorial Allocutions, Encyclical and Apostolic Letters on which it is 
based and to which it constantly refers, plus the doctrinal constitution Pastor 
Aeternus (Eternal Shepherd) promulgated by the First Vatican Council in 
1870, are all meant to "reprobate, denounce and condemn generally and 
particularly the most grievous errors, heresies and deprived fictions of 
innovators," such as materialism, rationalism, naturalism, pantheism, 
secularism, communism, socialism, liberalism, latitudinarianism, 
Americanism, indifferentism, pietism, modernism, democracy, civil society 
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(as a religiously neutral arena), scientism, freedom of conscience, the cult of 
religious tolerance, the principles of civil and religious liberty, the separation 
of Church and state, civil marriage, secular education, etc. Conversely, a few 
of these condemned heresies require brief explanations. 
Latitudinarianism refers to the reform movement in the Church of England, 
which argued that the texts of Holy Scriptures allow for latitude of 
interpretation and proof based on reason as opposed to the pure authority of 
tradition. The debate within the Church over "Americanism" refers to those 
Bishops and priests in Europe and the United States who showed excessive 
zeal for constitutionally protected civil and religious liberties, and who 
pointed to the American Catholic Church as a model for reorganizing the 
Church's relations in Europe with such novel developments as secular states, 
democratic governments, rapid scientific progress, new critical scholarly 
methods of dealing with holy Scriptures and the history of Christianity, and 
all the rest. Although the Syllabus did not explicitly condemn Americanism or 
mention it by name, it did so in substance. It was left to Pope Leo XIII to 
make the implicit explicit by bringing the Church debates over this tendency 
to a conclusion by declaring Americanism, in 1899, a heresy which 
constitutes "a complete synthesis of contemporary errors". Thus the 
Americanists were accused, by the Catholic fundamentalist reaction, of 
undermining the faith and subverting the authority of the Church by "this 
combination of Catholicism and democracy", by supporting "liberals and 
evolutionists" and by "talking forever of liberty, respect for the individual's 
initiative, natural virtues and sympathy for our age". 
Indifferentism refers to the view that all religions, sects, and confessions are 
(a) equal before the state, and (b) stand on the same footing as to their validity 
and truth-claims ( except for their own adherents). Pietism refers generally to 
those who regard religion as a strictly private matter, and more particularly to 
those who regard its essence as an inward, personal and individual affair of 
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the heart which may or may not have any consequences for the outside world 
Uustification by faith alone versus by works also). 
The condemned Modernism is part of what is usually known as "The 
Modernist Crisis in the Catholic Church", spanning the papacies of Pius IX, 
Leo XIII and Pius X. It is basically a 19th century phenomenon ( on the 
assumption that the 19th century ended in Europe in 1914 ), arising out of the 
Church's head-on collision with Europe's powerful secular and secularising 
states (particularly Italy and Germany), the scandalous conflict between 
Catholic teachings and modern science (particularly Darwinism and higher 
Biblical criticism) and the as-yet unmediated contradiction between religion 
in general, on the one hand, and secular modern culture and its institutions on 
the other. The Modernist crisis reached its climax in 1907, when Pius X 
declared it not just a heresy but "the synthesis of all heresies" and denounced 
the Modernists as "true children and inheritors of the older heretics" and the 
perpetrators of a "deliberate conspiracy to destroy the Church". In fact the 
arsenal of weapons brandished by The Church Fundamentalist against all the 
said errors, innovations and heresies of modern times, include (in addition to 
the Syllabus), the promulgation of the doctrines of the Immaculate 
Conception and Papal Supremacy and Infallibility, as official Roman Catholic 
dogma (First Vatican Council 1870), and the later explicit condemnation of 
the two super-heresies of Americanism and Modernism, as mentioned earlier. 
The Jahiliyyah of the Twentieth Century 
Although one can assume with certainty that the Arab World's Muslim 
Fundamentalists - from their master theoretician and ideologist Sayyed Qutb 
to the assassins of President Sadat and including the mainstream Muslim 
Brotherhood - have never heard of the Syllabus of Errors or given a second 
thought to Pius IX and/or any other pope, still their pronouncements, 
documents, books, manifestoes and practices give one, interestingly enough, a 
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no less ringing condemnation and emphatic rejection of exactly the same 
errors, heresies and bida' (innovations) of modernity that one find in the 
Syllabus itself. 
Because classical Islam has had its Origens and his like, the Muslim 
Epiphaniuses denounced with similar power of penetration of Islamic 
theology, doctrine, scholarship and learning by the pagan and Christianised 
Greek and Hellenistic culture of the old world that the Arab Muslims had only 
recently conquered. Thus the great theologian of orthodoxy, al-Ghazali, 
unknowingly continued the same old Epiphanian struggle by producing his 
own "syllabus" of the twenty major errors committed by the Grecophile 
philosophers of Islam (for example al-Kindi, al-Farabi and Avicenna), in a 
famous work appropriately entitled The Destruction of the Philosophers. 
Seventeen of these errors were denounced by al-Ghazali as heretical bida', 
while the remaining three were consigned to the sphere of out-and-out 
apostasy or infidelity (kufr). 
The present-day radical Islamists such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizbullah 
and Al-Qaeda etc are even more violent and vociferous than the Syllabus of 
Errors in condemning their century's culture, civilization and society for 
paganism, apostasy, Godlessness and unbelief. This is their doctrine of the 
Jahiliyyah of the 20th Century, first formulated by the Indian theologian, 
theoretician and Muslim activist Mawdudi, and later elaborated and 
popularised in the Arab world by Sayyed Qutb and his brother Muhammad 
Qutb, especially in the latter's fat volume, The Jahiliyyah of the Twentieth 
Century. 110 More recently a judge intervened in the public debate on this issue 
by publishing in Cairo another volume on the subject entitled, Introduction to 
the Jurisprudence of the Contemporary Jahiliyyah; 111 to which Fahrni 
110 Qutb, M., The Jahiliyyah of the Twentieth Century, Wahba Publishers: Cairo, 1964. 
111 Judge Abdul-Jawad Yasin, Muqqadimahfi Fiqh al-Jahiliyyah al-Mu'asirah, 
(Introduction to the Jurisprudence of the Contemporary Jahiliyyah), Cairo, 1986. 
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Huweidi replied in three articles that appeared in Egypt's foremost newspaper, 
al-Ahram. 112 In other words, the 20th century is simply declared an age of 
paganism, Godlessness, idolatry and false belief, more pervasive, dangerous, 
sinister and threatening to Allah's true religion than the earlier Jahiliyyah that 
Islam first confronted and triumphed over. The Tunisian Islamists make the 
direct connection between the modem and ancient Jahiliyyahs explicit in the 
following declaration: 
If in the ages of backwardness, the tyrants hid behind the idols of Al-
Lat, Manat, Hubal, and Baal [the pre-Islamic gods of Arabia], then 
freedom, democracy, equality, nationalism, humanism, progressivism, 
are the modern idols behind which [today's] tyrants hide the darkness 
of their souls and the ugliness of their deeds. 113 
In his Epistle of the Faith, Saleh Sirriyah denounces nationalism and 
patriotism as forms of this regression to the pre-Islamic age of Paganism and 
Jahiliyyah. 114 Similarly, an Islamist manifesto of 1987, entitled The 
Philosophy of Confrontation explains the aims of the militants adhering to its 
philosophy in the following unambiguous words: "We want to declare war on 
modern paganism and modern idolatry which have spread in our countries 
and in most of the countries of the Islamists, in imitation of atheistic and 
pagan Europe, just as our good predecessors fought ancient paganism and 
ancient idolatry" .115 Obviously the Islamists understand very well, that what is 
happening to their countries and societies, on this score, is an extension of 
what had already come to pass in European societies and the capitalist and 
communist West in general. 
112 Fahrni Huweidi, 'Jahiliyyah Doctrine' in al-Ahram Daily Newspaper, August 5, I 2, I 9, 
I 986, p. 7. 
113 Abdel-Latif El-Hermasi, The Islamic Movements in Tunisia, Tunis: Bayram Publishers, 
I 985 (in Arabic), p. I I 1. 
114 Vol. I, p. 44. 
115 Vol. II, p. 296. 
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It is useful to emphasize here that the first section of the Syllabus is devoted 
to the denunciation of exactly the same pernicious errors, viz., (a) the atheism 
of 19th century Europe as in the condemned proposition that "There exists no 
Divine Power, Supreme Being ... and Providence distinct from the Universe", 
(b) its paganism in the two most dominant forms, then, "Naturalism and 
Pantheism", and (c) its idolatry in the form of the fetishisation of human 
reason's supremacy ("Absolute Rationalism" in the terminology of Section I 
of the Syllabus), as in the condemned proposition that: "reason is the master 
rule by which man can and ought to arrive at the knowledge of all truths of 
every kind". In addition, the introductory Encyclical to the Syllabus does not 
short-change the Islamists concerning the emphasis on the continuity of 
current fundamentalist efforts to stamp out the modern versions of the above-
mentioned ancient evils and damned heresies, with glorious deeds of the 
"good predecessors and ancestors"; and with "the illustrious founders whom 
they venerate upon their altar, and who constituted these societies under the 
inspiration of God" .116 
Shukri Mustafa, the leader of one of the most radical of the Islamist 
organizations in Egypt, known as: "The Excommunication and Emigration 
Group", denounced "modern civilization" as "the high idol now worshipped 
on earth instead of Allah," 117 putting us all before the utterly exclusive choice 
of serving either the one or the other but not both. 118 In fact, like the Syllabus, 
Shirk Mustafa declared both institutional war on, and a Kulturkampf against, 
this innovation called modernity and modernization. If anything, the attacks 
of Islamists seem more mean-spirited and vicious than their Catholic 
counterparts. While this "modern civilization" was unquestionably indigenous 
116 Ibid. See note 1 above. 
117 Ibid. p. 119. 
118 Ibid. p. 120. 
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to Europe and Christendom, it seemed totally alien and external to Islam in 
the eyes of these protectors of Islamdom. 
At present Monsignor Lefebvre is the principle defender of the continuing 
validity and relevance of the Syllabus of errors, adopting unreservedly every 
one of its condemnations. His favourite and most quoted Popes are Pius IX, 
Leo XIII and Pius X (the fraternity he leads carries the name, "The Priestly 
Society of St. Pius X). In fact he denounced the Vatican II Papacy because it 
represents the exact opposite of what the Syllabus stands for; having been 
taken over by the very forces of evil that his preferred Popes were struggling 
to protect the Church and Christianity against. So like the Islamists, 
Lefebvre's fundamentalism discredits all these modern developments by tying 
them to ancient paganism in three steps: 
(a) By propagating the doctrine of the Jahiliyyah of Islamic century in 
such words as: "To be sure, to live in a time of apostasy has in itself 
nothing of an exalting nature! Let us ponder nevertheless that all the 
times and all the centuries belong to our Lord Jesus Christ... This 
century of apostasy, without doubt in a different way from the 
centuries of faith, belongs to Jesus Christ. On the one hand, the 
apostasy of the great number manifests the heroic fidelity of the small 
b ,, 119 num er .... 
(b) By invoking the past model of the Alexandrian Arian heresy of the 
fourth century (pagan to the core) given its roots in the Origenistic 
tradition and the Hellenistic philosophical teachings of the time. 120 
Thus Lefebvre denounces the Conciliar Church in terms that are as 
historically suggestive as those used by the Tunisian Islamists quoted 
above: 
And behold! Instead of magnifying the royalty of Our Lord Jesus 
Christ, a pantheon of all religions is instituted! Just as the pagan 
119 .• 
U, p. XVII. 
120 Lefebvre and the Vatican, pp. 250-251. 
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emperors of Rome had made that pantheon of all the religions, today it 
is the Roman authorities of the Church who are doing it! 121 
At the same time his followers intentionally compare him to Bishop 
Anthanasius "who, in times of similar general blindness in heresy (Arianism), 
was one of the few bishops to refuse with vigor to take any part in the politics 
of Pope Liberius, who favouring heresy ... ". 122 
(c) By contrasting the origins of the Jahiliyyah of European modernity and 
culture as a whole to "Protestant and Renaissance Naturalism" (via the French 
Revolution), which are then, traced back in their turn to the paganism of 
antiquity. 123 Even the Sistine Chapel does not escape Lefebvre's censure: 
Under a pretext of art, they determined to introduce then everywhere, 
even in the churches, that nudism- we can speak without exaggeration 
of nudism - which triumphs in the Sistine Capel in Rome. Without 
doubt, looked at front point of view of art, those works have their 
value; but they have, alas, above all a carnal aspect of exaltation of the 
flesh that is really opposed to the teaching of the Gospel: "For the flesh 
covets against the spirit", says Saint Paul, "and the spirit militates 
against the flesh". 124 
No Islamist could disagree, though s/he may want to supply his/her own 
sacred quotations against nudity and the exaltation of the flesh. 
For another example, take the last item in the Syllabus, which condemns the 
proposition, that: "The Roman Pontiff can, and ought, to reconcile himself to, 
and agree with progress, liberalism, and civilization as lately introduced". 
Now translate the above to Islamic idiom by simply substituting for the 
121 Ibid. p. 15. 
122 Ibid. p. 234. 
123 U, pp. 3-11 
124 Ibid. p. 4. 
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"Roman Pontiff', the "Rector of al-Azhar" or simply "al-Azhar", and you will 
get exactly what Shukri Mustafa and his followers and comrades have been 
condemning for some time and inveighing against in their writings, speeches 
and adversarial practices. In fact all the Islamists attack al-Azhar and 
denounce its leadership and elite for having succumbed over the years the 
very forces and influences that Pope Pius IX was trying to keep at bay. Thus, 
Shukri Mustafa justified to the court his group's condemnation of the 
venerable Azhari Sheikh al-Zahabi, Minister of Religious Endowments for 
kufr (apostasy or infidelity) and his eventual abduction and "execution", by 
citing the fact that the victim had "worked for the Ministry of Religious 
Endowments, become its Minister, acted as the director responsible for "the 
mosques of mischief and infidelity" and vowed to rule in accordance with 
things other than what God had commanded, when he took his ministerial 
oath". Then Shukri Mustafa stressed that all this was not out of any ignorance 
on the victim's part of his "obligation to rule according to what God had 
commanded". 125 
Again, take item XIII of the Syllabus, which condemns the proposition that 
"The method and principles by which the old scholastic Doctors cultivate 
theology; are no longer suitable to the demands of the age and the progress of 
science". Translate the above to Islamic idiom by substituting for "Doctors," 
"Fuqaha" or "Imams" and you will have exactly what Shukri Mustafa and his 
like are both censuring, rebelling against and affirming in its stead, at one and 
the same time. 
The following is a translation of typically extreme positions adopted by 
Shukri Mustafa concerning not only the above issues, but also the whole 
problem of the idolatry of human reason, its supremacy and arrogance, 
particularly in its most prevalent form at present, i.e., modern scientific 
reason: 







( 1) "I say, he who thinks that the burdens of building modern 
civilization are not in conflict with the commandments of worshipping 
God, and he who thinks it is possible for the Western scientists and 
builders of civilization to be also obedient servants of God at one and 
the same time, simply testifies to his own shamelessness and insolence; 
for they [the Western scientists] are the ones who have forsaken the 
other world in favour of this one" .126 
(2) "Was it really possible for the Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions - the hermits of the night and knights of the day, in God's 
service - to be also physicists, mathematicians, pioneers of space 
exploration and makers of modern civilization?"127 
(3) "For thirteen years in Mecca, Allah's Prophet taught the Muslims 
Islam and nothing but Islam, neither astronomy, nor mathematics, nor 
physics, nor philosophy; where are those imposters who claim that 
Islam can not be established unless it becomes a pupil of the European 
sciences?" 128 
( 4) "The knowledge willed by God for us so we do not exceed our 
bounds - i.e., so we remain obedient slaves of His - and the knowledge 
commanded by the Prophet on every Muslim - for the purpose of 
worshipping Allah - is the knowledge of the other world and no 
more". 129 
(5) "Concerning the question of science (knowledge), it remains for 
me to say that the whole of humanity that went astray and that God 
destroyed, prided itself on nothing but its science, and was able to exalt 
itself above God through nothing but the fruit of a science, cut off from 
the worship of God alone and no one else". 130 
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(6) "We do not reject learning the number of the years and arithmetic 
connected to God's worship and within its confines ... hence, all 
arithmetical knowledge which does not serve that worship is definitive 
idolatry and definitive deification [i.e., deification of man]". 131 
Here is Shukri Mustafa's appropriate Islamic idiom of the following 
pronouncement of Pope Leo XII, a' propos of his condemnation of the heresy 
of Americanism in 1899: 
First, efforts to adapt the church's teachings to the modem world are 
misguided because, as the Vatican Council made clear, the Catholic 
faith is not a philosophical theory that human beings can elaborate, but 
a divine deposit that is to be faithfully guarded and infallibly 
declared. 132 
In fact one have here instances of a simple translatability test which shows 
that core Christian Fundamentalist theses and representative propositions and 
positions, can be readily and accurately Islamised to express equally core 
Islamist Fundamentalist theses and representative propositions and positions; 
without so much as needing more than a few minor terminological 
modifications and formal substitutions. This is why the list of modem idols 
one saw condemned in the Syllabus and denounced by the Tunisian Islamists 
quoted above will continue to repeat itself like a refrain - with minor 
variations and some expansions and extractions - in the fundamentalist 
teachings, preachings and thunderings of the other Islamists, as well as of 
Monsignor Lefebvre's movement and its adherents and spokesmen. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Lester R. Kurtz, The Politics of Heresy, Berkeley, CA: University of California, Press, 
1986, p. 47. 
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Consider for the moment, Lefebvre's attacks: (a) on "the independence of 
reason and science in regard to faith" (italics in the original) 133, (b) on "the 
independence of man, with regard to God" 134, (c) on "the dethroning of God 
and putting man in His place" 135, (d) on "the idol of the 'cult of man', 
established in the sanctuary and sitting as if it were God" 136, ( e) on liberals 
who "wanting to be free from God, become slaves to earthly things!" and 
"reject God's Supremacy ... and set up a new absolute: Liberty!" in His 
place137, and (f) his appeal to the Christian martyrs "who understood that man 
is not first, but God is first and must be given pride of place in our life, in our 
families, in our countries ... ". 138 What more does one need to call the Islamist 
movement a genuinely Fundamentalist phenomenon? 
Although the Muslim partisans of the Jahiliyyah doctrine have not produced 
as yet a single unified list detailing the errors, heresies, and depraved 
innovations of the age, A' la al-Ghazali's index and/or Pius' Syllabus, their 
writings, teachings, documents and manifestoes leave no doubt that they are 
out to destroy and eliminate from the live contemporary Arab states, society 
and culture, their local and much weaker versions of modern materialism, 
secularism, liberalism, socialism, communism, latitudinarianism, modernism, 
indifferentism, pietism, democracy, religious tolerance, secular education, 
civil society (as a religiously neutral arena), and the de facto prevailing 
respect for the principles of religious liberty. 
Let me note in passing that while the Syllabus condemned "these most fatal 
errors of Socialism and Communism", Egypt's celebrated tele-evangelist, 
Sheikh Mutawalli Sha'rawi, related the following incident before the millions 
watching his show: "When I learned of the Arab defeat in 1967 (the Six Day 
133 U,p.21. 
134 Ibid. p. 24. 
135 Ibid. p. 29. 
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War), I prayed twice to Allah thanking him for what had passed; and when 
my son asked me, 'how can you thank Allah for the defeat of the fatherland?' I 
replied, 'a victory, my son, would have tempted us away from our religion in 
favour of communism"'. 139 
Abboud al-Zomor, a member of the Al-Hijra wal Takfir cell of the Jihad 
organisation that masterminded and carried out President Sadat's 
assassination, castigates Arab leaders for having committed all the following 
unforgivable sins: 
[The rulers] have turned their backs on Allah's Book, and raised, first, 
the banner of democracy calling for secularism, patriotism, 
nationalism, parliamentarianism, personal freedom, the use cosmetics 
[by women], and the intermingling of the sexes ... then they proceeded 
to raise the banner of socialism, shouting "long live socialism, freedom 
and unity", and to call for progress, upward development and the 
liberation of Palestine ... 140 
Similarly, Saleh Sirriyah, leader of the attempted Islamist armed seizure of the 
Technical Military Academy in Heliopolis near Cairo in 1974, declared the 
apostasy of anyone who believes in such things as; "materialism, 
existentialism, pragmatism, ... democracy, capitalism, socialism, patriotism, 
nationalism, and internationalism" 141 ; and then proceeded to define secularism 
as "collective apostasy" .142 
In the same vein, The Charter of Islamic Action declared a holy war (literally 
and not just figuratively) against secularism, (a) "as a call for the separation of 
state and religion," (b) "as a doctrine, idea, regime and rule", ( c) "in 
legislation, government, the judiciary, education, information and the media", 
139 Al-Watan al-Arabi Weekly Magazine, March 17, 1989, p. 22. 
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and (d) as a "call to socialism, liberalism, nationalism and shu'ubism" (a 
pejorative code word for communism). 143 
Their Connections 
Let me note in this connection that article LV of The Syllabus of Errors 
condemns the proposition that "the Church ought to be separated from the 
State and the State from the Church", in addition to the entirety of its 
consequences such as: the destablishment of Catholicism's hegemony over not 
just "individual men, but nations, peoples, and sovereigns", "the exclusion of 
religion from the life of civil society", the notion that "the entire direction of 
public schools ... may and must appertain to civil power and belong to it...", the 
idea that "there is no necessity that human laws should receive their sanction 
from God", the conception saying that "the Republic is the origin and source 
of all rights ... ", and those" ... not content with abolishing religion in public 
society ... desire further to banish it from families and private lives". Exactly 
like the radical Islamists, Syllabus denounced its manifold enemies for 
"promising liberty, while they are themselves the slaves of corruption", and as 
men "animated and excited by the spirit of Satan" thus "arriving at an excess 
of impiety". Like them also, it speaks of the "terrible conspiracy of Islamist 
adversaries against the Catholic Church" (Islam), and condemns the abolition 
of "Ecclesiastical Courts" (Shari'a Courts, abolished by Nasser in Egypt and 
by Mustafa Kemal before him in Turkey). 
The Islamists similarly condemn present-day Arab governments because they 
"do not mean by Islam a total way of life", but only "acts of worship; 
imitating in that the states of the Christians", where "man becomes free to 
worship or not to worship his God". They further denounce as "apostate, he 
who holds that Islam is no more than a matter of acts of worship", and those 
who "want to insulate Islam from the affairs of society and to isolate it inside 
143 Ibid. p. 173. 
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the mosque - after the fashion of what the Western states did to the Church -
thus prohibiting Islam from interfering in social and economic matters as well 
as the rest of life's affairs; and leaving the field free to communism, socialism, 
and the Jewish declarations on society's other problems, as in the cases of 
Freud, Durkheim, Marx and others". 144 
Thus The Epistle of Faith of Saleh Sirriyah states, "apostate is he who raises 
the slogan 'religion belongs to God, while the fatherland belongs to all' 
because both religion and the fatherland belongs to the Lord of the creation 
and because those who raise that slogan not only refuse to submit themselves 
to religion's rule but want religion to submit to theirs" .145 Similarly, The 
Document of Islamic Revival addresses the subject by speaking pejoratively, 
sarcastically, and dismissively of "those patriots, Westernised with secular 
patriotism" 146, while the document titled The Position of the Islamic 
Movement vis-a-vis Political Parties in Egypt, attacks the Wafd Party -
Egypt's classical bourgeois party which led the nation against colonial rule -
for its secularism, and more specifically for having raised the banner of 
Christian-Muslim Egyptian national unity under such slogans as: "religion 
belongs to God while the fatherland belongs to all" and "the embrace (or hug) 
of the Crescent and Cross" .147 
Interestingly enough, this kind of Muslim-Christian "ecumenism" is even 
more thoroughly denounced by Monsignor than by the Islamists, particularly 
in his attack on what he calls "The Reign of Religious Indifferentism", 
legitimated by the Second Vatican Council. He sarcastically speaks of Vatican 
II, inviting "Our Lord to come and organize and enliven society, in concert 
with Luther, Mohammed, and Buddha!" And then he adds: 
144 Ibid. pp. 40, 41 and 45. 
145 Ibid. p. 45. 
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"To each his religion!" it is said. Or, "The Catholic religion is good for 
Catholics, but the Moslem one is good for Moslems!" Such is the 
motto of the citizens of the indifferentist City. How do you expect 
them to think otherwise, when the Church of Vatican II teaches them 
that other religions "are not devoid of significance and of value in the 
mystery of salvation"? How do you expect them to consider the other 
religions differently, when the State grants to all of them the same 
liberty? 148 
Again the Islamists do totally embrace a literal Muslim vers10n of the 
condemnation of the following proposition in item XV of the Syllabus of 
Errors: "Everyone is free to adopt and profess that religion which he, guided 
by the light of reason, holds to be true". The Islamists are certainly more than 
a match for this Papal Fundamentalism when they reject categorically and on 
grounds of apostasy (punishable by death), (a) the notion that a person is (or 
should be) "free to worship or not to worship his God" 149, and (b) the wicked 
indifferentism which fails to distinguish sharply and clearly between "faith 
and apostasy, right and wrong", and which lets "he who wishes to believe in 
any doctrine to do so, and he who wishes to renege his Islam to do so also, 
without any punishment or reproach ... and which gives the right to he who 
accepts communism to call for it...". 150 
Of course, the Syllabus had made the same point by censuring the "pest of 
indifferentism and its representatives," who show no regard for the 
"distinction between true and false religion"; and by denouncing those who 
hold "that the best condition of human society is that wherein no duty is 
recognized by the Government of correcting, by enacted penalties, the 
148 U,pp.210-211. 
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violators of the Catholic religion, except when the maintenance of the public 
peace requires it". 
It is commonly known that Islamists are uncompromisingly calling for the 
formal, official and unambiguous reestablishment of Islam as the one and 
only recognized religion in Muslim countries; and for the prohibition and 
suppression of all "ideas that disagree with Allah's religion and law ... such as 
calling for atheism, depravity and innovation" .151 Interestingly enough, the 
Syllabus has similarly condemned in item LXXVII the proposition that "in the 
present-day it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion shall be held as 
the only Religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other modes of 
Worship". 
The very identical fundamentalist logic of Monsignor Lefebvre declares 
freedom of religion, (a) "Absurd ... because it grants the same rights to truth 
and to error, to the true religion and to the heretical sects", and (b) 
"blasphemous ... because it 'concedes to all religions equality under the law' 
and 'puts the holy and immaculate Spouse of Christ on the level of the 
heretical sects and even of Jewish perfidy"' (italics in the original) 152. His 
conclusion states, "In a Catholic country, one is well entitled to prevent the 
false forms of worship from being publicly displayed, to limit their 
propaganda!" 153 And still more forcefully: 
... And not the state have the duty, and therefore the right, to safeguard 
the religious unity of citizens in the true religion and to protect the 
Catholic souls against scandal and the propagation of religious error 
and, for these reasons only, to limit the practice of the false cults, even 
to prohibit them if need be? (Italics in the original). 154 
Ultimately, both sides share profoundly: 
151 Ibid. 
152 8 U, p. 7 . 
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(a) The fundamentalist conviction that real liberty of conscience means 
not only condoning, but also promoting falsehood, error, heresy and 
indifference to God's true religion; or in Lefebvre's words, "only truth 
has rights; error has no rights" and Catholicism alone is true. 155 
(b) The cynical practice of demanding that their faith be instituted as 
the sole established religion of the states and countries where Catholics 
and/or Muslims are in the majority; while appealing to the same 
discredited principle of the liberty of conscience where their flocks 
happen to be in the minority, as in Russia, India and China. 
Monsignor Lefebvre concurs quoting approvingly the following "principled" 
argument offered by Father Garrigou-Lagrange: 
We can ... make of the liberty of worship an argument ad hominem 
against those who, while proclaiming the liberty of worship, persecute 
the Church (secular and socialising states) or impede its worship 
directly or indirectly ( communist states and Islamic ones, etc.). This 
argument ad hominem is fair, and the Church does not disdain it, using 
it to defend effectively the right of its own liberty. But it does not 
follow that the freedom of cults, considered in itself, is maintainable 
for Catholics as a principle, because in itself is absurd and impious: 
indeed, truth and error cannot have the same rights (italics in the 
original). 156 
Small wonder, then, that this Papal Fundamentalism described the 
"Fundamental Law" of the Austro-Hungarian Empire ( 1867), decreeing 
"freedom of belief, conscience and doctrine", as "an abominable 
development"; while declaring the provisions of the same law, giving 
members of any religion in the realm the right to set up their schools ( even in 
the totally Catholic provinces), null and void. The Islamists affirm exactly the 
155 Ibid. p.190. 
156 Ibid 
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same monopolistic claims and exclusivist demands on behalf of their religion; 
and make no bones about their readiness to rigorously implement all that, if 
and when they seize power. In fact Fahrni Huweidi, the moderate Islamist 
thinker we came across earlier, did argue frankly that wherever Muslims are 
in the majority the state should be thoroughly Islamised and wherever they 
are in the minority it should remain secular and resolutely separated from and 
independent of the religion of the majority. 
It follows naturally that both this old Papal Fundamentalism and its newer 
Islamist counterpart keenly seek to re-establish control over public education 
and exercise strict censorship over what is taught, published, projected and/or 
shown to make sure that nothing is disseminated that is contrary either to 
"true religion" or to "good morals". Thus Saleh Sirriyah writes in his Epistle 
of the Faith (castigating the present-day governments of Muslim countries), 
"The Islamic state is one whose objective is to carry the mission of Islam; to 
spread it and apply it in total, internally and externally ... This is to prevail over 
all the state apparatuses and all the affairs of life. All information would be, 
then, at the service of the Islamic mission; and nothing contrary to Islam 
would be broadcast or published. The purpose of education would be to 
graduate generations, ( a) that believe in Islam, (b) that know it well, ( c) that 
accept it as their arbitrator, and ( d) that sacrifice for its sake. So, all curricula 
would be turned in that direction, including the scientific ones. No man would 
hold responsibility in the affairs of information and education unless he is a 
missionary for Islam" .157 
Items XLV-XLVII of the Syllabus are neither ambiguous nor lenient in their 
censure of secular public education. For example, they condemn the 
proposition that the entire direction of public schools, in which the youth of 
Christian States are educated ... may and must appertain to the civil power, and 
belong to it so far that no other authority whatsoever that shall be recognized 
157 Vol. I, p. 41. 
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as having any right to interfere in the discipline of the schools, the 
arrangement of the studies, the taking of degrees, or the choice and approval 
of the teachers. 
Lefebvre, for his part, strongly endorses his favourite Popes when they affirm; 
that "the Catholic State does not have the right to permit such liberties, like 
religious liberty, freedom of the press, and freedom of education" .158 
In similar fashion, Islamists devote a considerable amount of space in their 
documents, programs and propaganda to the denunciation of the entire public 
education system in the Muslim countries, not on account of its palpable 
failures and miserable shortcomings, but primarily on account of the 
predominantly modern and secular orientation of its curricula, methods of 
teaching, subject matter taught, pedagogical theory, school and university 
organization and so on. Even al-Azhar and its successive elites of 'ulama' and 
clerical leaders have been vehemently attacked and severely criticized by the 
Islamists for allowing the "corruption and heresy" of secular education to 
infiltrate the traditional fort and guardian of Muslim learning, doctrine and 
orthodoxy. In fact their castigation of al-Azhar is in many ways similar to 
Monsignor Marcel Lefebvre's censure of the post Vatican II Papacy for having 
betrayed the faith. 
For example, at Shukri Mustafa's trial, the defendant took up at length this 
whole educational question (al Azhar's situation and role) while under cross-
examination, as well as in his extensive replies to, and altercations with, the 
court judges. 159 He explained that on account of the totally un-Islamic 
character of Egypt's educational system, some of his followers voluntarily 
withdrew from schools and universities (al-Azhar) while he advised others to 
do the same. In his Document of the Caliphate, Shukri Mustafa explains "the 
Jews succeeded in diverting people from learning Allah's Book and Wisdom 
to learning other sciences which they - i.e., the Jews - have founded, 
formulated and specialized in. This is the earthly knowledge with which the 
15s U, p. 82. 
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apostates busy themselves in lieu of worshipping Allah. This is the 
knowledge on which they have built their civilization, constructed their 
worldly life, and taken joy in, until it turned into their idol in place of 
Allah ... These sciences that we study and the laws that we learn, are the 
primary means by which humanity exceeds its bounds, gets diverted from its 
true purpose and dispenses with its God - it is a temptation" .160 Needless to 
say, the above expressed crude anti-Semitism and Judeophobia is even more 
entrenched in the well-known varieties of Christian Fundamentalism - Roman 
Catholicism, Greek Orthodoxy, Protestantism - than it is among the Islamists. 
Monsignor Lefebvre is no exception. 
Shukri Mustafa denounces the modern school system in Egypt as "the 
educational institutions of the jahiliyyah", which he and his followers are 
required to withdraw from, pretty much the way they withdrew from "the 
temples of the jahiliyyah [i.e., mosques other than their own] and its army 
[i.e., the Egyptian army]" .161 It is commonly known that fundamentalist 
Catholics of the variety one is considering here refuse to worship (attend 
mass) with other Catholics not of their own persuasion. 
A more sophisticated Islamist critic and theoretician goes so far as to attack 
the substitution in today's Arab and Islamic countries of the modern European 
model of school and university instruction and organization ( classroom, 
laboratory, competitive examinations, degrees), for the traditional religious 
system of teaching, training students and preparing scholars; a system based, 
according to him, on the paradigm of the circle of pupils surrounding a 
recognized 'alim, scholar, faqih, or jurist, giving his lessons in a mosque. He 
recommends a return to the old practice of the certification of students by 
such individual senior scholars, advanced/aqihs and recognized shaykhs. 162 
160 Vol.II,p.p.123-124. 
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CHAPTER 3: SOVEREIGNTY AND ISLAMISM 
Another important feature shared by contemporary Islamism and the Papal 
Fundamentalism under consideration is the deep-seated enmity and open 
hostility against the whole idea and practice of popular sovereignty, along 
with its democratic, constitutional and institutional implications and 
applications. Thus, while the introductory Encyclical of the Syllabus of Errors 
assails those who "dare cry out together 'that the will of the people, 
manifested by what they call public opinion, or in any other way, constitutes 
the supreme law, independent of all divine and human right ... " the Islamists, 
for their part, push the logic of this kind of attack to its logical conclusion, by 
vociferously insisting on the total incompatibility of Islam with the notion of 
popular sovereignty in any form or shape. 
During his trial, Shukri Mustafa discussed in detail Egypt's constitution, and 
more specifically those of its provisions which affirm that "sovereignty 
belongs to the people" and that "the people are the ultimate source of the 
powers of the state" and so on. For him the most salient "example of man's 
premeditated disobedience of God on earth and in society - all societies - are 
constitutions taken not from God's law, but emanating from the people's will, 
as they allege" .163 He explained to the court, furthermore, that article six of 
the Egyptian constitution, to the effect that "the people are the source of the 
power of the state," contradicts the fundamentals of Islam: (a) because in 
Islam "all things belong to Allah, He alone creates and commands ... no one 
else - be it creature, nation or people - has any such power to legislate"; and 
(b ), because such a provision "upsets the balance established by Him between 
the umma [Muslim nation] and its Imam; considering that God did not 
provide for any power whatsoever of the umma over the ruler, but did make 
Arabic), pp. 48-49. No publisher mentioned. 
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provisions for the powers of the ruler over the umma; that is, if he rules it in 
accordance with Allah's Book and the Prophet's Sunnah" .164 Lefebvre argues 
the same point in the following words: 
... Elected governments, even if they are called, as by Saint Thomas, 
"vicars of the multitude," are such only in the sense that they do for it 
what it cannot do itself, that is, govern. But power comes to them from 
God, "from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth draws it 
name" .165 The people in power are therefore responsible for their acts 
first of all before God, whose ministers they are, and only after that 
before the people, for whose common good they govern ... the "general 
will" is null if it goes against God's rights. The majority does 'Make' 
the truth; it has to keep itself in the truth, under penalty of a perversion 
of democracy. 166 
He then concluded: "therefore, all authority comes from God, even in a 
democracy!" (Italics in the original). 167 
In his Epistle of the Faith, Saleh Sirriyah argues bluntly the following: 
"Democracy, for example, is a way of life which contradicts Islam's way; for 
in democracy, the people have the power to legislate and to permit and to 
forbid what they will ... while in Islam the people who have no such 
competence over what is halal [permitted by God] and, what is haram 
[prohibited by God], even if they were to achieve total unanimity over the 
matter. Combining Islam and Democracy is, then, like combining Judaism 
and Islam, for instance; for as a person cannot be a Muslim and a Jew at one 
and the same time, he cannot be a Muslim and a Democrat at one and the 
same time". 168 
164 Ibid. p. 90. 
165 Eph. Ch. 3:15. 
166 U, p. 55. 
167 Ibid. p. 52. 
168 Vol. I, p. 40 
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In a similar fashion to Shukri Mustafa and Saleh Sirriyah, the Jihad group 
devoted the greatest amount of hostile attention to the question of popular 
sovereignty and its implications and applications. The titles, topics and 
subjects of some of their documents speak for themselves: The Position of the 
Islamic Movement vis-a-vis The Work of Political Parties in Egypt169 ; A God 
Beside Allah: A Declaration of War Against the People's Assembly [The 
Egyptian Parliament] 170; Our Countries Are Ruled by Positive Laws and Not 
by the Laws of Jslam 171 ; and, Putting the Egyptian Political System on 
'T'. • 1172 1rza. 
The reader will find below a close summary and a somewhat free translation 
of the main relevant points in one of the above-mentioned documents. 173 
The Jihad Islamists argue that Democracy, as defined by Lincoln, is the rule 
of the people, by the people and for the people; and its most important 
principles are five in number: ( 1) sovereignty belongs to the people alone -
affirmed in article two of the Egyptian constitution; (2) the people are the 
source of the powers of the state - article five of same constitution; (3) the 
guaranteeing of liberties and their protection - articles 41, 46-29, 55, 57, 62, 
63 and others; ( 4) the plurality of political parties - article five; and (5) 
equality in the political and social sense of the term - article four. This 
diagnosis is then followed by a detailed point-by-point refutation from the 
point view of Islam. 
(1) The fact that Democracy makes the people sovereign by giving them 
absolute power is something that no Muslim can ever approve of, because 
Muslims never grant that sovereignty belongs to anyone except to Allah. 
169 Ibid. pp. 150-163. 
170 Vol. II, pp. 187-197. 
171 Ibid. PP. 249-254. 
172 Ibid. pp. 273-282. 
173 Ibid. pp. 188-189. 
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Monsignor Lefebvre also holds that in a society where government is based 
on the principle of popular sovereignty: 
The Sovereignty of God is ignored, exactly as if God did not exist, or 
were not at all interested in the society of mankind; or, indeed, as if 
men, either in particular or in society, owned nothing to God, or as if 
one could imagine any power whatsoever of which the cause, the 
force, the authority did not reside quite entirely in God himself. 174 
(2) Democracy makes the people the source of the powers of the state; i.e., the 
legislative, executive, and judiciary powers. The existence of a human 
legislative power, capable of legislating that which God had not permitted in 
accordance with its own views and inclinations and via a parliament or some 
other means, is a condition of jahiliyyah [idolatry and Godlessness]; for the 
right to legislate has never been given to any creature, as it belongs to God 
pure and simple. 
(3) As for liberties, Democracy unleashes them unconditionally and to all 
citizens, without any distinction of right from wrong, good from bad, true 
from false, belief from unbelief; and it acknowledges no religion - whatever it 
may be ... And as Islam approves of no such false conception of liberties, 
Muslims are free to call neither for an idea that is opposed to Allah's religion 
and law, nor for atheism, depravity and innovation ... Furthermore, Muslims 
are not at liberty to dress the way they like, eat as they desire and learn what 
they wish; no, there is such a thing as what Allah permitted (halal), what He 
prohibited (haram), and what He required (wajib). What he prohibited is 
forbidden to us we have been commanded to abstain from it and to interdict it 
in our societies; what He permitted we are free to do or not to do; and what 
He commanded we are obliged to carry out. 
174 8 U, p. 5 . 
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As for Monsignor Lefebvre, the thrust of all his teachings, preachings and 
writings are wholly directed at the disparagement, rejection and undoing of 
exactly the same freedoms that the above Islamists inveigh against. Look 
randomly at any two or three pages of his books and an attack on liberty will 
hit you in the face. He summarized his own position on this matter in the 
following judgment, "the fruit that the Devil presents to the modern world to 
deceive it, is Liberty" (and he was speaking metaphorically about the 
Devil). 175 
( 4) Democracy establishes the principle of the plurality of [political] parties -
a principle radically opposed to Islam, also. The plurality of parties arise only 
out of the plurality of ideologies in society, whereby each one of them has a 
need to express itself, to develop its ideas and to recruit supporters .. .in its 
endeavour to reach the seat of power. But in a Muslim state, power is not 
subject to the conflicts of different ideologies; for the simple reason that it can 
never reside save in the hands of Muslims, who have but one doctrine, one 
religion, one method and are, hence, free of ideological conflicts, contrary to 
what is the case in democratic societies [remember the old maxim: une foi, 
une loi, une roi]. Therefore, there are only two parties in a Muslim society: 
the party of God, and we have been commanded to establish it; and the party 
of devil, and it is prohibited. 
Again, the party of the devil is no figure of speech for Monsignor Lefebvre 
either, as part three of his book They Have Uncrowned Him carries (in all 
seriousness) the following suggestive title: "The Liberal Conspiracy of Satan 
Against the Church and the Papacy". 
(5) Democracy calls for equality among all citizens - citizenship being the 
basis of their parity - regardless of their religion and piety. Islam rejects this, 
175 lb'd . I . p. IX. 
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as it rejects the equality of the Muslim to the infidel...of the learned to the 
ignorant...and of the obedient to God to the disobedient...So, the rule of the 
infidel [over Muslims] is unlawful, while the people of the book [Christians 
and Jews] have to pay the tribute tax to the Muslim state. 
For Shukri Mustafa, the famous slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity 
were invented by the Jews in the service of their long-term conspiracy to 
dominate the world to the detriment of everyone else. 176 Monsignor Lefebvre 
attributes the same to the equally long-term and pervasive conspiracy of the 
Freemasons, a codeword for the Jews also. This is how the fundamentalist 
Archbishop portrays and censures what he regards as the Second Vatican 
Council's servility to the enemy camp: 
"Freemasons, what do you want? What do you ask of us?" Such is the 
question that Cardinal Bea went to ask the B'nai B'rith before the 
beginning of the Council. All the newspapers of New York where it 
took place announced the interview. And the Freemasons answered 
that what they wanted was: "religious liberty!" - that is to say, all the 
religions put on the same footing. The Church must no longer be called 
the only true religion, the sole path of salvation, the only one accepted 
by the State. Let us finish up with these inadmissible privileges. And 
so, declare religious liberty. Well, they got it: it was Dignitatis 
humanae (italics in the original). 177 
In a chapter of his book bearing the title: Necessary Inequalities, Lefebvre 
rejects the principle of liberty-equality ( as he calls it) in favor of the following 
position: 
176 Vol. II, p. 151. 
177 U, pp. 67,214. 
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I insist on the fancifulness of this equality, according to, which men are 
born equal, or at least equal in rights? 'Men are born and remain free 
and equal in rights', proclaims the first article of the declaration of the 
rights of man, and of the citizen of 1791. Let us look at what the Popes 
have thought of this: 
Pope Pius VI, first of all, condemning especially article II of this same 
declaration, goes from that to the principle itself of liberty-equality: he 
condemns it by calling it "idle fancies" and "words devoid of 
meaning ... ". 178 
Furthermore, if the inherent inequality of the Christians and Jews with the 
Muslims in the Islamic realm imposes on the former the obligation of paying 
the tribute tax, Monsignor Lefebvre has a more radical solution for the 
problem of non-Christians in the Catholic realm: 
Pius IX teaches thus that the State governs in a better way when it 
recognizes that it has the function of representing the public practice of 
the erroneous, and not simply to safeguard the public peace; on the 
exclusive grounds that they go against the Christian and Catholic order 
of the city, and not only because the public peace or morality would be 
affected by them. 179 
The Jihad Islamists, on their side, remain consistent with themselves and with 
their principles, when they declare, addressing the present-day Islamic states, 
" ... let no one think that we are petitioning these states to permit the 
establishment of a Muslim party, as we radically differ with democratic idea. 
We have announced more than once that we and democracy are the opposite 
178 Ibid. p. 45. 
179 Ibid. p. 205. 
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terms of a contradiction; the two of us are as uncombinable as water and fire, 
light and darkness". 180 
Let one add that in their firm opposition to the modem egalitarian principle, 
the Islamists do not stray far from the comparable teachings of the Papal 
Fundamentalism that we have been examining. The First Vatican Council did 
declare the following: 
But the Church of Christ is not a community of equals in which all the 
faithful have the same rights. It is a society of unequals, not only 
because among the faithful some are clerics and some are laymen, but 
particularly because there is in the Church the power from God 
whereby to some it is given to sanctify, teach and govern and to others 
not.181 
In a place of egalitarianism and its politico-juridical implications and 
applications, the Islamists propose not only the restoration of the hierarchical 
structures of dependence and subordination embodied in the Caliphate, but 
also the practice of the bay'ah; i.e., the obligation of every Muslim to swear 
allegiance to a prince (amir) and to obey his commands thereafter (again, une 
foi, une loi, un amire ou un calife, or as formulated by Mawdudi himself "one 
God, one Prophet, one Book"). Reacting to similar modem egalitarian 
demands and pressures, the First Vatican Council reaffirmed that "this power 
of Jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff'' is "truly episcopal" and "immediate"; 
and then proceeded to insist that all: 
... Both individually and collectively, are bound by their duty of 
hierarchical subordination and true obedience, to submit, not only in 
180 Vol. II, p. 190. 
181 'The First Draft of the Constitution on the Church of Christ', in The Teaching of the 
Catholic Church: As Contained in Her Documents, edited by Karl Rahner, Staten 
Island, NY: Alba House, 1966, pp. 219-220. 
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matters which pertain to faith and morals, but also in those that pertain 
to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the world, 
so that the Church of Christ may be one flock under one supreme 
pastor through the preservation of unity both of communion and of 
profession of the same faith with the Roman Pontiff. 182 
That is why for Lefebvre's fundamentalism and its followers, the enemy 
remains "the application of the false principles of religious liberty, 
Ecumenism, and Collegiality introduced by the Second Vatican Council" .183 
On the other side of the divide the late master of Pakistan's military regime 
and chief martial law administrator, General Zia ul-Haq, used the Islamisation 
of the state and implementation of Shari'a Law to exact an absolute obligation 
of obedience from his subjects. He typically argued: 
One basic point that emerges from a study of the Qur' anic verses and 
the Prophet's sayings .. .is that as long as the Amir or the head of State ... 
abides by the injunctions of Allah and his Prophet, his obedience 
becomes mandatory for his subjects or the people, irrespective of the 
personal dislike that someone may harbour for the Amir or any of his 
actions ... Not only in my opinion but also in the opinion of legal experts 
and scholars, my Government, too, is a constitutional Government, 
which has been acting upon the tenets of Islam ... We are ... devout 
Muslim. I concede, and I am proud of it, that the present Government 
is a military Government. 184 
182 Ibid. pp. 224-225. 
183 Lefebvre and the Vatican, p. vii. 
184 Address by the late President General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, Islamabad, August 12, 
1983, quoted by Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1 991, p. 41. 
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CHAPTER 4: MODERNISM AND LATITUDINARIANISM 
It follows naturally from the above comparative analysis that both the 
Islamists of today and the Papal Fundamentalists of Pius' time regard the 
Modernists and Latitudinarians of their respective religions as the "enemy 
within": whether taken as individual scholars and theologians, as schools of 
thought and interpretation, or as trends of social reform and religious 
reconstruction. In other words, Modernism and Latitudinarianism come to 
signify, in both instances, the siren calls for the departure from and corruption 
of the Fundamentals of the Catholic and/or Muslim faith, doctrine, teachings, 
discipline, symbols, realities, and practices, in favour of accommodating all 
the modern pagan heresies, alien errors, and contemporary idols cited and 
condemned above. Hence Lefebvre's endless railing against the Modernists 
for wanting the Church to assimilate such ideals as "liberty, equality, 
fraternity, democracy and pluralism", and his denunciation of such people as 
"traitors, turncoats and dangerous enemies of the Church" .185 
As a result of this internal enemy's expansive interpretations, cunnmg 
distortions, and unprincipled manipulations of the sacred, "the revealed truth", 
"the deposit of faith", the "Usu/", "Usus" and authentic practices of Islam 
and/or Catholicism fall into an unholy state of "absence", "neglect", "loss", 
and "forgetfulness". Thus the Syllabus of Errors speaks of how "the doctrine 
and authority of divine Revelation" and "the true and germane notion of 
justice and human right" have been "obscured and lost"; while the documents 
of the First Vatican Council go out of their way to reaffirm, consolidate, and 
reinforce the doctrine of Petrine succession embodied in the Papacy and its 
supremacy and infallibility, all in fundamentalist opposition to the sceptical 
Modernists and the accommodationist Latitudinarians. Thus the "first 
185 U, pp. 114, 119. 
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Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ", issued by the First Vatican 
Council repeatedly emphasized the decisiveness of such matters as: "Of the 
Institution of the Apostolic Primacy in blessed Peter in the Roman Pontiff', 
"On the Power and Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff', and 
"Concerning the Infallible Teaching of the Roman Pontiff' .186 
Not surprisingly, Modernist attempts at mythopoetic readings, figurative 
interpretations and allegorical understandings of the "truth" of the sacred 
Scriptures are summarily rejected. Item VII of the Syllabus condemns the 
proposition that: 
The prophecies and miracles, uttered and narrated in the sacred 
Scriptures, are fiction of poets; and the mysteries of the Christian faith, 
the result of philosophical investigations. In the books of the two 
Testaments there are contained mythical inventions, and Jesus Christ 
Himself a mythical fiction. 
Obviously God could not have revealed himself to humanity through myth, 
fiction, poetry, philosophical discourse and all the other familiar modes of 
human speech; he had to do it in the form of accurate propositions about 
historical events and supernatural states of affairs. 
Similarly, contemporary Islamists condemn endlessly the "absence", 
"neglect", and "loss", from the life of contemporary Muslim states and 
societies of the authority of Divine Revelations, of the Fundamentals of Islam, 
and, above all, of the original commandment to carry on the jihad against the 
infidels, both internal and external. The epitome of this line of thought is 
reached in the basic document of the Jihad group, The Absent Commandment, 
which goes out of its way to castigate the Muslim Latitudinarians and 
186 MacGregor, Geddes, The Vatican Revolution, Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 187-197. 
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Modernists, for emasculating the Islamic imperative of holy war, by 
explaining it away as signifying no more than defensive battle against foreign 
invaders and for protecting the Islamic realm only. The author of The Absent 
Commandment wants, of course, to negate the "absence" by reviving jihad in 
the fullness of its original splendour and primarily as an offensive war now 
against all that is un-Islamic. 187 Abboud al-Zamor - member of the Al-Hijra 
wal Takjir cell that assassinated President Sadat - makes the same point by 
explaining that "it is not true that jihad has been legislated [by God] for the 
defence of Islam, without pursuing the infidels to and attacking them in their 
own house ... ". 188 
A no less "absent commandment" transpires through Monsignor Lefebvre's 
attack on the ecumenism and collegiality of the Second Vatican Council and 
the resulting Conciliar Church, viz., the imperative of returning to the Church 
Militant's mission and demands, or to Catholicism's traditional fighting spirit. 
As in the case of Islamists, the imagery of jihad dominates the Archbishop's 
discourse, including: a defence of the Inquisition and the Crusades, the use of 
such terminology (in describing the tasks ahead) as "holy war", "the true 
soldiers of Christ", and "the sword of the spirit", in addition to 
pronouncements like, "our Lord sent his Apostles not to dialogue but to 
preach" 189, "we are forming an army intent on remaining Catholic no matter 
what the price" 190, "and we must be an army, an armada which ... follows Our 
Lord Jesus Christ who fights this crusade that Our Lord wishes to wage today, 
and through which we must convert the world ... "191 One's sense is that the old 
Fundamentals of the counter-reformation Church have found ardent advocates 
and devoted resuscitators in Monsignor Lefebvre and his followers. 
187 Vol. I, pp. 127-147. 
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Like modern day fundamentalists elsewhere, the Islamists go out of their way 
to vigorously reassert - contra the games of the Latitudinarians - the certainty 
of the simple meaning of the Qur'anic verses and the absolute unilaterality of 
their message, form and structure against all permeability, redefinition and 
innovative interpretation. In their war against the "enemy within", they also 
reaffirm, consolidate, and strengthen what may be called the doctrine of 
"Mohammedan Succession", i.e., the absolute imperative of restoring the 
Islamic Caliphate (and caliphate means succession), abolished by the founder 
of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, in 1924. The Charter of Islamic Action 
insists that the aim of the Islamists' struggle is to "establish The Religion in its 
entirety everywhere" and "to institute the Caliphate after the example of the 
Prophecy". 192 At the same time, another Islamist turns the famous fighting cry 
"The Republic or Death" into "the Caliphate or Martyrdom". 193 Let me note in 
passing that the "Republic or Death" was also the rallying and fighting cry of 
the Nasserist Yemeni Free Officers who overthrew the imam in the early 
1960s; particularly during their heroic defense of the capital Sana', against the 
invading royalist troops and restorationist forces supported by the 
neighbouring Saudi Arabian monarchy. 
Singled out for special attack by the Islamists is 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, the 
prominent Azhari cleric who defended the abolishing of the Caliphate and 
argued for the separation of Mosque and State on grounds internal to the 
traditional Qur'anic, Prophetic, and legal Islamic discourses and narratives. 
His book Islam and the Sources of Political Rule (Cairo, 1925), turned, at the 
time, into a major literary-religious scandal in both the Arab and Muslim 
worlds, leading to the author's expulsion from al-Azhar. 
For the Western reader to appreciate the utter radicalism, stunning impact and 
sheer enormity of Mustafa Kemal's abolition of the Caliphate and 'Abd al-
192 Vol. I, p. 168. 
193 Ibid. p. 191. 
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Raziq's defense of that drastic act, s/he should try to imagine what would have 
happened had the Italian nationalists in 1870 proceeded to simply abolish the 
Papacy after the annexation of Rome to the Italian kingdom, in lieu of 
recognizing the Pope's full sovereignty over the Vatican and his spiritual 
authority over all Roman Catholics! 
Furthermore, just as the Catholic Fundamentalists look to a past European 
society, where Papal temporal and spiritual authority was supreme, as more 
representative of Christian ideals, social norms and practical behaviour, 
similarly the Islamists invoke a vague past Islamic order, where the spiritual 
and temporal power of the Caliph ( especially the first four Caliphs) held 
sway, as the example of what a more representative - if not ideal - Muslim life 
could ( and should) be. More specifically ( and pure political opportunism and 
tactical hypocrisy aside), neither party seems to regard that past as.an ideal for 
inspiration - a nostalgic desire of sorts - but as a practical model for present-
day societies and states to copy and implement. 
It is of interest to note in this connection the resemblance between: first, the 
organicist, corporatist, communalist, hierarchical and complementarian ideal 
conception of the Islamic state (Caliphate) as elaborated today by Islamic 
Fundamentalist ideologists, under the rubric of the Tawhidist state, society, 
economy and culture (where Islam moves the rich to give the poor their fair 
share, and where the poor remain contented and spiritually compensated for 
by obeying Islam's imperatives, living its life and taking to heart its other 
worldly message), and second, the no less organicist, corporatist, 
hierarchical, etc., ideal conception of the corresponding Christian state as put 
forward by Monsignor Lefebvre. The fundamentalist Archbishop also 
explains that in such a state society is harmonized "as an organism of 
coordinated and hierarchically arranged social groups", social classes 
"naturally complement" each other, "the common good of civil society" is 
"ordered to the heavenly city of the blessed" and "the Catholic City is the fruit 
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of the union between the Church and the Catholic state". The more or less 
typical historical realization of this ideal has been, we are told, "the French 
monarchy of the Old Regime" where "a whole order and hierarchy of multiple 
intermediate bodies" existed "between the monarch and the multitude of 
subjects" .194 
Now it remains to be seen, (a) how the Arab Islamists will actually behave 
vis-a-vis this proclaimed ideal, if and when they seize power, and (b) how the 
constraints of resistant modern realities and the responsibilities of power will 
condition their future actions on this score, and modify their utopian 
conceptions about the implement ability of that ideal In Iran they gave up on 
the ideal in favour of the republic, popular elections and the nation state. 
Let one note that The Document of Muslim Revival denies outrightly that the 
Modernists and Latitudinarians of the Nahda/Renaissance period are "true 
Muslim Revivalists". It characterizes them pejoratively as "pseudo-
revivalists", because a revivalist movement cannot come about either by 
seeking means to make peace with jahiliyyah or by manufacturing a new 
mixture of Islam andjahiliyyah. True revival (or renewal) is the purification 
of Islam from every part of jahiliyyah ... " 195 Similarly, the Islamist thinker Ali 
Kurani dismisses this adulterated form of Islam by labeling it disdainfully, 
"this deviation of secularist Islam" .196 Marcel assumes the same 
fundamentalist attitude and stance when he dismisses, with equal disdain, the 
whole world and achievement of contemporary modernist and liberal 
Catholicism. 
The two forms of Fundamentalism under consideration regard the Modernist 
"enemy within" as a bridgehead for and/or a Trojan horse (perhaps a Trojan 
194 U, pp. 18, 53, 210. 
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camel for the Islamists) at the service of the massive forces of modernity bent 
on destroying their respective religions and the attendant institutions, 
teachings and historical hold on people's hearts and minds. Naturally the 
result is, in depth, a militant defensive reaction, which sees the whole of the 
Christian and/or Muslim religion, the whole of European and/or Islam's 
societies under mortal threat from the encircling satanic conspiracy of the 
modem condition. 
Thus in his diatribes against the errors of "our most unhappy age" and the 
heresies of our "utterly deplorable times", Pius IX spoke in his Syllabus of the 
"struggle between Christ and Belial", of "the terrible conspiracy of our 
adversaries against the Catholic Church and this Apostolic See", of "the 
numerous calamities of the Church and of Civil Society" and of the impious 
enemies "animated and excited by the spirit of Satan". Other declarations of 
the First Vatican Council spoke of how the "gates of hell with daily increase 
of hatred are gathering their strength on every side to upheaval the foundation 
laid down by God's own hand, and so, if that might be, to overthrow the 
Church .... 197 Pope Leo XIII identified the main force behind this terrible 
conspiracy in no uncertain terms: 
In our time the instigators of evil seem to have formed a coalition in an 
immense effort, under the impulse and with the help of Society spread 
out in a great number of places and skillfully organized the Society of 
the Freemasons. 198 
Then he proceeded to praise the vigilance of his predecessors in the following 
words: 
197 "The First Draft of the Constitution on the Church of Christ", in The Teaching of the 
Catholic Church: As contained in Her Documents, originally prepared by Joseph 
Neuner, S.J.; and Heinrich Ross, S.J.; edited by Karl Rahner, S.J.; translated from 
German by Geoffrey Stevens, Staten Island, New York: Alba House, 1966, p. 221. 
198 U,p.10. 
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Our predecessors had very quickly recognized this principle enemy at 
the moment when, coming out of the darkness of an occult conspiracy, 
it sprang forth to the attack in the full light of day. 199 
And Monsignor Lefebvre follows suit by referring the conspiracy back to the 
French Revolution: 
From the day after the Revolution, the devil raised up on the inside of 
the Church men filled with the spirit of pride and of novelty, posing as 
inspired reformers who, dreaming of reconciling the Church with 
Liberalism, attempted to bring about an adulterous union between the 
Church and the principles of the Revolution! 200 
The dark conspiracy acqmres Orwellian dimensions of convolution and 
absurdity with the followers of Lefebvre's type of fundamentalism. Thus, just 
as the secret book of the dissidents in Nineteen Eighty Four; turns out to have 
been written by Big Brother's Thought Police in the first place, similarly "the 
Master Stroke of Satan", leading the Conciliar Church "into disobedience to 
tradition" turns out to have been executed "in the name of obedience itself' .201 
In any case Lefebvre himself had been preaching for some time about 
explanations like: "This is not a human battle. We are in a close combat with 
Satan" and we face "in front ofus an army directed by Satan".202 
The writings and pronouncements of the Islamists, their thinkers and 
ideologists, are replete with exactly the same images of contemporary gloom 
and doom and of dire warnings to the Islamic world against the mortal 
dangers posed to Islam and everything Islamic, by the evil conspiracy of the 
199 Ibid. 
200 U, pp. xvi-xvii. 
201 Lefebvre and the Vatican, p. 219 (italics in the original). 
202 Ibid. pp. 17-18. 
131 
wicked forces constituting that overpowering Satanic creation known as the 
jahiliyyah of the Twentieth Century. For example, Shukri Mustafa left us a 
lengthy disquisition on the great international conspiracy against Islam, 
masterminded by the Devil and carried out primarily by the "World Jewish 
Government" (Lefebvre's Freemasons) without exempting the permanently 
crusading Christians either.203 
Lefebvrian fundamentalism attacks the Conciliar Papacy for having 
succumbed totally (via the enemy within) to the secular anti-Christian and 
anti-Catholic powers that be, obediently carrying out their evil will. 
Consequently the Archbishop came to adopt a sedevacantist position, 
regarding the Seat of Peter as vacant and Rome as occupied by the Antichrist. 
He bolsters his case by quoting a supposed "prophetic vision" of Pope Leo 
XIII (reported by the Virgin herself), "revealing that one day 'the See of Peter 
would become the seat of iniquity'," and by citing the predictions of "Our 
Lady at La Salette" to the effect that "Rome will lose the Faith" and 'there will 
be an 'eclipse' at Rome".204 
The Fundamentalism of the Islamists attacks 1-Azhar, its 'ulama' (Islam's 
clerics and scholars) and rectors for exactly the same reasons. The "enemy 
within" has completely taken over the venerable institution, obediently 
carrying out the evil will of the secularist anti-Muslim powers that be. Shukri 
Mustafa damns the entire teaching curriculum of al-Azhar and denounces 
Sheikh Shaltut, one of its most prominent and enlightened rectors under 
Nasser's regime, for returning Muslim right into wrong and Muslim wrong 
into right, all in the service of the un-Godly secularist powers of the time.205 
The Jihad militants are equally adamant in their sarcastic attacks on "those 
who wear the robes of the 'ulama' filling the land with sound and fury ... " 
203 Vol. II, pp. 144-151. 
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those "who distort the word", support the reigning infidelity and justify - with 
their fatwas and rulings - the wrongdoing of apostate rulers.206 
Obviously for Islamists, no less than for Lefebvre: there is an "eclipse" over 
al-Azhar these days and a loss of faith inside it. The Rector's Chair is only 
vacant, but has become a seat of iniquity as well. 
All in all, the inescapable conclusion tells one that the Islamism of today is no 
less of an "Islam-of-crisis" than was the Papal Fundamentalism reviewed 
above a "Catholicism-of-crisis", all in counter-reaction and begrudging 
adaptation to the disruptive threats and mortal challenges posed by the 
incredible dynamism, teeming forces and irresistible pressures and lures of 
the modem condition. 207 
CHAPTER 5: ISLAMISM AND SCIENCE 
Where God is in charge some things cannot be allowed to be true.208 
Although the scientific-critical study of Christianity is condemned in the 
Syllabus and dismissed by Monsignor Lefebvre as "the false critical science" 
and the "false immanentist philosophy of the age"209, one should all know 
something by now about the entrenched suspicion and hostility with which 
religious fundamentalists of all colours and hues have held modem scientific 
investigation, knowledge, and world pictures. For example, the Papal 
Fundamentalism discussed above inveighed endlessly, in its own time, against 
"Scientism", "false science", "Rationalism", "Naturalism" and "the abyss of 
206 Vol. II, p.246. 
207 Berman, Marshall, All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity, New 
York: Penguin Books, I 988. 
208 Rushdie, Salman, Shame, Jonathan Cape Ltd., 30 Bedford Square, London, I 983, p. 82. 
209 U, p. I 12. 
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Pantheism", "Materialism and Atheism"; declaring the following beliefs 
anathema, via the pronouncements of the First Vatican Council: 
1. If any one shall say that in divine revelation there are no mysteries, 
truly and properly so called, but that all the doctrines of faith can be 
understood and demonstrated from natural principles, by properly 
cultivated reason: let him be anathema. 
2. If any one shall say that human sciences are to be so freely treated 
that their assertions, although opposed to revealed doctrine, are to held 
true, and can not be condemned by the Church: let him be anathema. 
3. If any one shall assert it to be possible that sometimes, according to 
the progress of science, a sense is to be given to doctrines propounded 
by the Church different from that which the Church has understood 
and understands: let him be anathema. 210 
The Islamists are no exception to this rule, except for their greater crudity, 
extremism and virulence. The master theoretician of contemporary Islamic 
Fundamentalism, Mawdudi, expressed similar fears of and suspicion about 
modern science when he wrote: 
Reflections on the nature of modern education and customs, 
immediately reveals their contradiction with the nature of Islamic 
education and customs. You teach young minds philosophy, which 
seeks to explain the universe without Allah. You teach them science, 
which is devoid of reason and slave of the senses. You teach them 
economics, law and sociology which, in spirit and in substance, differ 
210 MacGregor, Geddes, The Vatican Revolution, Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, p. 183. 
134 
from the teachings of Islam. And you still expect them to have an 
Islamic point ofview.211 
The spokesperson on cultural and scientific affairs of Mawdudi's 
Fundamentalist political party, the Jama'at-el-Islami, explained the idolatrous 
nature of modem science in no uncertain terms: 
All modernist ideologies are characterized by man worship. Man 
worship most often appears under the guise of science. Modernists are 
convinced that progress in scientific knowledge will eventually confer 
upon them the powers of divinity. 
Modern science is guided by no moral value, but naked materialism 
and arrogance. The whole branch of knowledge and its applications is 
contaminated by the same evil. Science and technology are totally 
dependent upon the set of ideals and values cherished by its members. 
If the roots of the tree are rotten, then the tree is rotten; therefore all its 
fruits are rotten.212 
Similarly, the American-based Iranian Islamist thinker, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 
holds against modem science the fact that "so many present-day students lost 
their religious moorings upon studying modem mathematics and chemistry", 
and then proclaims that no amount of protestation on the part of Muslim 
Modernists "will prevent this kind of science from corroding the foundations 
of the citadel oflslamic faith". Consequently he affirms: 
Whatever devout Muslim scientists may believe as individuals, they 
cannot prevent their activity from emptying the Islamic intellectual 
211 Hoodbhoy, Pervez, Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the battle for 
Rationality, London, Zed Books, 1991, p. 53. 
212 Ibid. pp. 52-53. 
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universe of its content unless this science is shorn away from its 
secular and humanistic matrix where it has been placed since the 
Renaissance.213 
Needless to say, the Muslim Fundamentalists, like their Christian 
counterparts, regard Darwin, Marx and Freud as the "Diabolical" enemy 
incarnate (the Jewishness of the latter two helps) and as the symbols of all 
that is wrong not only with modern science but with the modern world in 
general. The distinguished Pakistani nuclear physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy 
(Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) gives the following account of a major "scientific" keynote 
address delivered by the Rector of the Islamic University of Pakistan, A. K. 
Brochi, under the Islamisation policies of the late President of the country, Zia 
ul-Haq: 
In his speech Mr. Brochi expressed little sympathy for the "dubious 
contribution of contemporary thought that is reflected in sciences like 
Physics and Chemistry". The textbooks used in universities today were 
the particular objects of his ire because they: "bear on the face of their 
pages indelible imprint of the findings that have been recorded by 
some, at least, of the outstanding irreligious thinkers like Darwin, 
Freud, Karl Marx". Mr. Brochi found Einstein's theory of relativity to 
be objectionable and incompatible with Islam: "In my considered 
opinion, the Einsteinian view of the behaviour of moving particles - or 
the ultimate constituents of matter - regarded from the Islamic 
perspective, is false" .214 
Under the Islamisation policies of present-day Sudan, the eminent biologist, 
Farouk Muhammad Ibrahim, was persecuted and imprisoned in 1990, because 
213 Ibid. pp. 69-70. 
214 Ibid. p. 79. 
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he taught his students something about Darwinian evolutionary theory. 215 And 
in a document of the Jihad group devoted to an attack on Nasser and 
Nasserism, the following accusation can be rerad: "The reader of the Nasserist 
discourse cannot but smell clearly the odour of Darwinism, the creed of self-
interest, the marginalisation of religion, and its description as mere 'spiritual 
values"'. 216 
Let me digress for a minute here to point out that this negative attitude 
towards modem science becomes even more striking ( and interesting) when 
one reminds oneself of the lengths to which earlier Muslim latitudinarians and 
modernists went to reconcile Islam with science. Their main strategy was to 
naturalize science Islamically by first singing its praise and privileging the 
kind of knowledge it yields, and then arguing (a) that Europe borrowed the 
scientific method from Islam in the first place ( via Spain), (b) that nothing in 
modern scientific knowledge and discoveries really contradicts true Islam, 
and ( c) that when such seeming contradictions arise they can easily be 
mediated and resolved to the satisfaction of both sides by an improved 
understanding of the profounder meaning of Islam's scriptures and essential 
teachings. Needless to say the current radical Islamists follow the exact 
opposite strategy of privileging Islam alone or a certain conception of it, to 
the deliberate denigration and exclusion of science. 
The general complaints about scientific knowledge remain the same: (a) Its 
inherent autonomy in the face of the totalising and overarching claims of 
traditional, conservative and fundamentalist religiosity; (b) Its abandonment 
of authority - especially religiously sanctioned authority - as a criterion of 
truth and acceptability; ( c) Its constant sceptical bent of mind and materialist 
orientation; ( d) Its explanation of the world in terms that inevitably challenge 
and contest the comprehensive - and ostensibly final - accounts of same given 
215 Ibid. p. 47. 
216 Vol. II, p. 288. 
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by the long established and elaborate religious belief-systems; ( e) Its powerful 
impact on the interpretation of the religiously sacred, leading, for example, to 
the understanding of the language of the Bible and/or Qu'ran in light of our 
scientific knowledge of natural phenomena rather than the other way round. 
By way of example consider the following minor experiment: 
The Qu'ran is absolutely infallible, without error in all matters 
pertaining to faith and practice, as well as in areas such as geography, 
science, history, etc. The disintegration of our social order can be 
easily explained. Men and women are disobeying the clear instructions 
God gave in His Word. 
These could have been the stereotypically fundamentalist words of Ayatollah 
Khomein, Shukri Mustafa, Saleh Sirriyah, the assassins of President Sadat, 
the leaders of the Islamist band that occupied the holy shrine in Mecca in 
1979, but in fact they are the words of the famous and highly influential 
American fundamentalist leader Jerry Farwell, with the exception of a single 
word that is altered, viz., substituting "Qu'ran" for "Bible". 217 
In confronting the power and destabilizing impact of science, the Islamists 
resort to a variety of strategies and tactics that are well known and well tried 
in the West - the locus classicus of the explosive confrontation between 
religious orthodoxy and modem science. The most sophisticated strategy can 
be summarized in two main points: 
1. Scientific knowledge is underrated and disparaged by turning its 
very distinguishing characteristics against it. In other words, the fact 
217 Falwell, Jerry, Listen America, Doubleday, NY, 1980, p. 63; quoted by Nancy 
Ammerman, Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World, New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987, p. I. 
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that scientific knowledge is always incomplete, cumulative, 
approximative, contingent, corrigible, falsifiable, revisable and so on, 
renders it "not real knowledge" in their eyes. Knowledge, for them, is 
always of the Truth, while the known truths are not knowledge. 
2. Science is stripped of all significant theoretico-epistemological 
value and cognitive content by reducing it to not much more than sets 
of successful guesses, useful calculations, practical techniques and 
effective operations for the manipulation of material objects and the 
satisfaction of human needs. As far as science is concerned, the radical 
Islamists come out as enthusiastic partisans of primitive operationalism 
and crude technicism. The more sophisticated theoreticians among 
them tend to add a dash of fashionable conventionalism and pragmatic 
instrumentalism. 
All in all, its safe to say that in practice they clumsily and unknowingly heed 
the substance of the advice Cardinal Bellarmino once gave to Galileo in order 
to avoid head-on collision with the fundamentals of the then reigning Roman 
Catholic orthodoxy and its guardians. According to that cunning piece of 
advice Galileo had, first, to stop affirming that his scientific inquiries were 
producing knowledge about the nature of the world (true propositions about 
floating bodies, sun spots, vacua, the motion of the earth, the moons of Jupiter 
and the mutability of celestial matter), in favour of only claiming that his 
science proposes no more than, (a) useful "hypotheses" that allow us to 
handle physical phenomena more effectively and efficiently, and (b) practical 
mathematical calculations, formulae and tricks for the improved manipulation 
of objects, their motions and relations. Of course, "hypotheses" are to be 
taken, here, in the older pejorative sense repudiated by Isaac Newton, qua 
scientist, in his famous denial: "hypotheses non-fingo". In other words, 
Galileo was advised to leave the truth about the affairs of this world also - and 
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not just the other one - to established religion by confining himself, as 
scientist, to the production of interesting speculations, useful hypotheses and 
practical calculations, but no more. 
In the following the reader will find two concrete illustrations of this kind of 
contemporary fundamentalist response to the threat of modern scientific 
knowledge: 
1. The devaluation of the theoretico-cognitive significance of science 
and modern scientific knowledge, in general is given by Ayatollah 
Mutahhari in the following words: 
Another shortcoming of the scientific world view as a basis for 
an ideology is that science is unstable and un-enduring from a 
theoretical standpoint, that is, from the standpoint of presenting 
reality as it is or of attracting faith to the nature of the reality of 
being. From the viewpoint of science, the face of the world 
changes from day to day because science is based on hypothesis 
and experiment, not on rational and self-evidence first 
principles. Hypothesis and experiment have a provisional value; 
so the scientific worldview is shaky and inconsistent and cannot 
serve as a foundation for faith. Faith demands a firmer, an 
unshakable foundation, a foundation characterized by eternity ... 
The importance of the scientific worldview lies in its practical, 
technical value, not in its theoretical value. What can serve, as 
the support for an ideology is a theoretical value, not practical 
one... The practical and technical value of science lies in 
science's empowering man in his work and being fruitful, 
whether or not it represents reality. Today's industry and 
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technology displays the practical and technical value of 
science.218 
Then the Ayatollah concludes that: 
One of the remarkable things about science in today's world is 
that, to the extent that its practical and technical value increases, 
its theoretical value diminishes.219 
2. The condemnation of the following characteristics of scientific 
knowledge, is given by Monsignor Lefebvre: 
(a) "The independence of reason and science in regard to faith"; i.e., 
their autonomy and "self-sufficiency" in general and their rejection of 
"any foreign domination" from outside, in particular (italics in the 
original).220 
(b) The spirit of innovation ( bida' for the Islamists) and its attendant 
attitude of intellectual curiosity so characteristic of and essential to the 
modem scientific enterprise of search and research. Or, in the words of 
this brand of fundamentalism, condemned are: "the morbid love of 
novelty under the pretext of progress"; the consequent "curiosity" and 
"pride" (in science and reason) leading to mortal error; the "!amenable 
spectacle" of "how far the wandering of human reason go once the 
spirit of novelty is given way to" (italics in the original)221 ; the "turning 
aside of all revelation .. .in order that access may be opened up to the 
218 Muttahari, Ayatollah Murtaza, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought: God, Man and the 
Universe, Translated from the Persian by R. Campbell, California: Mizan Press, 1985, 
pp. 69-71. 
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discoveries or rather frenzies of unaided reason"222 ; the spirit of 
"unrestricted research" which m any case, very rarely leads "to 
religious and Philosophical truth"; "the philosophy of open 
investigation" which "results in Hegel" (who may, then, lead to Marx); 
and the fact that "a free researcher" is really indistinguishable from the 
proverbial enemy of religion, the "free thinker". 223 
(c) The idea of "evolutionism" in all realms: biological (Lamarck and 
Darwin), intellectual (rationalism and its myth of the indefinite 
progress of human reason), moral (emancipation from the 'taboos'), 
political-religious (emancipation of societies with regard to Jesus 
Christ)".224 Condemned is also the accompanying notion "of a Church 
that evolves" and all those who "want an evolving faith", considering 
that for "the faith, evolution is death" .225 
The spokesperson on culture and science for Mawdudi's Islamist party 
referred to above, relayed the same message in the following terms: 
[In Islamic society] originality, innovation and change were never up-
held as intrinsic values. The ideal of Islamic culture was not 
mechanical, evolutionary progress but the permanent, immutable, 
transcendental, divinely revealed moral, theological, and spiritual 
values of the Qur'an and Sunnah.226 
The Islamists are no less aware than their Catholic counterparts that the truths 
about the affairs of this world had slipped out of Islam's sphere of competence 
- with the help of earlier Muslim reformists, modernists, latitudinarians - and 
222 Ibid. p. 7. 
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show signs of anguished struggle to redress the balance in favour of restoring 
religion's once paramount theoretico-epistemological position and 
domination. For example, Shukri Mustafa is so acutely conscious of the threat 
posed by modern science to the Islamic World picture and its edifying 
narratives, so suspicious of the destabilizing impact of the spread of scientific 
information, explanation and world views on the Islamic belief-system and its 
attendant practices, that he mounts a comprehensive and formidable assault 
on all forms of non-religious knowledge, sparing not even mere literacy and 
simple arithmetic. What was fear and suspicion of science with Mawdudi, 
resurfaces as pure phobia and obsession with Shukri Mustafa. 
Thus for Shukri Mustafa also, scientific knowledge is no more than guess, 
surmise and hypothesis, because "the knowledge which Allah permitted 
human beings to acquire is strictly limited to what binds them to the one and 
only obligation He imposed on them, viz., to worship Him alone and no one 
else" .227 Furthermore, this radical Islamist is certain that the acquisition of any 
form of knowledge, which exceeds the bounds of meeting the immediate 
practical needs of the Muslim community and serving its urgent interests, 
simply leads to idolatry and apostasy. For him, "an atom's worth of learning 
intended for something other than the above objective, falls outside the 
bounds of servitude to Allah"; and is the beginning "of man's deification on 
earth" .228 Similarly, he holds that because all "learning should be tied to 
worship, the acquisition of the practical side of knowledge may take place, 
even in the religious sciences, only in case of pressing need.... The same 
applies to the sciences, such as astronomy, writing and foreign languages, 
considering that Allah wanted the 'best umma ever brought forth to 
mankind'229, to be an illiterate nation which can neither write nor calculate" .230 
227 Vol. I, p. 93. 
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Basing himself on the additional fact that the Prophet himself was illiterate, 
Shukri Mustafa prohibits literacy in the Muslim community save in cases 
where practical necessity and urgent need require it. He explains to the court 
during his trial that, "the teaching of writing in the Muslim community is 
prohibited except when it relates to a practical and real need". For emphasis 
he added, "learning to write in excess of that limit is prohibited [haram]". 231 
All attempts by latitudinarians at figurative interpretations and/or expansive 
readings of the question of "illiteracy" (ummiyyah) in Islam, both as Quranic 
concept and as an important attribute of the Prophet himself (illiterate= 
ummi), are expressly rejected by him in favor of the narrowest and most 
literal of meanings, viz., plain inability to read, write and calculate. In brief, 
strict fidelity to Islam's Fundamentals and to the ideal of the imitation of 
Muhammad imposed an overriding preference for that sort of illiteracy. 
Although the other Islamists do not subscribe to Shukri Mustafa's extremist 
radical condemnation of all learning and knowledge, they also want no more 
of them than is absolutely necessary and useful to Muslims. Thus Abboud al-
Zomor divides knowledge into the two categories of "the religious sciences" 
and what he calls the "realistic sciences" (the natural and social sciences). His 
pamphlet explains that in addition to instruction in the sciences of the first 
category, the members of the Jihad group are taught "the necessary minimum 
of the legitimate 'realistic sciences' that are useful to the Islamic Movement so 
the member can correctly understand the reality he lives, the goals he is 
seeking to achieve, the nature of the path he is embarked on and the 
difficulties facing him; all this in accordance with a curriculum prepared by 
specialists m various fields" .232 The "realistic sciences", specifically 
mentioned by Abboud al-Zomor are, "the political, military, economic, 
administrative, organizational, informational and educational sciences". 233 
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The Lefebvrians, on their part, also warn their flock against the dangers of 
over-expanding their reading lists beyond orthodox Catholic works, 
impressing on all concerned the truth enunciated by John of Salisbury in the 
12th century to the effect that the safe and caution thing is to read only 
Catholic books. Accurate reading on a wide range of subjects makes the 
scholar, but careful selection makes the saint. 
For the Islamists, as for Marcel Lefebvre, the way out is to reintroduce God 
into science. By this way, Islamists reproduce below the bizarre manner in 
which the Mawdudi Fundamentalists propose to achieve that end in Pakistan's 
schools as well as in correct Islamic scientific discourse and explanations: 
No phenomenon or fact should be mentioned without referring to the 
benevolence of Allah. For example, in writing a science book for class 
3 children one should not ask, "What will happen if an animal does not 
take any food?" Instead, the following question should be asked: 
"What will happen if Allah does not give the animal food?" ... Similarly 
it is un-Islamic to teach that mixing hydrogen with oxygen 
automatically produces water. The Islamic way is this: when atoms of 
hydrogen approach atoms of oxygen, then by the will of God water is 
produced.234 
Conclusion 
In Greetzian terms Part Two's approach is marked by a subtle analysis of 
multiple subtext on a broad cross-cultural spectrum. By contrast, most 
observers of Islamist movements tend to analyse at local actors, surface 
234 Islam and Science, 1991, p. 54. 
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events, and nation-specific data, privileging them as unique signposts without 
parallel equivalents, for the understanding of Islamism. 
The rest of Part Two consists of analysis of Roman Catholic and Protestant 
fundamentalist texts, which are cross-read with documents and writings from 
the most radical of the Egyptian fundamentalist groups. The result is a kind of 
cognitive polyphony which allows one to hear voices from three insular 
traditions talking to one another on identical issues and, more surprising still, 
often in the same semantic field. 
Four emphases illustrate the degree to which all three groups - Protestant, 
Catholic and Muslim Islamists - concur. First, they detect errors, they declaim 
heresies, and debar innovations. Only one Truth - ageless and unchanging -
endures. Second, popular sovereignty is not just flawed, because too many 
groups have divergent levels of awareness and conflicting ambitions, it is 
wrong. It is wrong because the masses never know, and can never know, what 
is true or right. In their opposition to popular sovereignty all three share a 
"deep-seated enmity and open hostility" to democratic ideals. Third, they 
mark out, and then attack, again and again, the enemy within, that is to say, 
the modernists or latitudinarians, all those who support reform, liberty, and 
revolution as worthy ideals for the present or modern era. Finally, they gird 
themselves with special zeal on the side of religion in its battle with science. 
Not only do they undervalue and disparage scientific knowledge but also, 
some go so far as to claim that all forms of non-religious knowledge are to be 
regarded as invalid. 
Protestant and Catholic fundamentalists, who do not recognize each other as 
believers, are here brought into conversation with one another. And both in 
turn become conversation partners with an unimaginable third set of 
fundamentalists, their look-alikes who happen to be an Islamist. 
PART THREE: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL ISLAM 
INTRODUCTION 
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In the last three decades, the Middle East and North Africa has being marked 
by two major currents: democracy and political Islam. Islam itself is the 
subject of a contemporary theopolitical debate, between a modem form and 
an authentistic form, out of which a synthesis tends to rise, only to be attacked 
again by a new authentic antithesis. Political Islam is the current antithesis, 
attacking the unpopular states for impiety and materialism. Democracy is also 
rising in popularity as a criterion of good government, with special meaning 
as the consummation of nationalism for new states recently free from colonial 
rule. In Chapter Two of Part One, the two currents are not necessarily 
incompatible but they have different sources and will have a profound effect 
on each other whenever they meet. 
While many non-Muslim thinkers have considered the state, from its 
beginning, as an established order dealing with the worldly concerns of its 
members, Islamic thought in general has justified, in Chapter Two of Part 
Two, the existence of the state on more fundamental grounds. Everyday 
problems and survival are not seen as sufficient reasons for establishing a 
political system. The state protects and encourages morality. The specific 
reason that is usually cited for the existence of the state is the establishment of 
a moral society on the basis of God's teachings. The goal of politics is the 
attainment of the Islamic system. Politics should also aim at the realization of 
the good, the attainment of normative principles, and the application of 
prescriptive remedies to social problems. Two dominant interpretations have 
been put forward in modem times- modernism and fundamentalism. 
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CHAPTER 1: ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY 
Much of the Muslim world finds itself today at the crossroads of two 
historical political currents. One of these currents is democracy: the other, 
political Islam. It is unlikely that either current will win totally. More 
probably, the result will be a turbulent mixture of the two in varying 
proportions. The outcome, however, will have momentous consequences for 
the people involved and also for the rest of the world. 
The confrontation concerns two rising tides of attention, surging from their 
own sources, spreading through their own dynamics, and flowing together in 
many places throughout the world. They meet wherever governance is 
debated in the land of Islam, but they also meet in the streets of Paris, in the 
hidden house of Salman Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses,235 and in the 
District Building in Washington, D.C, when it was taken over by the Hanafi 
sect in 1977. From one side, democracy, flowing from the West since classical 
Athens, has suddenly resurged as a popular demand and a political criterion in 
response to the failures of authoritarian rule in both the Second and Third 
worlds. On the other side, Islamic revival and its extension as a political 
formula have also arisen in reaction to the failures of modernization and 
secular socialism in developing countries. 
This is not to say that Islam is the successor to communism as a threat to the 
West, as some U.S. government spokespersons have suggested.236 Islam, as a 
personal religious belief, has no necessary consequences for either domestic 
governance or foreign relations, despite the inherent unity of social and 
religious life in Islamic teaching. It is only when the religious beliefs about 
piety and correct behavior are promoted as the basis of the political system 
that they shape the practices of domestic governance and international 
relations.237 Even then, as other parts of this thesis will show, regimes that call 
235 Rushdie, Salman, The Satanic Verses, Viking: Penguin Group, London, 1988. 
236 New York Times, World, 1 January 1992. 
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themselves Islamic may pursue their interests in cooperation with Western 
states, as governments in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Mauritania have done, 
whereas others also calling themselves Islamic may see themselves 
necessarily and primarily in conflict with the West, as governments in Iran 
and the Sudan have done. Moreover, in all of these states, opposition parties 
calling themselves Islamic have contested their own governments. 
Nonetheless, as currents of political philosophy, and so of practice, both 
Western democracy and political Islam are systems of thought and action with 
their own integrity, neither containing the precepts of the other. In reality, in 
the workings of politics and governance each other wherever they meet. How 
to be a democrat in an Islamic state? The two sets of ideas and practices 
challenge and contaminate How to be an Islamist in a democratic state? How 
democratic can an Islamic state be? How Islamic can a democratic state be? 
All are real and important questions for sincere citizens not only in Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, the Sudan, and Mauritania but also in France, Nigeria, 
England, India, the Russian Confederation, and the United States. 
The Cultural Dialectic 
Arab writers and Western analysts have long debated two poles of attraction 
for Muslim society in its search for a model for the kingdom of believers on 
earth. One is an Arabo-Islamic model of revealed values, calling for a return 
to religious inspiration to bring the kingdom of God to his followers. The 
other is a worldly model of materialist values, designed to bring modern 
success to the community of believers. To some, the first is seen as authentic 
but traditional, and hence outmoded; to others, the second is considered as 
modern but secularist and often foreign, and thus alien. This dichotomy 
represents not merely a clash of conceptions and of criteria for desirable 
Press, 1983; Dawish, Adeed, ed., Islam in Foreign Policy, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983. 
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conduct but the basis of a dynamic process of conflict and creation that acts as 
dialectic. 
Out of this clash between thesis and antithesis came not simply a clear-cut 
victory but rather, in time, a synthesis of the two cultures into a political 
system that combined the material values of the state with religious values for 
the individual, as recorded earlier in Part One of this thesis. In time, however, 
the synthesis itself has come under attack, usually from a new antithesis in the 
form of a religious revival that castigates the incumbent political culture for 
its materialism, mismanagement and corruption. The confrontation reopens, 
and is resolved in tum not by a clear defeat of one side but by a new synthesis 
combining elements of both models. The dynamic goes on. 
This dialectic was the basis of the famous analysis of the fourteenth century 
Arab philosopher Abdurahman ibn Khaldun,238 who saw the dynamic of 
history as a conflict between desert zealots and urban materialism. The rulers 
of Arab society became caught up in the corrupting material culture of their 
capitals, arousing the corrective zealotry of the hardy communities living on 
the desert fringes of the countries. They emerged from the wilds to conquer 
the cities and install austere government based on religious principles. But in 
time the urban life got to them and their rule became a synthesis of the two 
cultures. In a cyclical fashion, new zealot groups, bound together in their 
coarse life by a strong spirit of solidarity, again came over the mountains to 
clean out the urban fleshpots and, in tum, fall into them. 
With the coming of Western colonialism, the dialectic took on a new meaning. 
The materialistic thesis became the colonial society, drawing in imitators 
fashioned by Western material success but which offended the colonized 
society because of its foreign and secular worldliness. This time the antithesis 
238 lbn Khaldun, Abdurrahman, An Arab Philosophy of History, ed., Issawi, Charles, New 
York: Grove Press, 1950. 
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came from abroad, through contact with Europe, producing reform 
governments in the Ottoman core and in Tunisia at the end of the nineteenth 
century. In the Arab world, the clash of values produced a notable synthesis of 
faith and reason in the works of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani at the same time. 
However, the corruption of this synthesis through association with reinforced 
colonial rule in World War I produced a new antithesis in the ideas of Hassan 
al-Banna and the organization he founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Throughout the depression and World War II, Arab nationalism and Islam 
combined to form a powerful message to be used against colonial rule. The 
most successful nationalist leaders, however, were those who could not only 
wield that message but also could also speak the language of the colonizer 
and negotiate an agreement for independence to create a modern society 
based on both national and modern values. North African nationalist leaders 
such as Allal al-Fassi, the 'alim ("doctor of theology") from Qarawiyin 
University in Fez who led the Moroccan Independence Party, or Habib 
Bourguiba, the French-trained lawyer from Monastir who founded the New 
Constitution Party and for thirty years was Tunisia's first president, embodied 
the new synthesis of modern Western and Arabo-Islamic national values. 
In time, however, this synthesis too, has come under attack from a new wave 
of corrective zealotry from the margins of modern society. Bourguiba, 
President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt, King Hassan II of Morocco, and, outside 
the Arab world, Shah Reza Pahlevi of Iran, have drawn heavy attack for being 
too modern, materialistic, secular, and tied to the West.239 Their governments 
have been charged with not only corruption, impiety and neglect of the 
national culture and heritage but also with disrupting traditional national 
society in the name of modernization without providing the promised benefits 
in compensation. Basic values have been destroyed. The city has corrupted 
the soul. But poverty is more pervasive than it ever was in traditional times. 
239 Tozy, Mohammed, :Islam and the State in the North Africa," in Polity and Society in 
Contemporary North Africa, ed., Zartman, I. William, and Habeeb, W. Mark, CO: 
Westview Press, 1992. 
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The wealth of the few is more ostentatiously flaunted. And yet the developed 
world surges ahead: mocking the house of Islam. This is the language of the 
new antithesis, turned against the former national synthesis of modernity and 
authenticity and carrying the banner of resurgent political Islam. 
These moments of confrontation and challenge to a former synthesis do not 
arrive by chance, and it is no accident that Islamism is on the rise since the 
end of the twentieth century. Such times occur when the current order is in 
difficulty and no longer a source of stability and satisfaction. When order, 
identity, and resources collapse, believers flock back to their religion and seek 
in it not just a means of salvation in the after life, in its normal personal role, 
but also an answer to unsatisfactory conditions in the earthly life. Previous 
instances in the collapse of regional orders were associated with the coming 
of colonialism at the turn of the century and then with its destruction in the 
aftermath of the two world wars, both of them important influences in the 
disruption of the twentieth-century world order. Steps in the colonialisation 
and decolonialisation of the Muslim world were disruptions in the sense of 
identity in the region; people literally no longer knew who they were in the 
clash between authenticity and modernity. 240 
But these moments of confrontation are not merely philosophical matters; as 
well, and perhaps above all, they concern material conditions. When the 
economy is no longer able to fill the needs of its inhabitants, the disruptions 
of modernization dismantle the peasant and traditional urban commercial 
economies, and the state falls short in assuming the colonial promise of social 
services as well as general responsibility for welfare, believers tend to see the 
cause in divine retribution for the adoption of alien models and for the corrupt 
deviance of the rulers. The correction is a return to the straight path revealed 
in God's word. 
240 Memmi, Albert, The Colonizer and the colonized, Boston: Beacon Press, 1967; and 
Fanon, Frantz, Black Skin, White Masks, New York: Grove Press, 1967. 
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The antithesis, it would seem, comes in the form of religious utopia, this 
promises jobs and good government here and now, because its economic 
program "is in the Qur'an", in the words of Islamist campaigners from 
Algeria and Tunisia to the Sudan and Iran. Because the response bears the 
stamp of religious legitimacy, it must succeed. Again, not in terms of bringing 
salvation in the hereafter - where it cannot be verified, but in terms of 
bringing successful governance in the temporal immediacy. If it does not 
succeed immediately, it is not because it is wrong but because it is thwarted 
by the incomplete eradication of the forces of impiety. In the best dialectical 
terms, the antithesis does not seek a compromising synthesis; it seeks to win. 
What is required for a new synthesis, therefore, is a vigorous confrontation 
between the two forces, modernist and Islamist, and, eventually, a new figure 
with a following that can combine the better of the two into a nationalist-
modernist program for society. That synthesis cannot come too early, or it 
weakens the force of the debate that is needed to reveal and purge the depths 
of corruption and irresponsibility in the modernist thesis and the shallowness 
of utopia and atavism that is in the Islamic antithesis. Only then can the 
scientific understanding of modernism and the mobilizing inspiration of 
nationalism be combined to produce a program of commitment and 
productivity that will meet the need for order, identity, and resources in 
society. 
Democratic Consummation of Nationalism 
There have been many stirring and insightful treatises on democracy, from 
which it is necessary to draw two apparently contradictory but defining 
elements into this discussion. On the one hand, democracy is a procedure. It is 
the ability to choose and the ability to repent. It is the provision of a choice of 
rulers, at regular intervals, from among contending candidates. It does not 
guarantee results at any particular time; it is not synonymous with good 
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government in the short run. It is the way in which both good results and 
mistakes are produced, and the procedure cannot be annulled merely because 
of a momentary mistake. In the long run, however, it is the only guarantee of 
accountability and responsibility by the governors, the only way of correcting 
mistakes, the only way both of getting the rascals out and reducing rascality 
while they are in. 
On the other hand, democracy is not just procedure. It is government 
conducted by democrats, by people who live within the rules that provide for 
repeated choice and who believe that losing does not threaten their security, 
nor winning guarantee their privilege. While it does not guarantee good 
results at any one election, it is based on the deeper belief that only by open 
debate will the best alternative be brought to light and that open debate will 
produce the best alternatives. Perhaps the most difficult part of democracy lies 
in the surrounding attributes that allow for its success. These attributes that 
comprise social preconditions such as literacy and urbanization241 but also 
include an adherence to such democratic ideals and values as those indicated 
previously. Literacy and urbanization have independent sources of 
development, but adherence to democratic values is hard to come by without 
experience in democracy, posing a chicken-and-egg dilemma. 
Colonialism tried to resolve this dilemma by giving three-old training in 
democracy to its subjects. It taught colonial peoples about its own ideals of 
governance, in terms of parliamentary democracy, for example, or liberty, 
equality, and fraternity. It gave them something to emulate by showing how 
colonial governments were responsible to settler populations, a process from 
which the colonized peoples were excluded. But colonial training in 
democratization was necessarily skewed and truncated. Finally, it forced them 
to create democratic nationalist movements as the means to achieve national 
self-determination, since masses and then legitimacy were the only 
241 Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man, New York: Doubledat, 1960. 
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instruments of power that the colonial ruler did not monopolize, unlike arms, 
money, organization, and international support, for example. 
Nationalist movements were the embodiment of the mass democracy of 
Rousseau's General Will, targeted against the colonial order. They were an 
exercise in national self-determination, taking government into their own 
hands and restoring it to the people, often using institutions that the colonizer 
had brought and left them. But the nationalist governments were so heavy 
with legitimacy and unity that they were unable to carry the democratic 
argument to the conclusion it required. They were unable to condone division, 
debate, political parties, and repeated elections between competing 
candidates. They were therefore unable to provide for successors to the father 
of the new emancipated countries. The democracy of the colonial succession 
remained a dead letter, a truncated exercise. 
Thus, nearly half a century or so after independence, there is a new wave of 
democracy sweeping the world, a renewed pressure for popular sovereignty 
that has a special meaning for political development and for the Muslim 
countries among them. It is the fulfillment of the logic and promise of the 
nationalist movement and culmination of self-determination, in which 
government itself is determined at regular intervals by people, and not merely 
the independence of the state determined by a one-time vote. The current 
wave of democracy, which began in the late 1980s, draws its major impetus 
from the collapse of the Communist system of social or totalitarian 
democrac/42 in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and from the 
culmination of the colonial liberation movement seen in the exhaustion of the 
apartheid system of hijacked democracy in South Africa. But it is in the 
Muslim world where it has a special impact, since it meets the historical 
current of Islamism, which is rising at the same time. 
242 Talmon, J.L., The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1985. 
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In addition to its importance as the culmination of the nationalist movement, 
the current wave of democracy gains significance from two other aspects in 
the operation of the post-colonial state. One is, the numerous expansions of 
the functions of the state, into areas of socioeconomic services and 
regulations that far exceed the scope of state activities in the pre-colonial or 
even colonial times. Typically, in the Third and especially the Muslim worlds, 
the state is the largest employer and the largest investor; nearly all university 
faculties are civil servants and all students live on state subsidies, expecting-
and sometimes guaranteed- state jobs upon graduation. Basic food samples 
are subsidized to a low consumer price, and medical treatment, as with 
education, is free or low cost. The other aspect is that, it is also a source of 
intrusive regulations, being a legislator of labor laws, currency control, exit 
visas, curriculum reforms, and social norms. As a result, the state is an 
important prize for democratic- or any other- control and not just a resource 
of privilege for a ruling few. 
Yet the other element in the struggle for the state is that in fact it has been 
viewed in the Islamic world- and elsewhere in the Third World- as the hunting 
preserve of the few, alienated from the people, ruling not so much by coercion 
as by manipulation, and without the charismatic leaders of Islamic politics in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The decade of the 1980s saw significant outbursts of 
popular disapproval in most Arab countries, protesting not only shortfalls in 
goods and services provided by the government but a lack of trust and faith in 
the leaders themselves. Riots in 1981 and 1984 in Casablanca and 1990-91 in 
northern Morocco, 1986 in Constantine and then 1988 throughout Algeria, in 
1984 in Tunisia, in 1986 in Cairo and other cities of Egypt, in 1989 in 
Amman, and in 1986 at the Great Mosque in Mecca and, of course the 
revolution of 1979 in Iran, are all strident and bloody instances of popular 
protest against the dictators of the Muslim Middle East and North Africa. 
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Alienated rulers, controlling powerful states and confronting a sudden rise in 
the pressures for democracy as the consummation of nationalist self-
determination have made for a most explosive combination. Unfortunately for 
a lasting commitment to democratic values, the situation has meant that 
democracy is not viewed merely as a healthy procedure but as a guarantee of 
the results that the previous system failed to produce. That is a tough 
challenge to throw in the face of a new system of government in which its 
practitioners had little experience, at a time of decreasing foreign aid, 
unfavorable terms of trade, and shrinking and redirected investment. 
Democracy in the Middle East and North Africa, and elsewhere in the Third 
World, is threatened with becoming yet another system of government that 
did not produce the expected results, because so much is expected of it. If the 
democratic resurgence threatens incumbent authoritarians in the Muslim 
world, the charismatic demagogues in turn threaten to deform democracy into 
xenophobic populism. But the most powerful form of this challenge is 
political Islam, which promises the restoration of morality, authenticity, and 
earthly success and the exclusion of corruption and error, backed by God's 
word as a guide and as a guarantee. 
Democracy Vs Islam 
There is no inherent incompatibility between democracy and Islam. Like 
other Abrahamic Scriptures- the Torah and the Bible - the Qur'an can be 
interpreted to support many different types of political behavior and systems 
of government. It contains no direct support for democracy, the closest 
statement being an indication that "what is with God is better and more 
lasting for those... who [conduct] their affairs by mutual consultation 
[shura]".243 As would be expected, its emphasis lies much more on the pious 
qualities expected of a ruler than on the way in which rulers should be chosen. 
243 The Holy Qur 'an, 42:36, 38. 
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As indicated at the outset, each of the two currents comes from different 
sources and addresses different issues. 
The conflict arises when the particular form of political Islam precludes the 
procedural essence of democracy, e.g. the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
repeated provision of debate and choice between free ranges of options. When 
political Islam, in the name of cleaning out the stables of corruption and 
alienation, promises to install a system in which only those who subscribe to 
the true path are allowed into the contest for power, then the incompatibility 
arises. When parties led by devoted leaders inspired by religious beliefs vie 
among others for a role in government, there is no incompatibility. But when 
the party arrogates for itself the mantle of the national religion, monopolizing 
its symbols and de-legitimizing its opponents, open democratic debate and the 
guarantee of future free elections are hard to ensure. 
Islamic parties and regimes are usually rather straightforward about their 
intentions, although not always to the Western press. For example, although 
the leaders of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) profess their 
devotion to democracy before Western journalists, they also tell local 
audiences that "democracy is heresy" and all parties who subscribe to the Way 
can compete freely, clear statements of incompatibility with democracy. It 
should be remembered that the position of democracy and that of political 
Islam on the matter of open debate are similar but different in an important 
way. Both maintain that truth will prevail in an open debate, but democrats 
are proponents of the debate whereas Islamists are proponents of the Truth. 
More complex is the usual division of Islamic parties into a moderate, usually 
visible, leadership and a radical militant wing, often underground. This 
creates a situation where, as in any revolutionary movement, the moderate 
leadership is controlled and can eventually be replaced by the militants once 
its usefulness in achieving power is spent. Thus the compatibility of political 
Islam and democracy must be judged not only by public statements but also 
by an analysis of probable political dynamics. 
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The Issues Before Us 
While the confrontation is going on, what can be done to create conditions for 
a functioning synthesis, so that democracy can be preserved in the presence of 
political Islam rather than being destroyed by it? 
One way , adopted by most Muslim countries, is through constitutional 
provisions declaring Islam to be the national religion but prohibiting Islamic 
parties, often along with ethnic and other religious parties. Many Muslim 
states constitutions have both provisions- including Algeria, where the FIS 
was authorized in 1989 despite its unconstitutionality! A similar method 
involves the use of a charter of agreed principles to register a national 
consensus of values upon which participation and competition can be based. 
This device has been used both in Egypt and in Tunisia, and in the latter case 
included an Islamist representative as a signatory but did not permit the 
legalization of the Islamist party. 
A second measure is the development of a credible opposition. The crisis in 
the current confrontations between a decrepit authoritarian regime and a new 
Islamist opposition arises from the absence of an alternative. In Algeria, in the 
elections of 1990 and 1991- and the cancelled elections of 1992- it was not 
that the FIS won but that the discredit of the old single party, the National 
Liberation Front, left no party known and attractive enough to draw the votes. 
The crisis came from the fact that there was no party able to win majority 
support from the nation and, more specifically, able to encourage the majority 
of the population to vote. In Tunisia and Egypt, strong government parties, 
even if tied to the old regime, handily overcame Islamist opposition, running 
as independents in Tunisia in 1989 and among several parties in Egypt in 
1990 and 1991. But in both countries, third parties, try as they did, were too 
new, inexperienced, and unknown to present serious challenge to the 
incumbents, while the old parties, were hampered by their ties to previous 
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regimes. Yet, as the experience in Iran under the Shah shows, incumbents are 
in a poor position to help develop credible oppositions to their own regimes. 
A third measure is to use the technicalities of elections to encourage pluralism 
and limit the hold that an Islamist party could gain on the government 
apparatus. An electoral system of proportional representation gives seats to 
smaller parties and prevents an overemphasis of the majority. However, it 
often leads to coalition governments and less coherent policies. Majoritarian 
systems, either for single member districts or for large-constituency lists, tend 
to focus on prominent alternatives, to the under-representation of small and 
regional parties. Establishment of a minimum percentage for inclusion, 
usually set between 5 and 8 percent, keeps small parties from producing many 
splinter and overvalued coalition partners. Parties may be required to show 
clientele or candidates in all regions or all voting districts, in order to 
establish their national character. These and other aspects of election laws can 
be used to limit extremist parties, encourage coalitions, eliminate splinters, 
and strengthen credible options. 
A fourth measure would be to delay political democracy until its reconditions 
are established or at least begun. Literacy levels and urban concentrations 
have been mentioned as social requisites, but other political correlates of 
democracy include a free and pluralistic press, an independent judiciary, 
autonomous associations such labor unions and public affairs discussion 
groups, and respect for civil liberties and human rights. The problem is that 
these conditions are as difficult to establish as free elections themselves and 
more difficult to maintain. Their existence does not guarantee their continuity, 
and their imperfection be used too easily as a pretext to postpone the exercise 
of democracy that will help perpetuate them. Yet without these conditions, it 
is hard to maintain the democratic values that undergrid free elections. The 
bundle of measures should go together, and it is important to begin wherever 
one can. 
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A fifth measure would be to practice the forms of democracy whenever 
scheduled. Let the most popular- including the Islamists- win, and let them 
learn democracy on the job. The lesson of many experiments with radical 
groups is that responsibility moderates, but that lesson is not absolute. 
Another lesson is that experiments in moderating revolutionary groups tend to 
take up to a generation, as the Iranian experience shows. Such experiments 
make for exciting stuff for social science analysts, but they are hard on the 
subject populations and disruptive for the world around them. The theo-
political conflict within Islam and the confrontation of the two waves of 
political Islam and democracy also have their costs. Ultimately, it is the 
populations themselves, acting as masses or as political leaders, who will 
have to make the choice of which costs to bear. 
CHAPTER 2: MODERNISM AND ISLAMISM 
The subject of this chapter is not Islamic political history and movements nor 
contemporary Islamic politics but Islamic modernism as advocated by Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Muhammad 
Iqbal (11875-1938), and Ali Shari'ati (1933-1977) and Islamism as advocated 
by Abu al-Al-la al-Mawdudi (1903-80), Hassan al-Banna (1906-49), Sayyid 
Qutb ( 1906-1966) and Ayatollah al-Khomeini 1903-89).244 
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part one, deals with the philosophical 
foundation of both modernism and Islamism. Part two focuses on the political 
principles of both. 
But, first, a word on fundamentalism is in place. Fundamentalist Islamic 
political thought has been treated as a passing political phenomenon, 
dependent upon specific social and political circumstances. The movement 
244 Khadduri, Majid, 'From Religious to National Law', in Thomson, J.H., and R.J. 
Reischauer, eds., Modernization in the Arab World, Princeton: D. Van Nostran Co., 
1966, pp. 37-51. 
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has being studied by political scientists as a movement that lacks any deep-
rooted principles and is often dismissed as religious fanaticism. 245 A typical 
discourse on, for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood, the most distinguished 
and powerful fundamentalist organization runs as follows: 
The Muslim Brotherhood was a militant group, which believed in the 
sufficiency and supremacy of Islam and in literal interpretation of the 
Quran and the Sunnah. It worked for the revival of the principle of 
jihad, holy war. Unlike the Wahhabis, however, it believed in reform 
and in the utilization of certain Western methods. Unlike Adbuh, the 
Brotherhood did not think that a restatement of Islamic doctrines was 
necessary.246 (Emphasis added) 
The above statement does not capture accurately the character of 
fundamentalism or account for a variety of interpretations advanced by 
fundamentalist leaders such as Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi, the 
founder of the Islamic movement in Pakistan, or Hassan al-Banna, the 
founder of Muslim Brethen, neither of whom advocate a literal interpretation 
of the Holy Qur' an or think that Islamic doctrines are in no need of 
restatement. 
In fact Islamic fundamentalism has been part of an intellectual discourse, 
which has been going on for hundreds of years in the East and the West. 
Fundamentalism constitutes a critique of philosophy, political ideology, and 
science. Philosophically, it rejects both the claim that man is the possessor of 
truth and the claim that there is no truth. More essentially, it offers a way of 
life and thought, a way regulated by God's laws and by nature. Politically, it 
rejects the notion that authority belongs to the people and that societies are no 
245 Dessouki, Ali H., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 
1982. 
246 Armajani, Yahya, Middle East: Past and Present, N. J.: Prentice Hall Inco. 1970, pp. 
287- 88. 
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more than marketplaces where desires are satisfied. Also, it strives to erect 
societies whose basic components are justice, virtue, and equality. 
As a result of the negative image applied to them by scholars, governments, 
Arab and foreign media, the theoretical and practical contribution of the 
fundamentalists has been viewed superficially, and, consequently precluded 
any serious study of their assumptions and doctrines. Whereas the student of 
contemporary Islam finds a substantial output by Westerners on modernist 
reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and 
Muhammad Iqbal, there is less theoretical discussion concerning 
fundamentalist thinkers such as Hassan al-Banna, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi 
and Sayyid Qutb. 
Philosophical Foundations 
It is now useful to analyze in this section three main principles that make up 
the intellectual foundations of both Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic 
modernism. These principles are reason and morality, philosophy and science, 
and political principles. Also comparing and contrasting these principles will 
reveal the different conceptions between both movements; in fact, the 
different conceptions of these principles mark one movement from the other. 
Reason and Morality 
Notwithstanding its insistence on the existence of moral principles in human 
nature, fundamentalism emphasizes man's inability to arrive at them by 
reason. This necessitates the existence of revelation in order that man has an 
example to follow. For al-Mawdudi and Qutb, the innate human nature (or 
fitrah), the recipient of revelation, is nothing but the obedience to dominate 
forces that created the law, which is controlled by God for the well being of 
this universe. 
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According to Qutb, Islam is in conformity with the innate human nature and, 
more importantly, in conformity with the universe. And because we are part 
of this universe, our happiness results from the harmony between the part and 
the whole. Unhappiness, on the other hand, is the consequence of man going 
against nature, i.e., the man whose system (nizam) is not divine. Therefore, 
knowledge and happiness are based on their correspondence and harmony 
with fitrah. In his book, The Future Belongs to this Religion, Qutb defines 
happiness as the conformity to and the fulfillment of human fitrah in nature, 
i.e., by obeying God's laws. 247 It is, therefore, apparent that nature for Qutb as 
well as for other fundamentalists plays a fundamental role in laying the 
foundation of knowledge as well as existence. Thus, any definition, say, of 
social justice, or beauty, is defective if not based on an accurate and correct 
understanding of nature itself. Hence, he argues, in Social Justice in Islam 
that the nature of social justice in Islam cannot be realized in a comprehensive 
manner unless the Islamic concept of divinity, universe, life and man is 
attained. Social justice is nothing but a branch of the wider origin ( oneness of 
God) from which all Islamic teachings are derived.248 
For Qutb, religion replaces reason and philosophy. Whereas the ancient and 
medieval philosophers show that the good city, knowledge, and happiness are 
dependent on correct metaphysics attained and justified by reason,249 Qutb 
considers that the good state, knowledge, and happiness are dependent on 
correct doctrines harmonious with nature. By linking the correctness and the 
ability of any political order to produce and promote happiness on that order's 
conformity to nature, it seems that Qutb's purpose in this argument is to show 
that political and social orders should be based on a correct concept and 
should take into account the fulfillment of the purpose of human existence; a 
fulfillment that requires a correct understanding of nature. Consequently, any 
247 Qutb, Sayyid, Al-Mustaqbal li-hadha al-din (The Future Belongs to this Religion) 2"d 
ed., Cairo, Maktaba Wahbah, 1965, p. 13, (Hereafter cited as Future). 
248 Qutb, Sayyid, Social Justice in Islam, translated by John B. Hardie, New York: Octagon 
Books, 1970, pp. 24, 25-29, (Hereafter cited as Social Justice). 
249 Qutb, Future, pp. 11-13 and 57-61. 
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social order not meeting and fulfilling humanfitrah is unnatural, unjust, and 
unsuitable to the movement of man and with the movement of the universe.250 
Although the function of fitrah is to direct man to the good, fundamentalists 
view man as having diverted his natural drive and forgotten the fitrah and 
replaced them with will and choice. For man has involved himself in a 
domain (philosophy) that, although supported by reason and argument, had 
led him to wrong conclusions symbolized in his worship of stars, gods, ideals, 
idols, abstract ideas, and world forces. Nonetheless, they assert that man looks 
to nature for God; and, in as much as he seeks water and shelter, he also seeks 
God. Put simply, moral laws, residing in the fitrah, are intuitive and are as 
natural as physical laws. For instance, al-Mawdudi contends that humans 
agree that a well-administered society enjoys cooperation, mutuality, advice, 
social justice, and equality. Humans also agree that theft; adultery, murder, 
spying, jealousy and so forth are evil.251 
Modernism, on the other hand, maintains the existence of natural laws and 
moral laws in nature. These two laws are authentic and can be demonstrated 
by reason. Ali Shari'ati, for example, argues that, contrary to Marxism, which 
equates moral law with social customs and relates them to social and 
economic materialism, Islam attempts to attribute moral laws to the 
primordial nature of man.252 This means that it can be demonstrated by 
reason. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani insists on the existence in man of an urge to 
rise above bestiality or lust and to improve his life. This does not take place 
by following fitrah only but primarily by the pursuit of knowledge and 
cultivation of those arts and skills, which have been the works of civilization. 
In particular, Muslims should pursue progress, which is manifest in the study 
250 Ibid. pp. 1 7-18. 
251 Al-Mawdudi, Abu al-Ala, Mafahim lslamiyah (Islamic Understanding), Kuwait: Dar al-
Qalam, 1977, pp. 10-22 and 28-29. 
252 Shari'ati, Ali, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, trans. By Campell, R., Berkeley: 
Mizan Press, 1980, p. 80. 
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of science. For solid moral and religious grounds require not only religion but 
also solid knowledge.253 
The difference between the modernists and the fundamentalists can be 
summarized in the following statement. Whereas Qutb and al-Mawdudi 
consider the secrets of human nature as known to God only, al-Afghani, 
Abdu, Iqbal, and Shari'ati consider man as capable of attaining some, if not 
all, of those secrets. This difference is due to their conception of reason. For 
the concept of fitrah, which is interwoven with the concept of reason, 
manifests itself in al-Mawdudi's and Qutb's argument that the Muslim should 
submit to God in everything. 
Qutb divides systems of thought, life, and action into two basic divisions: 
those given by God and those that are not. Those individuals who regulate 
their life and behavior according to the system derive from a divine creed that 
is followers of the religion of God. But those individuals who derive their 
system from a king, a prince, tribe, or a people are followers not of the 
religion of God but that of the king, the prince, the tribe, or the people, 
respectively. 254 
The fundamentalists perceive religion as a system of life, which includes a 
metaphysical concept and is accompanied by a social order: every system of 
life is a religion, and the religion of a group is the system that regulates the 
life of that group. Put differently, religion is not, only an abstraction, a 
metaphysical doctrine, an emotion, or a belief but, equally, the culture or the 
system that disciplines the behavior. And this is the reason why Qutb regards, 
for instance, communism not only as "a social system but also as a 
metaphysical concept based on material contradiction, and ultimately, as not 
only a social order but also as a religion".255 Those individuals who do not 
253 Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, al-Urwah al-Wuthqah (The Strongest Bond), Cairo: Dar al-
Arab, 1957, pp. 60-61; and see al-Afghani, al-Amal al-kamilah (Complete Works), Part 
II, Political Writings, ed. by Amarah, Muhammad, Beirut: al- al-Arabiyah li-Dirasat wa 
al-Nashr, 1980, pp. 9-13 & 16-17. (Hereafter cited as Works). 
254 Qutb; Future, pp. 12-14. 
255 Ibid. pp. 15-17. 
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submit but ask God for logical proofs and do not obey when dissatisfied with 
proofs, are infidels. This is so because Islam, for the fundamentalists, means 
total submission with or without logical proof and satisfaction. Belief in the 
Day of Judgment, for instance, should be adhered to whether a logical proof 
can be found or not. Although Islam is not opposed to reason, a logical proof 
should follow belief and not vice versa.256 For Hassan al-Banna, logical 
proofs and syllogisms are accepted because the mind is spoken to in the Holy 
Qur'an, but their service is the defense of religion against myth and distortion. 
More importantly, God's existence is in need of proof; it is intuitive. And the 
question "who created God" is a misguided question - for humans are 
incapable of understanding themselves, let alone God. Belief is, by definition, 
the heart's submission and tranquility with certainty. 257 
The modernists agree that religion is intuitive more than volitional, but 
perceive that reason and religion are in harmony. According to Muhammad 
Abduh, Muslims in general have agreed that some issues in religion cannot be 
believed except through reason as in knowing, for instance, God's existence 
and God's ability to send messages. Also, Muslims have agreed that religion 
advances high principles that man cannot understand easily; but religion does 
not advance principles that are opposite to reason. For instance, man can 
prove that God exists but reason cannot understand the essence of God. This 
stems from man's inability to understand oneself. Islam is the religion of 
oneness, and reason is one of its most strong helpers.258 
Religion, according to Abduh, is the strongest factor in morality and one of 
the greatest human forces, for it influences the majority more than reason 
does. More importantly, reason is the source for the knowledge of religion and 
for using it; but once belief is attained, the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) 
256 Al-Mawdudi, Abu al-Ala, Nahnu wa-al-hadarah al-gharbiyah (Us and Western 
Modernity), Beirut: Mu'assassat al-Risalah, 1983, pp. 146-48, 150 and 174. 
257 Al-Banna, Hasan, Rasa'il al-shahid Hasan al-Banna (The Treatise of Marty Hassan al-
Banna), Cairo: Dar al-Qalam, 1987, pp. 429-31 & 471-74. 
258 Abduh, Muhammad, Risa/at al-Tawhid (Treatise of Oneness), al-Mu'assassah al-
Arabiyah li-Dirasat al-Nashr, 2nd ed., 1981, pp. 19-20, 31, 46-51, (Hereafter cited as 
Treatise). 
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should be followed.259 Similarly, for Iqbal, while religion starts with feeling, it 
has never taken itself as a matter of feeling alone and has constantly striven 
after metaphysics. Religion is not a compartmental affair, mere feeling or 
mere action, but is an expression of the whole man. In Islam, the ideal and the 
real are not two separate or opposite forces but Islam attempts to bridge the 
gap between the ideal and the real where the ideal eventually absorbs the 
real.260 Shari'ati defines Islam as a profound spiritual, idealistic, intelligible, 
and logical interpretation of the universe fully attuned to earthly reality and to 
divinity. 
Philosophy and Science 
The major difference here is that whereas the Islamists perceive Islam as a 
comprehensive system that is self-proven and requiring no logical proof, the 
modernists accept the principle of arriving at truth by proof. Thus, Abduh 
allows individuals to seek proofs, but once attained the individuals need to 
submit to the Prophet's teachings. In other words, the fundamentalists 
disclaim the ability of human reason to arrive at truth without the aid of 
revelation, but the modernists find that reason can arrive at moral and 
metaphysical truth by reason and by the human being. 
The explanation for this opposite understanding is related to the difference in 
the modernists' and fundamentalists' conception of tawhid and the purpose of 
Islam. For example, al-Mawdudi and Qutb define Islam as a program of life 
according to the rule of nature given by God and as the extension that aims at 
constructing the superstructure for the whole of humanity on the governance 
of God. Tawhid, the fundamental component of Islam, is not only a religious 
creed but, more importantly, is the elimination of systems based on human 
independence in earthly affairs from the governance of God. It should lead to 
259 lbid.pp.111-113. 
260 Iqbal, Muhammad, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, Ashraf, 
1960, pp. 2, 9 & 22 (Hereafter cited as Reconstruction). 
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complete transformation in the life of individuals. Also, it indicates that God 
is the Creator, the Governor and Controller of this universe and negates the 
government of man, class, and race.261 Thus, an essential part of the 
fundamentalists' conception of tawhid is the negation of and opposition to any 
man-made system or order. Their perspective, moreover, denies any 
meaningful search for ultimate truth in this universe since they believe that 
everything is clear and given. 
But the modernists' see tawhid in a more constructive way. It is a starting 
point that seeks fulfillment and understanding. And not everything is given 
but man has to exert himself. They do not view tawhid as an instrument of 
negation and opposition but; to paraphrase Iqbal, as a working force for the 
establishment of equality, solidarity and freedom. Iqbal even considers the 
state as no more than an attempt to transform these principles into a definite 
organization.262 For Shari'ati, tawhid means viewing the whole universe as a 
single living and conscious organism that possesses intelligence, will, purpose 
and feeling. 263 
The definition of tawhid by Iqbal's and Shari'ati allow and, even, encourage 
the principle of philosophizing, but not accept every philosophy. For instance, 
Shari'ati argues that the method of attaining truth is to invent "a method of 
investigation" useful for the discovery of truth. Although, according to 
Shari'ati, Plato's philosophy is more sophisticated than Descartes', the latter 
was a more useful one.264 Iqbal, for example, contends that the birth of Islam 
is anti-classical and that the Muslim philosophers did not understand Islam, 
which they read in the light of Greek thought. This is so because Islam asks 
its adherents to use their mind and sense of perception to understand the 
world, but the philosophers despised sense perception. Furthermore, Islam 
261 Al-Mawdudi, Minhaj al-inqilab al-Islami, Beirut: Mu'assassat al-Risalah, 3'd ed., 1981, 
pp. 28-34; see also note 12, pp. 267-70. 
262 Iqbal; Reconstruction, 1960, pp. 145-55. 
263 Shari'ati, Ali, On the Sociology of Islam, tms. by Algar, Hamid, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 
1979, p. 83. 
264 Ibid. p. 63. 
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encourages empirical approaches to knowledge, but science has a sectional 
character and is unable to furnish complete knowledge making the concept of 
mechanism inadequate for the analysis of life. But Iqbal still believes that the 
religious and the scientific, although following different methods, aim at the 
real.265 His rejection is directed at materialism and speculative philosophy, not 
at every intellectual or spiritual pursuit. 
In fact modernist Muslim thinkers perceive philosophy essentially in terms of 
science. For instance, Abduh's argument that Islam cannot contradict reason 
means that it cannot contradict science. For he believes that the domain of 
reason is not speculation but the scientific field. Although reason and 
revelation are compatible, those thinkers who tried to harmonies revelation 
and philosophical proofs about God's existence and essence went too far. 
Their speculations cannot be ascertained. But science, on the other hand, can 
be ascertained. Therefore, when Abduh says there is harmony between reason 
and revelation, reason is equivalent to science.266 Al-Afghani as well as 
Abduh made science the ultimate judge not only when the Qur' an is obscure 
or controversial but also when the Qur'an contradicts science. Because the 
Qur'an provides very general principles, it should not contradict "the 
stipulation of reason and the achievement of science. Interpretation (ta'wil) is 
the method to solve the contradiction between science and the Shariah.267 
Fundamentalism views science differently. Al-Mawdudi asserts that Islam 
does not prohibit benefiting from human experiments, but experimental 
science is biased and is not panhuman. Science, which has been started in the 
West, is directed at nationalism, moral confusion, and atheism. 268 Although 
al-Banna and Qutb agree with some of his conclusions (such as the direction 
of science), they view science as panhuman and accept its benefits; for they 
believe that the Muslims have contributed to it. 
265 Iqbal, Reconstruction, pp. 4, 14-15, 42, 54-57 and 196. 
266 Abduh, Treatise, pp. 18-19, 28-32, 46-47, 59, 69,-70, 108 and 112-32. 
267 Afghani; Works, pp. 440-441. 
268 AI-Mawdudi; Nahnu, pp. 13-18. 
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And not withstanding some objections, the modernist thinkers accept modem 
Western thought based on science by subjecting the interpretation of the Holy 
Qur'an and religion to scientific discoveries. Their rejection of medieval 
thought should be viewed in this manner; for they subject medieval and 
ancient philosophy as well as Muslim theology and thought to science. The 
modernists replaced speculative philosophy, which the medieval thinkers 
depended on for the exposition of their ideas, with philosophy of science. 
Iqbal suggests the rewriting of Islamic theology on the basis of science. One 
of the examples he gives is the verse in the Holy Qur'an where God is likened 
to light. Usually, this verse has being used by some scholars to mean 
Omnipresence. But Iqbal thinks that, because of the discoveries in physics, it 
should be interpreted as Absoluteness. His argument is as follows: Modern 
physics teaches that the velocity of light cannot be exceeded and is the same 
for all observers. Since light is the nearest approach to the absolute, the 
metaphor of light as applied to God must be viewed as a suggestion of 
absoluteness of God and not of His Omnipresence.269 
The modernists' emphasis on science for the validity of interpreting the 
revelation leads to the rejection of the traditional, theological, and 
philosophical understandings and to the acceptance of new philosophical and 
theological interpretations that are based only on science. 
In one way, moral philosophy and religious precepts are weakened insofar as 
they have to seek the authority of science. But science, assuming its' 
correctness, is incapable of providing morality and metaphysics. Knowing 
that from an Islamic viewpoint God is neither a body nor is in a body, it does 
not make a difference whether the metaphor of God as a light is interpreted as 
absoluteness or omnipresence. For the moral obligation to obey God's 
teachings does not change or affect the theory of light and has nothing to do 
with the metaphysical understanding of God. Whether the light travels in 
269 Iqbal; Reconstruction, pp. 8, 63-64 and 70. 
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particles or in straight lines has no bearing on God's essence and attributes or 
even moral laws. In Islam, God simply does not exist in a spatio-temporal 
sense. 
Consequently, science constitutes an essential part of the modernists' new 
theology that judges the correctness of Islamic teachings and principles and 
their thought is partly based on this premise. On the other hand, the 
fundamentalists disclaimed any instrumentality or validity for science as a 
theological or exegetical or interpretive power over scripture. They were 
aware of the damage that science could cause if considered as a criterion for 
interpreting revelation. But their alternative is denying not only science for a 
correct understanding of the revelation but also of philosophy, theology, and, 
even, history, which is important for understanding the scripture itself. 
Fundamentalists disregard the importance of history in understanding the 
Holy Qur'an since the actual writing and the transmission of the Qur'an as 
well as their accuracy depends on historical accuracy. Also, discrediting 
history leads as well to the weakening of the Prophets Sunnah since its 
validity depends as well on historical transmission. But the fundamentalists 
accept both the accuracy of the Qur'an and the Sunnah; a notion that 
underscores their dismissal of any danger in denying the importance and 
validity of diverse disciplines of knowledge.270 
Political Principles 
For the Islamists Tawhid has become the thread that weaves all the materials 
of politics, economics, ethics, theology, and all other aspects of life together. 
Because God, the source of knowledge and of matter, is the Creator of both, 
He is given the ultimate say in political life as well. Man, they contend, 
should submit only to God; this submission is not only theological as 
understood by traditional thinkers, medieval and modem, but more 
270 As-Said, Labib, The Recited Koran, trns. by Bernard Weiss, M.A. Rauf, and Morroe 
Berger, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1975, pp. 19-60 & 121-25. 
172 
importantly, the fundamentalists endow this concept of tawhid with ultimate 
political significance. Their insistence on subjecting the political regime to 
religion leads them even to consider those individuals who disregard either 
the establishment or the maintenance of the state on the basis of God's 
governance as infidel and unqualified to rule. It is ironic that fundamentalists 
like al-Banna and Qutb who reject the teachings of medieval Islamic 
philosophy should seek the same kind of polity, i.e., a polity that is created for 
and sustained by God and that aims at a virtuous society whose ultimate goal 
is God. 
Though the fundamentalists reject many teachings of the modernists, they are 
by no means traditional. On the contrary, a great portion of their attack is 
directed at traditional religious 'ulama' (scholars); the 'ulama' are, according 
to Qutb incapable of understanding the true principles of the Qur' an. Because 
they have followed imitations and looked for solutions in juristic books, 
which were essentially human and not revelation, their teachings have made 
the public complacent and have alienated the educated. On the other side, the 
fundamentalists level their attacks also on elites who, though administering 
the affairs of Muslims and controlling the government, are ignorant of Islam 
and are leading their nations to darkness. Because of the failure of the two, 
there is a need to create a new group of Muslims who truly understand their 
religion as well as modernity. Al-Mawdudi, for instance, acknowledges, as 
Qutb and other thinkers do the weakness of Muslim civilization and declares 
the necessity for an Islamic revival because the past is insufficient to generate 
an Islamic renaissance. It is of primary importance to find Muslims who can 
build a new science and philosophy based on pure Islam; those Muslims 
should take the leadership of science and politics from non-Muslims. 271 
This statement of al-Mawdudi is of crucial significance for understanding the 
fundamentalist theory of politics and its difference from the Muslim 
modernists. Because the modernists have not rejected the West altogether 
271 Al-Mawdudi, Nahnu, pp. 47-5 I, and 23-25. 
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rather some particular philosophies, they have adopted and accepted many 
Western political theories like republicanism. Hence, the modernists have not 
attempted to put forward a political theory - because it existed already and 
what it needed is to transport it into the Islamic milieu. This is not to say that 
they do not have a political teachings, but their teachings do not amount to a 
new or a full-fledged political theory: their political thought is mostly of a 
fragmentary nature advanced for immediate political goals. Moreover, though 
the modernists have attacked traditionalism, they have not repudiated 
traditions as such. Perceiving, with validity, that the way for a revival can be 
done by bringing together two traditions: the Islamic and the Western; they 
have focused their efforts on the harmony of religion and science. Their 
respect for history is very immense and has culminated in learning and 
accepting many benefits of both the West and Islam. 
Nonetheless, they have never claimed to have, and they have not, written a 
complete political theory, for instance, on social justice or tawhid or the 
principles of politics or legislation or equality. Their attempts have focused on 
reviving the intellectual atmosphere in the Muslim land first, and then on 
political matters; or, in other words, their teachings are an outgrowth of their 
intellectual temperament. Put differently, because they have accepted many 
philosophical ideas produced in the West, they have not hesitated in accepting 
numerous benefits of Western political systems. 
But, except for the period of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) who was 
inspired and the first two caliphs - according to Qutb - or the first four caliphs 
- according to al-Mawdudi - who followed the true essence of Islam, the 
fundamentalists do not, by and large, sanctify history or see it as a guide. Not 
sanctifying history is one of the challenges to the orthodox establishment of 
Sunnism as well as Shia'ism. Muslim scholars in general, except some 
philosophers of Islam, have sanctified the past by accepting as imperative the 
teachings and interpretations of earlier scholars such as Abu Hanifah, al-
Shafi'i, Ibn Hanbal, and Malik on jurisprudence and al-Ghazali, and al-
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Baqillani on theology. With the passage of time, their teachings, which were 
the result of ijtihad (reasoning), acquired unchallenged authority as well as 
normative status. And because ijtihad has been stalled for centuries, even 
open-minded people such as Abduh have not challenged their arguments in 
general. 
As an example, Abduh rejects the notion of human capability to fathom the 
essence of God and follows traditional theological arguments of God's 
essence and attributes. Thus Risalat al-tawhid (Treatise on Oneness) is 
nothing more than a simplified edition of medieval treatises on theology. 
Abduh's exposition is very traditional except in two points; his refraining 
from entering into disputation that characterized medieval writing (for 
instance, whether God's attributes are part of His essence or not) and his 
argument that Islam and reason are not contradictory. The first point comes 
from al-Ghazali who in Tahafut al-falasifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers) 
argues that this kind of discussion is futile since man cannot know whether 
God's attributes are part of the essence or not. (Al-Ghazali was chastising both 
philosophy and theology). 
The second point is that of the philosophers such as al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn 
Sina, and Ibn Rushd, and the theologians such as al-Ashari and al-Baqillani. 
What Abduh and other modernists have done is to reintroduce intellectual 
circles again to the legitimacy of ijtihad by using the past itself. There is 
nothing wrong in doing so, but the point is made here to show the difference 
between fundamentalists and the modernists concerning the past. Also, what 
is implied is not that Abduh's achievement is minor, but that his efforts were 
focused on regenerating Islam by recycling past notions on reason and 
modern science.272In sharp contrast to this, the fundamentalists in general 
percive as outmoded, the past as well as the present in its philosophical, 
juristic and theological manifestations, whether produced in the East or West. 
Historicism is a main feature of fundamentalism, embodying its rejection of 
272 Abduh, Treatise of Oneness, pp. 17-51. 
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almost all old interpretations, which are, for the fundamentalists, historically 
oriented. Though those interpretations and doctrines were suitable for their 
societies, they are, the fundamentalists contend, by no means of intrinsic 
value. Their value is historical in showing the Muslims that Islam allows a 
multitude of interpretations. In other words, they do not look at the truth of 
arguments in themselves but select only those interpretations suitable for 
modernity. Qutb and other fundamentalists transformhistory into a justifying 
vehicle for renewal, reassessment, and revolution. 
Legislation 
Rejecting the past and the present necessitates that the fundamentalists 
provide an alternative to Islamic and Western political theories. This 
alternative is manifested primarily in their understanding of tawhid and 
governance of God (al-hakimyyah). Therefore, al-Banna, Qutb, and al-
Mawdudi proclaim, that the source of legislation in the new society is God. 
And truly Muslim societies should be directed at obedience to God. Also, 
they insist that the fundamental characteristic of ethics in obedience to God is 
accepting and applying His teachings. According to Qutb, tawhid is not only 
the liberation of men from submitting to each other, it is also the starting point 
in the formation of ethics and values as well as human legislation and law. A 
government or a people should not legislate for their basic notions of right or 
wrong and lawful or unlawful, but should follow what is revealed in the Holy 
Qur'an. This is because legislation, Qutb reasons, is a divine matter. Society 
has an inherent moral order based on universal (divine) laws prescribed in the 
Holy Qur'an. Since these laws are not human conventions, their application is 
natural. Therefore Islamic government is not an imposition of human will on 
social life. The alternative to human legislation is, legislation based on the 
principles of the Islamic divine law. For Qutb, Islamic law is not a social 
phenomenon but an eternal manifestation of God's will defining the duties and 
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rights of individuals and of the state. This means that the legislation of the 
basic principles of authority, right or wrong, and legality or illegality is set 
apart from human consideration. No matter what individuals or societies 
think, they do not have the right to; or cannot - make what is right wrong or 
what is wrong right. These principles, with their flexibility and 
comprehensiveness meet the needs of life. And so, what is needed is to codify 
legal articles from these general principles in accordance with the changeable 
needs of everyday society. 273 
And because tawhid, for Qutb, is the criterion for right or wrong, lawful or 
unlawful, and legal or illegal, sovereignty only belongs to God and not to the 
individual. Submission to the will of another person or group of individuals or 
to the will of the nation is shirk (polytheism or infidelity). Here, the will of 
the individual or the nation is in contradiction to the divine message or the 
principles found in the Holy Qur' an. And since sovereignty belongs to God in 
this as well as the other life, legislation belongs to God. The reason behind 
this notion is that submission to God is of vital significance not only for 
conscience and heart but also equally for political matters. The real goal of 
establishing God's laws on earth is not merely to work for the next life. This 
and the other life are two integral parts. It is the divine law (Shari'ah) that 
plays the role of harmonizing the life of man with the general divine will, 
revealed in the Holy Qur' an; thus, it is the Muslim's duty to apply divine law 
on earth and to realize that Islamic system. 274 
Whereas the process of history has illuminated the Qur' an and the Sunnah for 
the traditionalist, from a fundamentalist perspective, it has become, by 
preventing a direct understanding of the Qur' an and the Sunnah, a process of 
obscurity and dilution. Therefore, history itself has to be disrupted in order to 
forward a more authentic and direct understanding of the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah without recourse necessarily to traditions of philosophy, theology, and 
273 Qutb, Capitalism, Cairo: Maktaba Wahbah, 1962, pp. 49 & 60, (Hereafter cited as 
Capital ism). 
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jurisprudence. For the fundamentalists, these branches of knowledge, 
especially the political and the intellectual as opposed to the ritual, have to be 
re-evaluated and verified by a new direct interpretation of Islam. Not only the 
history of Islamic nations is not accepted as a correct interpretation of Islam, 
but also Western and socialist doctrines and histories cannot propose a model 
acceptable to the fundamentalists. 
This fundamentalist claim is essential in order to justify the rejection of the 
past because if the fundamentalists accept the historical or scientific processes 
as possessing normative claims, neither a new history nor a new science, as 
al-Mawdudi believes, will be required only continuation and development; 
their insistence on disrupting the existing societies will be a meaningless 
claim. Hence, by tarnishing sciences and philosophies as un-Islamic, the 
creation of purely Islamic sciences and philosophies becomes a must. And 
because these two aspects of life should be subjected neither to past Islamic 
civilization nor to foreign civilizations, the fundamentalists find a justification 
for refusing reconciliation with Western thought; they even perceive that there 
is an essential contradiction between the conception of man in Islam and other 
systems. It is not reason per se or science per se, al-Mawdudi argues, that 
bestows honor on man. It is man's rising from obligatory instinctual worship 
of God to the level of human, willful worship. If man worships other than 
God or is detracted from worshipping God - al-Mawdudi believes that the 
West is in this state - he is less honored than animals because animals are still 
at least on the instinctual level. 275 
The argument so far has been that the fundamentalists want to create a new 
society based entirely on Islam. And because they are reluctant to accept 
consciously Western principles or to follow Western outlook or even Islamic 
political thought, they insist on "Islamic authenticity" in any theory, social 
and political. Even in determining, a form of government they shy away from 
275 AI-Mawdudi, Mafahim lslamiyah (Islamic Understanding), Kuwait: Dar al- Qalam, 
1977, pp. 24-25. 
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using, or at least are reluctant to use, terms like "republican", "democratic" or 
"socialist". 
Revolution 
On the other hand, the modernists, though rejecting some medieval political 
theories of Islam, find no contradiction in imitating the West or in adhering to 
Western and Islamic notions of politics. Al- Afghani, Abduh, and Iqbal accept 
the republican form of government as an ideal. 276 
But "No god but God", declares Qutb, is a revolution against the 
worldly authority that usurps the first characteristics of divinity, and a 
revolution against situations based on this usurpation and against the 
authorities who rule by their own laws that are not given by God. 277 
Revolution occupies a decisive role because it is the only credible instrument 
of attaining social justice and of applying the Shari'ah. A revolution should be 
a conscious effort to transform current existing societies. Though it does not 
force people to adhere to Islam, it aims at creating the Muslim individual, the 
Muslim society, and the Islamic state. This is so because the Islamic 
revolution aspires as well to the transformation of man's enslavement to a 
man and matter. As such, this revolution is not directed at a particular society, 
but essentially at those societies that subordinate themselves to anyone but 
God. 
Revolution is not a revolution if it patches up old conceptions with Islamic 
conceptions. Because the road to change necessitates creativity, it requires the 
development and not "patching up" of life. Likening a society to a building, 
Qutb states: 
276 Iqbal; Reconstruction, p.157. 
277 Qutb, Signposts, Cairo: Makataba Wahbah, 1956, p. 26 (Hereafter cited as Signposts), 
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There is a difference between having a plan to construct gradually and 
patching up a construction based on another plan. In the end, this 
patching up does not establish a new building for you. Thus, it is 
necessary to destroy the old system and to build a new one.278 
Because tawhid "is not a negatively philosophical and theoretical declaration" 
but "is a positively realistic and active declaration, "279 it involves confronting 
other conceptions and ideologies. This confrontation requires that Muslims 
should acquire knowledge of other philosophies and ideologies. And Islamic 
activism should confront the material obstacles, foremost among which are 
the existing political authorities. This confrontation by words and deeds 
applies not only to Muslim societies but also, to all societies because the 
message of Islam is not for Muslims alone; its' subject is man. Therefore, the 
ultimate goal of Islamic revolution is abolishing those regimes and 
governments that are established on the basis of man ruling man and the 
enslavement of man by man, i.e., the Jahili society. Then, the revolution sets 
individuals free to choose the creed they want. As is obvious, this declaration, 
for Qutb, means: 
The comprehensive revolution against the government of man, in all its 
forms, shapes, systems and situations, and the complete rebellion 
against every situation [that is contrary to the principles of Islam] on 
the whole earth.280 
What has been said so far - in addition to different historical circumstances -
can help one see why the modernists like Iqbal, Abduh, and al-Afghani aimed 
at reformation more than revolution. This can, also, help us to understand why 
278 Qutb, On History, Cairo: Makataba Wahbah, 1949, pp. 24-25. 
279 Qutb, Signposts, p. 68. 
280 Ibid. pp. 69-71; Social Justice, p. 67. 
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the fundamentalists view revolution as a viable alternative to reformation. 
Rejecting the past and even the present and viewing existing societies as 
corrupt and unjust at their roots, the fundamentalists see that there is nothing 
to reform. Rather, the radical transformation of societies is the avowed motto 
and principle of the fundamentalists, especially al-Banna, Qutb, and, to a 
lesser extent al-Mawdudi.281 
The first step in this process of transformation is to disregard the past except 
for the period of the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) and the first two caliphs because the 
former contains legislative procedures while the second step contains a 
correct practical application of some Islamic principles such as in not forcing 
themselves on the community and being elected by the community after 
consultation. Though they should consider it as a good example of applying 
Islam to the life of community, the Muslims should, by no means, try to 
imitate that period and should aim at creating a materially and morally 
advanced society that no one has attempted before. The first society in Islam 
was not materially but morally advanced: therefore, the new society is not a 
replica of the first. 
Hence, statements like " ... to the Muslim mind, nothing in the present or the 
future could possibly ever be as good as that exquisite society erected by 
Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) and transfixed for ever by his death," or "the object of 
true Islamic reform cannot be to create a new society; rather, it must have as 
its ultimate end the re-establishment of the Prophet's ideal community,"282 do 
not accurately capture the consequences of the fundamentalists' attitude 
towards the ideal Muslim society. Although Qutb considers the first 
community as the best example of an Islamic nation because its principles 
were tawhid and justice, and although he considers the first two caliphs as 
representing the best example of the exercise and transition of power by the 
281 Qutb; Characteristics, pp. 15-31; Signposts, p. 22. 
282 Naff, Thomas, "Towards a Muslim Theory of History", in Islam and Power, ed., 
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consent of the community, those principles of tawhid, justice, shura 
(consultation) and ijma' (consensus) are attainable again and can even be 
understood differently. Because the Quran was the basis of the Muslim 
community, the death of the Prophet (P.B.U.H) does not deter the 
accomplishment of an ideal Muslim society. The arguments of Qutb and the 
rest of the fundamentalists stipulate implicitly and explicitly that the 
principles of Islam are attainable and are, through continuous 
reinterpretations, valid for all ages. If this is not true, then the fundamentalist 
endeavor, i.e., the attainment of a perfect Muslim society, is a futile one. 
Thus, the mere attempt to establish a new - and Qutb insists on "new" -
Muslim society entails, at least in theory, the notion of the attainability of a 
perfect Muslim society. It's perfect because its governed essentially by the 
Qur' an, and the perfection or idealization of the Prophet Muhammad 
(P.B.U.H.) stems from his application of the Qur'an and from following its 
prescriptions. Furthermore, because the concepts of tawhid, morality, and 
justice as well as electing the ruler, are by no means unattainable, the ideal 
new Muslim society is something to be achieved and is distinguished from the 
first Muslim society by its material advancement. 
It has become a common practice to define fundamentalism as - and to quote 
Richard Stephen Humphrey's -
The affirmation is a radically changed environment of traditional 
modes of understanding and behavior. In contrast to conservatism or 
traditionalism, which assumes that things can and should go as much 
as they have for generations past. Fundamentalism recognizes and tries 
to speak to a changed milieu, and altered atmosphere of expectations. 
Fundamentalism is by no means a blind opponent of social change, but 
it insists that change must be governed by traditional values and modes 
of understanding. 283 
283 Humphrey's, Richard S., "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria", 
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In the quotation above, Humphrey's captures only half the truth. Humphrey's 
is not clear in defining "traditional modes of understanding," but refers to the 
Holy Qur'an, "the lawyers and theologians of medieval Islam." First, what are 
the traditional modes of understanding and behavior? Are they the modes of 
the public, the theologians, the philosophers, the Su/is, the jurists or a 
combination of those? Or does he mean modes of the Holy Qur' an and the 
Sunnah? But ifby traditional modes of understanding means the Holy Qur'an 
and the Sunnah, he is wrong because the Qur'an and the Sunnah are sources 
of and the material of understanding, not modes. 
The questions that interest the fundamentalists are how to understand, to read, 
and to interpret the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In their answers, the 
fundamentalists reject the traditional public understanding because they 
perceive that the public is ignorant about Islam. In other words, the public 
does not understand; ignorance is its mode, and, therefore, the public needs to 
be educated about Islam. Furthermore, the fundamentalists dismiss 
philosophy as unwarranted; here another mode of understanding is rejected. 
As to the theologians' mode of understanding, it has also being rejected by the 
fundamentalists because theology submerged itself into unfathomable 
questions such as the characteristics of God. 
The Sufis are discredited as well because they encouraged laziness and helped 
the deterioration of Muslim societies by having nothing positive to 
constructive to offer to the Muslims. Hence, their mode of understanding is 
rejected as well. As to the jurists, the fundamentalists perceive as fulfilling the 
needs of their societies, and their (the jurists') teaching belongs to a specific 
past generation. Even though scholars like al-Ghazali or Ibn Taymiyyah are 
revered, their teachings belonged to a different historical epoch - and one fails 
to find, for instance, any reference to al-Ghazali for support in Qutb's attack 
on Muslim philosophers. In fact, the political teachings of individuals like al-
in Islam and Power, ed., Dessouki, 1981, p. 108. 
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Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah are not in harmony with the political teachings of 
the fundamentalists especially in the matter of the ruler's qualifications, the 
form of government, and the like. As to contemporary scholars, they are 
subjected to vigorous attacks from the fundamentalists for their subservience 
to temporal power and for their imitation of the West. 
In short, the fundamentalists, especially Qutb and al-Banna, have offered an 
untraditional, new comprehensive interpretation of Islam. Although they 
leave the interpretation of the Holy Quran to the understanding of the 
individual without a guide - but many people cannot even read it, let alone 
understand or interpret it - this only goes to show that this notion of the 
individual's freedom to interpret the Qur'an itself undermines all traditional 
modes of understanding and behavior. Not only this, but also the 
fundamentalists stress the notion that traditional Qur'anic exegeses is not 
binding on Muslims - and Qutb himself attempted to reinterpret the Qur' an. 
And if by behavior is meant political behavior, fundamentalist behavior is not 
traditional - a notion that Humphrey's disregards. Traditional political 
behavior has been, on the public side, submissive and, on the government 
side, authoritative- both of which are rejected by the fundamentalists. But if 
by behavior is meant values such as prohibition of pre-marital sexual activity, 
theft or murder or as preserving family structure, reverence to older people or 
enjoining the good, it is correct. But the basis of acceptance is not the 
scholars' stipulation but arises from the Qur'an itself. On important issues 
such as theology and jurisprudence, fundamentalism as propagated by Qutb 
and al-Banna is especially non-traditional. 
Consensus (Jjma') 
Two political concepts, among many, should make clear the untraditional and 
revolutionary aspects of fundamentalism; one is ijma' (consensus) the second 
is revolution. Ijma' which has been accepted as legal and theological concept 
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is transformed by the fundamentalists into a political doctrine. Muslim 
scholars have traditionally used this doctrine as a tool to interpret revelation 
and the Sunnah; once the consensus ( of the scholars) was reached in a specific 
matter, the outcome was obligatory on Muslims. In terms of theology, law, 
politics, and other fields of knowledge, the ijma' of a specific generation 
acquired a normative and legislative status. The most well-known ijma' was 
the one of the tenth century where scholars of that time agreed, for instance, 
that ijtihad (reasoning), especially in jurisprudence was not warranted any 
more. Note that up to that century what is meant by ijma' anyway is that of 
scholars and not necessarily of all people.284 
Stripping off the doctrine of ijma' from its theological and juristic 
components, the fundamentalists, and especially Qutb, have, instead, 
transformed it into a main demand in matters of politics. First of all, ijma' 
should not be limited to scholars, but be open to all people. All Muslims, 
scholars or not, have the same rights in terms of formulating new concepts by 
interpretation or in terms of political behavior. In order to do this, Qutb and 
others have channeled this doctrine into a political vehicle. Thus, Qutb argues, 
that the consensus of the people is necessary for the election as well as the 
legitimacy of Muslim rulers, and that those rulers who ascend to power 
without the approval of their people, though they may apply the Shari'ah, are 
illegitimate. Whereas medieval thinkers such as al-Mawdudi accepted the 
seizure of power on the condition that the usurper apply the Shari'ah, the 
fundamentalists totally reject this view because of their belief that God 
entrusted people as a whole with authority and legitimacy. Whether scholars 
approve or disapprove of usurpation, the fundamentalists do not accept any 
justification for usurpation of power. 
This attitude towards politics spills over towards Muslim scholars and 
thinkers who have been elitists in their approach to knowledge and politics. 
Scholars-whether theologian, jurists or philosophers- accepted, and have been 
284 Lewis, Bernard, "Politics and War", in A Legacy of Islam, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1982, p. 160. 
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traditionally, as authorities on matters of theology and jurisprudence, 
notwithstanding the non-existence of clergy in orthodox Islam. Contrary to 
this, the fundamentalists reject all kinds of intellectual and political elitism. 
Though they acknowledge differences in human faculties, these differences 
should not be institutionalized. For instance, those who traditionally an_d 
theoretically had chosen the caliphs have no more rights than the rest of the 
Muslims; all Muslims should enjoy the same rights in terms of electing or 
disposing of rulers. 
In addition to this, Qutb renders idiom' on theological matters unnecessary 
and unrestricted to specific groups of people; all people should enjoy reading 
and understanding the Qur'an and the Sunnah according to their abilities. In 
other words, there is no one or more legitimate interpretation of Islam in so 
far as they do not contradict them; theology and exegesis as well as 
jurisprudence become wide open to interpretation and reinterpretation. The 
only concept to which Qutb and other fundamentalists ask unwavering 
adherence is tawhid and governance by God (al-hakimiyyah). Hence, the ijma' 
of the Muslims becomes the embodiment and application of tawhid and 
hakimiyyah; tawhid is manifested in the unity of Muslims under the Qur'an, 
and hakimiyyah is manifested in adhering to the Shari'ah. Both tawhid and 
hakimiyyah are the principles of regeneration. Otherwise, the regeneration is 
lacking its essential characteristics that distinguish it from secular or un-
Islamic movement because the Muslim regeneration aims not only at 
eradicating injustices as many other movements do but also at the creation of 
Muslim society under the banner of the Holy Qur'an.285 
But the fundamentalists are not aware that if a concept like tawhid is left to 
every individual, many of those individuals are going to understand it in 
anthropomorphic pantheistic terms, which undermines the very essence of 
tawhid in Islam. In actuality, this might also mean many Iqbals or 'Abduhs -
285 Enayat, Hamid, Modern Islamic Political Thought, Austin: Taxes University Press, 
1982, pp. 69-110. 
186 
whose understandings are rejected by Qutb - who advocate outright 
reinterpretation of Islam through science. 
The other point, which illustrates the fundamentalists' rejection of an accepted 
political behavior as well as mode of understanding, is revolution. Muslims in 
general have accepted traditionally just or unjust rulers if they adhere, even 
nominally, to Shari'ah - in modem time, some modernist Muslim thinkers co-
operated with unjust governments like 'Abduh with the Egyptian government. 
Many jurists and thinkers such as Ahmad b. Hanbal prohibited revolution; 
Muslims were asked to obey the victorious ruler. lbn Taymiyyah, al-Ghazali, 
lbn Jama'ah and others required obedience even to unjust or heretical rulers 
once victory was achieved. The reason for this is that the evils of revolutions 
were brought to outweigh their benefits. And the modernist thinkers as 
'Abduh and Iqbal follow more or less the same path.286 
Hassan al-Banna and other fundamentalists looked at revolution as an ethical 
concept and a political obligation, and Qutb's writings on revolution represent 
a new understanding. Revolution is not only a means to fight enemies of 
Islam but acquires, more importantly, theological, metaphysical, and political 
implications, for Islam is the religion of revolution in the fields of ethics, 
metaphysics, politics, and economics. The revelation of Islam was a 
revolution against the status quo in its all-unjust political, metaphysical, and 
religious manifestations. Furthermore, al-Mawdudi and other fundamentalists 
argued that all messengers of God were advocates of revolution, renewal, and 
transformation of political, social, ethical and economic structures. Moreover, 
for Qutb, al-Banna, al-Mawdudi, and Khomeini, revolutions are universal, 
favor no specific group, and do not aim at revenge, but aim at justice and 
happiness. 287 
What should be noted here is that revolution for most fundamentalists has 
become a part of or is itself Islamic. For them, a particular environment 
286 Amarah, M., al-Islam wa-al-thawrah (Islam and Revolution), Beirut: al-Mu'assassah al-
Arabiyah li-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr, 1980, pp. 234-38. 
287 AI-Mawdudi, al-Jihad fi-Sabililah (Striving unto God), 1st ed., Beirut: Muassassat al-
Risalah, 1983, pp. 25-28. 
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"produced of a crisis situation characterized by economic difficulties, moral 
and ideological confusion and political instability" does not only invite the 
rise of fundamentalism. 288 On the contrary, the non-existence of revolution is 
a sign of crisis, of laziness and economic injustice and moral and political 
instability. Islamic political and moral norms are revolutionary; the absence of 
revolution is a sign of moral weakness and political stagnation. And this is 
why Qutb, for instance, insists on the necessity of activism before and after 
the creation of a Muslim society. Revolution is a moral responsibility because 
of its instrumentality in creating and maintaining a Muslim society and in 
education, culture, economics, governments, and politics. 
The most important aspect of tawhid in political behavior - and this is by no 
means a traditional mode of understanding - is its' being the substance and the 
motto of Islamic revolution. Tawhid is a concept that revolutionizes the mind, 
which sooner or later will be embodied in a popular movement, and the goal 
of this revolution is the transformation of the outlook as well as the heart of 
individuals. In many ways it is also the transformation of what is secular into 
the religious; for instance, a visa or a passport should not be required from 
Muslims entering other Muslim countries: the Muslim's passport is his 
religion. In other words, Muslims qua Muslims have rights beyond the limits 
of particular citizenships because the oneness of God and unity of people is 
the link that should tie together all facets of life. 
Put differently, what the Muslim revolution aspires to is the creation, the 
continuation, and attainment of a moral, strong, and happy society erected on 
tawhid and wahdah (unity). Thus, those societies that are not based on and do 
not continue to serve tawhid and wahdah are in a state of moral and political 
bankruptcy, notwithstanding any material gains and progress. This bankruptcy 
is an indication not only of bad regimes but also of the unhappiness and 
misery of mankind. Consequently, a rich, as opposed to a bankrupt, society 
entails a people whose mind is not preoccupied with lust, selfishness, 
288 Dessouki, A., "Islamic Organization," in Islam and Power, 1981, p. 113. 
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infidelity, and disunity. And because Muslim societies are on the road to total 
bankruptcy, the only solution to their problems is a comprehensive movement, 
i.e., a revolution similar to that of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) that 
uprooted bankruptcy. 289 
This revolution should not be imposed by a coup or an elite but should, in the 
opinion of most fundamentalists including Qutb, be "natural". "Natural" 
means that the state should not try to undermine the activities of the advocates 
of Islam who should be allowed to disseminate Islamic teachings freely. But if 
the freedom of speech of Muslim activists is denied or hampered, there is 
sufficient ground to taking arms against the government. Freedom of speech 
is very important to the fundamentalists because it is the instrument they need 
to disseminate their ideas and to transform people's mental attitudes and to 
create a new psychology. 
All these activities necessitate the existence of a group or a party whose 
raison d'etre is struggle,jihad. Al-Banna, al-Mawdudi, and Qutb see that this 
party should carry the seeds of revolutions and its principles of tawhid and 
justice and, ultimately, should assume power. Assumption of power should 
not be the result of employing force but of popular conviction.290 In other 
words, this party should advocate Islam and its teachings, including the 
political. When people are shown the advantages of Islamic teachings and are 
convinced of its viability, Muslims, the fundamentalists contend, will opt 
naturally for an Islamic government. Hence, societies should be able to decide 
what kind of society they want and, Islam should be allowed to preach its 
message. Armed resistance is allowed when Islam is suppressed. 
But insisting on adherence to Islamic principles does not necessarily lead to 
theocracy. The Islamic system is not realized; Qutb and al-Banna argued, if 
men of religion rule because, in Islam, there are no men of religion or clergy. 
289 Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, "al-Khatirat", in Complete Works, ed., Amarah, Muhammad, 
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And the Islamic system is not realized where Islamic law is implemented, 
where the idea of Islam rules, and where its principles and regulations define 
the kind of government and the form of society. Because Islam has created a 
society that is based on law, Sayyid Qutb's repudiation of theocracy stems 
from his opposition to the notion of the inherent authority of the clergy. Qutb 
is very emphatic in distinguishing between religion and "men of religion" or 
clergy. Because the clergy does not represent "the idea of God", to call an 
Islamic government a theocracy is misleading. The rule of clergy should not 
be taken as the ideal for an Islamic government. This is so because neither 
theory nor practice supports this ideal.291 
Furthermore, Qutb would have rejected the idea of government by jurists like 
the one advocated by Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini, in his book, 
The Islamic Government, argues that only government by jurists is the 
legitimate government. Since the Islamic government is based on 
jurisprudence, the most qualified men for government are the jurists.292 
But, for Qutb, if religious government means that a specific group rules or 
assumes authority, Islamic government has not been established. Islamic 
government is a government that is built on the notion that authority belongs 
to God alone and on the execution of the Shari'ah. For Khomeini and Qutb 
the Shari'ah is the basis of government. But Qutb perceives that the right to 
rule, which is dependent on Shari'ah is a matter of delegation by the people. 
But for Khomeini, the right to rule comes ultimately from the Imam. And 
because Qutb does not believe in the power of delegation from Imam, judges 
and sheikhs become no more than scholars. Thus a Muslim judge is a Muslim, 
skilful in the field of law, but without the right to enjoy more authority and 
legitimacy in terms of election than other Muslims since both notions resides 
. M 1· . 1293 m us 1ms m genera . 
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Notwithstanding the fundamentalists' agreement on many issues there are still 
some differences. Al-Mawdudi believes that the majority does not enjoy a 
calm, reasoning mind. Therefore, the few should plan the path for the whole. 
The elites enjoy wealth, reason, pride, and governmental positions. In fact, the 
real power of a nation is in its elite whose goodness makes the nation good 
and whose corruption makes the nation corrupt. Therefore, the corruption of 
Muslims is due to the deterioration of their elite.294 For Al-Mawdudi, reform 
and change should come from above. But for Qutb and al-Banna the direction 
of change should come from below and move upwards; to al-Mawdudi the 
direction is from above downwards. The upward movement leads to the 
destruction of wealth and privileges and transforms the whole fabric of 
society. Conversely, the downward movement tries to maintain existing 
structures but infiltrates the branches of government since it does not aim at 
complete break with power structures and tries to use them to redress 
substantively social evils. 
Conclusion 
The two tendencies, modernism and Islamism, aim to motivate the Muslims 
to work towards progress and development. Both see Islam as necessary for 
the reformulation of history and reformation of civilization. Islam should 
provide the metaphysical foundations as well as motivating force for 
regeneration. However, Islam as has been understood for centuries should be 
re-examined and re-interpreted in the light of modernity. 
To the modernists, though Islam should be the essence of progress and 
development, its understanding should develop along Western lines. On yet 
another level, religion's most important function is the calculation of morality. 
Tawhid is not only a metaphysical concept but is also a concept that relates to 
294 AI-Mawdudi, Abu al-Ala, Nizam al-Hayatfi al-Islam (The Islamic System of Life), I st 
ed., Beirut: Mu'assassat al-Risalah, 1980, pp. 54, also pp. 50-3. 
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all facets of life. It should be seen as a process of unity at all practical and 
theoretical levels and a process of liberation from the past. 
On the other hand, Islamism perceives tawhid as a process of total 
domination. Tawhid should dominate all aspects of life and negate any other 
form. Authority, sovereignty, and knowledge as well as related doctrines 
belong only to God, and no man can legitimately put forward any claim to 
any of the doctrines. In practice the ummah in general is charged with 
executing these doctrines. 
However, both tendencies believe that man has an essential role in the making 
of his destiny and that he demands a spiritual, intellectual, political and 
economic regeneration. Whereas this generation starts in purification and 
moves to unification from the Islamist perspective, it starts in unification and 
moves to integration from the modernists' perspective. This difference is not 
only methodological but also relates to the normative differences mentioned 
above. 
To the modernists, knowledge is sought in order to believe whereas, to the 
Islamists, belief is sought in order to know. However, both view knowledge 
and belief as necessary tools for a proper regeneration of the Muslim nation. 
Renewal and authenticity are also two dominant concerns of the two 
tendencies. Whereas, to the modernists, authenticity should be viewed and 
evaluated in the light of the new (i.e., science), to the Islamists, the new 
should be viewed and evaluated in the light of the authentic (i.e., revelation). 
Thus, the authentic serves the Islamists as the measure of correctness of the 
new; to the modernists, the process is the other way; the new confirms the 
authentic. 
Re-interpretation to the modernists constitutes a new statement, but a new 
statement to the Islamists, constitutes re-interpretation without affecting the 
text itself. Thus, if something does not work, it is not due to the test itself but 
to a wrong reading or interpretation. 
Finally, the two tendencies are proponents of change leading to productivity 
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and independence in thought and in behavior, though they differ conceptually 
and practically, on the means of their achievement. 
PART FOUR: CASE STUDIES 
INTRODUCTION 
The severe blow dealt to Arab unity by Egypt's signing of a peace treaty with 
Israel in 1978 dealt an equally severe blow to pan-Arabism, which has been in 
decline ever since. 
In its place has risen Islamism. Like pan-Arabism, the spread of Islamism has 
sprung in part from hostility to the spread of Western influence and culture. 
Unlike pan-Arabism, however, Islamism seeks not a single unified Arab state 
but rather the establishment of Islamic theocracies in Muslim countries. 
Another difference between the two is that whereas pan-Arabism was 
embraced by a number of Arab regimes as well as by substantial sections of 
their public, Islamism enjoys significantly less endorsement from the political 
elites and has instead become the most potent ideology of popular dissent. In 
fact, while Islamism has enjoyed increasing support among the Islamic 
masses, many of their elites have turned from pan-Arabism to territorial 
nationalism. 
The recent history of the Arab world has been marked by a recurrence of 
military defeats, economic disasters, and bloody internecine conflicts. The 
gap between the rich and the poor within each country has widened, with 
ever-increasing numbers of people living at subsistence levels while others 
have acquired unprecedented wealth.295 Conflicts between Arab states have 
been the norm and cooperation the exception. Political repression 
295 Fisher, Sydney N. and William Oschsenwald, The Middle East: A History, 41" ed., New 
York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1990, p. 736. 
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predominates, while national heritage and traditional values, particularly 
those concerning religion and community, are being increasingly displaced by 
modem, Western practices. 
Nevertheless, Islam remains a basic component of both personal and national 
identity, and Islamic fundamentalism296 has found widespread support among 
the unemployed, the alienated, the frustrated, and the repressed. Since the 
1970s and 1980s, Islam has been used as a political weapon in various 
struggles against perceived sources of social injustice, inequality, atheism, or 
political repression, most notably in Iran and in Egypt, where fundamentalist 
elements considered Sadat to be "the Pharaoh". 
This Part examines the surge of Islamism, paying particular attention to the 
recent political activity of Islamists in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon, and Israel. 
Islamism (also referred to as political Islam) has as its goal the establishment 
of an Islamic state on the basis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Like pan-
Arabism, Islamism first appeared in response to the introduction of Western 
influence into the Arab world. However, unlike the pan-Arabists, most pan-
Islamic leaders reject the notion of a single unifies state, seeking instead to 
establish Islamic theocracies in countries where Muslims constitute the 
majority of the population. 
The first major Islamic party was the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in Egypt 
in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, it became a tightly organized political 
movement, striving to establish a theocratic state.297 The Brethren were not 
hesitant to engage in acts of violence. Egyptian governments in the 1940s, 
and those under Nasser in the 1950s, cracked down on the Brotherhood, 
greatly weakening its influence. Upon his accession to power, President 
Mohammad Anwar Sadat released members of the Brethren from prison, 
296 Fundamentalism is defined here as the strict adherence to the letter of the Shari 'a, its 
rigid and constrictive interpretation. 
297 Faksh, M. A., The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in Egypt, 
Algeria and Saudi Arabia, Westport, PT: Praeger, 1997, p. 43. 
194 
allowing them to reorganize and participate in the political process. Although 
not granted legal status, the Brethren were allowed to run for office under the 
auspices of any of the legal parties. As a result, support, especially among the 
young, for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic movements increased 
not only in Egypt but also in other Arab countries. 
The response of the Islamic movements themselves, however, was neither 
uniform nor consistent, particularly at the beginning of the independence 
crises. The nature of Islamic movements varies, depending on the social and 
political context in which they operate. For example, significant differences 
exist between the political strategies, goals, and even doctrinal tenets of Shi' a 
Islam, which prevails in Iran and parts of Lebanon, and those of Sunni Islam, 
which predominates among Arabs. The Muslim Brotherhood of Syria differs 
in its political means and goals from its counterparts in Egypt, Jordan and 
Lebanon298 and also from such militant Islamic groups as Islamic Jihad and 
Muhammad's Army. Given this diversity, as well as the lack of reliable 
information concerning the organization and activities of underground 
movements such as the Shi'ite Islamic groups in Iraq,299 it is unhelpful to 
generalize across the Arab world. A wiser approach is to examine the present 
status of Islamism in selected Arab states, thereby conveying the diversity of 
Islamism while also indicating certain characteristics common to all of the 
movements and pointing to possible future developments in other parts of the 
Arab world. Of the five Arab countries that form the focus of Part Four, three-
Egypt, Jordan, and Algeria- posses visible and influential Islamic movements. 
298 Hourani, Albert, A History of the Arab Peoples; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1991, pp. 457-58. 
299 In the case of Saudi Arabia, the regime itself is fundamentalist Islamic but is challenged 
by more puritanical groups whose popular influence and organizational strength is yet to 
be determined for want of accurate information. 
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Egypt 
Egyptian society is overwhelmingly Muslim, with Islamic values constituting 
a major component of all populist ideologies, including Nasserism, which, 
despite its secular orientation, was never antagonistic toward Islam. Nasser's 
long-standing dispute with the Muslim Brotherhood concerned not Islam, but 
rather the use of violence to topple an Egyptian regime headed by a "devout" 
Muslim. During his first years in power, Sadat encouraged the rise of political 
Islam, cracking down only when it began to constitute a serious threat to his 
regime. In the wake of Sadat's assassination by the militant Islamic group, 
Jihad Organization, President Hosni Mubarak adopted a two-pronged 
strategy: to be conciliatory towards mainstream Islamic groups such as the 
Brethren while being firm against small, armed groups that advocate violent 
means for the achievement of their political goals. 
The demise of socialist pan-Arabism has further strengthened Islamism, and 
ever-increasing numbers of Egyptians are responding to the calls for the 
Islamisation of society or the implementation of the shari 'a. Well aware of 
the popular appeal of such demands, the government has adopted some 
measures designed to please devout Muslims. The sale of alcohol has been 
prohibited in 14 out of the 26 governorates300 and there has been an increase 
in the number of television programmes featuring such outspoken 
fundamentalist speakers as Sheikh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi, who 
appears regularly on state-run Egyptian television responding to queries about 
the position of Islam toward many social and political issues. 
The Islamisation of Egyptian society also has a darker side. The Jihad, 
founded by the blind cleric Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman,301 was accused of 
300 Murphy, Caryle; "Islam: Politics and Piety, Part I", The Washington Post, April 26, 
1992, p. A28. 
301 Sheikh Abdul Rahman convicted in the United States for involvement, either directly or 
indirectly, in the bombing of the World Trade center in New York City in February 
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gunning down Rifa'at al-Mahgoub, the speaker of the National Assembly, 
during the 1990 Gulf crisis. Other smaller groups, employing violence against 
both the state and the Copts are also beginning to emerge. Having accused 
Abdul Rahman of collaborating with the authorities, one of these, the 
Shawqiyeen (followers of Sheikh Shawqi from Fayyoum in Upper Egypt), 
has launched attacks on the Egyptian police. Armed bands have also targeted 
churches, Copt-owned businesses, foreign tourists, and Muslims who refuse 
to submit to them,302 or those who have publicly condemned their actions 
such as the writer Farag Foda.303 
The religious resurgence has not been limited to Islam. Influenced by the 
current international trend toward revival of ethnic and religious identities, as 
well as the sectarian dimension of the civil war in Lebanon, which some local 
and Western media have depicted as a war against Christian Arabs, Copts 
have also begun to display their religious identity and loyalty more visibly. 
Many observe religious rituals more regularly, celebrate religious holidays 
with more fanfare, and wear large crosses around their necks. Thus it appears 
that religious fundamentalism- and its inherent tendency toward intolerance 
and away from compromise- is becoming a powerful force in both 
communities. This situation is unlikely to change, even if economic 
conditions were to improve substantially. 
Thus far, Mubarak has sought to contain this potentially explosive situation 
by making concessions to moderate Islamists and conservative traditionalists, 
whose views probably reflect the beliefs of most Egyptians, in the hope of 
driving a wedge between them and militant extremists. For example, the 
Muslim Brethren are allowed freedom of expression through their daily paper 
and other publications.304 They are also permitted to engage in social 
1993. 
302 Mideast Mirror, May 27, I 992, p. 21. 
303 Farag Foda, a secularist writer and a staunch opponent of Islamic fundamentalism, was 
assassinated by Islamic militants in Cairo in June 1992. 
304 Faksh, M.A. The Future of Islam in the Middle East, 1997, p. 47. 
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activities, such as running health centers, social welfare institutions, and 
schools, and to preach and lead prayers in mosques and cultural centers.305 
Nevertheless, their organization remains officially illegal because Egyptian 
law prohibits the establishment of political parties on the basis of religion. 306 
At the same time, however, there is evidence that government concessions to 
traditional elements have begun to impinge on the free expression of more 
liberal points of view. For example, the 1991 publication of a work of fiction 
considered "blasphemous"307 by an Islamic research agency connected with 
the Azhar308 resulted in a sentence of several years imprisonment for its 
author Ala' Hamed and his publisher. In January 1992, five books written by 
a noted Islamic liberal, Muhammad Sa'id Ashmawy, chief judge of the 
Higher State Security Court, and a book on the Jihad organization by the 
journalist Adel Hammouda, were confiscated from the Cairo International 
Book Exhibit by the same research agency. President Mubarak himself was 
forced to intervene and ordered the books returned to the exhibition. 
Since the autumn of 1992, militants have sought to turn up the heat on the 
government by attacking tourism, which had been the country's chief foreign 
currency earner and employer of more than one million people. In that same 
year, President Hosni Mubarak resorted to military courts to secure swift 
persecution and harsher verdicts for extremists hoping to topple his 
government and create an Islamic state through a violent campaign. The 
radical extremists were convicted of forming an illegal group that aimed to 
topple the government by use of force, possessing arms and ammunition 
without license, and plotting acts of violence and terrorism. 
305 Ibid. p. 46. 
306 Ibid. p. 47. 
307 Cicil Society newsletter, Cairo, lbn Khaldom Center for Development Studies, No. 1, 20, 
January 1992. 
308 The AI-Azhar is the most distinguished academy of higher learning in Sunni Islam. It is 
a traditional, conservative body that has continuously played a legitimating role for the 
Egyptian regime and its policies. Successive rulers of Egypt maintained a distinct 
Policy toward the Asher. They have patronized this institution and made it part of their 
bureaucracy. 
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While attempting to accommodate the more moderate traditional elements, 
the government has cracked down on militant Islamists, arresting and jailing 
many of them. In March 1992, the holy month of Ramadan, Mubarak publicly 
denounced "negative trends" in the Islamic world that deviate from "the 
essence of the Koran and the teachings of Islam". He described this 
phenomenon as a "sickness" that needed to be "decisively cured and boldly 
confronted" by combating "sectarian discord, doctrinal extremism, 
intellectual terrorism, and the exploitation of religion". 309 
Although Mubarak noted that Islam calls for tolerance and freedom of 
belief,310 his speech followed a number of publicized and unpublicized 
clashes between Islamist youth, on the one hand, and Copts, government 
security forces, and other Islamic groups, on the other. The authorities blamed 
the Jihad group led by Abdul Rahman for these incidents. A particularly 
significant Muslim-Christian encounter occurred in September 1991 in the 
Cairo district of Imbada when hundreds of militant Islamists took to the 
streets, defacing portions of the Virgin Mary and burning Christian-owned 
shops. 311 These clashes marked the extension of religious conflict from 
southern Egypt to Cairo, a city that has rarely witnessed such incidents in its 
modern history. The social composition of Imbada makes it a likely site for 
further religious conflicts. It is an impoverished, congested slum whose 
residents firmly adhere to religion in its most constrictive, rigid form. 
In May 1992 a second, more violent sectarian battle took place at Minshiyat 
Nasser in the governorate of Assyut in Upper Egypt, an area where village 
and clan feuds are common. This battle resulted in the death of a dozen 
Christians and one of the Islamist assailants,312 prompting Mubarak to travel 
to the troubled area in an effort to soothe the aggrieved and reconcile Islamic-
309 Mideast Mirror, April, 1992, p. 16. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Hedges, Chris; "A Religious War Rends a Cairo Slum", The New York Times, October 
22, 1991, p. Al2; and Mideast Mirror, September 24, 1991, p. 15. 
312 Mideast Mirrror, May 6, 1992, p. 13. 
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Christian differences. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights attributed 
the armed assault to a dispute over payments demanded by the Islamic group, 
which has imposed its own laws, exacted taxes from businesses,313 and barred 
Christians from expressing their religious beliefs in public.314 
These clashes, based on misconceptions and unfounded information, reflect 
the growing distrust between Copts and a large segment of Muslims. One 
Islamist leader in Imbada has publicly asserted the belief that, having 
succeeded in gaining control of vital areas of business such as gold shops, the 
Christians are conspiring to take over all of Egypt315 Even many non-Islamist 
Muslims criticize the Copts for blocking the adoption of the shari'a in Egypt, 
describing their act as "the tyranny of the minority".316 For their part, 
Christian elites blamed the government for failing to respond to the 
grievances of more than 6 million Copts317 by "selling more Islam" rather 
than advocating secularism and democracy. 318 Coptic associations in the West 
accused the Egyptian government of condoning an anti-Christian campaign, 
calling on the international community to step in and "help save the Copts 
from further destruction". 319 
The Assyut incident cannot be dismissed as a clan or village feud, nor can it 
be attributed solely to "unemployment among youth",320 as some analysts 
have argued in the case of Imbaba clashes. Neither a pure rebellion of the 
dispossessed and repressed, nor a religious war, nor a "conspiracy" by the 
regime and the Islamists to destroy the Copts, the Assyut incident is part of a 
313 Mideast Mirror, May 27, 1992, p. 22; New York Times, June 25, 1992, p. A12. 
314 Mideast Mirror, May 27, 1992, p. 22. 
315 Hedges, A Religious War. 
316 Shukri, Ghali, as cited in Mideast Mirror, May 27, 1992, p. 23. 
317 According to the Egyptian government estimates, Copts make up 10 percent of the 
population, or 6 million, while Coptic associations in the West put the number of Copts 
at 11 million, or 20 percent of the total population. 
318 Murphy, "Islam: Politics and Piety", p. A29. 
319 Ibid. See note 313 above. 
320 The phrase was stated by Sa'adeddin Ibrahim, in Murphy, Islam: Politics and Piety, 
A28. 
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multifaceted conflict with religious, class, and anti-establishment dimensions. 
Its participants are poor, politically repressed, religious Islamists determined 
to Islamise their society by force, beginning in their immediate community. 
Having failed to overthrow the central government, they have subsequently 
directed their frustration against more accessible targets: first the Christians, 
then Western tourists who, in their view, are protected by the "un-Islamic" 
regime and share religious beliefs with another enemy, the West.321 Another 
objective of attacking tourists is to weaken the country's economy by pushing 
domestic investment away from tourism. It appears that the tradition of 
religious toleration that flourished in Egypt for centuries is now being 
challenged by strong Islamist forces and by Christian assertions of a distinct 
identity. As intolerance and mutual distrust between Muslims and Christians 
in mixed neighborhoods grow, the extremists in both communities can easily 
incite violence, which is likely to become even more bloody and atrocious. 
Yet there are three factors that strongly militate against the possibility that 
Egypt will reach the extent of strife that prevailed in Algeria in the l 990s.322 
First, the Egyptian tradition of religious toleration is centuries old and deeply 
rooted, serving as a guiding principle for both traditional, conservative 
Muslim groups and institutions, notably the Al-Azhar, and mainstream 
Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which has adopted 
peaceful means of achieving its political goals. Second, the Egyptian state is 
composed of long-standing, stable institutions that are highly resistant to 
radical, extremist politics. The stability of these institutions is further 
reinforced by state domination of social and economic activities, which 
renders a large segment of the population directly dependent upon them. 
Third, the regular army and security forces have so far proven to be united, 
nonsectarian, and effective, moving swiftly to end sectarian clashes and to 
321 Brekowitz, Lawrence; "Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis", Psychological Bulletin 
106, 1989, pp. 59-73. 
322 Faksh, M.A. The Future of Islam in the Middle East, 1997, pp. 52-57. 
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combat armed bands of extremists. Only in the unlikely event of a large-scale 
infiltration of the army by Islamist militants would there be a real threat to the 
stability of the regime. 
Nevertheless, given the power of Islamic values and the popular appeal of the 
call for the implementation of the shari 'a, Egypt will probably become a 
more Islamised, national territorial state. While striving to maintain tolerance 
of other beliefs, the regime may be confronted with irresistible popular 
pressure to widen the application of measures that are considered consistent 
with the shari 'a and to restrict or abandon others that are inconsistent with it. 
Although such steps could undermine the power of Islamist extremists by 
depriving them of their ideological base, they may also further alienate the 
Christian minority. 
Financing Islamist Groups 
The Egyptian political intelligence police, Mabaheth Arnn al-Daw/a, 
apparently has reason to believe that a Kuwait businessman Abdurahman al-
Mujaibil, who was in charge of foreign relations for a Kuwaiti religious 
organization called Jamiat Ihya' al-Turath al-Islami (Brotherhood for the 
Resurrection of The Islamic Heritage), was one of the major financiers of 
Egyptian Islamists. There are about two-dozen religious and humanitarian 
organizations currently active in Kuwait and often in competition with the 
official organization sponsored by the government, Beit al-Zakat. The 
Egyptian intelligence services believe that four of these organizations secretly 
finance and organize the activities of violent Islamists and their movements 
throughout the world. This accusation applies specifically to Jamiat Ihya' al-
Turath al-Islami, and also to the organization called Al-Isiah al-ljtima' (Social 
Reform) which apparently included the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood and, 
surprisingly enough, the group Al Hila/ al-Ahmar al-Kuwaiti (The Kuwaiti 
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Red Crescent) and its sister association, the Jamiat al-Hayat al-Khayriya al-
Islamiya al-Alamiya (Brotherhood of the International Islamic Humanitarian 
Society). 
According to Egyptian intelligence, these associations all have a double 
structure: an official religious and social front, and a clandestine structure for 
financing and organizing Islamist movements fighting "infidel" regimes. 
These clandestine structures communicate through the use of encrypted 
messages and are financed through a series of accounts in a network of 
Islamic banks mainly in Sudan but also in Saudi Arabia where Islamist circles 
maintain close relations with radical religious groups in Kuwait. 
In Kuwait certain Islamist movements seem to operate in a climate of official 
neutrality. 323 The situation is not the same in Oman and Saudi Arabia where 
several waves of arrests have taken place over the past few years. Since early 
1994, the authorities in Muscat dismantled an Islamist network belonging to 
the Egyptian organization called Tabligh wa Dawaa (Transmission and 
Preaching), which apparently managed to infiltrate the armed forces and 
administrative services. Some 400 members of this organization have been 
arrested.(20)324 It seems to be particularly well established in the Zufar and 
Salala provinces along the border with Yemen, where the "brothers" of 
Hadramaut, sheikh Abdulrahman Bakir and sheikh Abubakar Haddad, are 
quite active. During their investigation, Omani intelligence services 
uncovered the trail of an Omani businessman, member of the Al-Ghozali, 
who is supposedly a major financier of the Yemenite Islamist militia of sheikh 
Abdulmajid Al-Zandani. 
In Saudi Arabia, hundreds of arrests have taken place among Islamists over 
the past few years, particularly in the north. A well-known imam, Salman 
Aludeh, was arrested in Buraidah in 1994. His jailing led to a press release 
from London by a hitherto unknown organization called Kataeb al-Iman 
323 Intelligence Newsletter No. 248, Paris, France, September 22, 1994. 
324 Ibid. 
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(Battalions of the Faith), which threatened to kidnap members of the Saudi 
royal family and also to attack American and Europeans in the Gulf countries 
if the imam was not released. Among those arrested figure many lawyers, 
professors and civil servants. 
Sisk asserts that there are three broad categories to which Egyptian Islamists 
can be ascribed.325 Firstly, a non-violent faction that expounds fundamentalist 
religiosity. Secondly, the activists who seek change through moderate political 
action. Thirdly, the radical category who base themselves on the writing of 
Sayed Qutb, the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue in the 1960s, and his ideas on 
jihad (holy war) and rule by God.326 The goal of this latter group is to destroy 
the existing regime, and violence is the method that is used to achieve it. 
In the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood had opted for a policy of moderation 
and gradualism. Hence, it was advantageous for them to co-operate with the 
Sadat regime up to a certain point. They functioned openly and spread their 
message through publishing and established educational and financial 
institutions. As a moderate reformist group, the Muslim Brotherhood took on 
a role as a critic and pressure group and began to reject violence and 
terrorism. 327 
In the 1980s, Islamic revivalism was becoming an important part of Egyptian 
society. Many groups had become institutionalized and religious 
consciousness increased dramatically. As a response, the government began to 
make Islam a more visible entity through television programs and publishing 
books on Islam. President Sadat went so far as to label himself Al-ra 'is Al-
mu 'min (the Believer-President).328 By the 1990s, religion was a pervasive 
language and behavior in Egypt and Tahsin Bashir, a former spokesman for 
325 Sisk, T. D.; Islam and Democracy: Religion, Politics, and Power in the Middle East, 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1992. 
326 Faksh, M.A.; The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in Egypt, 
Algeria and Saudi Arabia, Westport, PT: Praegar, 1997, p. 47. 
327 Mansfield, P.; A History of the Middle East, London: Penguin Books, 1992. 
328 Faksh, M. A. 1997, p. 46. 
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Sadat, noted "Political Islam has been checked in its bid for power, but the 
Islamisation of society had gained ground".329 Even so, the last three decades 
of the twentieth century have been a turbulent and destabilizing time for 
Egypt and using Islamic rhetoric and symbols was just one of the ways that 
the government handled the Islamist threat. 
Militant extremist groups have sanctioned violence in order to overthrow the 
Egyptian state and have targeted government officials, journalists, and 
members of the security forces, Coptic Christians and writers over the past 
three decades. Similarly, the ulema (religious leaders) were not safe from the 
extremists as they tended to be viewed as puppets of the state. For the 
Islamists Jihad was the only way to redeem Egypt and denounce the West. 
Events such as the failed coup attempt in 1974 by the Islamic Liberation Party 
and the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 by the Jihad Organization 
cell called Al-Hijra wal Takfir were a major threat to the Egyptian regime. 
Since then successive governments responded to the violence, of such 
Islamist movements, with repression by imprisoning, torturing and executing 
the perpetrators. 
In the 1990s, tourists were, on many occas10ns, the targets of different 
militant groups. The Islamists' desired effect was to damage the tourist 
industry in order to undermine the effectiveness of the government in the 
continuing economic crisis. Since 1991, tourism was Egypt's highest foreign 
currency earner. 330 Therefore attacks on the tourist industry were effective 
targets for destabilizing the regime. Destabilization was achieved by 
undermining the government's support through intimidation, emphasizing its 
lack of societal control and its inability to provide support in terms of social 
service and economic growth. 
However, this type of tactic has played a part in jeopardizing the support of 
the Islamists too. In 1995, an assassination attempt on President Mubarak 
329 Ajami, F.; "The Sorrows of Egypt" cited in Alterman, J.B.; Egypt: Stable, but for How 
Long? Washington Quarterly 23:4, 1995, pp. 107-119. 
330 Agence Europe, Egypt. http://www.medea.be/en/index054.htm. 1996. 
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rallied support for the government as people began to question the future of 
Egyptian politics. Similarly, in 1997 the horrific attack on tourists at the 
Temple of Queen Hatshepsut firmly swung support away from the Islamists 
as the loss of the tourist dollar would greatly affect society with tourism being 
a major source of employment.331 Thus, it appears that Islamist groups in 
Egypt may have in fact eroded their own power base through impacting on an 
important economic base for ordinary Egyptians. For example, Osama Bin 
Ladin's deputy Ayman Al-Jawahiri is the leader of Islamic Jihad of Egypt 
who was condemned to death in Egypt. 
The Operations Man: Dr. Ayman Muhammad Rabi' al-Zawahiri 
Osama Bin Ladin has always sought publicity for his activities; not 
surprisingly, therefore, most attention paid to his networks concentrates on the 
man himself. But, he is primarily the organizer and banker of his operations, 
not the operational planner. 
The man Western investigators tend to characterize as Osama Bin Ladin's 
operations chief is Ayman al-Zawahiri. 332 Many insiders think that Zawahiri is 
actually the planner of the more dramatic attacks of recent years, and the 
probable successor to Bin Ladin. An Egyptian and founder of Egypt's Jihad 
Organization, which was involved in the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 
1981, Zawahiri has been closely allied with Bin Ladin since some time prior 
to 1998, and has been often identified as being one of the key operational 
chiefs, along with another radical of Egyptian origin, Muhammad 'Atef. A 
physician by training, Zawahiri is also Bin Ladin's personal doctor; Bin Ladin 
is said to suffer from a number of serious ailments. 
331 Alterman, J.B.; "Egypt: Stable, but for How Long? in Washington Quarterly 23:4, pp. 
I 07-1 I 9. 
332 Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda: Golabal Network of Terror, Scribe Publications, 
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Al-Zawahiri was born in Egypt (apparently in Giza) on June 9, 1951.333 
Trained as a physician, he became involved in radical Islamist politics and 
was a founder of the Jihad Organization, which in addition to its role in the 
assassination of Sadat; also staged an uprising at Asyut in Upper Egypt at the 
same time in October 1981. 
In the wake of the crackdown on Jihad, Zawahiri served three years in prison, 
but as he had not been directly linked to the Sadat assassination itself, 
eventually went free in 1984. He is said to have briefly resumed medical 
practice in the Cairo area. But by 1987 he was in Afghanistan and 
neighbouring parts of Pakistan, founding a local office for Jihad in Peshawar. 
That is probably the point he first established links to Bin Ladin's operations; 
though thus an "Afghan" Arab, it is not known if he took part in military 
operations against the Soviets. Zawahiri's where-abouts in subsequent years 
are not always known and he may have spent some time in Europe or back in 
Egypt. He has been reported by Egyptian security forces to have had traveled 
on French, Swiss and Dutch passports at various times. Zawahiri speaks 
French as well as Arabic. 
Jihad's operations within Egypt gradually faded away, with the similar but 
separate Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya accounting for most of the attacks in the 
1990s. Jihad may not have carried out an operation in Egypt proper since 
1993. Zawahiri is under indictment in Egypt for plotting an attack against 
former Interior Minister Zaki Badr, and in more recent years has been charged 
with other crimes. 
Jihad's operations meanwhile became more international, and many Egyptian 
Jihad members reportedly operated out of Albania into Bosnia and Kosovo. 
In Februay 1998, Zawahiri's name came second on the famous "fatwa" in 
which Bin Ladin declared the responsibility of Muslims to kill Americans, 
333 Barakat. Muhammad, 'Egytian Terrorism', Al-Watan Al-Arabi, Paris, 22 Jan. 1999, p. 4. 
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including civilians, anywhere.334 (Bin Ladin is an engineer and Zawahiri a 
physician; neither has the religious authority to issue a fatwa.) By that time, 
he had apparently merged the Peshawar operations of the Jihad Organization 
into Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization, though the fatwa was issued in the 
name of a new "World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders". 
Later in 1998 came the trial in Egypt of several Jihad members known as 
"Albanian returnees", and reports that Zawahiri's brother, Muhammad, had 
been turned over to Egyptian authorities by the United Arab Emirates. Those 
events preceded the attacks on the US Embassies in Dar es Salaam and 
Nairobi. Zawahiri, along with Bin Ladin, Muhammad 'Atef, and others, was 
indicted in the US for those attacks. There is a $5 million reward for his 
apprehension. In early 2000, Arab press reports indicated that the Jihad 
Organization in Egypt had removed Zawahiri as its Amir, being disaffected 
with his alliance with Bin Ladin. Others suggest, however, that he had long 
since ceased to have real influence in the internal Egyptian organization. 
Conclusion 
Islamic revivalism in Egypt has been strong, as the ordinary Egyptian on the 
street has turned towards religion as a response to modernization and the 
rapidly changing mode of society. Islamism, in the political sense, has been 
resolute in its protest against the state whether it is within the political system 
or illegally through terrorist attacks or assassination attempts. Violence has 
impacted on the Egyptian regime by establishing it through attacks on the 
vital tourist industry and assassinations of civil leaders and officials. 
However, the government has taken a hardline response to violence and 
terrorism, and imprisoned and repressed in order to retain control of society. 
Islam underpins Egyptian society, as it does in the whole of the Middle East 
and North Africa, hence it can be a powerful force for, firstly, reformists and 
334 Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 1. 
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terrorists in their attempts to destabilize the state; and secondly, the elites in 
their attempts to influence society and retain power. 
Jordan 
The Jordanian regime was taken by surprise by the 1989 elections,335 in which 
Islamists won 34 out of 80 parliamentary seats. Twenty-two of these seats 
were won by the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that was 
relatively unaffected by the ban on political parties because its official status 
was that of a charitable organization. Alarmed by the prospect of a division of 
the country along religious lines, the late King Hussein initially resisted the 
Brotherhood's attempts to be represented in the cabinet. However, as the 
Islamists garnered even more popular support because of their antiwar stance 
during the Gulf crisis, cooperation between the Islamists and the regime 
increased and members of the Brotherhood were appointed to cabinet 
positions in January 1991.336 
Despite its control of important cabinet portfolios, the Brotherhood 
encountered stiff opposition from the secular community when its ministers 
and members of parliament (MPs) tried to outlaw the manufacture, sale, and 
consumption of alcohol, segregate the sexes in the workforce, and ban fathers 
from observing their daughters' participation in school sports. With the tacit 
support of the king, secular MPs and ministers resisted these demands, 
forcing the Islamists to back down on most of them. The secular counter-
offensive was further strengthened by the king's approval of a National 
Charter signed by the Muslim Brotherhood and other political parties. The 
Brotherhood, it should be explained, had to sign the charter to maintain its 
legality as a political party .... While declaring the shari 'a to be the source of 
335 Abu Owdeh, Adnan; Jordan's Ambassador to the U.N. and former longtime advisor to 
King Hussein, in his talk at the symposium on "Islam and Democracy", which was 
sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., May 15, 1992. 
336 Milton-Edwards, Beverley; "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: the Islamic 
Response in Jordan," in James Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf 
Crisis, Chicago: Academy of Arts and Science, 1992, pp. 92-94. 
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law in the country, 337 the charter, which provides for personal freedom, 
freedom of expression and organization, and a multi-party system, clearly 
circumscribes the power of the Islamic movement. The Islamists suffered 
another major setback in June 1991, when the late king, preparing to join the 
Middle East peace process, dismissed the cabinet and appointed as prime 
minister Taher al-Masri, a Palestinian who supports a negotiated settlement 
with Israel. 
Opposition to the Madrid peace talks ended the Brntherhood's alliance with 
the crown. To gather support for its position, the Brotherhood called for a 
public rally on October 11, 1991. This effort was blocked when the cabinet 
banned the rally and the Brotherhood was forced to back away from a head-
on confrontation with the regime. Later in the month, the Brotherhood joined 
other pan-Arab parties at an indoor rally that attracted approximately 1,000 
people: It was disbanded by police after clashes between pro- and anti-Madrid 
groups.338 In a subsequent gathering of some 4,000 fundamentalists at 
Amman's principal mosque, a Brotherhood speaker denounced the Madrid 
conference, calling for a jihad to liberate all of Palestine. At the same time, 
however, he clearly stated that his party would express its opposition to the 
Jordanian position without resorting to violence,339 thereby revealing that 
although the Islamists were ideologically opposed to a peace settlement with 
Israel under the terms of UN Resolution 242, they did not want a showdown 
with the government over the issue. 
In October 1991, members of the pro-establishment Constitutional Bloc 
joined Brotherhood opponents of the policies of the Masri government: 
following that party's exclusion from a reshuffied cabinet. With preparations 
for the Madrid peace conference at a crucial stage, these two groups together 
mustered a majority ( 49) of MPs who signed a petition calling for Masri' s 
337 Ibid. pp. 105-6. 
338 Mideast Mirror, October 29, 1991, pp. 13-14. 
339 Mideast Mirror, November 1, 1991, p. 20. 
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resignation. Reacting to the disorder of his house, King Hussein sought to 
mobilize popular support for the decision to join the peace talks by convening 
a national congress on 2 October 1991. Some 2,500 influential Jordanians, 
including MPs, senators, former premiers and ministers, heads of professional 
associations, mayors, and other elected officials attended; the Muslim 
Brotherhood, however, chose to boycott the congress. In an effort to convince 
Jordanians for the soundness of his decision, the monarch responded to 
various concerns and questions raised by the opposition by explaining that 
"we must be involved in the drive for peace because it concerns our present 
and future and has an impact on our community".340 
The following month, King Hussein replaced Masri, appointing a Hashemite 
Sharif of the royal family, Zayd Bin Shaker, prime minister. Bin Shaker was a 
capable, veteran politician of good reputation who could not be attacked by 
MPs with impunity. One MP aptly described him as "a man who is always 
powerful, whether or not he is in office. Deputies who know better will not 
forget that".341 As expected, Bin Shaker initially adopted a tougher stance 
against the anti-peace parties, while maintaining the general political and 
economic policies of his predecessor by retaining the ministers of foreign 
affairs, finance, and interior. Reports claim that he threatened the Islamists 
with dissolution of parliament and early elections in which they would not be 
assured of victory. Opinion polls were revealing a dramatic decline in popular 
support for the Brotherhood.342 Ultimately, however, the new premier struck a 
deal with the Islamists, allowing them to retain the speakership of parliament 
in exchange for a vote of confidence in the cabinet. 
The policy of the new government was guided by statements the King made 
in his letter of appointment to Bin Shaker and in a speech to the senate and 
the lower house. In his letter, the King implied that Masri's MP critics had 
340 Mideast Mirror, October 4, 1991, p. 15. 
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overstepped their authority, and he denounced the so-called "intellectual 
terrorism" that violated "democracy and the principles of the National 
Charter".343 His speech emphasized the role of parliamentarians in 
"preserving the authority of the state and its various institutions." In a clear 
reference to the Islamists' rigid views and attempt to dictate government 
policy, the King said: 
Democracy does not confer on any single group a claim of monopoly 
over wisdom or truth. Nor does it provide a license to justify 
encroachment on the rights and liberties of the vast majority of the 
people ... Preaching and guidance are closely associated with 
maintaining national unity, enhancing the forces of amity and solidarity 
and promoting the general good in a climate that does not allow for 
bigotry, intolerance, or introversion. This being the case, we would 
emphasize that the principal role of mosques and other places of 
worship are to educate people in matters of religion, urge them towards 
virtue, integrity, respect for public order and a firm rejection of 
division and disarray among the citizens.344 
Meanwhile, the authorities clamped down on members of a clandestine, 
militant Islamic group known as Prophet Muhammad's Army, accusing them 
of planning bombs, setting fire to liquor stores, attacking a foreign bank, and 
plotting to overthrow the government. Of the 18 arrested and tried, 8 were 
sentenced to death. These sentences have created uproar among Islamists in 
Jordan and Egypt, resulting in appeals to the monarch for commutations. 
They were also criticized by Amnesty International, which cited evidence that 
testimony was obtained from some of the defendants under torture. The late 
343 Ibid. p. 13. 
344 Mideast Mirror, December 2, 1991, pp. 3-4. 
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king then commuted the sentences of the six to life imprisonment, but 
retained those of the two who were tried in absentia. 345 
In May 1992, Islamists suffered a serious electoral reversal in Irbid, Jordan's 
second largest city, where the "reformist bloc" won 11 of the 12 seats on Irbid 
city council, a body that had been dominated by the Islamists since the early 
1980's. Reflecting on the outcome, a senior government official noted that, 
despite its organizational strength and elaborate network of social 
relationships,346 the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to convince the 
electorate of the worth of its "Islamic alternative". In late May, the 
Association of Workers in Land Transport and Mechanics, the largest labor 
union in Jordan with a membership of 107,000 workers elected a new 77-
member administrative committee. The new leadership was described as 
mostly "liberal with centrist political views". Only in the city of Zarqa did 
Muslim Brotherhood candidates won.347 
The Islamists further experienced setbacks when two of their elected MPs, 
Ya'qub al-Qarsh and Laith Shbeilat were arrested on charges of stockpiling 
unlicensed weapons, sponsoring secret, terrorist groups, and conspiring 
against the state. The charges and subsequent conviction in court raised 
doubts about the Islamists' present and future loyalty to the throne. After 
demonstrating the power and vigilance of his regime and its firm policy 
toward any subversive activity, King Hussein pardoned the sentenced MPs, 
who had pledged their support to him and who had claimed that the arms they 
stored were to be used against Israel rather than the kingdom. 
To date, King Abdallah is carefully following his late father's (King Hussein) 
footsteps with some of the democratic measures that he has introduced, while 
preventing any group from claiming a monopoly over Islamic interpretation. 
In stark contrast to Egypt, the Jordanian law on political parties does not ban 
345 Mideast Mirror, December 5, 1991, p. 9. 
346 Mideast Mirror, Mat 18, 1992, p. 18. 
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parties based on religion; however, it does require them to formulate a 
specific platform348 beyond the implementation of the shari 'a. Jordanian 
politics encompass a vast array of factions and groups, most of which are not 
political parties in the Western sense. These groups tend to coalesce into two 
major, rival blocs, Islamic and secular.349 In the future, it seems the emerging 
Islamist coalition will be formed around the Muslim Brotherhood, while the 
secular coalition will be heavily influenced by the King and may lack a single 
leading party. Neither will be openly anti-establishment. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the struggle for power between the Islamists and 
the heterogeneous array of secular nationalists, both territorial and pan-Arab, 
is not yet certain; two factors- the fate of the Middle East peace process and 
the state of the economy- are likely to have a significant impact. The 
necessity of conducting a peace agreement with Israel was reinforced by the 
influx of some 300,000 Palestinians from the Gulf States. If the peace process 
fails to produce tangible results within the next couple of years, the Islamist 
movement will have a good opportunity to impose its vision on the 
government. At the same time, signs of further deterioration in the economy 
and large-scale corruption and mismanagement in state institutions are likely 
to fuel frustration and dissent, particularly among the youth. 
Conclusion 
Because Islamist symbolism remains appealing to many Jordanian Muslims, 
the fact that King Abdallah, a Hashemite, is a descendent of the Prophet 
Muhammad endows him with an exceptional legitimacy that is coveted by all 
other Arab leaders, notably the Saudi monarchs. Like his father, he has 
capitalized on this hereditary asset in the past and he will undoubtedly use it 
348 Murphy, Caryle, "Islam: Politics and Piety, Part II", The Washington Post, April 27, 
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in the future to gain leverage over the Islamists. Nevertheless, he may be 
forced to make concessions, as President Mubarak has done, in order to stem 
the tide of Islamism. Thus far, King Abdallah has proven to be a shrewd and 
open-minded Arab leader. For the foreseeable future, his rule guarantees the 
country's stability, and ability to be flexible and realistic in peace talks with 
Israel. In the event of King Abdallah' s sudden death or assassination, his 
successor is unlikely to deviate significantly from the regime's present 
policies. 
Algeria 
The Islamist movement in Algeria began to emerge following the introduction 
of democratic measures in February 1989. Prior to the January 1992 
crackdown, four Islamist parties played major roles: The Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS), the Movement for an Islamic Society (HAMAS), the Movement 
of the Islamic Renaissance (MNI), and the Movement for Democracy in 
Algeria (MDA). The FIS, whose ultimate goal is the Islamisation of society 
through control of political power by any available means, was the largest and 
most popular party at the time. HAMAS, founded in 1990 by Sheikh Nahnah, 
supports the principle of political pluralism. The MNI of Sheikh Djaballah 
shares the views of the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jordan 
in all aspects except economic libralisation, to which it is opposed.350 The 
MDA, led by former President Ben Bella, advocates a reformist version of 
Islam. 
In contrast to the situation prevailing in the Arab East (Mashriq), Islamism in 
Algeria and the Maghreb has generally not been a rival ideology to pan-
Arabism. Given the virtual absence of local Christians within an 
overwhelmingly Sunni population and the presence of large numbers of non-
350 Robert, Hugh, "A Trial of Strength: Algerian Islamism", in Piscatori, ed., Islamic 
Fundamentalism, 1992, pp. 133-38. 
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Arab Berbers, Islam has played a unifying role,351 and Arabic has become a 
"sacred" language. The secular line of demarcation between pan-Arabism and 
Islamism has little significance for Maghrebi pan-Arabs. Algerian Islamism, 
unlike that of Saudi Arabia, has been radical and populist, despite having 
been financed for a number of years by Saudi largesse. 
Since the early days of Algerian independence in 1962, the National 
Liberation Front (FLN) had enjoyed a monopoly on power.352 'The social 
state-run economy promoted a new class of modernists, French-educated 
technocrats with special privileges and status that set them apart' .353 The 
Algerians in the street were becoming resentful of the widening gaps in 
society and this began to be expressed in Islamic terms. 
By the 1980s, Algeria's economic and social life was worsening and the 
government was criticized by Islamist groups for its failure to provide for its 
people adequately. 354 Corruption, unemployment, economic mismanagement, 
and over-population were just some of the factors that caused dissent amongst 
the population. For Islamists, such as the FIS, recruitment accelerated as 
people looked for ways out of their personal quagmire. 
"Its (FIS) proclamation of Islam's message of social justice, m 
particular its condemnation of societal failures in education, 
housing, and employment as well as of government corruption, proved 
especially popular among Algeria's unemployed youth and rural-urban 
migrants. With more than 60 percent of the population under twenty-
five years of age and a high percentage of them unemployed, young 
people proved ready recruits, exchanging idleness and boredom for a 
sense of direction and hope as they swelled the crowds at mosques and 
engaged in political action". 355 
351 Ibid. pp. 138-39. 
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The FIS itself became a populist movement as it began to become involved in 
providing for society through establishing financial and educational 
institutions. 356 The FIS was also very quick to provide for those affected by 
the earthquake that occurred in Algeria in 1989. In doing this, they were able 
to undermine the government by emphasizing its inadequacy and failure to 
support society in times of great need. 
The regional and municipal elections of 1990 were the first multiparty 
elections Algeria had had in its almost 30 year history. Unlike countries such 
as Egypt and Tunisia, these were elections in which the Islamist parties were 
allowed to participate. The popularity of the FIS was greatly underestimated 
by both the government of Algeria and the West. 
Over those decades, the incompetence and corruption of its leadership had 
brought Algeria, a country rich in oil, gas, and gold, to the brink of economic 
ruin.357 In June 1990, the Islamists won a landslide victory in municipal and 
provincial elections, thereby discrediting the FLN, and hailing their victory at 
the ballot as Islam winning the battle over Westernization. The FLN fought 
its defeat by attempting to gerrymander electoral districts in order to minimize 
Islamist representation in the new assembly. However, this failed to halt the 
tide of Islamic reform that was sweeping the country and the FIS was 
eventually victorious through election by the people.358The FLN responded by 
holding street protests that forced the president to remove Prime Minister 
Mouloud Hamroche. His successor, Sid Ahmad Ghozali, came to office with 
a promise to revise the electoral law and to hold fair elections. 
Having grown intolerant of the rising Islamist challenge to the ruling party, in 
June 1991 top army commanders set out to reassert state authority. They 
began by attempting to replace Islamist slogans in town halls with the FLN 
356 Faksh, M. A. The Future of Islam in the Middle East, 1997, pp. 69-72. 
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motto, but these efforts were firmly resisted by FIS militants. The army then 
arrested two of the principal FIS leaders, Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhaj, 
charging them with conspiracy against the state. During the same month, 
some 2,500 FIS members and supports were also arrested.359 The FLN 
leadership hoped that bans on political speeches and meetings in mosques, 
combined with mass arrests intended to deprive the FIS of its leadership and 
active cadres, would liquidate the opposition. Many Arab journalists and 
politicians believed this was possible as, in their view, the Islamist 
"phenomenon" was on the wane because it had supported Saddam during the 
Gulf War. An Egyptian journalist, writing one month before the Algerian 
national elections, predicted that the Islamist movement in all Arab countries 
"could soon be finished as a major force on the political street".360 This 
crackdown drove the FIS to evolve from a reforming movement within the 
existing system to a militant opposition fighting against the repression of the 
regime. 
To the surprise of many analysts, the FIS won the first round of elections in 
November 1991, garnering 81 percent of the seats, an outcome that stunned 
not only the Algerian leadership but also that of the rest of the Arab world. 
Immediately following the elections, over 100,000 people took to the streets 
of Algiers, demonstrating in support of democracy. While Anis Mansour, an 
Egyptian journalist known to be a confidant of President Mubarak, expressed 
exaggerated alarm, predicting that Islamist control might ultimately extend 
from Tunisia to Syria,361 other analysts urged President Benjedid to stand up 
and refuse to deliver his country to a new totalitarianism, and offered advice 
on how to "clip the claws" of the FIS.362 
On January 12, 1992, a few days before the second ballot, the Algerian army 
took control, forcing President Benjedid to resign. The High Committee of 
359 Roberts, A Trial of Strength, p. 149. 
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State (HCS), a new five-man governing body headed by the revolutionary 
leader Muhammad Boudiaf, was created. Reaction in the Arab world was 
mixed. While some observers felt army intervention was justified, others were 
outraged at the abrogation of democracy. Western and Arab regimes, with the 
exception of that of Sudan, were generally relieved, and the government of 
neighboring Tunisia openly rejoiced as it prepared for the trials of its 
outlawed Islamists. 
Meanwhile, the Algerian leadership attempted to eliminate the FIS through 
the enactment of laws and decrees. Affirming its commitment to democracy 
and promising to hold parliamentary and presidential elections within two 
years, the new government headed by former Prime Minister Ghozali, 
declared a state of emergency and banned religious and linguistic-based 
parties.363 In response, the FIS went underground, appointing a new secret 
leadership made up of unknowns.364 Most opposition parties, including the 
other Islamist parties, rejected the cancellation of elections and the dissolution 
of the FIS. Sheikh Nahnah of the Algerian HAMAS warned of more violence 
if the authorities continued to reject negotiations with the Islamists. 
The government oppression spawned the fractionalization of the FIS and 
groups such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Islamic Salvation 
Army (AIS) began a reign of terror using jihad and terrorism as their 
weapons. Not only was the government attacked but also civilians who 
symbolized Western values were targeted such as journalists, entertainers, 
intellectuals and 'unveiled' women and schoolgirls.365 
The FIS, or radical groups within its ranks, have employed a variety of tactics 
in their battle with security forces, ranging from armed resistance to the 
implementation of government decisions, to bombings and assassinations of 
police officers. One clash took place as a result of the rejection of the 
appointment of a pro-establishment imam to one of the mosques. Another, 
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364 Al-Hayat, March 6, 1992. 
365 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 1995, p. 180. 
219 
more serious, confrontation between armed Islamists and the army occurred 
in the mountains near Algiers in late May 1992, resulting in 150 arrests. By 
the end of May 1992, an estimated 8,000 FIS members and supporters366 were 
held without charge in prison camps in the desert where the temperature in the 
summer exceeds 45 degrees Celsius. The FIS maintained that the number was 
higher, and accused the government of torturing the detainees and deliberately 
overcrowding the desert prisons. In an attempt to reduce the tension with the 
FIS, Boudiaf released about half of the prisoners a few days before his 
assassination on June 29, 1992.367 
Reports just prior to Boudiaf s death indicated that Algerian leaders had 
begun to believe that support for the FIS would decline as a result of the 
jailing of thousands of militants.368 Many citizens and analysts, however, did 
not share this belief, citing the fact that, despite the merciless government 
crackdown, the FIS continued to produce a newsletter and official 
communiques and to launch limited attacks on the government.369 In addition, 
the FIS won a larger electoral victory in 1991 than in 1990, an indication that 
popular support was undiminished by the jailing of the principal leaders and 
approximately 2,500 party cadres. 
This support is based on factors other than the FIS's uncertain role in killing 
Boudiaf.370 One of the principal factors is the economic crisis, which was 
largely created by the incompetent and corrupt bureaucracy of the ruling 
party. High levels of unemployment, particularly among the young, combined 
with widespread political repression, are not conducive to stability of public 
support for the regime. In addition, as a result of its suppression, the FIS may 
have gained increased legitimacy, both domestically and among international 
pro-democracy forces. By contrast, the HCS, which was imposed by the army, 
lacked legitimacy among most Algerians and Algerian parties. 
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Conclusion 
Over the last 10 years, the conflict spiraled into full civil war as society 
polarized and Algeria's democratic experiment had failed. The secular state 
and its apparent encouragement of democracy was now questioned as it is 
obvious that a move towards democracy is only possible if the opposition is 
weak and presents no real threat to power, or "risk-free" democracy. 371 
Democracy was spurned by the incumbent regime of President Abdul-Aziz 
Boutufliqa in order to retain power and stop the Islamisation of Algeria. This 
was a reaction to the uncertainty of the establishment of an Islamic state with 
regards to inclusiveness, participation and civil rights for the majority of the 
people. 
The economic frailty of the 1980s was extreme for many Algerians as 
unemployment increased and disparity became more apparent. Wide appeal 
for Islamic principles became widespread as Islamist groups presented a 
solution that was firmly placed in the Arab identity, Islam. It is possible that 
Islam is viewed as the only alternative solution however, it can be argued that 
repression and lack of freedom would most certainly follow the establishment 
of an Islamic state. Since the prevention of the installation of an Islamic rule 
in Algeria, retaliation has been violent and merciless, taking the lives of about 
150,000,372 and impacting on the lives of Algerians who have since lived in 
fear of retribution. 
Thus, the young Islamist movement in Algeria may continue to be a powerful 
political force in the coming years. However, given the failure of the FIS to 
gain power through peaceful means, it is likely that the party will be 
dominated by radical, militant elements, thereby increasing the probability of 
protracted conflict between Islamists and other groups led by the army and 
secular politicians. 
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Iran 
During the 1960s the leader of Iran, the Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty, 
embarked upon many reforms including rapid modernization, land reforms, 
female suffrage and literacy corps.373 The Shah aspired to transform Iran into 
a dominant regional power and although the increase in oil revenue of 1973 
and 1974 had bolstered Iran's economy and enabled rapid modernization, 
gross overspending had spiraled the economy into recession.374 The economic 
problems and its effects on the Iranian population, along with the Shah's co-
operation with the West, had led the majority to view Westernization and 
modernization as evil. The Shah's reforms came to be known as the white 
revolution and were denounced as unconstitutional and 'un-Islamic' by the 
religious leader, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 
During the 1960s Khomeini symbolized the voice that opposed the Shah's 
policies and as the Ayatollah rallied for support, the Shah became more 
repressive against opposition and "abandoned his past policy of balancing 
coercion with co-option, repression with reform. (He) would no longer 
tolerate internal dissent or political opposition .... His new policy resulted in a 
reign of terror. 375 It is argued that the Shah's politics of repression went hand 
in hand with his lack of interest in the internal politics of Iran. He was out of 
touch with the day-to-day reality of everyday life and also saw religion as a 
threat to his regime. Consequently, he sought to undermine the Shi'ite ulama 
(religious leaders), which ultimately secured his downfall. 376 
It's argued that the Iranian revolution in 1979 was a catalyst for the belief by 
many Muslims that revival of Islamic ideals in politics could be possible. 
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Islamic principles have, for a long time, been present in Middle Eastern 
politics. But a government totally immersed in Islam, rejecting modernization 
and the West shocked the world and many Middle Eastern intellectuals. The 
Islamisation of Iran alerted its neighbors to the possible assertion of Islamist 
quests for power and throughout the rest of the world the idea of an Islamic 
revolution had become a reality. 
The religious establishment of Iran was at the center of the opposition to the 
Shah. Through the mosques and educational institutions the ulama was able 
to mobilize the population and shape the revolution using Shi'ite Islam as the 
principal organizational tool. Demonstrations in 1963 led to the arrest of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1964. He then lived in exile in Southern Iraq where he 
taught, wrote and spoke out against the Iranian government. He regarded 
Islam as a complete way of life and the absolute solution to social 
problems.377 Khomeini's shi'ite Islam and political ideology were spread 
through smuggled tapes of his speeches and pamphlets and he became a 
figurehead of hope for the oppressed under the Shah's regime. 
The revolution started and shi'ite Islam leaders began to take on the lead 
under Khomeini. He rallied the people towards rule by Islam- is rule by God. 
Islam would pervade all aspects of social life as well as personal life. This 
ideology was described by Nahas378 as supranational, or pan-Islam. Khomeini 
used rhetoric and Islamic symbols to encourage Muslims in other countries to 
rise up against their regimes and install Islamic rule. However, other Middle 
Eastern regimes recognized this threat and although the revolution did impact 
on other Muslim groups, Khomeini's push for a region wide Islamic 
revolution was never fully realized. 
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The exportability of the revolution proved difficult because of the ethnic 
difference between the Shi'ite Iranians and the predominantly Sunni 
populations of the rest of the Middle East and North Africa. Shi'ite 
populations in other countries, such as Lebanon, were influenced by the tum 
of events. However, they did not constitute a majority and therefore did not 
mobilize to the same extent. In contrast, the Shi' ites of Iraq remained loyal to 
their nationality rather than religious brethren. 379 The exception to the rule of 
the inability to spread the revolutionary fervor was Sudan. A military coup led 
to the installation of an Islamic government rather than a popular uprising.380 
The regimes of Iran's neighbors were quick to perceive the threat of Islamists 
to their power bases and took steps to counter Islamic movements. 
Nevertheless, Iran is regarded by U.S. as the world's principal sponsor of 
international terrorism, and the patron of the most deadly terrorist 
organization one have seen in the last century- Hizbollah. Since 1982, Tehran 
has provided Hizbollah with hundreds of millions of dollars and tons of 
weapons. It has trained thousands of its cadres and protected its leaders. Since 
the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1988, the Iranian regime has actually 
stepped up its own direct involvement with terror by a campaign of renewed 
assassination of its opponents around the world. And Iran supports the most 
violent and extremist elements in Algeria and elsewhere with money, arms 
and training. 
Iran is not the cause of unrest in these places, but it adds to the intensity by 
promoting violence and extremism. In the analysts' view, the track record of 
the last few years makes clear that these policies are approved and directed by 
the highest levels of the Iranian government. There is no credible evidence to 
suggest these actions are the work of rogue factions. Rather, it is believed that 
they are the policies of the state, using the framework of a complex 
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bureaucracy to wage war on the Arab-Israeli peace process, on its domestic 
foes, and on its cultural adversaries. Iranian authorities believe that the peace 
process is a flawed and sterile exercise because it is launched on terms that 
are extremely favourable to Israel and the United States. Iran also believes 
that the outcome of the process will be more Israeli and U.S. domination of 
the region. From aiding Hizbollah, to repressing its Kurds and Baha'i 
populations, to targeting Salman Rushdie- these are the acts of Iran's leaders 
and not some radical fringes. 
Left unchecked, Iran, by the end of this decade, could be a nation perilously 
close to having a nuclear device, and with a sophisticated arsenal of weapons, 
long range strike aircraft, missiles and submarines, capable of threatening its 
neighbors. 
In Iran, disillusionment with the rule of the Shah prompted a religious 
revolution that would see Islam used as an organizational tool and an answer 
to social problems. However, the leaders of the ulama had no clear economic 
agenda other than righting the rapid Westernization, consumerism and 
widening gaps of social classes they perceived to be the fault of the Pahlavi 
regime. It was believed that Shi'ite Islam was the appropriate model for 
establishing a healthy economy and reducing dependence on the outside 
world.381 However, the religious regime has had to become more pragmatic in 
both its domestic and foreign policies as it has discovered the necessity to be 
a part of the international community, and to maintain the important relations 
it must foster with its regional neighbors. Its continual support of Islamist 
factions in other countries is a sticking point that pits it against many of its 
neighbors, nonetheless, Iran's ideology still supports the establishment of 
Islamic states, and its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and support 
for terrorism are factors which account for anti-Iranian feeling in much of the 
Middle East and the West. 
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Conclusion 
The impact of Islamism in Iran was substantial as it was a successful tool to 
mobilize the masses against what they saw as a repressive, corrupt and un-
Islamic government. Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers viewed Shi'ite 
Islam, as the consummate model for rule of Iran. It was seen as the basis of 
Iranian identity and the foundation for Iranian everyday life. However, severe 
repression has continued under the religious leaders' rule and many Iranians 
find themselves suffocated by strict Islamic law. Although the revolution 
influenced many Islamist groups in other parts of the Middle East and North 
Africa, it was not successful in mobilizing a pan-Islamic revolution and so has 
failed to impact on the region to the level of Khomeini's aspiration. 
Lebanon 
"The fall of the Shah in 1979 provided an example for the dissatisfied, of 
what pious, well-organized Muslims can accomplish in the face of seemingly 
insurmountable odds. Even those many Islamic groups that do not seek to 
emulate the form of the revolution in Iran derive inspiration from the success 
of their Muslim colleagues there. The revolution was an object lesson that 
deprivation or second-class citizenship did not have to be passively 
accepted". 382 
There was a proliferation of many political activist groups during the 1970s 
and 1980s, using Iran as their example. The Shi'ite population in Lebanon 
was greatly influenced by the Iranian revolution as it demonstrated Islamic 
mobilization and organization against a regime that was believed to be corrupt 
and inept. As a population, the Shi'ite Muslims of Lebanon were politically 
disorganized and economically disadvantaged in comparison with the 
382 Norton, A.R., Musa al-Sadr in Rahnema, A: ed., Pioneers of Islamic Revival, London: 
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Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Druzes. Although all groups were 
represented in some way in Lebanese leadership, the relative deprivation and 
lack of proportional political participation gave rise to restlessness and 
resentment. This found its outlet through the guidance of a religious leader, 
Musa al-Sadr. 
Sadr rose as a charismatic and insightful leader in Lebanon giving the Shi'ite 
community a sense of identity and the ability to see that their deprivation in 
society was not a given. 
In 1975 Sadr founded AMAL (Afwaj al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniyah), an 
acronym for the Lebanese Resistance Battalions, also meanning "hope", to 
protect Shi'ite rights and interests. Its growth can be attributed to four main 
factors: The Lebanese civil war of 1975 and 1976, the 1987 disappearance of 
Musa al-Sadr, and the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Israeli invasions of 1978 
and 1982.383 AMAL followed the path of reformism, although it did revert to 
violence in some cases, but concentrated mainly on reform within the existing 
regime. 
In 1982, two members from AMAL, Abbas Mussavi and Sheikh Subhi Tufayl 
established the militant group Hizbollah, which operates out of Southern 
Lebanon.384 Hizbollah is an Islamic struggle movement that came into being 
as a reaction to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the subsequent 
occupation of Beirut. Violence and terrorism are used in order to achieve their 
goals of defeating the 'Zionist enemy', improving social conditions and 
overthrowing the Lebanese government, and establishing an Islamic state. 
Furthermore, Hizbollah is greatly influenced by Iran and points out the 
historic links between the Lebanese and Iranian Shi'ite.385 
We, the sons of Hizbollah's nation, whose vanguard God has given 
victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the worlds' 
383 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 1995, p. 144. 
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central Islamic state, abide by the orders of a single wise and just 
command currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Khomeini. .. 
We have opted for religion, freedom and dignity over humiliation and 
constant submission to America and its allies and Zionism and their 
[Christian] Phalangist allies. We have risen to liberate our country, to 
drive the imperialists and the invaders out of it and to take our fate in 
our hands.386 
Iran played a major role in training and financing Hizbollah in its military 
operations and its commitment to social services. Esposito states that financial 
backing from Iran may well have reached levels of ten million dollars per 
month by 1987.387 In undertaking the responsibility for providing schools, 
housing, hospitals and finance for the war tom Shi'ite population, Hizbollah 
retained loyalty and support. 
Hizbollah employed the Shi'ite doctrines of sacrifice and martyrdom in its 
war against its enemies. In the early 1980s, suicide and car bomb attacks were 
perpetrated against both Israeli and American targets. The group asserts that 
the suicide attacks are its own special type of resistance against Israel. "These 
attacks dealt great losses to the enemy on all thinkable levels such as 
militarily and mentally. The attacks also raised the morale across the whole 
Islamic nation". 388 In October 1983, over 250 U.S. Marines were killed in 
their barracks outside Beirut, and in April of the same year the United States 
embassy was bombed killing over 60 people. As a result of such attacks, the 
Multinational forces withdrew from Beirut in 1984, and Israel retreated to 
their security zone389 from which Prime Minister Ehud Barak subsequently 
withdrew unilaterally in June 2001 to achieve a peace treaty with Lebanon. 
As a consequence, Hizbollah' s reputation and image was greatly advanced as 
386 Wright, R., Lebanon in Hunter, S.T. ed., The Politics of Islamic Revivalism, 1988 cited 
in Esposito, J.L. The Islamic Threat, 1995, p. 66. 
387 Ibid. p. 147. 
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the great protector of the Shi'ite rights, and takes credit for evicting Israel out 
of Southern Lebanon. 
Hizbollah is a relatively small group, numbering approximately 1000, and it is 
thought it represents only a minority of Lebanese Shi'ites.390 However, its' 
support of the Shi'ite population through welfare and its fight to protect 
Shi'ite rights has sustained its existence. The activities of Hizbollah and its 
affiliated groups such as Islamic Jihad, and the presence of PLO in Southern 
Lebanon, has had a destabilizing effect on the population in that area as it has 
led to Israeli occupation and retaliation. It is arguable that Islamic groups such 
as Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad achieve their main impact through attacks on 
Israel and their constant call for Israel's destruction. 
Conclusion 
The state of Lebanon has experienced upheaval, economic collapse, invasion, 
Syrian hegemony, and civil war since the 1970s. Economic deprivation and 
lack of political participation of the Lebanese Shi'ites, along with internal 
political strife have led to the growth in Islamist groups in Lebanon during 
that time. Using Iran as their example, Lebanese Islamists seek to gain power 
by overthrowing the government and establishing an Islamic state. Islamism 
is perceived to be a tool with which society can be corrected as much as it is a 
vehicle to gain power. Along with the aim of gaining a foothold in the 
political realm, Lebanese Islamists aim to achieve their objective to destroy 
Israel. In more recent years, Lebanon has managed to make inroads into 
boosting its' lagging economy, yet Southern Lebanon remains unstable due to 
Islamist activity against Israel in that area. Although Lebanon itself has 
experienced relative peace over the last decade, it remains trapped under 
Syrian hegemony, Israeli retaliation, and is polarized by the heterogeneity of 
the Lebanese population. 
390 Hoveyda, F., The Broken Crescent, 1998, p. 97. 
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Israel 
As in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, the growth of Islamist 
tendencies in Israel was a reaction to the failure of Arabs in the 1967 war and 
the humiliation felt by many as a result of the loss. "Those who became 
disillusioned after the 1967 with western influences, secular Arab 
nationalism, and socialism turned to Islam".391 However, the real turning 
point came with the Iranian revolution as it showed that a secular regime 
could be overthrown and replaced by an Islamic rule. Similarly, the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 and the attacks of Lebanese Shi' a 
Islamists on Israeli troops in 1983 also showed the Palestinian Islamists that 
political change could be achieved. The images of success achieved by these 
events were pertinent in attracting new recruits to the Palestinian Islamist 
order such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 
Both the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority are at times threatened 
by the activities of Islamists. The heads of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), in its attempt to create a Palestinian state, has tried to 
remain secular, as there is a threat that polarization amongst Palestinians 
could disintegrate the whole movement,392 through religious and ideological 
difference. 
As a more militant force emerged on the West Bank, the Israeli government 
tried to utilize them to attempt to drive a wedge between the nationalist 
Palestinian factions and the Islamist factions in order to disintegrate the whole 
Palestinian movement. Violent clashes broke out as the Islamists targeted 
other Palestinians who did not conform to Islamic codes.393 This provoked 
tensions between the two camps and violent encounters became 
commonplace. 
391 Sisk, T.D. Islam and Democracy, 1992, p. 52. 
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In 1987, Sheikh Ahmed Yaseen was able to bring together Islamist factions 
organized as the militant group HAMAS (Zeal).394 HAMAS was born out of 
an association with the Muslim Brotherhood and the two groups still remain 
close ties. Like many other fundamentalist groups, HAMAS provides social 
benefits to the people through hospitals, schools and mosques. However, its 
militant wing has become known for its suicide bombers and attacks 
frequented upon Israelis as well as non-conforming Palestinians. HAMAS, of 
all the organizations eager to kill the rapprochement between Israel and the 
Arabs, is probably the greatest threat. An acronym for Islamic Resistance 
Movement that literally means "zeal", HAMAS wants nothing less than the 
destruction of the Jewish state, followed by the establishment of an Islamic 
Palestine as a precursor to a greater pan-Arab union. 
In December 1987, the Intifada (uprising) was declared and HAMAS and the 
PLO combined to create the United Intifada Command. However, in 1988 
HAMAS withdrew and pursued its own struggle.395 The HAMAS manifesto 
states that it is not prepared to accept any agreement with Israel. They fight 
for the liberation of historical Palestine (which includes Israel), and the 
establishment of an Islamic state. HAMAS denies that a peaceful solution can 
be found, because to renounce Palestine is to renounce Islam.396 
The organization was born in the misery and despair of the teeming refugee 
camps of the Gaza Strip more than a decade ago, two months after the 
beginning of the Intifada. Within three years, the Islamists that the Israelis 
had once allowed to exist as a counterbalance to the PLO were outlawed as 
the most serious security problem in the occupied territories. HAMAS' appeal 
is both social and political. With money from Iran and private Arab 
benefactors in the Gulf, the organization runs clinics, kindergartens while 
supporting candidates for chamber of commerce elections. Preaching radical 
394 Ibid. 
395 Agence Europe. 1996. HAMAS. http://www.medea.be/en/index074.htm 
396 Yisraeli, R. The 1988-1989 Annual on Terrorism cited in the Charter of the 
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solutions from the mosques, HAMAS has rapidly won converts disenchanted 
with foibles and failures of the PLO. 
The group's aggressive violence has made Israel's occupation of the Gaza 
Strip more dangerous than ever. Israeli soldiers are constantly stoned and 
frequently shot at, while civilians in Israel are often targets of suicide 
bombers. The Israeli Defense Force sees the militant group as a double 
security threat since the territories were granted autonomy. They fear 
HAMAS will go after Israeli settlers and the Palestinian authorities in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, provoking reprisals that could easily turn into 
a bloodbath. They are also worried about how much easier it will be to stage 
large-scale terrorist operations into Israel. 
Similarly, Islamic Jihad turns to violence and terrorism in order to defeat 
Israel and, like HAMAS, rejects the leadership of the PLO and attributes its 
lack of success to its lack of faith. 397 As a result of the growth in Islamist 
tendencies the Palestinians have become divided in their quest for a 
Palestinian nation. 
Islamist groups such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad continue their struggle to 
destroy Israel and establish an Islamic state through violence. HAMAS retains 
close links with Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbollah and other Islamist 
groups. However, it is a decentralized organization and poses problems of 
control for both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It retains support through 
social welfare and any success it can gain in its fight against Israel. This 
support is apparent in its ability to recruit members for militant activity and its 
use of suicide bombers. The Islamic concept of martyrdom, or those who die 
for Islam go straight to heaven, is utilized and it is reported that HAMAS' 
charitable system supports families of martyrs and thus nurtures their 
support. 398 
397 Deeb, M., "Militant Islam and the Politics of redemption" in Butterworth, C.E. and 
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Conclusion 
HAMAS and other militant Islamists in Israel continue to fuel fear both for 
Israelis and Palestinians. However, the groups also become tools when the 
Palestinian Authority requires the escalation of conflict with Israel in order to 
achieve its objectives against Israel. This has become a major problem for 
Israel as it is unable to fully protect its citizens from the daily threats of 
terrorist attacks by groups such as HAMAS, Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa 
Brigade, which are both volatile and unpredictable. 
Saudi Arabia 
"The response of most Saudis to this bonanza has been to maintain that 
wealth and Islam, technology and traditional values, economic 
modernization and old social customs can be made to coexist in their 
society".399 
Western colonial influence or liberal secularism never extended to Saudi 
Arabia and the territory only ever came under foreign influence during the 
Ottoman-Turkish suzerainty.400 Saudi Arabia is the only Middle Eastern state 
that has tried to mesh religion and politics since 17 44 when the Saud and 
Wahhab alliance occurred and the Kingdom began to be ruled in conjunction 
with the ulema.401 However, tension between religion and politics surfaced in 
this publicly pious country in the late 1970s, and in the 1990s it re-ignited as 
new fundamentalism. 
The event that raised the issue of Islamic revival in Saudi Arabia was the 
storming of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. The Islamists who seized 
399 Faksh, M.A., The Future of Islam in the Middle East, 1997, p. 89. 
40° Kechichian, J.A., "The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of 
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the mosque demanded recognition of one of their leaders as mahdi (deliverer) 
along with moral cleansing of Saudi Arabia. They denounced corruption and 
bribery within the regime, were against the presence of alcohol, and called for 
strict control on radio, television and the employment of women.402 This neo-
Wahhabi movement arose as a religious-militant response to modernism but 
the Wahhabi basis of the state was of sufficient strength to counter the 
movement. The rebellion was only short lived, as the Saudi military was able 
to seal off the mosque and overcome the rebellion in a short time. 
A religious uprising in the devout Saudi Arabia meant that there could be a 
genuine threat for the governments of other Middle Eastern states that were 
more secular in orientation than Saudi Arabia. Therefore, most Muslim 
countries supported the Saudi regime in their efforts to take back the mosque, 
and the rebellion was labeled as sacrilege by many of the other regimes.403 
However, the underlying discontent in this wealthy, seemingly stable state, 
was then brought to the surface. 
The oil revenues of the 1970s had bolstered the economy and changed the 
face of Saudi Arabia. Modernization and materialism profoundly affected 
society but the historical religious base has enabled, to some extent, the 
merger of the conflicting values and aspirations. 
Nevertheless, the conflation of these values did not occur at all levels and 
although the Mosque takeover seemed to be an isolated incident, friction did 
exist beneath the surface. The Saudi regime has always been able to counter 
this friction with the use of its Wahhabi Islam to legitimize itself. As the 
guardians of the two holiest shrines in the Muslim world, "State-sponsored 
fundamentalism is thus a tradition in Saudi Arabia. Armed with Wahhabi 
Islam as its official ideology, the state has always posed as the Islamic state 
par excellence.404 Opposition to the state has, therefore, always been on the 
402 Ibid. p. 277. 
403 Ibid. p. 272. 
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back foot as the basis of the state, which is religion, is used as a neutralizing 
force. 
However, the Gulf War of 1990 and 1991 catapulted the divisions of society 
to the fore as sections of the community questioned the wisdom of Western 
support and the condemnation of a fellow Arab State. In particular, as more 
than 50 per cent of the population was under the age of 20 and had been 
brought up in an era of wealth and education, their expectations of what life 
and society should offer them were radically different from the generation 
before. They desired participation in the decision-making process, equality, 
human rights, representative government and legality but within the realm of 
strict Islamic rule.405 These new fundamentalists chose to use the technologies 
of their age to spread their message and attempt to bring about change 
through reform within the system rather than by the use ofviolence.406 
A round up of Saudi dissidents in recent years does not bode well for a regime 
whose legitimacy has been eroding since the Gulf War. Nor is an erosion of 
legitimacy the only weakness exposed by these developments. The country's 
financial institutions are suffering because the bureaucracy is corrupt. 
The arrest of some dissident clerics and Islamist movement leaders is an 
indication that the royal family is losing the support not only of its 
conservative religious constituency, but also of important tribal leaders.407 
Most of the dissident clerics are from Qasim, not the eastern province 
inhabited by the traditional Shi'ite opponents of the regime, or the Hijaz, an 
area more liberal than the rest of the country. Qasim is where the traditional 
supporters of the regime live, conservative Najdis from the Saudi heartland. 
Adding to the dissident movement's clout, some of those arrested, such as Dr. 
Safar al-Hawaii and Shiekh Salman al-Aouda are well known in the rest of 
the Muslim world. 
405 Ibid. p. 95. 
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Saudi Arabian Minister of Interior Prince Naif first dismissed reports of the 
roundup as false part of a Zionist-inspired propaganda campaign. Then, 
switching tactics, he admitted to the arrests, but claimed the militants were 
backed by Iran.408 This claim is a suspect, too, since the clerics are Sunni, not 
Shi'ite Muslims; nor would they need Iranian funds. 
Nevertheless, discontent is rising among the Saudi oil generation. The 
discontent can be traced to the rise of a new middle class of Saudis who 
gained access to higher education during the 1970s, an era when the Saudi 
government spent lavishly on its citizens. Many dissidents are young men in 
their 20s and 30s- the "oil generation". They want to contribute to the shaping 
of heir nation's future, but the system is closed to them because they are not 
part of the Saud clan. Instead of family and tribal connections, the critics 
advocate education and Islam as an alternative form of advancement. 
The choice of education and Islam is not arbitrary. These are shortcomings of 
the existing regime. The country's resources have been mismanaged, in part 
because some of those who acquired their positions through family 
connections lack education and financial skills. Islam offers an indirect way to 
criticize the regime's lack of ethical constraints, principally the corrupt 
princes who skim money from their country's oil and commercial deals. 
Islamists point to the moral and economic laxiness of the Royal family as 
being due to corruption and mismanagement. Some dissidents say the royal 
family could easily cover the deficit from their personal accounts, estimated 
at US$20 billion. 409 Many ordinary Saudis believe the royal princes are only 
interested in their own personal gains, not the welfare of the citizens. This 
strong belief that the royal family is corrupt attracts young Saudi men and 
women to Islamist leaders. 
408 Ibid. p. 99. 
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The threat of an Islamist challenge in Saudi Arabia is of special concern. 
Saudi Islamists do not need the outside financial backing that other Islamist 
movements in the region, such as those in Egypt and Algeria, are dependent 
on. Unlike Egyptian Islamists, some of whom have broken into jewelry shops 
to get money for weapons, the Saudi Islamists had funds to buy missiles to 
fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Both Egypt and Algeria consider Saudi 
Islamists the main financiers of their opposition. Saudi Islamists have the 
finances necessary to destabilize the regime. In addition, Saudi Islamists have 
infiltrated the state bureaucracy and the army, and represent a majority in the 
Saudi National Guard. They have also succeeded in forging alliances with 
other social forces in Saudi Arabia, namely rich businessmen from Najd. 
Given the extent of the Islamists' network and the general dissatisfaction of 
the Saudi public with the "despotic rule" of the royal family, the question of 
change in Saudi Arabia is not one of how, but when. The disparity between a 
rapidly changing society and a static state is bound to lead to friction and 
perhaps revolt. Since the oil boom in the 1970s, the society has had a taste of 
modernity. Students went to college in Britain and America; members of the 
Islamist movements have stopped communicating through cassette tapes in 
favor of the Internet and computer bulletin boards. Meanwhile, the country is 
governed by a family whose sole means of maintaining power is its military, 
yet the Gulf war has exposed the hollowness of the Royal family's claims of 
building a modern state with a strong army. Saudi Arabia required American 
defence from Saddam Hussein's Iraq with which it should have been equally 
matched. One Saudi joked that the only thing the royal family can organize is 
a good soccer team. 
The New Islamists 
The U.S. and its allies have in recent years worked hard to isolate Iraq and 
Iran in order to stave off any external threat to the GCC (Gulf Cooperation 
Council) States. What the West's arms and diplomatic muscle cannot do, 
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however, is to protect the GCC rulers from their domestic opposition- the new 
Islamists. It is this internal threat, which is of growing concern.410 
Recent instances of opposition- the high public profile of Saudi dissidents and 
the violent protests in Bahrain- have highlighted this concern. In the short-
term, criticism of Saudi practices or exposure of official wrong-doings can be 
costly for the country concerned as the Saudis withdraw their financial favors. 
This explains the reluctance of Western governments to talk to the Saudi 
opposition. Britain's Foreign Office, for instance, has held informal talks with 
Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and their Tunisian counterparts. No 
such line has been opened to the Saudi Islamists. Rather, the then Foreign 
Secretary had apologized to Riyadh for the presence of opposition figures in 
London. On 17 May 1995, Prime Minister John Major told Arab ambassadors 
in London that radical Muslim dissidents who abused British hospitality were 
'extremely unwelcome' ,411 but there was little the U.K could do unless British 
law was broken. The growing attraction to London for such radicals is based 
partly on the fact that asylum seekers do not have to renounce all political 
activity, and partly on the presence of a large and lively Arab press. 
The refusal to make contact is understandable if it is based on an informed 
judgment that the opposition poses a threat to the status quo. Nonetheless, 
analysts must be careful not to fall into a state of complacency. To avoid this 
mind-set, it is useful to look in more detail at the Islamist threat to the 
Kingdom, while recognizing that its significance should not be exaggerated. 
The contemporary Islamist movement in the Kingdom emerged in the 1980s 
but went public in the wake of the Gulf War which exposed the Royal family 
to charges of being in league with the secular and 'imperial' West. The 
adherents of this loosely organized movement label themselves as al-
salafiyyun (followers of the pious ancestors) rather than al-usuliyyun 
(fundamentalists). Their leaders are intellectuals, predominantly from the 
Najd- the conservative heartland of the Kingdom. Over half of them are 
410 Jane's/ntelligenceReview(JlR), Vol. 7,No.4, 1995,pp.180-183. 
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employed at one of four conservative universities- Muhammad bin Saud; 
King Saud, Umm al-Qura and the Islamic University. 
The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), or Lajna al 
Difa' al-Huquuq al-Sharia, has emerged as the most visible symbol of 
Islamist opposition to the House of Saud in May 1993. It has a network of 
informants in the Kingdom and has made use of modern technology to get its 
message across internally and externally.412 The Committee has presented 
itself to Western audiences as an advocate of human rights and a critic of 
corruption, economic mismanagement and financial profligacy. It has 
enthusiastically co-operated with Western investigative journalists to expose 
financial and moral improprieties relating to business deals between Western 
politicians and the Royal Family. The CDLR's propaganda emphasizes the 
alleged fiscal and moral laxness of the Royal princes and exaggerates the 
Kingdom's admittedly difficult fiscal situation. Western critics of the CDLR, 
however, paint its leaders as obscurantist fundamentalists while Arabian 
critics argue that its leaders are unimportant self-publicists. 
The CDLR's true aims and beliefs remain uncertain, in part because its 
leaders have not formulated an agreed set of goals. Rather, they are casting 
their net wide, trying to act as a lightning rod for dissidents of any color. 
Hence, the committee's general secretary, Dr Muhammad al-Masari was 
quick to claim a connection with two Saudi diplomats who defected from 
their posts in the U.S.A. in 1994, even though the individuals clearly did not 
share the CDLR's Islamic agenda. It is more difficult to assess the 
movement's aims by the fact that its leaders do not speak with one voice and 
that they vary their pitch depending on the audience. For instance, Dr Masari 
has appeared on platforms with individuals ranging from radical socialist 
British politicians to the virulently sectarian and obscurantist Islamist group 
Hizb al-Tahrir, Freedom Party. Masari's leading colleague in London, Dr 
412 Faksh, M. A. The Future of Islam in the Middle East, 1997, p. 97. 
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Saad al-Faqih, takes a softer line and appears sometimes to restrain Masari's 
more fiery tendencies. 
All these fundamentalist voices denounced the House of Saud and predicts its 
overthrow either in the form of a military coup as a result of escalating 
clashes between the government and the opposition or as a result of a direct 
Islamist take-over of power. He admits that an alternative scenario is that 
power could be transferred to one of the younger Saudi princes who would 
institute major reforms to accommodate opposition demands. He is adamant, 
however, that he would not negotiate any such compromise. Dr Faqih is more 
ambivalent and argues that the CDLR is not committed to the overthrow of 
the Royal Family but that it could countenance some form of compromise. 
The imprisoned shuyukh, sheikhs, al-Alawi and al-Hawdah, which have a 
greater following inside the country than does Masari, also stop short of 
calling for the overthrow of the Al-Saud. 
In his attitude to the outside world, Masari does not sound a reassuring tone to 
Western governments. He blasts Western establishments and 'capitalists' for 
exploiting Arab oil, plying the Arab rulers with unneeded weapons and for 
keeping in power the un-Islamic 'tyrannies' that hold sway across the middle 
East and North Africa. He suggests that his movement could work with the 
West if it ceased its support for 'repression' but this olive branch is lost in a 
flood of rhetoric. Like radical Islamist leaders world, Masari rejects an 
international political economic order dominated by the USA, the UN, the 
IMF and the World Bank. These bodies, he argues, are subjugating Muslim 
peoples in their pursuit of profit and are subverting the Muslim world with the 
'cultural imperialism' of the pop-culture.413 
In a speech delivered in the British House of Commons, Masari called on the 
British people to stand up to their capitalist 'rulers' and urged the Western 




The gap between rhetoric and action is notoriously wide in the Arab world. 
During the celebration in May 1995 of the Islamic Id al-Adha, Saudi TV 
broadcast a sermon delivered at the Holy Mosque in Mecca which attacked 
"the Jews" who "have ... trampled on mosques" and warned that "the enemy 
is now threatening openly".415 Despite this officially sanctioned diatribe, there 
is no prospect of Riyadh disagreeing to Washington's terms for an Arab-
Israeli peace settlement. The same cannot be said of the CDLR. More 
reassuringly, while the rhetoric of Saudi Islamists may not be much different 
from that of their counterparts in the Maghreb, they have displayed no 
tendency towards violence with the exception of Osama Bin Ladin. 
Who is Osama Bin Laden? 
Profile 
Osama bin Laden, is an International terrorist and an Islamic extremist. 
He is both one of the CIA' s most wanted men and a hero to many young 
people in the Arab world.416 A Saudi born leader of Al Qaeda, in Arabic, the 
Base, is a terrorist organization devoted to uniting all Muslims and 
establishing a transnational, strict-fundamentalist Islamic state. The youngest 
son of a wealthy Yemeni-born businessman, he is believed to be in his 40's, 
and to have at least three wives. Bin Laden was trained as a civil engineer. He 
graduated in 1979 from King Abdul Aziz University, Jiddah. 
Born in Riyadh Saudi Arabia on 30 July 1957417 to a Yemeni family. Bin 
Laden left Saudi Arabia in 1979 to fight against the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.418 But following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan he went to 
Pakistan where he helped to finance the mujahidi. His power is founded on a 
personal fortune earned by his family's construction business in Saudi Arabia. 
The Afghan jihad was packed with American dollars and had the blessing of 
415 Ibid. 
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the governments of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. He received security training 
from the CIA itself, according to Middle Eastern analyst Hazhir Teimourian. 
While in Afghanistan, he founded the Maktab al-Khidimat [Services Office] 
(MAK), which recruited and trained non-Afghan Muslim fighters from 
around the world and imported equipment to aid the Afghan resistance to 
fight in the war against the Soviet army. Egyptians, Lebanese, Turks and 
others - numbering thousands - joined their Afghan Muslim brothers in the 
struggle against an ideology that spurned religion. 
In 1987 he split with MAK to begin a jihad [holy war] against Israel and 
Western influence in Islamic countries. He founded Al Qaeda the next year. 
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he returned to his family's 
construction business in Saudi Arabia. 
Turned against the US 
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, the "Arab 
Afghans", as Bin Laden's faction came to be called, turned their fire against 
the US and its allies in the Middle East. When U.S. troops were stationed on 
Saudi soil in 1990, he became violently opposed to the Saudi monarchy and 
the United States.419 After he was caught smuggling arms in 1991, he was 
expelled from the country because of his anti-government activities there. 
Then he went to Sudan, where he began financing terrorist training camps 
while investing in businesses and increasing his fortune. His Saudi citizenship 
was revoked in February 1994.420 
He spent the next five years in Sudan until US pressure prompted the 
Sudanese Government to expel him. 
After the attempted assassination of Egyptian president Mubarak in 1995, to 
which Bin Laden was linked, he was expelled from Sudan in 1996 and 
419 Ibid. pp. 27-28. 
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reestablished himself in Afghanistan, where the extreme Islamic 
fundamentalist Taleban had come to power. Bin Laden, an immensely wealthy 
and private man, has been granted a safe haven by Afghanistan's ruling 
Taleban movement. That same year he issued a "declaration of war" against 
the United States. In its camps in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda trained a 
decentralized network of international terrorists that have been linked to the 
1998 car bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 
attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon. Bin Laden also is reported to have financed or 
trained Islamic guerrillas operating in Kosovo, Kashmir, the Philippines, and 
Somalia. 
He has been indicted in the United States for the embassy bombings, and the 
United States launched retaliatory cruise missile attacks against his 
Afghanistan camps in 1998. Following the 2001 attacks the United States 
demanded the Taleban hand over Bin Laden. When the Afghanis refused, 
U.S. forces began military action against Afghanistan, and in conjunction 
with opposition forces there largely defeated Taleban and Al Qaeda forces by 
Jan. 2002. Bin Laden, however, was not captured, and Al Qaeda continued to 
function and launch terror attacks on limited scale. 
Terrorism experts say Bin Laden has been using his millions to fund attacks 
against the US. The US State Department calls him "one of the most 
significant sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in the world today". 
BBC correspondent James Robbins says Bin Laden had "all but admitted 
involvement" in the Saudi Arabia killings. 421 
Some experts say he is part of an international Islamic front, bringing together 
Saudi, Egyptian and other groups. 
421 B.B.C. World Service News, Tuesday, 18 September 2001, 16:31 GMT 17:31 U.K. 
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Analysts say Bin Laden's organisation is very different from the groups that 
carried out bombings and hijackings in the past in that it is not a tightly knit 
group with a clear command structure but a loose coalition of groups 
. , 422 operatmg across contments. 
American officials believe Bin Laden's associates may operate in over forty 
countries - in Europe and North America, as well as in the Middle East, East 
Africa and Asia. 
The few outsiders who have met Bin Laden describe him as modest, almost 
shy. He rarely gives interviews.423 
Activities 
Bin Laden masterminded and financed several of the past decade's most 
barbaric acts of terrorism. 424 His worldwide terrorist network, Al-Qaeda, 
played a central role in the Sept. 11, 2001 multiple plane hijackings and 
coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The Saudi 
exile has been directly linked to the Aug. 7, 1998 bombing of the U.S. 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people, 
and the October 2000 bombing attack of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen. 
The Al-Qaeda Organization 
Osama Bin Laden is a about 44 years old "businessman" and son of one of 
Saudi Arabia's wealthiest families, and the coordinator of an international 
terrorist network believed to be responsible for numerous deadly attacks 
against American and Western targets. 
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Bin Laden formed the terrorist Al-Qaeda ("The Base") organization in 1988, 
and it is believed to have operatives in as many as twenty countries.425 In 
February 23, 1998 Bin Laden announced the establishment of "The 
International Islamic Front for Holy War Against Jews and Crusaders,"426 an 
umbrella organization linking Islamic extremists in scores of countries around 
the world, including Egypt, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The group issued a 
religious edict upon its establishment: the ruling to kill the Americans and 
their allies, civilians, and the military, is an individual duty for every Muslim 
who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to 
liberate Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque from their grip and in order 
for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated, and unable to 
threaten any Muslim. 
His militancy is traced back to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Bin 
Laden's avowed goal from that time is to remove Western "infidels" from 
Muslim countries - the Russians from Afghanistan, the American military 
from Saudi Arabia and other points in the Gulf, the downfall of many 
government of Muslim states, and for the destruction of the United States and 
its allies. 
Bin Laden is the son of the Yemeni-born owner of a leading Saudi 
construction company. Born into great wealth, he is believed to have inherited 
as much as $300 million when his father died in the 1960's.427 From 1979, Bin 
Laden began raising money for the Mujahideen forces fighting the Soviets in 
Afghanistan, and gradually became more and more affiliated with Egyptian 
Islamic extremist groups, such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad. From the mid-
1980's Bin Laden began to establish training camps in Afghanistan, initially 
for the war in Afghanistan, but later to fight against other targets worldwide. 
425 Ibid. pp. 21-22. 
426 Ibid. p. 1. 
427 Ibid. p. 19. 
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He has attracted thousands of recruits from Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, 
Yemen, Pakistan and Sudan. 
Reportedly, Bin Laden's anti-Americanism intensified during the Gulf War, 
when U.S. troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia.428 The presence of 
American soldiers in Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad 
and the home of the two holiest Muslim shrines, enraged Mr. Bin Laden and 
other Arab militants. He and his associates also blamed the U.S. support for 
Israel as anti-Islam. 
In 1994 Saudi Arabia stripped Bin Laden's citizenship, citing his opposition to 
the Saudi King and leadership and expelled him from the country. He then 
went to Khartoum, Sudan, where he owns numerous businesses. But under 
U.S. pressure was expelled in 1996 and relocated to Afghanistan. Bin Laden 
is on the FBI's list of 10 most-wanted criminals, and the State Department 
offered a $5 million reward for his arrest following the August 1998 embassy 
bombings. The United Nations imposed economic sanctions on the Taleban 
regime in Afghanistan in 1999 for harboring Bin Laden, and many nations, 
including the U.S. have frozen assets owned by Bin Laden and his senior 
associates. 
Bin Laden has been thought to finance, inspire or directly organize various 
terrorist attacks.429 His name has been linked to the killings of Western 
tourists by militant Islamic groups in Egypt, bombings in France by Islamic 
extremist Algerians, the maintenance of a safe-house in Pakistan for Ramzi 
Ahmed Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, and sheltering Sheikh Omar Abd Al-Rahman (the Blind Sheikh), 
who was also convicted in the World Trade Center bombing. He has also been 
linked to the 1992 bombings of a hotel in Yemen, which killed two 
428 Ibid. p. 28. 
429 Ibid. p. 16. 
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Australians, but was supposedly targeted against American soldiers stationed 
there; the 1995 detonation of a car bomb in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; the 1995 
truck bomb in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. servicemen; and the 
1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Bin Laden 
has been directly connected to the August 7, 1998 bombing of the U.S. 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 
people, and the October 2000 attack of the U.S. destroyer ship Cole in Yemen. 
Beliefs and Goals 
In 1998, Bin Laden issued a religious edict to his followers, to kill the 
Americans and their allies, civilians and the military. 
Bin Laden has made no secret of his anti-American, anti-Western and anti-
Israeli sentiments. In fact, he has been outspoken on these topics, issuing 
theological rulings calling for Muslims to attack Americans and threatening 
terrorism against related targets. Pointing to the defeat of the Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan, Bin Laden has consistently declared that the United States is 
vulnerable to defeat by a jihad oflslamic forces. 430 
Their rallying cry is the liberation of Islam's three holiest places - Mecca, 
Medina and Jerusalem. 
Status 
Bin Laden tops the FBI's most wanted terrorist list. Until recently, he has been 
living in exile under the protection of Afghanistan's Taleban regime. Since the 
collapse of the Tale ban regime, he has been in hiding. 
During his time in hiding, he has called for a holy war against the US, and for 
the killing of Americans and Jews. He is reported to be able to rally around 
him up to 70,000 fighters. 431 
430 Ibid. p. 51. 
431 The New Zealand Herald, 15 July 2003, Section B 1. 
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He is also suspected of helping to set up Islamic training centres to prepare 
soldiers to fight in Chechnya and other parts of the former Soviet Union. 
Current location 
Though his current whereabouts are unknown, most reports indicate that, if 
alive, Bin Laden is probably in Afghanistan. 
The best choice for preserving order in Saudi Arabia is a system-wide 
overhaul that begins to establish power sharing and responsibility sharing 
between all groups. This must be a central or driving principle. 
Thus far the Saudi government does not seem to have considered this 
position. It has chosen repression instead. Worse, the Saudi policy of silencing 
dissent goes beyond national boundaries. In 1994, they successfully 
demanded the firing of Hafiz Mirazi, the then host of a Washington-based 
Arabic talk show after he interviewed Mohammed Masari, a leading Saudi 
dissident. Mustapha Bakry, editor of an Egyptian opposition newspaper, said 
that the Egyptian police at the request of the Saudi government kidnapped 
him because he reported on Saudi dissent.( 16)432 
Contrary to the assertions of the Saudi regime, the problems of Saudi Arabia 
are not the result of a Zionist media campaign in the U.S. nor they caused by 
liberal journalists in the Arab world. Saudi dissent is home grown; unless its 
root causes are addressed, the discontent may grow violent. 
Conclusion 
As in the other case studies, Saudi Arabia has been affected by rapid change 
to its society. However, its wealth and the link between religion and politics 
have sustained its power base. The Wahhabi basis of Saudi society and 
politics enables the regime to use religious discourse in order to demonstrate 
432 The Christian Science Monitor, October 13, 1994. 
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its legitimacy. Opposition to the state also uses Islamic rhetoric to counter the 
state but has failed to make any inroads because as the Saudi regime retains 
control through its Wahhabi based legitimacy and forceful repression. 
PART FIVE: ANALYSIS 
CHAPTER 1: PROLIFERATION OF ISLAMIST GROUPS 
Introduction 
The prominence of the Islamists in the early stages of political relaxation in 
the Middle East and North Africa comes from their being the most organized 
theo-political groups. In the 1970s, and early 1980s, when opposition parties 
were banned and public political discussion was not allowed, the Islamists 
were able to meet, talk and form what amounted to political networks through 
their charitable societies. They were able to make political points through 
sympathizers preaching at the mosques on Fridays. It was very difficult for 
the governments either to control the societies of the preachers. If a preacher 
chose his words well the authorities could hardly criticize him for saying that 
the government was imperfect, as is everything except God himself, and that 
it should be run more on lines laid down by God in the Qur'an. In effect the 
societies became the only practicable and permitted form of opposition of the 
day. This gave them a political head start on all secular opposition groups 
when Arab governments began to relax control in the later 1980s. There have 
been changes in this direction in Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco 
and, in rather different circumstances, in Yemen. The problem in most cases 
has been that the people who have moved most vigorously to seize the new 
political opportunities have been the militant Islamist groups, who are not 
interested in continuing either the economic or political reform. The Islamist 
movements had the enormous additional advantage of standing for an idea, 
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which the people understood. Everyone knew what the Shari'a law was and 
roughly what an Islamic state was supposed to be, but nobody knew much 
about the leaders and policies of the multitude of new secular parties. 
Inevitably, since the period of political change began it had been the Islamist 
groups that have dominated Arab political instability. Hence, a rising tide of 
Islamic radicalism is sweeping over the Middle East and North Africa, and 
threatening Western security interests. 
A Rising Tide of Islamists 
From North Africa to the Persian Gulf, impoverished and disaffected Muslims 
have embraced the fiery of appeal of Islamists. Their leaders blame all of 
society's problems on "heretics" and the corrupting influence of Western 
culture, and seek to replace secular government with an Islamic state based on 
their own rigid interpretation of Qur' anic law. They condemn intellectuals and 
artists, Muslims who disagree with them and members of other minority 
religions, demanding a jihad, or holy war, against all who oppose them. 
Although the vast majority of the world's 1 billion Muslims reject such 
fanaticism,433 Islamists have scored ominous victories in the last three 
decades. Iran fell to them in 1979, followed by Sudan, the largest country in 
Africa, a decade later. Until recently Algeria was teetering on the brink, while 
in Egypt, Islamist gunmen have virtually taken over whole areas of the Upper 
Nile. 
Other fundamentalists are making inroads without violence. In Egypt, the 
Muslim Brotherhood party runs key professional organizations. Even in 
secular Turkey, an Islamic party captured control of the two largest cities 
throughout 1990s. 
This upheaval poses a serious challenge to the security interests of Western 
nations. Islamists oppose any western presence in the Middle East, and the 
433 The Christian Science Monitor, April 23-29, 1993, p. 11. 
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very existence of the state of Israel. Indeed, when Iraq's Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait, Islamist leaders lined up against the U .N. coalition in the 
Gulf War. And HAMAS, the militant Palestinian group that continues 
carrying out suicide attacks in Israeli civic amenities, considers the territory 
oflsrael as Islamic land assigned to Muslims to the end of time. 
In the years since Islamists came to power in Iran and seized the American 
embassy, taking 52 hostages, their regime has slaughtered thousands of 
political opponents, fought a costly war with Iraq and wrecked the economy. 
Nevertheless, the late Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini; is admired by 
Islamist revolutionaries everywhere. 
When a group of army officers seized control of Sudan, they asked Tehran for 
assistance. Iran responded with tens of millions of dollar's worth of Chinese 
weapons and hundreds of Revolutionary Guards, sent to train the Sudanese 
military. Tehran also dispatched Majid Kamal as its ambassador to Sudan; he 
had helped in the takeover of the US embassy and assisted in developing 
Lebanon's Hizbullah terrorist group. Officials in neighboring countries of 
Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria complained that Sudan supports antigovernment 
terrorists in their countries with weapons, passports, funds, training and a safe 
haven. 
How could a faith famed for the brightness of its culture and the depth of its 
learning have been turned into a force for intolerance and violence? Islamists 
say, "Its [Islam] approach is all embracing .... It seeks to mould every aspect of 
life". Considered from that respect, it seems, the Islamic state bears a kind of 
resemblance to fascist and communist states. And although Islamists claim 
the Islamic state would not suppress individual liberty, their description of it 
appears to leave little room for individual expression or dissent. 
In their drive for power, Islamist militants adopt violent means. Although, in 
Algeria, the FIS distances itself from violence, other groups, aided by 
terrorists trained in Sudan, have ordered Westerners out of Algeria and killed 
those who haven't obeyed. 
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Algerians have borne the brunt of the slaughter: at least 150,000 have been 
killed in the past ten years.434 Militants have burned down establishments that 
served alcohol, ransacked beauty salons and destroyed satellite dishes that 
brought in foreign television. Women have been attacked for wearing Western 
clothes. Teenage girls have been killed for not wearing a veil. The Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) recently declared that education hinders the holy war 
and warned students and teachers to stay away from schools. To reinforce the 
warning, a university professor was shot dead just before classes were to 
begin. 
Once separated by geography and linguistic differences, militant Islamists are 
increasingly linked in what is "IslamNet" - a network where ideas and aid 
flow back and forth. Many Islamists believe that the liberation of Afghanistan 
and Kuwait was only an excuse to establish Western hegemony by dissolving 
the Arab and Islamic regimes and putting Israel in control of the region. If 
asked how Islamist governments should treat those of different faiths, they 
reply, "No-one should be punished for his religion", "but if he degrades other 
people's beliefs, he should be punished" .435 
In practice, militants (like the Tale ban and the Saudi religious police) 
routinely target those who deviate from fundamentalist orthodoxy. The 
majority of Muslim intellectuals maintain that the Islamists' doctrine is not a 
faith; it is a political ideology. They say "jihad is a religious duty to impose 
Islam in other people" .436 In fact, it really means 'to purify yourself. The 
Qur' an teaches us to look upon all human beings as equals, regardless of sex, 
religion, language or other difference. 
Radical Islamism flourishes where democracy does not exist. Authoritarian 
politics breed economic stagnation that makes attractive the simplest answers 
of the Islamists. Democracy will provide an outlet for people to feel they have 
influence on the government. Many Muslim moderates look to the West for 
434 B.B.C. World Service News, 8:00 am NZ Time, 29 May 2002. 
435 Reader's Digest, January 1995, p. 39. 
436 Ibid. p. 4. 
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encouragement. Instead, some in the West have recently suggested that 
moderate fundamentalism represents no real challenge. The Afghan War 
offers a cautionary lesson for those who downplay the ruthlessness of the 
Taleban and Al-Qaeda agenda. Years of U.S. support won Americans no 
friendship among the Islamist volunteers who fought against the Soviets. 
Many "Arab Afghans" who returned to their home countries after the conflict 
simply resumed the jihad against their own governments and the West. One of 
the supporters in the Afghan War against the Soviets, Saudi dissent Osama 
bin Ladden, wound up charged as a chief conspirator in the plot that blew up 
the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon on the 11th of September 
2001. Fifteen of the other 19 suicide bombers who hijacked the planes were 
Saudi nationals. 
The Islamists want the United States and the West to put pressure on their 
governments to legalize their parties. But once they are legalized, there will 
only be two parties in their minds: God's party and the Devil's party. Rather 
than supporting repressive regimes or courting the Islamists, Western 
governments should support Muslim moderates. If they fail to do so, they 
may contribute to bringing Islamists to power. 
Reasons of Islamist Discontent 
Many authors cite political factors, economic reasons, and alienation, 
urbanization and moral degradation brought about by rapid social change 
among the main reasons for the rise of Islamism. 
Politically they note, for example, that the intellectual leaders of Islamic 
movements have made Islam a political movement with a political 
vocabulary. In Egypt and North Africa, governments deliberately fostered 
Islamic groups to counteract Marxist influence among students. It is typical of 
outsiders to dismiss Muslim fundamentalists as politically rather than 
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religiously motivated. 437 Fred Halliday described both Iran's and Tunisia's 
Islamic movements as "a revolt against the intrusive secular state,"438 Leonard 
Binder has described the Islamic movements as "in a sense . . . an ideological 
dimension of the movement to restrict the power of the state".439 Francois 
Burgat describes Islamic fundamentalism as "more language than doctrine ... 
political ideology capable of resisting the great Western ideologies" .440 Some 
scholars have even gone so far as to describe the fundamentalists as "secular" 
in their basic orientation and goals, using elements of Islamic tradition like 
the veil of women as mere political symbols.441 
The description of Islamic fundamentalism as political certainly has its 
justification. After all, the goal of many fundamentalists is the Islamisation of 
society by seizure of government by "righteous" (i.e. fundamentalist) 
Muslims whether by coup or by democratic processes. 
It is perhaps not surprising that some have accused the Jamaat-i-Islami of 
being more interested in power than in religion. 442 
Economic reasons are also commonly cited as incentives to join Islamic 
movements. In Egypt, Sadat's "open door policy", which liberalized the 
economy by allowing foreign imports, is blamed for widening the gap 
between the rich and the poor and causing the lower middle classes to slip in 
the economic scale even as, through education, they seek to attain a higher 
social status. 443 Many observers speak of the professional frustrations of the 
437 Chartrad, Sabra, "The Veiled Look: It's Enforced with a Vengeance", New York Times, 
22 August 1991, p. A4. 
438 Halliday, fred, Tunisia's Uncertain Future, reprinted in The Renaissance Party in 
Tunisia: The Quest for Freedom and Democracy, a compilation of articles and 
documents put together by the Renaissance Party, Washington, D.C. 26 July 1991, pp. 
91-93. 
439 Binder, Leonard, Islamic Liberation: A Critique of Development Ideologies, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 16-17. 
440 Burgat, Francois, L 'islamisme au Maghreb: La voix du sud, Paris: Karthala, 1988, p. 70. 
441 Arkoun, Mohamed, "Algeria", in Shireen T. Hunter, ed., The Politics of Islamic 
Revivalism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 184. 
442 Duncan, Emma, Breaking the Curfew: A Political journey Through Pakistan, London: 
Michael Joseph, 1989, p. 225. 
443 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Contemporary Islamic Fundamentalism: A Quest for 
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educated members of the lower middle class, who often were educated at 
considerable cost to their families in the hope of upward social mobility. 
James Rupert describes Islamist students in Tunisia as "would-be 
professionals- engineers, lawyers, doctors" who "are alarmed at the bleak 
futures they face in Tunisia, where economic development has stagnated and 
prospects for climbing into the country's elite classes seem slight". 444 Norma 
Salem comments, "These are the young upwardly mobile professionals 
('yuppies') oflslamic Third World, caught in a bottleneck".445 
In all cases, there are problems of uneven development. In every single-
country study, major problems that seem to issue in Islamist movements stem 
from the fact that the development of education, made available at the highest 
level to all who are qualified, has far outpaced developments on the economic 
and political levels. The Arabisation of the educational system, for 
nationalistic reasons, was not reflected in a corresponding Arabisation of 
public administration and the state sector of the economy, with the result that 
large numbers of university graduates could not find employment. Similar 
problems may be found in all of the countries under study. All of these 
countries have a proliferation of higher degrees and insufficient job 
opportunities for those who have earned them. In Pakistan, the government 
tries to solve the problem of unemployment by establishing more colleges and 
liberalizing admissions criterion, thereby generating yet more people with 
advanced degrees and perpetuating the problem.446 Actual class affiliation is 
not as important for the rise of Islamism as "an incongruity between high 
aspirations and the decrease in economic and political opportunities".447 
Understanding", unpublished paper, quoted in Nemat Guenena, The "Jihad": An 
"Islamic Alternative" in Egypt, Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol 9, monograph 2, 
Cairo: American University in Cairo, 1986, pp. 77-78 
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445 Salem, Norma, "Tunisia", in Hunter, The Politics of Islamic Revivalism, 1988, p. 160. 
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Others reject these explanations. To reduce Islamism to economic desperation 
is simplistic, and does not take into account the subjective factor. People don't 
come to Islam as an alternative to their social ills. People come to Islam in 
response to a call, which goes very deep into the human spirit. Some scholars 
also find the reduction of Islamic fundamentalism to political and economic 
causes unsatisfying. Chris Eccel believes this rationale reduces the Islamists 
to "near automata, angry blisters on the body politic reacting to socio-
. · · ,, 448 economic irritants . 
Indeed, one must ask, why should the economic bottleneck and lack of 
legitimate political expression result in the appeal of Islamism rather than 
some other form of protest? And why does it appeal particularly to students 
and graduates in the sciences? Why does it appeal to so many women? 
In a perspective article on the Islamic movement in Tunisia, Susan Waltz 
analyses the economic and political argument for the appeal of Islamic 
fundamentalism, and finds both these theses unconvincing. Likewise, it is 
unconvincing to argue that women are involved in the movement because of 
economic and political frustrations, when the movement itself advocates 
restricting women from the public sphere, in contrast to the major strides that 
late President Bourghuiba made on behalf of women in that country. Instead, 
Waltz feels that "an explanation that puts primary emphasis on psycho-social 
l. . . 11· " 449 a 1enat1on 1s more compe mg . 
What is the nature of this psychological alienation? One fact stands out in all 
of the countries under study: Islamism is primarily a revolt of young people 
who are caught between a traditional past and a higher secular education with 
all its implications of Western intellectual impact and contact with the 
materialistically oriented culture of the modern urban environment. The 
contradiction from the values learned from the past and the realities of the 
present confront young people with bewildering contradictions and often a 
448 Eccel, A. Chris, "Alim and Mujahid in Egypt: Orthodox versus Subculture, or Division 
of Labour?" Muslim World 78, 1988: 203. 
449 Walz, Susan, "lslamist Appeal in Tunisia", Middle East Journal 40, 1986, pp. 662-65. 
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multitude of moral choices that create a sense of anxiety, loneliness, and 
disorientation. 
Rapid urbanization has been a pervasive phenomenon in all countries under 
discussion for at least the last thirty years. Urbanization has contributed to the 
rise of Islamism in a number of ways: (a) it is partly an expression of 
disappointment of the hopes engendered by the move to the city; (b) it is 
partly a result of the increased facility of communications made possible in an 
urban environment; and it is a result of the perception of moral corruption in 
the urban environment compared with the more traditional and socially 
cohesive village environment. The abrupt, uncontrolled migration into the 
cities created sprawling shantytowns. These, in tum, produced a vast array of 
new social problems- prostitution, alcoholism, drug addiction, delinquency, 
suicides, and crime. The Islamists saw these social problems not as the result 
of rapid urbanization, industrialization and uneven development, but as 
caused by simple moral laxity. The solution, they say, is the strict enforcement 
of the Shari'a. Unplanned and rapid urbanization in early industrial England 
inspired John Wesley and his Methodist movement. "In contemporary Iran, 
the same pressures helped create the Khomeini phenomenon and the Islamic 
Revolution" .450 
Whether the discussion concerns politics, economics, or the social disruption 
brought about by rapid urbanization, the problems are perceived by the 
Islamists to be ultimately moral in nature. 
The proliferation of luxury goods is commonly interpreted as moral 
degradation.451 The acquisition of luxury items, particularly in a context of 
surrounding poverty, is regarded as immoral; it has also being seen how rapid 
450 Abrahamian, Evrand, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton: Princeton Universiy 
Press, 1982, pp. 473-74. 
451 Yaldin, Rivka, "Militant Islam in Egypt: Some Socio-cultural Aspects", in Gabriel R. 
Warburg and Uri M. Kupferschmidt, eds., Islam, Nationalism, and Radicalism in Egypt 
and the Sudan, New York: Praegar, 1983, p. 171. 
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urbanization and sudden introduction into this urban environment contribute 
to perceptions of moral degradation. The transformation of the family in this 
way was traumatizing for the women, who felt confused as to their own 
personal identity. Joining an Islamic movement and donning Islamic dress 
was seen as a solution to an inner struggle. 
The foregoing discussion leads naturally to the question of the attraction of 
the Islamic movement for women. Why would women join a movement that 
often explicitly seeks to limit their economic and political opportunities and 
general freedom of movement? Islamist mobilization touches perhaps as 
many women as men, without seriously or systematically restricting their 
freedom of action. This indeed appears to be the case with many of the 
mainline university-based movements like al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and the 
MTI (Islamic Movement Tendency) of Tunisia. Many of their women, like 
their men, are single young professionals or students aiming toward a career 
in medicine or the sciences. The MTI boasts in its literature of the large 
numbers of women in its ranks, who are Islamic activists in their own right. 
Women themselves, both within the Islamic movement and outside, are 
divided over whether Islam permits women to work outside the home.452 
Arlene MacLeod's own interviews with single young fundamentalist women 
in Cairo revealed that, although they were studying for some of the most 
prestigious careers of their society, they intended to cease working once they 
married or had children. 
However, the experience of most women in the middle and lower classes of 
contemporary urban Egypt and, most likely, the other countries under study as 
well, is that they are unable to give up their employment once they marry or 
have children. The economic problems discussed earlier force women in this 
social class in particular to work in order to help provide for their families, 
especially their children. The double burden of working outside the home and 
452 Macleod, Arlene Elowe, Accommodating Protest: Working Women, the New Veiling and 
Change in Cairo, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 93. 
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continuing to assume sole responsibility for care of the house and children 
leaves most women exhausted and resentful, particularly because their jobs 
are not rewarding or fulfilling. 
Women often stress that in Islam the man should provide financially for the 
household and the woman has no such responsibility, a point often 
emphasized by the fundamentalists as a major benefit Islam gives to women, 
and women are resentful that the circumstances of their lives do not allow 
them to avail themselves of this right. In light of these social realities, it is 
surprising that many women are far from dismayed when Islamists insist that 
woman's place is in the home? Macleod says that the resort to veiling, which 
since the course of the 1980s came to be embraced by some three-quarters of 
the women of this class in Cairo, is a way of reconciling the incompatibility 
of cultural gender norms with the realities of workingwomen. The veil 
defuses the conflict working women feel by asserting the primacy of 
traditional roles. Women, too, feel a loss of dignity and identity in the modern 
urban world, and "the veil is a symbolic remembering which seeks to recover 
this lost dignity and place". As one woman said, "It says that I am a good 
woman, and if they are a good man, they will see that it is right that they treat 
me with dignity".453 
Single women also wear Islamic dress in search of dignity, especially because 
in the cities of the contemporary Muslim world women who walk in the 
streets or ride public transportation in Western dress are subjected to verbal 
and physical harassment. In Muslim societies, for women in particular, 
personal morality is judged mainly by the manner of dress. The woman who 
wears Islamic dress has freedom of movement that other women do not have. 
Most of the women in Egypt wearing Islamic dress today are not actually 
members of an Islamic group, particularly since Islamic dress has become 
fashionable since the 1980s. Macleod reports that Islamist groups are 
453 Ibid. pp. 121, 133, 136. 
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typically regarded as political organizations rather than genuinely religious, 
and are best avoided. 454 
Yet with some Tunisian fundamentalist women, it is the group itself that is the 
attraction, offering a network of friends and a common cause. At weekly 
meetings at the mosque, those with needs are prayed for, and money is 
collected to help out those among them who are in need. 
The Islamic movement often sends a mixed message to women about the 
roles they should play in society. Although many of their male leaders say that 
a woman's place is in the home, others emphasize the dynamic nature of 
Islamic female activism. This contradiction may be observed in Iran, where 
during the revolution women were encouraged to be inspired by the 
revolutionary example of the Prophet's granddaughter Zaynab and even of a 
reinterpreted Fatima, the Prophet's daughter, as an untiring fighter for social 
justice, but after the revolution the more submissive and domesticated aspects 
of Fatima's character have been emphasized as a model for women.455 Zaynab 
al-Ghazali, the leading woman of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
embodies these contradictions in her own life and writings. In her capacity as 
editor of the women's section of Al-Da 'wa magazine in 1981, she wrote that 
it is contrary to a woman's nature to work outside the home, and that a 
woman's first duty is to be a wife and a mother. "The family comes first. If an 
urgent need arises, then work, in education until you marry; and then work 
stops, except in absolute necessity .... Learn, and earn the highest degrees of 
learning. That is not too precious to be spent in raising a Qur' anic generation 
of which we are in the greatest need. Return, my dear, to the house. Stay in 
your home and obey your husband. You will be rewarded for your obedience 
to your Prophet and to him".456 
The Islamist woman is a militant for a cause, and she leaves the usual role of 
women in society. They see their devotion to the Islamic cause as 
454 Ibid. pp. 40-41. 
455 Ibid. p. 78. 
456 Al-Ghazali, Zaynab, "Al-mara' '1-muslima" (The Muslim Woman), Al- Da 'wa, January 
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transcending the boundaries of traditional gender-role definitions. Many of 
the more devoted propagandists felt that they needed to continue to work 
outside the home in order to devote them to spreading the message of Islam 
rather than being removed and isolated from life. 
These pressures have already led to the adoption of a stronger, defensive 
stance by women in societies in which Islamic movements have been strong. 
In Algeria, for example, women's associations have regularly protested 
against the lack of an official defence of their rights. Large numbers of 
women have nevertheless also been joining Islamic movements, in reflection 
of the continuing ambivalence about women's roles in Maghrebi society. Like 
many of their male contemporaries, the absence of alternatives enhanced the 
appeal of Islamic movements that, if limiting in some respects, have offered a 
sense of dignity and purpose with which to face an uncertain future. 
Who Is Attracted to Islamist Message? 
In his book Islam in Revolution, R. H. Dekmejian devotes a few pages to a 
psychological profile of the muta 'assib, the Arabic Muslim "fanatic" or 
religious extremist. He lists a number of features: alienation, dogmatism, an 
inferiority complex that resolves itself in an assertion of superiority, 
activism/aggressiveness, authoritarianism, intolerance, paranoia, idealism, 
austerity, obedience, conformity, and conspiratorial tendencies.457 
"It is sometimes assumed in social science that joiners of 'radical movements' 
must be somewhat alienated, marginal, anomic, or possess some other 
abnormal condition", writes Saad Eddin Ibrahim. "Most of the ones we 
investigated would be normally considered as ideal or model young 
Egyptians".458 His study of incarcerated members of two Egyptian groups, the 
457 Dekmejian, R. Hrair, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World; 
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985, pp. 32-36. 
458 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Groups", International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 12, 1980, p. 440. 
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Shabab Muhammad, (Military Academy Group) and the Takfir wa 'l Hijra 
group, challenged descriptions oflslamists as "acutely alienated".459 
However, it would be incorrect to assume that these young men, who in some 
sense had succeeded according to society's standards, especially in its 
educational system, were not alienated. How much more acute an alienation 
from society is there than to declare it all so irretrievably corrupt as to 
necessitate complete withdrawal from it? 
Let us therefore examine the social characteristics of the thirty-four men 
interviewed in Ibrahim's study. Both groups recruited followers mainly from 
among students or recent university graduates, employing kinship, friendship, 
and mosque attendance as mechanisms. 
Ibrahim concludes that the class affiliation of most members of these militant 
Islamic groups is middle and lower middle class. The militants were much 
better educated than their parents; all but five were university graduates or 
enrolled in the university at the time of their arrest, and the rest had a 
secondary school education. A preponderance of the students and graduates 
were in the academically most competitive fields of science, medicine and 
engineering. They were, therefore, "decidedly high on both motivation and 
achievement." Most militants came from normal, cohesive families that had 
not experience any major trauma such as death of a parent or divorce.460 
The Renaissance Party of Tunisia (formerly the Movement de Tendance 
Islamique [MTI]) revealed a profile in many ways remarkably similar, 
although the MTI, a student-based movement modeled on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, is less extremist in its methods than either of the groups studied 
by Ibrahim. The membership included a large number of women. Although 
the members lived in urban centers at the time of the study, a large percentage 
was of rural origin. Other studies corroborate the observation made by 
Ibrahim in Egypt, that the majority of the students in the movement are in the 
459 Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, 1985, p. 33. 
460 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Islamic Militancy as a Social Movement: The Case of Two 
Groups in Egypt", in Ali E. Milla! Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, 
New York: Praegar, 1982, pp. 128-31. 
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most prestigious and competitive faculties of medicine, science and 
engineering. 461 
In Algeria, the Islamic movement is strongly based in the large towns and 
cities, where the FIS garnered its share of the vote in the June 1990 elections, 
which enabled it to take control of municipal government in many parts of 
Algeria. The FIS drew its recruits from students and university graduates 
originating mainly from the south and mountainous regions of the country, as 
well as the urban poor. 462 
The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan has, much more than the MTI, consciously 
aimed at recruiting its members from the intelligentsia, in the belief that the 
"good-natured elements" of society would be attracted to them, ultimately 
bringing about a "revolutionary change" in the "mental makeup" of the 
people at large. Given this goal of elitist recruitment, it is ironic that the 
Jamaat-i-Islami is a broader-based movement than either of Ibrahim's groups 
or the MTI of Tunisia. Its backbone is the lower sections of the new middle 
class and the traditional petite bourgeoisie. While students have not been the 
majority of members, the student wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami has been critical 
in penetrating the mosques and madrasas and mobilizing people for street 
demonstrations. Although the Jamaat-i-Islami has not been successful in 
national elections, the student wing has successfully captured the student 
unions of all major universities. In fact, during the period from 1977 to 1982, 
they "enjoyed almost complete veto power in most of Pakistan's twenty 
universities in matters of student's admissions and faculty appointments and 
promotions'. 463 
461 Walz, Susan; Islamic Appeal in Tunisia, Middle East Journal 40, 1986, pp. 651-70. 
462 Entelis, John, Islamism and the State in the Maghreb: From Conciliation (Algeria) to 
Containment (Morocco) to Crackdown (Tunisia):, paper presented at Workshop on 
Muslim Fundamentalism in the Maghreb, Council on Foreign Relations, New York 
City, 5 June 1991. 
463 Ahmad, Mumtaz, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jammat-I-Islami and the 
Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia", in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. 
Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 483. 
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Like the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya of Egypt, the 
Jamaat-I-Islami of Pakistan has succeeded in reorienting much of Islamic 
thought toward making Islam a political ideology. Unlike the Takfir wa'l 
Hijra group, the Pakistani Islamic movement does not exist on the fringe- it is 
very much in the mainstream of Islamic religious thought.464 In fact, the 
Takfir wa'l Hijra group is an exception to the larger process of the 
mainstreaming of the Islamic movement in Egypt.465 By the late 1980s, much 
of the vocabulary and thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood had become 
accepted on a large scale throughout Egyptian society. 
In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini ultimately garnered the support of all classes of 
society in a mass popular revolution against the Shah.466 However, looking at 
the original supporters and backbone of the movement, one can discern two 
distinct groups; one the traditional classes of small landowners and merchants 
led by the clerics, particularly Khomeini, and the other [ a mass] professionals 
and university graduates who were primarily inspired by Shari'ati. Shari'ati's 
political formation was through involvement in the liberation movement, a 
religious and political group founded in the early 1960s by Mehdi Bazargan, a 
civil engineer who was later to head the provisional government established 
after the revolution, and Hojjatalislam (later Ayatollah) Mahmud Taleqani, a 
cleric who studied at the famous Fayzieh madrasa in Qum. The other leaders 
of the movement were all well educated professionals, mainly in the sciences, 
medicine, and engineering. Abrahmian attributes the success of the movement 
partly to the close links it established with Khomeini, and partly to 
Bazargan's and Taleqani's ability to attract young professionals and radical 
technocrats, who sought to synthesize Islam and Western science.467 
464 Ibid. p. 501 
465 Voll, John 0., "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan", in 
Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 376-90. 
466 The NZ Listener, 14 June 1980. p. 17. 
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Press, 1982, p. 459. 
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The Islamic guerrilla movement, the Mujahedin-e Khalq, drew its members 
mainly from students in the physical sciences, whereas the Marxist Feda'i 
guerrillas were drawn from students in the humanities and social sciences. 
Many Mujahedin came from the traditional (and traditionally religious) 
middle class, whereas the Feda'is came from the new middle class of secular 
minded teachers, civil servants, and professionals. Among the dead guerrillas 
on whom social data were available, there were three times as many women 
among the Feda'is as among the Mujahedin.468 
A consistent pattern emerges, across all these different countries, of Islamists 
drawing heavily from students and university graduates in the physical 
sciences, usually student with rural or traditionally religious backgrounds. 
These movements seem to attract the recent beneficiaries of the expanded 
university systems [in all] of these countries, people who have, therefore, 
likely made recent adjustments to a modern urban intellectual and cultural 
environment after being raised in a fairly traditional milieu. 
The smaller, clandestine and violent groups tend to be heavily male, while the 
more mainstream groups with large student recruitments often draw 
considerable members of women. The exception is the Takfir wa'l Hijra 
group, which, despite its extremist nature and its very conservative 
perspective on the need for women to remain in the home, recruited large 
numbers of women to serve as the wives of their men. 
In none of these countries, with the exception of Iran at the end of its 
revolution, did the Islamists succeed in drawing the mainstream of traditional 
society. It is significant that despite the claims of the Renaissance Party of 
Tunisia (the former MTI) to champion the rights of the oppressed, the 
infamous bread riots of 1984 took place largely without the participation or 
instigation of the Islamists. The Renaissance Party and the Jamaat-I-Islami 
have both recognized these deficiencies in their recruitment and have made 
efforts to actively support the more bread-and butter interests of the poor, but 
468 Ibid. p 491. 
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in fact the backbone of the Islamist movements in all countries has been 
largely the intelligentsia of middle - or lower-middle class backgrounds. 
Are Islamists Monolithic? 
It is unwise to generalize about the various Islamic fundamentalisms spanning 
an arc from Morocco to the Gulf Emirates. The diverse Muslim responses to 
the 1991 Gulf crisis dispelled any lingering notions of a monolithic "political 
Islam". Nonetheless, one may expect that in the 21st Century 'the Islamic 
current' will gain prominence in shaping the social and political order in the 
Middle East and North Africa. 
But, American University political scientist Amos Perlmutter, writing in the 
Washington Post, sounded the alarm bell loudest. For Perlmutter, no 
distinctions need be made among Islamic movements around the world. 
"Islamic fundamentalism of the Sunni or Shia variety in Iran, Iraq, Egypt, 
Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, the Maghreb and also Algeria is not merely 
resistant to democracy but wholly contemptuous and hostile to the entire 
democratic political culture". It is "an aggressive revolutionary movement as 
militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, and Nazi movements of the 
past". He tipped his hand by asserting in the same editorial that the world's 
more than a billion Muslims should be viewed as one monolithic force. "The 
issue is not democracy but the true nature of Islam," he wrote. "Is Islam, 
fundamentalist or otherwise, compatible with liberal human-rights oriented 
Western-style representative democracy? The answer is an emphatic 'no"'.469 
However, Perlmutter's diatribe against Islamic politics obscures rather than 
clarifies matters. It is possible and even likely that the Algerian supporters of 
the FIS are motivated more by a passion for Islam than for democracy, and 
are not preoccupied with working out a long-term alliance between the two. 
469 The Washington Post, Editorial, February 19, 1992. 
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But such an alliance is not out of the question. The Quran and the Shari'a 
provide a socio-moral framework rather than a detailed blueprint for the 
political order, and they allow a measure of adaptation and flexibility in state 
building, as Islam's history demonstrates. Islamists have made great demands 
on their governments without yet developing coherent and sophisticated 
alternative economic and social policies. Up to this point they stressed 
cultural and political authenticity and self-reliance. But the quest for 
sovereignty and self-reliance does not rule out a gradual process of 
incorporation and "Islamisation" of Western structures and mechanisms, 
including mass participation in democratic procedures. Indeed, this pattern 
marks the Islamists' appropriation of Western science and technology. The 
incorporation of these tools into Islamic culture is described as an act of 
'repossession' of a mode of discourse and production that originated, the 
Islamists claim, in the golden age of Islamic civilization. 
Precisely because Islamism is not monolithic, one may hope that its every 
manifestation will not repeat the experiences of revolutionary Iran and the 
Sudan. Certainly the Algerian case, which is linked to an inchoate process of 
democratization, offers the possibility that the Islamists will in this instance 
retrieve and even develop Islam's traditional practice of respecting the rights 
of non-Muslims in an Islamic society. 
Islamists of various stripes do seek to establish the Shari' a as the explicit, 
comprehensive and exclusive legal basis for society- a goal not shared by the 
vast majority of Muslims. But their common commitment to the political and 
social implementation of Islamic law does not lead all Islamists down the 
same path. Like any complex legal code developed over time, the Shari's 
admits of many interpretations and diverse applications, each of which is 
unavoidably selective. Even "progressives" have styled themselves as 
fundamentalists dedicated to the proper interpretation and application of the 
Shari'a. 
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Of course, the possibility of a "progressive" fundamentalism does not ensure 
the existence of one. If the Islamists do win in Algeria, despite the repression, 
they may or may not behave in accord with the best interests either of the 
West or the Algerian people. But there is more than one way to implement the 
Islamic law. The situation may allow or necessitate the kind of shrewd 
compromise with secular governments and economies that has characterized 
the "conservative fundamentalist" monarchy in Saudi Arabia - now 
increasingly opposed by home-grown radical Islamists such as Osama Bin 
Ladin, incited by the presence of Christian and especially Jewish soldiers in 
the Muslim holy land during the gulf crisis. Or the situation in Algeria may 
eventually approximate that of Egypt, in which lip service; public ceremony, 
co-opted senior ulama (men of religion), and occasional deferential rulings of 
secular courts serve as a panacea in lieu of the actual implementation of 
Islamic law. Because either of these options stands a better chance of 
preventing large-scale North African emigration to Europe, either seems 
preferable to the importation of Iranian-style theocracy, backed by Iranian-
style patronage, to Algeria or to neighboring and now very nervous Tunisia 
and Morocco. 
Egypt allows many levels and varieties of Islamic fundamentalism within its 
borders. However, in the 50 years since the Free Officers Revolution brought 
Nasser to power, the secularized military state has perfected the art of 
constraining and containing Islamic militancy. It has done this in the Mubarak 
years by a sophisticated policy combining partial appeasement, co-optation, 
ruthless repression, constant surveillance and infiltration of radical cells, and 
a crushing monopoly over the media. 
In what seems to some observers like more than a last-ditch effort to retain 
control of civil society, and also a response to pressure from the West and 
from internal opponents, the ruling elites in Egypt and Algeria embarked 
cautiously on a perilous road of reform touted as "liberalization" or 
"democratization". As the developments in Algeria suggest, that road has 
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many detours and dead ends. One possibility is that fundamentalists will 
prove adaptive enough to succeed in democratic politics. 
Every major war in the Middle East has occasioned an inward turning, a time 
for repentance and soul-searching on the part of the vanquished.470 But shared 
ethnicity and language could not transcend national self-interest; neither could 
the now exhausted utopian secular political philosophies. This is, of course, 
what the Islamists have been predicting all along. Naturally, they feel that 
prophecy is fulfilled and the moment come for the rebirth of the one 
indigenous glory of their homeland, Islam. For the Islamists, Islam is the only 
force capable of transcending ethnic, linguistic and cultural barriers to unify 
the disparate peoples of the worldwide Islamic community (puma). In 
Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Kuwait, Islamists press demands with a 
renewed vigor and sense of purpose. 
Yet the Islamists are learning that a divine mandate to rule does not make the 
social and economic problems to the umma less intractable. The mantle of 
political power has not seemed to fit comfortably over the mantle of the 
Prophet in Iran, where the Shi'ite (and Persian) militancy was and is more 
purely consolidated than in Sunni Islam; or in the Sudan, where a makeshift 
Islam is a thin and unconvincing embellishment of despotic rule. If "Islam is 
the solution" in Algeria, it must be prepared to tackle billions of dollars of 
foreign debt, a high rate of unemployment, and severe shortages of health 
services and housing. And it must do so while avoiding charging riba 
(interest) and dealing with the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank- Western institutions that do not honor the economic prescription and 
proscriptions oflslamic law. To study comparatively, the 'Islamic economics' 
in the four nations in which Islamists have striven to implement the Shari'a-
Iran, Pakistan, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia- demonstrates a wide and often 
inconsistent variety of practices in fulfillment of the religiously mandated 
470 Sisk, T. D., Islam and Democracy, 1992, p. 52. 
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zakat (voluntary tax system) and the religiously proscribed charging of 
interest. 
Should they come to power in Egypt and Northern Africa, a region with a 
rapidly growing population and a food shortage, the Islamists may find it 
impossible to resist the temptation to make accommodation with the 
industrialized West. For example, after the IMF recognized Egypt's 
achievement of the short-term reforms it had demanded, including the painful 
accelerated privatization of the public sector, accompanied by rising interest 
rates and consumer prices, the IMF signed an agreement with Egypt in May 
1991 awarding Cairo millions in aid. 
Conclusion 
It might well be that the very elasticity of Islamic fundamentalism will keep 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and other Arab nations within its orbit for some time 
to come. The dramatically different outcomes of the Islamisation programs in 
countries as ethnically and linguistically diverse as Pakistan, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and the Sudan suggest that the history, social outlook and cultural 
patterns of the peoples who follow the Shari'a contribute at least as much as 
the law itself to the character and direction of an Islamic society. If this is so, 
then "the Arab problem" may eventually admit of several "Islamic solutions". 
Palestinian Islamists 
As the first assessments of Islamic activities in the 1980s, and 1990s appear, it 
becomes necessary to organize and analyze information regarding the 
Palestinian case in order to illustrate its specificity. By the end of the 1970s, 
Western observers of Islam had learned, finally, to talk about "the Islams" in 
the plural. But, some continue today to fall into the trap of speaking of 
"Islamic fundamentalism" or "Islamism" in the singular, as if it too were 
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monolithic and easily categorized. In the 21st century, we are forced to 
acknowledge that "Islamic fundamentalism" must be rendered in the plural, 
not only between given countries, but in most cases, within the same national 
and regional context. 
In terms of general trends there is a difference, for example, between the 
phenomenon of "Islamisation from above" (to use Gilles Kepel's term) or 
"revolutionary Islamism"(to use Olivier Roy's term) on the one hand, and the 
phenomenon of "Islamisation from below", or "neo-fundamentalism", on the 
other.471 In the first configuration, the priority is to overthrow the state 
through violent action (e.g. the Iranian model). In this program of action 
Islamisation requires and is conditioned by the fall of tyrants. In the second 
configuration, Islamists set out to establish and organize "Islamised spaces" in 
society. They do so with the intent of obtaining from the state the 
acknowledgement of these spaces and their extension to the whole of society. 
In the Palestinian case, the two Islamisms are easily identifiable. The 
movements of Islamic Jihad correspond to revolutionary Islamism and seek to 
overthrow Israeli occupation to bring about a Palestinian state. For this trend, 
the successful struggle for liberation constitutes the condition of a real re-
Islamisation of Palestine. By contrast, the different movements of the Muslim 
Brotherhood type reflect the model of re-Islamisation from below. There 
groups have been interested in taking advantage of their quasi-immunity, a 
fruit of their abstention from the liberation fight, in order to pursue an 
authoritarian religious re-socialization within the occupied territories. 
The present study identifies the ideology, the behavior, the organizational 
structures, and the actors of each of these waves of Palestinian political Islam 
by comparing them before and after the onset of the Intifada in December 
1987. 
471 Kepel, Gilles, The revenge of God, Paris: Le Seuil, 1990; and Roy, Olivier, Failure of 
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The Evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood 
The pre-1948 period 
The first Muslim Brotherhood group formed in Palestine was established in 
Jerusalem in 1946472 and was endorsed by the Palestinian nationalist leader, 
Musa al-Husseini. Later in that year other groups were established in Jaffa, 
Lydda, Haifa, Nablus, and Tulkarem.473 The movement was welcomed by the 
Nationalists as an ally in the liberation struggle against the Zionist and British 
mandate forces. The Muslim Brotherhood participated in the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war despite some initial opposition from Arab governments. Muslim 
Brotherhood volunteers found themselves fighting alongside the regular 
forces of the Arab armies. Hassan el-Banna, leader and founder of the 
movement, dispatched three brigades of volunteers from Egypt into Palestine 
to help the Palestinians in their struggle.474 These forces were further 
strengthened by local Palestinian volunteers. The brotherhoods in Jordan and 
Syria also dispatched small groups of volunteers to fight in Palestine. 
The 1949-67 period 
The performance of the Brotherhood-led volunteers in the 1948 war drew 
many Palestinian Muslims into their ranks in the aftermath of al-nakbah (the 
'catastrophe'). Palestinians who joined the brotherhood and lived in or sought 
refuge in the territories of Palestine administered by Jordan and Egypt 
experienced quite different conditions under the two administering 
authorities. This was to have a quite significant impact on the development of 
both Arab national political organizations and the Muslim brotherhood in the 
two territories. 
472 Cohen, Ammon, Political Parties in the West Bank Under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-
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The Egyptian authorities in Gaza pursued a policy towards the Muslim 
Brotherhood that essentially reflected the Egyptian government's attitude 
towards its own Muslim Brotherhood. During the first three years of Egyptian 
rule in Gaza ( 1949-52), when the brotherhood was banned outright, they 
operated clandestinely. Then from 1952-54, the first two years of the Egyptian 
revolution, the Brotherhood was to enjoy a fairly close relationship with the 
authorities. In the open atmosphere immediately following the revolution, 
their activities and membership grew substantially. 
In 1954 when the movement was banned again after the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt attempted to assassinate President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, its 
activities in Gaza were forced underground for a second time. During the 
1956 Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip subsequent to its invasion at Suez, 
the Muslim Brotherhood was to advocate armed struggle against the 
occupation. This was to bring it into direct conflict with the Communist Party, 
which advocated more passive forms of resistance. From 1954 onwards, the 
Muslim Brotherhood formed a series of clandestine groups to carry out armed 
actions against Israel. Members of these heavily armed groups joined FATAH 
years later and are currently senior PLO leaders. 
Unlike their colleagues in Gaza and in other countries, the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement in the West bank did not use violence across the 
border against Israel. Its activities were confined to the teaching of the 
movement's principles, the distribution of the movement's literature and 
social activity such as scouting and sport for the movement's youth. However, 
despite the Movement's fairly cordial relations with the authorities, it did 
criticize Jordan's close links with the West and occasionally came into 
conflict with the authorities over such aspects of its domestic policy as the use 
of alcohol and the state's liberal interpretation of Islam, particularly where 
this involved major deviations from the Sharia (Islamic law). The Jordanian 
regime in turn kept tight control over the Movement's activities and 
occasionally arrested leaders when it felt they were getting out of hand. 
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During the first ten years of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip (1967-76), Islam rarely constituted the primary principle of 
legitimization of the Palestinian struggle for liberation; rather, the fight was 
carried on almost exclusively in the name of pan-Arab or Palestinian 
nationalisms. The "official" Islam of the West Bank existed under the 
auspices of Jordan. In the Gaza Strip, the official administration of Islam 
proceeded under the auspices of autonomous associations, usually headed by 
graduates of the Egyptian al-Azhar University. In both cases, this Islamic 
leadership was content to restrict its activities to religious matters. 
The 1967-87 period 
Shortly after the Israeli occupation of the West bank and Gaza in 1967, armed 
resistance to Israeli occupation escalated significantly, reflecting the growing 
strength of the PLO in Jordan. However, with the expulsion of PLO forces 
from Jordan in 1970 and 1971, coupled with Israel's expulsion of the West 
bank leadership, armed resistance began to decline. By the mid- l 970s attacks 
from inside the occupied territories against Israel were very infrequent. 
Subsequently, there was a shift to a highly visible programme of political 
action in the occupied territories, sparked off by the participation of PLO 
supporters in the 1967 municipal elections of the West Bank. Throughout this 
phase the nationalist movement placed great emphasis on mass mobilization 
and on building educational and social institutions. 
The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West bank and Gaza Strip did not 
participate with the nationalist movement in armed resistance against Israeli 
occupation. During the first ten years of the occupation the Muslim 
Brotherhood maintained a low profile; they prudently chose not to challenge 
the nationalist movement, which enjoyed massive popular support. It was 
only after 1976 that the Brotherhood began to re-emerge as was evident in its 
recruitment activity and increased membership. This development was 
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substantially aided by the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle 
East region as a whole, particularly after the success of the Islamic revolution 
in Iran in 1979. Islamic fundamentalism- a response to imposed rule and 
political repression- then extended to both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
A survey conducted in 1984 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on political, 
social and religious change confirmed the existence of an Islamic revivalist 
trend in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, a trend, which increasingly 
manifested itself in the politicization of Islam and support for the Brotherhood 
and other Islamic organizations.475 The variables used to measure change of 
religious behavior to Islamic revivalism since 1978 were: the number of 
prayers performed each day, reading of the Holy Qur'an, Fasting during 
Ramadan, and the reading of religious literature. A significance feature of the 
analysis was that the survey data revealed that the Islamist trend was most 
evident among the youth and the college-educated. 
At the end of the 1970s a movement claiming to uphold the tradition of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, connected to its Egyptian and Jordanian branches, and 
financially supported by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, began to pursue the 
authoritarian re-Islamisation of the society. In Gaza especially, but also 
sporadically on the West Bank, the presence of these Muslim Brothers was 
felt when they conducted violent raids on "places of perdition" (bars, 
cinemas) and against a number of unveiled women, whom they considered a 
scandalous cause of public debauchery.476 Despite the radical nature of their 
discourse on the "Jewish entity", however, the Muslim Brotherhood did not 
openly confront the Israeli occupying forces during the decade that preceded 
the Intifada. 477 Rather, it limited its political activities to the struggle against 
the Palestinian Communist party in the name of fighting atheism. Fatah, the 
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main wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Jordan were 
happy to encourage this Islamist attack on the "Left", and Israel too had 
interest in encouraging divisions among the Palestinians. Exceptions to this 
general pattern occurred in 1984, Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, founder of the most 
important network of Islamic associations in the Gaza Strip, and several of his 
associates were arrested and convicted for having founded an armed cell 
aimed at the destruction of Israel. 
Structure of the Brotherhood Movement: 
Organization 
The Muslim Brotherhood movements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are 
independent of each other and have separate organizational structures. 
Although they share a similar ideological commitment to the movement as a 
whole, there has been no fusion of the two branches at any point during their 
histories. Before 1967 the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza was organized on 
lines somewhat parallel to those of the Brotherhood in Egypt, and both groups 
operated underground. The basic organizational unit was called usra (family) 
and a group of this unit formed shuba (branch), which is a gathering or 
meeting place. The highest structure of the movement, the General 
Administrative Center was composed of a committee, whose head was 
referred to as head of the center and was elected or chosen by shura 
( consultation). Since the movement was based in Gaza, the branch and the 
Center were for the most part nominal designations rather than actual 
structures performing specific functions within the movement.478 Since 1967, 
the Muslim Brotherhood movements in both the West Bank and Gaza have 
been operating underground and there is little if any reliable data on their 
current organizational position. However, their activities and the nature of 
their interaction with other groups indicate that there is no single leader for 
478 Abu 'Amr, Origins of Political Movements, op. cit. 1987, pp. 72-73. 
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the movement. Muslim Brotherhood authority is decentralized into districts, 
with major decisions taken collectively by the local leadership. This is an 
advantageous mode of operation in the light of the security risks involved 
under occupation. This modus operandi does not hamper the close 
coordination between the various districts in major functions and activities. 
The informal aspects of their organizational activities are at least as important 
as their formal activities. They maintain a network of close relations with 
important individuals in the community; these include prominent independent 
religious personalities, traditional leaders outside the nationalist movement 
and wealthy business personalities. The importance of their links lies in the 
fact that religious contacts help convey the impression that the Brotherhood's 
activities are motivated by community interests based on Islamic ethical 
values, and the movement's political and business contacts help them gain 
wider acceptability and credibility in the community. In return for support, the 
Brotherhood will immediately come to the defense of its network allies 
whenever nationalist groups for their anti-nationalist political positions and 
behavior criticize them. The Brotherhood coordinates closely with this 
network on various community issues, this leads occasionally to the formation 
of a list to challenge the nationalists at the elections of local institutions such 
as charitable societies, public committees, unions, etc. 
Recruitment and Mass Mobilization 
Membership in the movement is divided into three levels. Full or active 
members are the highly committed cores who make the pledge to constantly 
promote the call (dawa) of the Muslim Brotherhood, to undertake jihad (holy 
struggle) in the name, to heed, obey and have full faith in the leadership. A 
second level, participating members, express their desire to join the 
movement and seek to show through their involvement that they are worthy 
of full membership (participating members consist primarily of college and 
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high school students). Finally, supporting members (muazzer) are not required 
to make any formal commitment or to state their intentions of joining. They 
are merely supporters of the movement through their activity and financial 
support. 
The Brotherhood is keen to convey the impression that it is a strong, credible 
advocate of Islam and has mass support. The threat of violence is often used 
to secure the permission required to hold public functions on university 
campuses in the late morning hours when most students are on campus, thus 
allowing it to receive maximum exposure from a largely captive student 
audience. These are effective organizational tools, particularly in a society 
that tends to be religiously orientated. Its cultural educational and social 
programmes are carried out primarily for the purpose of mass mobilization. 
Funding 
The activities and programmes of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the 
West Bank and Gaza seem to be well financed although there is little 
information on its funding sources or on the amounts received. 
Membership dues or donations and local fund-raising functions can generate 
only a limited volume of funds, and since the movement does not own or 
control financial or large commercial institutions in the West Bank and Gaza, 
it is therefore dependent on external sources of finance to generate the 
necessary funds for its programmes. One can reasonably ascertain that its 
funds are obtained from the following sources: 
The local zakat (tithes) committees: These collect tithes and charity donations 
from the community and use the funds for local charity or social services. The 
Brotherhood maintains close relations with these committees, and 
brotherhood members usually serve on them. The Muslim Brotherhood 
receives contributions for some of its projects from this source, for 
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expenditure on student scholarships, etc. Furthermore, some of its projects are 
implemented through the zakat committees. 
Wealthy zakat committees in the Gulf States: These committees, particularly in 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, are favorably disposed to Islamic-oriented projects 
in the occupied territories. In periodic fund-raising trips to the Gulf, the 
Brotherhood secure from committees funding for specific projects, such as the 
building of a mosque. 
The Government of Saudi Arabia: The Muslim Brotherhood movement has 
always maintained good relations with the Saudi monarchy, which has 
provided financial support for the movement in the past.479 Reliable data on 
the extent of the present financial support to the movement in the West bank 
and Gaza is not available. However, the fact that the Saudi government 
permits it to raise funds in Saudi Arabia is an indication of its support for the 
movement. 
Reports in the West Bank indicate that the movement also receives financial 
backing from the Jordanian government. Although these reports cannot be 
substantiated, the Jordanian government does facilitate fund-raising activities. 
Political Strategy 
The Brotherhood's political strategy in the West Bank and Gaza is clear as far 
as it relates to the solution of the Palestinian question. The Brotherhood 
considers all of Palestine ( the area occupied by Israel in 1948 and in 1967) as 
Islamic lands; the creation of a Jewish state in the area occupied in 1948 with 
3.5 million Jewish residents does not alter this view. The Brotherhood stresses 
that no one has any right to negotiate away a single inch of Palestine.480 
479 Ibid. p. 70 
480 Palestine National Council, Al-Muntalak, Committee ofNajah National University 
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The idea of negotiating the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip or on parts larger than these areas is described as a 
betrayal of the cause; and the suggestion that the Palestinians should seek a 
compromise solution on the lines set out by the 1982 Arab summit conference 
in the form of the Fez peace plan is considered to be defeatism. While the 
Palestinian National Movement argues that time and objective conditions 
militate against the rejection of the peace plan, the Brotherhood stresses that 
such justifications are largely irrelevant given that Muslims succeeded in 
liberating Palestine after ninety-two years of occupation by the Crusaders in 
the twelfth century.481 It proposes an Islamic solution as an alternative. This 
proposal is premised on the following: 
Since efforts to resolve the Palestine issue have failed, the only viable 
alternative is to return to true Islam, which is the only effective tool in the war 
with Israel. The conflict is with an enemy that has utilized the weapon of a 
religious faith in its wars with the Palestinians; therefore the only effective 
response is to use Islam as a weapon in that conflict. 
Islam proved to be a successful weapon during the early period of Islam and 
later by the Ottomans in their conquests of parts of Europe and, therefore, 
there is nothing to be feared if Islam is resorted to as a weapon. 
If the Palestinians resort to Islam, there is sufficient evidence in the hadith 
(Prophet Muhammed's sayings) of the promise of victory.482 The practical 
steps that should be taken to achieve the Islamic solution include: 
The formation of a truly faithful and committed Muslim group within the 
Palestinian people; this group should have an understanding and awareness of 
the Palestine issue and of all the conspiracies against the Palestinian cause. 
Mosque: Nablus, January 1983, pp. 2-3 (in Arabic). 
481 Ibid. p. 2. 
482 Misha'!, Khalil, "The Islamic Solution and a Critique of the Proposed Solutions in the 
Palestinian Arena' in Muslim Palestine, Islamic Association of Palestinian Youth, n.p., 
n. d., pp. 56-67 (in Arabic). 
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This faithful group will expose the traitors, agents and proponents of 
nationalism and will bring about Palestinian awareness of the true nature of 
its battle with Zionism. 
The third step would be to carry to out an educational programme where the 
Palestinian masses will have full faith in God, and learn the full extent of the 
nature of this 'religious conflict with the Jews' .483 
The Brotherhood emphasizes that once the process of Islamic religious 
transformation in Palestine occurs and is accompanied by Islamic revivalism 
in the entire region, the battle for the liberation of Palestine begins, for the 
Palestinians alone will be unable to liberate Palestine, but they will be the 
spearhead in the battle. 484 
Undoubtedly the Muslim Brotherhood movements in the West Bank and Gaza 
perceive themselves as this select group of the faithful that will implement 
this strategy. They also justify the use of physical violence against their 
opponents, whether the enemy or fellow Palestinians. It can be easily 
observed that they identify the nationalist forces in the occupied territories as 
obstacles to their strategy; furthermore, their strategy does not call for 
confrontation or struggle against the occupation authorities and contains no 
transitional strategy for a prolonged occupation, given that it will take time 
for the movement to transform the Palestinian population into a true and fully 
observant Islamic society. 
Relations with other actors 
The Israeli occupation authorities 
The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Israeli occupation 
authorities in the West Bank and Gaza is a pragmatic one. Each behaves 
483 Ibid. p. 59. 
484 Ibid. 
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towards the other rationally and within the dictates of its own interest. The 
Muslim Brotherhood abhors the Israeli presence in the West Ban and Gaza as 
well as within the green line. They reject any contact with any Israeli 
elements, be it of the peace camp or otherwise. They criticize bitterly 
Palestinians who maintain contacts with Israeli peace groups. Their long-term 
strategy is to dismantle Israel as a Zionist or a Jewish state and to establish an 
Islamic state in all of Palestine. Their short-term strategy is to transform 
Palestinian society into an Islamic one and, during this process to avoid 
confrontation with the Israeli authority and [to] challenge the Palestinian 
nationalists strategy, and demonstrate its failure to Palestinian masses, by 
presenting themselves as the only viable alternative. The Israeli authorities are 
aware of this strategy and perceive positively the Brotherhood's decision not 
to confront them at this phase, as well as the Brotherhood's challenge to the 
nationalists. It can also be deduced that the Israelis will find that any success 
by the Brotherhood will be at the expense of the nationalists; consequently the 
latter will be weakened. Furthermore, directing the activities of the population 
to religious and spiritual matters veers them away from confrontation with the 
occupying power. Therefore this serves Israel's immediate interests both 
directly and indirectly. This explains the restraint of the authorities vis-a-vis 
the Muslim Brotherhood. The policy of the occupational authority towards the 
Brotherhood has three main characteristics. First, the authorities rarely 
obstruct the functions of the Muslim Brotherhood. A discriminatory policy 
thus exists: The Brotherhood is treated less harshly than the nationalists. 
Secondly, the authorities rarely restrict the movement of the Brotherhood, 
although tens of nationalists, particularly students, have been placed under 
town arrest. Finally, close surveillance of the movement is maintained, and 
members whom the authorities perceive as getting out of line are punished. 
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Jordan 
Since 1967, the relations of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Jordanian 
monarchy have improved considerably, compared with the previous period. 
There is now a convergence of interests between the two parties. The 
brotherhood refrains from criticizing the King and cooperates in 
implementing Jordanian policy and directives in the West Bank; in return 
Jordan facilitates their movement and affairs. 
The Jordanian government's current strategy is to forge an alliance with the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank in order to undermine the PLO 
support, an objective that serves the interests of both parties. Although Jordan 
does not oppose occasional uprisings by the nationalists, it feels that 
prolonged escalation would not dislodge the occupation, and it fears that this 
could lead to the deterioration of economic and social conditions and 
consequently further migration; particularly of the young. In this sense the 
Brotherhood by acting to undermine PLO support, reduces the risk of 
prolonged escalation and its related economic risks for the Jordanians. 
Palestinians in Israel 
During the last few years the Palestinian community inside the green line has 
witnessed an upsurge in activities and support for Islamic revival.485 This 
development began in 1978 when the Muslim Brotherhood first began to 
expand its activities over the green line. This may explain the dominance of 
the Brotherhood in the Islamic movement in this part of the Palestinian 
community. However, the acceleration in the growth of the movement has 
been more significant in the last few years. 
485 Jaffa Center for Media and Documentation, 'New Islamic movements among 
Palestinians in the 1948 areas', Al-Biader al- Siyasi, 261, 18 July 1987, pp. 29-31; and 
Elaine Ruth Fletcher, 'The New Moslems ', Jerusalem Post Magazine, 16 October 1987, 
pp. 4-6. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank played a pivotal role in the 
emergence of the Islamic associations in Israel; close co-ordinations between 
the two groups continues, and many believe that a great deal of financial 
support to the Islamist associations comes from or is channelled through the 
Muslim Brotherhood.486 
Other Islamic Groups 
There are a number of other Islamic fundamentalist tendencies in the West 
Bank and Gaza. These include the Sufis, Salafiyyun, al-Takfir Wal-Hijra, 
Jamat al-Tabligh, Hizb al-Tahreer al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) and al-
Jihad Al-Islami (Islamic Jihad). The main challenge to the Muslim 
Brotherhood among the other Islamic groups comes from the Islamic 
Liberation Party and Islamic Jihad. 
The rivalry between Islamic Liberation party and the Muslim Brotherhood, 
dates back to the early 1950s shortly after its birth in Jerusalem. The 
leadership of the party decided in 1967 to freeze its activities inside the newly 
occupied territories. This decision, which was reversed in the late 1970s, 
weakened the party and caused significant loss of mass support. Its members 
frequently express their displeasure with the Muslim Brotherhood's activities 
in the West Bank and Gaza, deploring the use of violence. There are also 
significant ideological and strategic differences with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
however it grudgingly acquiesced to the Brotherhood's leadership of the 
Islamic student bloc on university campuses. 
Al-Jihad al-lslami (Islamic Jihad), originally a splinter from the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt in the mid-1960s, emerged in the occupied territories in 
1979. It is an independent movement although some believe that it maintains 
links with Islamic Jihad in Egypt and the mainstream in the PL0.487 It 
486 Husain, Wa'el, et al, 'The Muslim Brotherhood', Nablus: Najah University, 1984, pp. 
75- 6 (unpublished paper). 
487 Rekhess, Elie, 'The Rise of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Jerusalem Post, 21 October 
1987, p. 5. 
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believes in immediate confrontation with the Israeli occupation. Not much is 
known about its organizational structure. It has been involved in armed 
operations against Israel in the 1948 areas, the West Bank and Gaza Strip488 
and recently it was responsible for several armed attacks and suicide bombers 
against Israelis in Israel proper. It is very critical of the Arab regimes and 
expresses strong support for Iran. 
Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood movement Islamic Jihad supports the PLO 
despite its reservations about the PLO's policy of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of the Arab regimes. Many of its members believe the PLO is 
the most important liberation movement in the region. They also have 
political and ideological differences with the PLO, arguing for the need for 
strong PLO relations with Iran.489 
The Islamic Jihad is very critical of the Muslim Brotherhood and its strategy 
in the occupied territories. It denounces the Brotherhood's use of force 
against the nationalists and stresses that dialogue is the only sound basis for a 
relationship between the various Palestinian groups.490 As the Islamic Jihad 
movement grows, its bid for the leadership of the Islamist current in the 
occupied territories becomes more likely. Such a development would result in 
the radicalization of fundamentalists in the West Bank and Gaza and 
consequently the substantial escalation of violent confrontation with Israeli 
occupation. 
The Nationalist Movement 
The nationalist movement in the West Bank; is led primarily by several PLO 
groups, Fateh being the largest faction. The PFLP (Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine), DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine), the Palestinian Communist Party, and smaller PLO factions all 
488 Ibid. 
489 Abdel-Aziz Odeh, interview conducted by Said al-Ghazali, 11 August 1987, Gaza. 
490 Ibid. 
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play a role in the functions of the nationalist movement in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The nationalist movement enjoys strong mass support; a public opinion 
survey reported that over 90 per cent of the population fully supported the 
PL0.491 
The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the occupied territories rejects the 
PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It denounces 
the Palestine National Charter and the PLO's political programme as 
secular. 492 
The Muslim Brotherhood has attempted to challenge the nationalist 
dominance in almost all the institutions in the occupied territories including 
the unions, the charitable societies and the universities. Their success in 
controlling or gaining significant support has been non-existent or marginal in 
the vast majority of institutions, with the exception of universities. Their 
primary objective of these events was first to demonstrate publicly the 
Brotherhood's strength; second, to polarize the community into religious and 
non-religious camps; third, to gain sympathy and broaden its support base in 
depicting its actions as being in defense of Islam against anti-Islamic secular 
elements, and lastly and perhaps most importantly, to weaken the nationalists 
and undermine their mass support. 
Conclusion 
The emergence of Islamic revivalist groups in the West Bank and Gaza 
receives special attention because of its potential impact in the occupied 
territories. The emergence and action of similar groups elsewhere in the 
Middle East has already exposed the vulnerabilities of the regimes in the 
region and challenged the interests of several major external powers. 
491 Shadid and Selzer, op. cit. in note 475 above. 
492 Ibrahim al-Yazoury, interview conducted by Said al-Ghazali, 2 August 1987, Gaza .. 
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With the rise of Islamic revivalist groups in the occupied territories during the 
last thirty years, the Muslim Brotherhood had emerged not only as the most 
dominant force among the Islamic groups but also as a power to be reckoned 
with on the national level. The Palestinian nationalist resistance did not 
welcome this development, particularly after the Brotherhood unfolded its 
strategy and programme for the occupied territories. Even the Israeli 
occupation authorities' initial apprehensions concerning the movement soon 
dissolved and they have been able to exploit it to their advantage. 
The Muslim Brotherhood strategy is divided into two phases. The first phase 
would be to transform the society in the West Bank and Gaza into an Islamic 
society. The second would be to call for jihad (holy war) against Israel. 
During the first phase the primary contradiction is not with the forces of 
occupation, but with the forces of modernization and secularization that 
would delay or hinder the process of returning society to Islam. In essence 
secularization and the nationalist struggle are posited as the primary 
contradictions rather than the occupation. The Brotherhood's strategy has 
therefore evolved to eliminate these threats through the use of literature, 
sermons from mosque pulpits and even physical violence is justified as a tool 
in the conflict with the nationalists 
Perhaps the strongest features of the Brotherhood is that it is well organized, 
has disciplined and committed members, moves in the religious environment 
of the community, and dispenses well-financed programmes. The movement 
in Gaza appears to wield more power than the one in the West Bank because 
of the more traditional nature of the Gazan society and through the 
Brotherhood's ability to control some of the Gaza's key institutions.493 Gaza 
also suffers a more oppressive socio-economic situation and its population is 
generally more religious than that of the West Bank.494 
The most serious threat to the increasing power of the Muslim Brotherhood is 
likely to come from Islamic Jihad and not from the nationalists. The 
493 Rekhess, Elaine, op. cit. in note 485 above. 
494 Shadid and Seltzer, op. cit in note 475. 
287 
nationalists feel burdened with the situation and more divided over the issue 
of developing an appropriate form of response at every point of friction. Some 
nationalists have advocated the use of physical violence to fight the violence 
of the Brotherhood, but the majority insists on withdrawing and avoiding 
violence. So far this strategy has prevailed. Nationalists feel that the strategy 
of the Brotherhood is to derail their nationalist struggle, and to alienate the 
Islamic religious sectors in the population that sympathies or support the 
nationalist struggle. Their approach is to accommodate the Brotherhood and 
keep the conflict with the Brotherhood as a secondary contradiction. 
The Muslim Brotherhood's political programme is its most vulnerable 
feature, particularly since it concerns a population under occupation; this is 
why it evades articulating publicly its political views. Its success has largely 
lain in its ability to be able to choose to confront the nationalists over social 
and religious issues. It is therefore significant that data collated from surveys 
conducted in 1984 and 1986 indicate that less than 10 per cent of the 
population would support the Brotherhood's political position.495 
There are many Palestinians who are critical of the Muslim Brotherhood 
strategy and behavior in the occupied territories; some even label them as 
anti-Islamic. There are major contradictions within the Muslim Brotherhood's 
strategy in the West bank and Gaza Strip, as compared with the strategies 
adopted by the Brotherhoods outside Palestine. In Syria, Egypt and Tunisia, 
the Brotherhoods confront the regimes; in the occupied territories fighting the 
occupying authority is considered to be a secondary activity to fighting the 
nationalist movement. When the Muslim Brotherhood first came to Palestine 
it entered under the banner of jihad and allied itself with the nationalist 
forces. More than fifty years later, priorities have changed and a transitional 
concept of jihad, a sacrifice of one's self and an effort to overcome personal 
desires was introduced.496 
495 Ibid. 
496 Zuhair el-Deb'I, interview, Nablus, 28 July 1987. 
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The implication of the Muslim Brotherhood's current strategy are very 
serious: it could precipitate continuous strife in the community, further 
wasting valuable energy, demoralizing the population and entrenching the 
occupation still further. The options for the nationalist movement are limited, 
although the nationalist movement could wage a more effective and sustained 
resistance against the occupation, which would inter alia expose the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Another option might be to forge an alliance with one of the 
smaller revivalist Islamic groups such as Islamic Jihad, which is challenging 
the occupation and the Muslim Brotherhood hegemony over the Islamic 
movement. Unless the increasing power of the Muslim Brotherhood is 
checked or its strategy altered, the Palestinian community would indeed be 
crippled in its ability to resist various occupation schemes of dispossession 
and uprooting. 
The Islamic Jihad Movement 
It was only with the appearance of a second movement, rivaling the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the field of Islamic activism but fundamentally different in 
political behavior, that Islam became integral to the politics of the occupied 
territories. In the process, the Muslim Brotherhood itself was radically 
transformed. This second Islamist movement made jihad against Israel, in all 
its forms including armed struggle, the central individual and immediate 
religious duty. The Islamic Jihad appeared publicly on the political arena in 
1981, when students entered elections at the Islamic University of Gaza as 
mustaqillun (independent, but partisans of the jihad), standing against 
candidates from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the nationalist camp. The 
Jihad entered the military arena when an Israeli settler was stabbed and killed 
at Hebron by a commando unit led by Ibrahim Sirbil. The generic name 
"Islamic Jihad" was applied to the various groups embracing this principle, 
even though each had a different structure and "guide" at the helm. The 
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movement was also diverse geographically, and its members and their 
activities ranged from the intellectual elite on the one hand to the military on 
the other. 497 
General 
The Islamic Jihad movement emerged as an ideological stream within Sunni 
Islam, primarily from within the Muslim Brotherhood, as a reaction to the 
weakening of the latter's militant fervor. It continues to espouse militancy and 
violence as the major tool in the struggle to establish an 'Islamic alternative'. 
This struggle is directed not only against non-Muslims but also primarily 
against the Arab regimes which have deviated from Islam and which 
persecuted the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Groups belong to the Islamic Jihad have appeared in almost all the Arab states 
and in some parts of non-Arab Islamic world under various names. They were 
influenced by the success of the revolution in Iran, and even more so by the 
growth of Islamic militancy in Lebanon and in Egypt. 
Background 
The Palestinian factions of the Islamic Jihad are the Palestinian counter-part 
of the Islamic Jihad movements, which appeared in the Sunni part of the Arab 
world in the 1970s. These movements, which were an outgrowth of the 
fundamentalism of the Muslim Brotherhood, were characterized by their 
rejection of the Brotherhood's 'truce' with most of the existing regimes in the 
Arab world. Thus, the major difference between them and the Muslim 
Brotherhood was and remains their advocacy of violence as the major tool in 
changing the face of societies and regimes. 
497 Legrain, Jean-Francois, 'The Islamist Palestinians tested by the Uprising', Maghreb -
Machrek, no. 121, July 1988, pp. 5-42. 
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Unlike the Islamic Jihad movements in Arab countries, the Palestinian 
factions of the Islamic Jihad view the 'Zionist Jewish entity' embodied in the 
State of Israel as the foremost enemy and the first target for destruction. This 
is because of the special situation prevailing in 'Palestine', which they view 
as an integral and fundamental part of the Arab and Muslim world, where 
Muslims are 'subjected' to foreign rule. Since the regime is foreign and non-
Muslim, the methods of resistance to be used are different from those adopted 
by similar groups operating against Muslim and Arab regimes. The ideology 
of the Palestinian Jihad factions calls for armed struggle against Israel through 
guerrilla groups composed of the revolutionary vanguard, which carry out 
terrorist attacks aimed at weakening Israel and 'its desire to continue its 
occupation'. They are thus to lay the groundwork for the day when a great 
Islamic army will be able to destroy Israel in a military confrontation. 
The Shekaki Faction 
The Shekaki faction of the Islamic Jihad movement has emerged in recent 
years, particularly since the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) 
between Israel and the PLO, as the dominant faction within this movement, 
both in terrorist attacks and in the public-political sphere. The faction is 
headed by Dr. Fathi Shekaki, who has succeeded in pushing aside the co-
founder of the organization, Abed el-Azia Ouda, considered its spiritual 
leader (the faction was originally called 'Shekaki/Ouda'). 
The founders of this faction, which operates primarily in the Gaza district, 
were influenced by the emergence of similar political groups in Egyptian 
universities, where some of its leaders studied in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Upon their return to Gaza they founded similar groups those aim was 
to promote the idea of armed struggle against Israel. 
With the deportation of its two leaders from Gaza to Lebanon in 1988, the 
faction underwent reorganization, resulting in the establishment of a military 
unit to carry out attacks against Israeli targets, alongside the existing political 
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unit (Sheikh Abdulla al-Shami is today considered the senior operative in the 
Gaza Strip). The movement's ideology is disseminated openly through the 
distribution of propaganda material and tapes, with the mosques serving as an 
influential tool. In addition, a newspaper called 'Al-Istaqlal' edited by Ala 
Siftawi, which conforms to the political views of the Islamic Jihad, has begun 
to appear in the area under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian authority. 
Dr. Shekaki, who resides in Damascus, enjoys freedom of expression. His 
organization is one of the ten Palestinian opposition factions based in Syria. 
Shekaki boasts of his close ties with Iran, which according to him were 
strengthened following his first visit to Tehran in December 1988 (his next 
visit to Iran was apparently in October 1993 following the signing of the 
D.O.P.), and with its Lebanese extension, the Hizbullah. He recently cited his 
ideological-political ties with Iran "our ties with the Islamic Republic, and its 
political and spiritual support of the Palestinian people's efforts to continue 
the jihad and to achieve independence". According to him, the organization 
does not receive Iranian military aid and does not have a base in Iran, but 
notes that Iranian support for his organization and HAMAS amounts to 20 
million dollars.498 
The Shekaki faction opposes the agreement between the Palestinians and 
Israel and has intensified the tone of its anti-Israeli statements, especially after 
the murder of Islamic Jihad activist Hani Abed in Gaza on 2 November 1994. 
Shekaki said: "The continuation of the jihad against the Zionist occupation is 
our primary concern and the center of our lives";499 and: "We shall raise arms 
against the criminal Israelis wherever they may be in the autonomous territory 
and outside it. We have a new reason which justifies the continuation of our 
struggle".500 In another statement, he announced the establishment of a group 
of 70 people prepared to commit suicide 'in order to carry out attacks against 
the occupation forces in the self-governing areas. Such attacks in the Gaza 
498 Al-Hayat, 17 December 1994; Al-Wassat, 12 December 1994. 
499 Radio Nur, Lebanon, 12 Novemebr 1994. 
500 Iranian TV, 3 November 1994. 
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Strip will cease only when the Israeli settlements in the area will be 
disbanded ... If this will occur, the suicide attacks will be transferred to other 
areas, because our fight against the occupation will continue' .501 
The Palestinian Jihad movement located its ideological roots in the Egyptian 
Jihad Organization, whose members had assassinated Egyptian president 
Anwar Sadat; in Sayyid Qutb, the Muslim Brotherhood intellectual who was 
executed by the Egyptian regime in 1966; and, although the Palestinian Jihad 
is Sunni and resolutely Palestinian, in 'Ali Shari' ati and the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran. The annihilation of Israel is, for Jihad, an obligatory 
condition of a profound and successful Islamisation of society. Anti-Israeli 
radicalism is the theme of its discourse: The liberation of Palestine is 
fundamentally a religious question which concerns the entire Islamic 
community; the protection of Islam from the West's repeated attacks is the 
main challenge of this century; and finally, since Israel constitutes the 
spearhead of this aggression, it is imperative to annihilate the Western menace 
by destroying the "Jewish entity". 
Jihad developed in reaction to what they saw as the inefficient missionary 
efforts undertaken by the Muslim Brothers. Averting the attention of the 
believer from political and militant action and the priority of liberating 
Palestine, the Muslim Brothers' main programme was judged ultimately 
damaging to Islam itself. 
Unlike the Muslim Brothers, Jihad is not a mass movement but a nebulous 
circle of small groups organized loosely around and by "guides" and united 
by a common ideology. At Gaza, it arose primarily as a result of the activity 
of two men: Dr. Fathi Shaqai, a physician in Rafah, who became the 
organizational leader, and Abd al-Aziz Uda, a lecturer at the Islamic 
University, who became the spiritual guide. Both were in touch with Jihad 
501 Associated Press, (AP), 18 November 1994. 
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study circles in Egypt and both supported the Islamic revolution in Iran. 502 On 
the West Bank Jihad cells were organized by Ibrahim Sirbil, under the 
religious auspices of Shaykh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamim (a resident of Amman); 
these cells were regrouped in the surroundings of Jerusalem and the region of 
Hebron.503 
Palestinian Jihad activists were recruited from the ranks of the Muslim 
brotherhood, from the religious wing of Fatah, as well as from the defunct 
National Liberation Forces, dismantled at the beginning of the 1970s. Many 
of these erstwhile NLF members rediscovered Islam while in jail. They were 
released in May 1985 as part of a prisoner exchange between Israel and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine under the General Command of 
Ahmed Jibril. As with the Muslim Brotherhood, the candidates of Jihad were 
almost exclusively men, with an over-representation of non-refugees. The 
Jihad candidates, then, accentuated the tendencies already observed in the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
The activism of the Jihad was an important stimulant to the Intifada, which 
occurred following the clashes of early October 1987 in Gaza between Jihad 
commandos and Israeli army forces. Some days before, a Jihad activist has 
stabbed the chief of Israeli military police in the Gaza Strip. A series of Israeli 
counter-measures, including banning Shaykh Uda from Palestine, built such 
sympathy in the Palestinian population for the Jihad cause that it only 
required a relatively trivial incident- a collision between an Israeli truck and 
two Palestinian taxis carrying workers from Tel Aviv to Gaza- to lead finally 
502 See the introduction to Min Manshurat Harakat al-Jihad al-Islamifi Filastin, Masirat 
al- Jihad al-Islami fl Filas tin (Conduct of Islamic Jihad in Palestine as seen by the 
communiques of the Movement of Islamic Jihad in Palestine), Beirut, 1989; Al-Mujahid, 
published at Beirut, since the beginning of 1990. Some of the leaflets in this collection 
had been already published in Islam wa Filastin (Islam and Palestine), a periodical of the 
Jihad Movement; edited in France and published in the United States. 
503 Al-Tamimi, Shaykh As'ad, Zawal Israel, hatmiyya Qur 'aniyya (The Disappearance of 
Israel, Quranic ineluctability), Amman, 1990; Ibrahim Sirbil, Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami 
wal-intifada (The Movement of Islamic Jihad & the Uprising), Amman: Dar al-Nisr, 
1990. 
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to the radical questioning of the three-decades old occupation, a process that 
ignited the fateful popular Palestinian resistance known as the Intifada. 
The Intifada 
Virtually spontaneous when it began, the Intifada quickly organized itself 
through local and regional committees. In the case of PLO partisans, these 
committees reported to the United National Leadership of the Uprising 
(UNLU). In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the committees reported to 
the Movement of Islamic Resistance, commonly known by its Arabic name 
and acronym HAMAS. The different movements of Islamic Jihad remained 
outside of these command structures.504 
Established at the beginning of January 1988 by bringing together the four 
largest nationalist organizations (the Fatah of Yassir Arafat, the PFLP of 
George Habache, the DFLP of Nayef Hawatmeh, and the Palestinian 
Communist Party), the UNLU immediately took charge of decisions 
concerning the appropriateness and timing of general strikes, demonstrations, 
and other forms of civil disobedience. This was done by the regular 
publication of numbered communiques. 505 Its political programme reaffirmed 
the principle that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people 
and demanded an international conference under United Nations auspices for 
creation of an independent state. 
Islamic Jihad then became the first organized victim of massive Israeli 
repression. Virtually destroyed two or three months after the start of the 
uprising in early 1988, it re-emerged at the end of 1988 in the form of 
periodic communiques, symbolic monthly strikes, and the organization of a 
504 Schiff, Zeev, Ehud Yaari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Thrid Front, New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. 
505 These communiques have been published in English, in their PFLP version, in No Voice 
Is Louder Than Voice of the Uprising, Iqbal Publishing, 1989. 
Also see Jean-Francois Legrain, 'The Voices of the Palestinian Uprising: Scientific 
edition of the Communiques of the United National Leadership and of the Movement of 
Islamic Resistance', trans. in collaboration with Pierre Chenard, Cairo: CEDEJ, 1991. 
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number of commando operations launched from outside the West Bank and 
Gaza. It also claimed responsibility for numerous knife attacks against 
Israelis. 
Having incited the uprising in the first place, the relatively small and fragile 
Jihad organization quickly found itself overwhelmed by the massive 
involvement of the entire population. The population included non-organized 
elements as well as forces structured in the different organizations of the PLO 
or engaged in the Muslim Brotherhood, which also decided to become 
involved in the Intifada after much hesitation. 
The uprising challenged the Muslim Brotherhood by injecting a new 
dynamism in Palestinian society in the daily fight against the occupation. As a 
movement they responded in several stages, all the while maintaining a 
remarkable continuity of ideology. 506 
The first period stretches from December 1987 to February 1988, during 
which time the Muslim Brothers, as an organization, maintained their 
customary avoidance of direct engagement in the fight against Israel. 
Although Shaykh Yassin of the Muslim Brothers was the primary founder of 
HAMAS, the movement published its three first communiques (between 16 
December 1987 and 11 February 1988) without mentioning its organizational 
links with the Muslim Brotherhood. These leaflets just called for 
reinforcement of the mobilization against the occupation and for the largest 
possible popular participation in the uprising. This delay in mentioning the 
Brotherhood was likely a calculated choice by the cautious Yassin. Eager to 
direct the unfolding of the events of the Intifada, he was nonetheless unsure 
that the uprising would last and take root in the deepest strata of the 
Palestinian population. Thus at first he refused to reveal the structure and 
resources of the Brotherhood for fear of exposing it for Israeli repression. 
Yassin's delay may also have been influenced by internal tensions in the 
506 Kepel, Gilles,Yann Richard, eds., Intellectuals et militants de !'Islam Contemporain 
(Intellectuals and Militants of Contemporary Islam), Paris: Le Seuil, 1990. 
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Muslim Brotherhood between the partisans of a rapid and active engagement 
and the "old guard" defenders of traditional quietism. 
HAMAS: The Islamic Resistance Movement 
The publication of the fourth communique, on 11 February 1988, inaugurated 
a new stage with the public adoption of the Movement of Islamic Resistance 
by the Muslim brothers as the "strong arm" of their association. The initial 
HMS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya) also appeared at the time, 
transformed in the next leaflet into the acronym HAMAS ("zeal"), and was 
thereafter used to designate the group. From the moment the connection with 
the Muslim Brotherhood was officially acknowledged, HAMAS functioned as 
a solidly structured organization. In the years since then, HAMAS has utilized 
and coordinated the very networks that were independently established 
several years earlier by Muslim Brotherhood. 
General Background and History 
The HAMAS (in Arabic, an acronym for "Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-
Islamia"- Islamic Resistance Movement- and a word meaning courage and 
bravery) is a radical Islamic fundamentalist organization, which became 
active in the early stages of the Intifada, operating primarily in the Gaza Strip 
but also in the West Bank. The HAMAS has played a major role in violent 
fundamentalist subversion and radical terrorist operations against both Israel 
and Arabs, and deploys its own "shock troops" ("Al-Suad Al-Ramaya"- the 
"throwing arm") for these purposes. The HAMAS makes frequent use of 
radical Islamic motifs, both in order to broaden its ranks and as a weapon 
against those whom it defines as its enemies. In its initial period, the 
movement was headed by people; primarily, identified with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the territories. 
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In the period prior to the Intifada, the religious-social "Al-Majama Al-Islami" 
association in the Gaza Strip was an important source for the recruitment of 
radical Islamic elements for the covert terrorist activity of the HAMAS. Many 
senior members of "Al-Majama" emerged with the outbreak of the Intifada as 
central figures in the HAMAS leadership. They used the existing 
infrastructure of the association as a basis for semi-covert activity, including 
the preaching of inflammatory sermons in mosques and the distribution of 
religious and political leaflets. The HAMAS movement also goes by several 
other names, which are used primarily to denote the semi-covert activity 
carried out by its supporters in the territories. Most of these names include the 
word "Islam", for example: the Islamic Stream ("Al-Tiar Al-Islami"), or the 
Islamic Trend ("Al-Athja Al-Islami"). 
In the course of Intifada HAMAS gained momentum, expanding its activity 
also in the West Bank to become the dominant Islamic Fundamentalist 
organization in the territories. It defined its highest priority as actual jihad 
(holy war) for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic 
Palestine "from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River". By its 
participation in street violence and murder, it boosted its appeal in the eyes of 
the Palestinians, further enhancing its growth potential and enabling it to play 
a central role in the Intifada. As a result of its subversive and terrorist activity, 
HAMAS was outlawed in September 1989. 
Today, HAMAS is the second most powerful group in the territories, after 
FATAH. Its influence is felt in all aspects of daily life, and it serves as a 
lodestone for extremist elements. It is currently the strongest opposition group 
to the peace process, and is sometimes viewed as threatening the hegemony of 
the secular nationalists. 
In the course of the past years, HAMAS has become the leading perpetrator 
of terrorist activity, second only to FATAH. HAMAS engages in terrorist 
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activity throughout the territories as well as the Green Line. It also engages in 
violent clashes with Palestinian rivals, such as the confrontation with FATAH 
members in the Gaza Strip in July 1992. Throughout the Intifada, there have 
been many such encounters, in which HAMAS rallied hundreds of people 
into the streets, some of them armed with guns. 
Ideology and Goals 
The basic ideology of HAMAS is founded primarily on the mainstream of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In the Islamic Covenant published by HAMAS in 
August 1988, it defined itself as the "Palestinian branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood". 
However, there is a clear distinction in the order of priorities set forth by 
HAMAS, as opposed to those of the Muslim Brotherhood in the territories 
prior to the Intifada, particularly as regards the question of Jihad. The Muslim 
Brotherhood in the territories viewed Jihad as a general duty and principle. It 
maintained that Islam would be established first throughout the Muslim 
world, only later to be followed by violent Jihad against Israel, in which 
Palestine, too, would be liberated. HAMAS, on the other hand, stresses Jihad 
as the sole and immediate means to solve the problem of Palestine. 
HAMAS defines the transition to the stage of Jihad "for the liberation of all 
Palestine" as a personal religious duty incumbent upon every Muslim. At the 
same time, it utterly rejects any political arrangement that would entail the 
relinquishment of any part of Palestine, which for it is tantamount to a 
surrender of part of Islam. These positions are reflected in the HAMAS 
Covenant, which was written in the territories, and of course in its activities. 
The central goal of HAMAS is the establishment of an Islamic state in all of 
Palestine, and ultimately an all-out Jihad, with the participation of not only 
Palestinian Muslims but also, the entire Islamic world. What then, is the ideal 
Islamic state? 
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Qur' anic View of an Ideal State 
The Quranic view of an ideal state cannot easily be fitted among numerous 
political theories of Western political philosophers. The Qur' an recognizes a 
commonwealth of believers bound together by ties of a common creed, and 
traditions and voluntary obedience to the common law of Islam on a universal 
scale. 
There is no deification of state in Islam in the garb of' general will' as viewed 
by Hegel, or a "totalitarian model of Karl Marx or Stalin's thinking. Though 
akin to democracy in themes such as consultation, representation, and regard 
for the popular will, the Qur' an proclaims in unmistakable terms the 
sovereignty of Allah, and not of men. Most of the so-called modern theories 
of constitutional government, such as government as a form of trust, the rule 
of law, and equality before law, have formed part of the political philosophy 
oflslam since the time of the Holy Prophet PBUH (Peace Be Upon Him). 
The Qur' an visualizes a universe of which God alone is the sole Master and 
Ruler. 507 Being the Creator and the Supreme Ruler of the universe, His Law 
and authority alone can be most just and righteous. In fact, righteousness is 
the key to the vicegerency of God on earth, as distinct from kingship, 
oligarchy, or theocracy. The Qur' an promises political domination to those 
who believe, and do good works.508 It contains law potentially, though many 
rules of political nature are actually and explicitly in it. 
As the Qur'an visualizes a political order for all times, there can be no 
restriction on the form of government as observed by Islamists. A state in 
Islam is an endeavour to translate the principles of equality, solidarity and 
freedom in a definite human organization. The modern concept of state as a 
territorially organized power is wholly alien to Islam. 
501 'h I T. e Hoy Qur 'an 7:54; 20:8; 30:26. 
508 The Holy Qur 'an 24:55. 
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Five hundred years of monarchy and a century of communism have left 
democracy as an irresistible choice to the modern world, but even to an 
optimist, Islamists would say, it has to yet to win credibility as a self-
cleansing and self-rectifying political process. It is not a harp within a million 
strings, nor its notes are rule, and others have dubbed it as a cult of 
incompetence. Even totalitarian states, and Communist Russia, had claimed to 
be democratic in their own way. 
Even the citadel of democracy and liberty in the West is apparently engaged 
in what Nietzche had observed cynically "murdering mankind with good 
conscience" by its commitment to the production of the deadliest weapons of 
mass destruction. Bertrand Russell had said, "It is difficult today to persuade 
mankind to acquiesce in its own survival".509 
As a religion of peace, sanity and tolerance, Islam cannot be an aggressive 
ideology. The holy Prophet (PBUH) had viewed the world as a mosque, 
signifying its sacredness. The Qur'an views the whole mankind as one 
"Ummat-el-wahida".510 
Instead of the warring nations and tribes of today, the Qur'an uses the term 
"Ummat"511 , which in its literal sense is the Community of Believers. It is 
moreover the middle nation (Ummat-el-Wusta), which avoids the extremes in 
its spiritual and worldly convictions and beliefs. 
The reason why some Western orientalists have dubbed Islam as a political 
religion is because it makes no distinction between the spiritual and the 
mundane, which are merely "two sides of the same coin" as Professor 
Cantwell Smith has rightly observed. On the other hand, the world of Islam 
had faced half a dozen Crusades from the champions of the Cross, between 
the 1th and 15th century. Mohammad Asad, the Jewish-born Muslim and 
author of Islam at the Cross-roads,512 says that with their crusading zeal, the 
509 Hussain, S. Muzaffar, 'Qur'anic View ofldeal State', Times of Oman, May 2, 1994. 
510 The Holy Qur 'an 2:213; 5 :48. 
511 Ibid. 2:143 
512 Asad, Muhammad, Islam at the Crossroads, 1st edition, Lahore: Arafat Publications, 
1963 .. 
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champions of the Cross acting as a judge, jury, and executioners had sought to 
condemn Islam. Even in the 20th and 21st century, the same drama is being re-
enacted in the Middle East with the active support of Christian superpowers. 
The Qur'anic term 'Jihad', so grievously distorted in the West and termed as 
religious militancy and fundamentalism, is in fact a religious obligation in the 
social solidarity of Islam. According the Qur' an, tumult and oppression is 
worse than slaughter. It is to suppress "Fasad" or disorder, and to put down 
mischief, rebellion, and transgression that Jihad is allowed.513 Despite the 
peaceful intentions of Islam, it can't however tolerate its faith being held in 
contempt, or abused. 
Collectivity and dynamism are the two cardinal features of the dialectic of 
Islam's evolution and extension as observed by Shah Wali Ullah, the 18th 
century political and spiritual reformer of the Inda-Pakistani subcontinent. 
Islam's collectivity, a by-product of "Tawheed", is sustained by its 
cosmopolitan outlook, as well as by the principle of fraternity and 
egalitarianism cementing the world-wide 'Ummah' which is enshrined in 
what Iqbal calls the "Principles of Movement"- to adapt, change, to 
synthesize and to progress. 
Islamists would say Islam did not die in 1258 AD, when Halaku destroyed 
Baghdad. It was in fact in the dark period of decline that Islam's masterpieces 
such as Ibn-Khaldun's 'Muqadamah', Ghazzalis' 'Ihaya', and Rumi's 
'Masnavi' had been written. The world saw the rise of the Selguqs, the 
Ottomans, the Safvids, and the Mughuls after Halaku had extinguished the 
Abbasides. 514 
Professor Cantwell Smith in his analysis of Islamic history has observed: 
"strictly speaking there is no such thing as Christian history," he says. 
"Certainly there is no Hindu history. There is a history of Hindus, and of 
Christianity, and then there is even the history of the Christian church. History 
can't be redeemed according to Christian faith. Even for an optimist, a 
513 The Holy Qur 'an 37:2; 38:3; 2: 191, 193. 
514 Times of Oman, op. cit. in note 509. 
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Christian history has not yet begun". He goes on to say that in the case of 
Islam, which constantly strives to make the transcendental actual, even 
ashaheed or martyr is capable of shaping history after his death. 
The never-ending refrain of Western political thought of separating the 
spiritual from the temporal as a guarantee for political peace and stability has 
exhausted itself in the modem age. Hence the short history of secularism in 
the West's political and social system. On the other hand, Islam never saw 
any conflict between state and Church. Similarly there has been no conflict 
between science and state as markedly true in the case of Christianity. In fact 
according to Professor Briffault "Science owes a great deal more to Islamic 
culture: It owes its very existence".515 Islam can be rightly proud of its claim 
to have heralded the advent of science and Renaissance in Europe. With such 
achievements, it cannot be regarded as a narrow, intolerant or a static, un-
progressive faith. 
Though mankind is not enslaved by race, colour the course of rivers, or the 
direction of mountain ranges, the West is never tired of eulogizing the nation 
state and "nationality" almost as spiritual principle ( as Renan said in the 19th 
century). It was Machiavelli (1469-1527), the archpriest of political deception 
(whom Iqbal calls the "worshipper of falsehood"), who in his Prince had 
originally founded the deity of nation state. Ever since then, the West has 
unceasingly worshipped this deity and in this process engulfed mankind in 
endless nationalist wars, which continue to this day. 
According the Qur' an the world is more an abode of peace than a theatre of 
wars of aggrandizement. The Western failure in political and social spheres is 
mankind. The United Nations, supposed to be the biggest step to bring about 
international harmony in the 20th century and held up as a "beacon of hope" 
for mankind has become "a shield for the strong, and a mockery for the 
515 Ibid. 
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poor",516 suffering as it does from the political malaise, which it has failed to 
remedy so far though committed by its charter which it proclaimed more than 
half a century ago. 
The two cardinal purposes of political activity, according to the Qur' an, are 
attainment of justice and equity on a universal basis,517 and the promotion of 
good and eradication of evil.518 Both these things are sadly lacking today in 
national and international politics. 
In the words of Mohammad Iqbal, humanity needs to avoid destruction: it 
needs spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the 
individual, and basic principles of universal import to direct the evolution of 
society on spiritual basis.519 In other words what the world needs today is an 
ethical and moral basis of politics, for which Islam provides the spiritual 
support of the Qur'an. But this is also the very thing, which Western political 
thought has been trying to divorce, segregating ethics from politics. 
Though the Qur'an does not rule out the use of power, it should be used to 
advance the boundaries of righteousness rather than the domain of "nations". 
It abolishes for ever: political, social and economic slavery in any shape or 
form, intolerance, racism, and national bigotry as in material greed for land, 
and the parochial will to dominate over others. These evils are symptoms of 
political bankruptcy and moral blindness. They show that the lust for naked 
and brute power is on the increase despite their affluence. Bosnia, Chechnya, 
Kashmir, and Palestine are, Islamist say, examples today to illustrate why the 
political thinking, and diplomacy of the West has apparently failed to bring 
about peace. 
516 Ibid. p. 3. 
517 TheQur'an42:I5;55:8. 
518 The Qur 'an 59:25; 22:41. 
519 Iqbal, Muhammad, The Reconstruction of Religious Though in Islam, Lahore, Ashraf, 
1960, p. 179. 
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Structure 
The structure of HAMAS in Gaza and the West Bank is based on a 
combination of regional and functional organization. In this framework, 
several identical, parallel frameworks operate in each region: 
a. Infrastructure ("Dawa", literally "sermonizing"), which engages 
in recruitment, distribution of funds, and appointments. 
b. Popular violence in the framework of the Intifada. 
c. Security ("Aman")- the gathering of information on suspected 
collaborators with the authorities. This information is passed on 
to the "shock committee", who interrogates and then kills the 
suspects. 
d. Publication ("A-' Alam")- leaflets, propaganda, press offices. 
HAMAS tries to maintain a clear distinction between the covert activity of its 
various sections and its overt activity, which serves primarily to broaden the 
ranks of the movement. The major reason for this is HAMAS' desire to 
increase departmentalization and secrecy, by not identifying itself directly 
with its public activity. The term generally used by HAMAS to define its 
overt activity is 'Daw a' - meaning literally, 'sermonizing'. This term is also 
the name given to the HAMAS section whose function is to broaden the 
movement's infrastructure, to distribute funds and make appointments. In 
fact, there is a large degree of overlapping between the two. 
Mahmud Rumhi, a semor HAMAS operative from Ramallah who was 
arrested and questioned by Israel in 1993, defined the Dawa as an apparatus 
separate from HAMAS. Its function is to create an organizational basis in the 
mosques and other institutions. According to him, it is a multifaceted 
organization, which maintains direct contact with Ibrahim Usha in Jordan, a 
spokesman of HAMAS. He also said that there is no direct link between 
HAMAS and the charity associations. Here it should be noted that, alongside 
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his senior position in HAMAS, Rumhi, a doctor by profession, also manages 
the medical center of the charity association in Ramallah and serves as a 
representative of the London-based Aid Fund for Lebanon and Palestine, 
which transfers funds to charity associations in the territories affiliated to 
HAMAS.520 
The internal HAMAS publication explains the three spheres of Islamic 
activity, while encouraging greater activity in two: Jihad and public activity. 
Specifically, it enjoins its followers to become members of existing trade 
unions and philanthropic associations and to found new ones in order to serve 
the goals of the movement. 
Thus, HAMAS is an organization composed of several interdependent levels. 
The popular-social base is maintained materially by the charity committees 
and ideologically through instruction, propaganda and incitement delivered in 
the mosques and other institutions, and through leaflets. This base is the 
source for the recruitment of members into the units, which engage in riots 
and popular violence. Those who distinguish themselves in these units sooner 
or later find their way into the military apparatus, which carries out brutal and 
violent attacks against Israeli and Palestinians alike. The latter ( and their 
families and relatives, if they are arrested or killed) enjoy the moral and 
economic backing of the preachers in the mosques, the directors of HAMAS-
affiliated institutions, and the charity committees. 
Intifada Activity 
HAMAS began to operate in the territories at the beginning of the Intifada, at 
first primarily in the Gaza Strip and later increasingly also in the West Bank. 
It claims credit for the outbreak of the Intifada and played a major part in its 
escalation. The organization of HAMAS and its rapid integration into 
520 ask@israel-info.gov.il IDF Spokesman 'HAMAS: The Islamic Resistance 
Movement, January 1993. 
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subversive Intifada activity was facilitated by the role played by central 
figures of the "Al-Majama Al-Islami" and by its broad and well-organized 
base of supporters. 
HAMAS activity in the course of the Intifada can be characterized mainly as 
follows: 
The concentration of a major part of its activity around the mosques, as 
spiritual centers, which enjoyed relative immunity from the Israeli authorities, 
these served as convenient locations. Moreover, many HAMAS operatives 
serve as religious functionaries in the mosques. HAMAS uses the mosques as 
recruitment centers to broaden its ranks, a focus for extremist incitement, 
disturbances and demonstrations, a center for the distribution of leaflets, and 
as a venue for organizing terrorist attacks. 
The publication and distribution of leaflets, which serve as a tool for 
incitement to riot, defining strategy, and instructing the general public as well 
as setting days for memorials and general strikes. The HAMAS leaflets are 
radical in content and virulent in their wording. Most include verses from the 
Quran and play on extremist Islamic religious feeling. The major themes are: 
1. Preaching Jihad as a means to establish an Islamic state in all of 
Palestine, while rejecting the right State oflsrael ("Zionist entity") 
to exist. 
2. A call to continue and escalate the violent struggle. The use of 
"shock troops" ("Al-Suad Al-Ramaya"- the "throwing arm") for 
the violent enforcement ofHAMAS directives, such as the boycott 
of Israeli goods, preventing workers from the territories in going to 
work in Israel, and enforcing strikes. 
During the period prior to the Intifada, HAMAS members (in its earlier form 
of the "Al-Majama Al-Islami") operated primarily against local Palestinians, 
such as moral offenders and criminal elements, in order to purge Muslim 
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society and to prepare it for Jihad against Israel. After the outbreak of the 
Intifada, the same people and new recruits began to assassinate Palestinians. 
In the course of the Intifada, HAMAS operatives had admitted numerous such 
attacks in which Palestinians were killed. On the basis of Israeli intelligence 
information, many more murders of Palestinians can be attributed to HAMAS 
members.(87)521 
In the course of the Intifada, HAMAS operatives also began to carry out 
terrorist attacks against Israeli targets, escalating in nature. At first they 
resorted primarily to explosive charges and other 'popular' means (firebombs, 
arson and property damage). In the course of 1989, they kidnapped and 
murdered two soldiers (Avi Sasportas and Ilan Sa'adon). In December 1990, 
three Israelis employed in a Jaffa factory were murdered. In 1992, HAMAS 
operatives displayed even greater daring, especially members of the Iz Al-Din 
Al-Kassam squad, who fired on security personnel at short range and stabbed 
two Jews to death in a packing plant in the Gaza Strip. These HAMAS 
'successes' naturally encouraged members of other organizations to try and 
emulate and even surpass them.522 
During the past two years, the number of attacks carried out by HAMAS 
members has risen dramatically, making it the second most important terrorist 
organization, after FATAH, and the leading organization in the murder of 
Israelis by gunfire. From the beginning of the Intifada (December 1987) to 
this day, hundreds of Israelis, and Jewish tourists were killed in HAMAS 
attacks. During this period, they also assassinated hundreds of Palestinian 
residents of the territories. 
Leadership 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, head of HAMAS until his arrest in 1989, was 




financial affairs, liaison with radical Islamic elements abroad, and supervision 
of violent and terrorist activity. Under him, a broad organizational network 
was set up, comprising various functions and local leaders, which directed the 
political and intifada-related work of the movement: distributing leaflets, 
organizing riots, enforcing strikes etc. 
Following the arrest of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and other leading operatives 
from the Gaza Strip, the centralized HAMAS leadership in the territories was 
weakened. It was replaced by a backbone of senior leaders/operatives 
identified with the movement who direct its activity in the different regions. 
They focused primarily on politics, propaganda, infrastructure, and inter-
organizational liaison, while competing with Palestinian nationalists for 
election to positions of power in various bodies (such as trade unions). 
Among the leading figures are Mahmoud Alzhar, Abdel Aziz Rantisi and 
Hamed Bitawi. Prominent religious leaders identified with HAMAS have 
recently formed the Association of Religious Sages of Palestine ("Rabtath 
'Alma Falestin"), which is to serve as a kind of supreme religious framework 
and to accord the movement 'legitimacy' through religious rulings that 
conform to the movement's ideology. 
HAMAS leaders residing abroad- in Arab countries (primarily Jordan) and in 
the West (the U.S., Britain, and others)- have also recently gained 
prominence. In this context, we should also note the movement's growing ties 
with Iran. 
The leaflets written and prepared by the HAMAS leadership as well as the 
sermons preached by its operatives in the mosques have played an important 
role in the attacks. Thus, periodical HAMAS leaflets calling for a "revolution 
of knives" have been found on the persons ofHAMAS members who stabbed 
Israelis. Recent HAMAS leaflets call for the use of guns against both security 
personnel and civilians. 
The monthly HAMAS leaflets serve as a maJor tool for clarifying its 
positions, handing down directives, and incitement- including riots and 
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attacks against Jews- with the ultimate goal being the destruction of Israel 
through holy war. The leaflets of the movement make extensive use of Islamic 
motifs, interlaced with virulent accusations against the Jews, "the offspring of 
apes and pigs".523 Almost all of them end with a call for "Jihad until victory, 
or martyrdom for the sake of Allah". There has recently been increasing 
cooperation by the movement with other organizations opposed to the peace 
process, and they have published joint leaflets against the peace process. 
Anti-Semitic 
Consistent with Hannah Arendt's observation about totalitarian movements 
necessarily being anti-Semitic, Islamist Muslims bristle with hostility toward 
Jews. They accept virtually every Christian myth about Jews seeking control 
of the world, and then add their own twist about Jews destroying Islam. The 
HAMAS charter sees Jews as the ultimate enemy: 
[They] have used their wealth to gain control of the world media, news 
agencies, press and broadcasting stations, etcetera .... They were behind the 
French revolution and the Communist revolution .... They instigated World 
War I. ... They caused World War II .... It was they who gave the instructions 
to establish the United Nations and the Security Council to replace the League 
of Nations, in order to rule over the world through them. 524 
Islamists discuss Jews with the most violent and crude metaphors. Khalil 
Kuka, a founder of HAMAS, says that, "God brought the Jews together in 
Palestine not to benefit from a homeland but to dig their grave there and save 
the world from their pollution".525 Tehran's ambassador once said: that "the 
523 Ibid. 
524 Article 22, quoted in Contemporary Mideast Background, October 1988, pp. 8-9. 
525 Quoted in Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ar, Intifada: The Inside Story of the Palestinian 
Uprising that Changed the Middle East Equation, trans. By Ina Friedman, New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1989, p. 235. 
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Zionists are like the germs of cholera that will affect every person in contact 
with them". 526 Such venom is common coin in Islamist discourse. 
Nor is violence confined to words. Especially since the September 1993 
White House signing of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles, HAMAS 
and Islamic Jihad have repeatedly targeted Israelis and other Jews, killing 
many of them. 
Financing 
HAMAS enjoys strong financial backing. In fact, its rivals claim that this is a 
major reason for its strength. HAMAS receives financial support from 
unofficial bodies in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and recently also from Iran. 
The amount of money, which reaches HAMAS operatives in the West Bank 
and Gaza, is estimated at one million dollars U.S. annually. These funds are 
distributed among the various groups and associations identified with the 
movement, and from them filter down to the operatives in the field. 
A broad network of charity associations ("Jama'at Al-Kheyriyah") and 
committees ("Lejnat Zakat") operate in the territories, on the basis of two 
Jordanian statutes: the Charity Association and Social Institutions Law, and 
the Charity Fund-Raising Regulations. HAMAS makes extensive use of these 
charity associations and committees, which (together with the mosques, 
unions, etc.) also serve as the overt fa~ade of the organization's activity, 
operating parallel to and serving its covert operations. The movement's 
ideology (like that of its mother organization, the Muslim Brotherhood) 
attributes great importance to the giving of charity ("Zekat", which is also one 
of the five basic principles oflslam). 
526 Islamic Revolution News Agency, August 9, 1993. 
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Conclusion 
By 2002, the fifteenth year of the Intifada, profound changes had occurred in 
the Palestinian political arena. The new bipolarization between PLO partisans, 
on the one hand, and the Muslim Brothers, on the other, constituted on of the 
major signs of this new balance of forces. 
As elsewhere in the Islamic world, the two main trends in Islamism could still 
be observed at work in Palestine: revolutionary Islamism of "Islamisation 
from above", advocated by the movements of Islamic Jihad, and the 
"Islamisation from below", preferred by the Muslim Brothers. 
In the Palestinian case, revolutionary Islamism has not been discredited, even 
if its objective- liberation of the whole of Palestine- has remained beyond 
reach. The Islamic Jihad's contribution to the early days of the Intifada in 
general gained for Islamic movements a measure of glory and legitimacy, thus 
affording them an opportunity to share a part of their ideals with the entire 
society. In spite of repression the movements of Islamic Jihad have not 
disappeared. They have maintained a significant mobilization capacity 
although this is limited by internal and personal quarrels between groups and 
leaders, by their factional mode of functioning, and by their image as agents 
for foreign states such as Iran and Syria. 
The Muslim Brothers, then, had to adopt as a tactic the order of priorities 
followed by the Islamic Jihad (no real Islamisation without liberation) and, in 
the same way, had to compete with patriotism, the foundation of the PLO's 
legitimacy. In order to secure their "Islamisation from below" for the long 
term the Muslim Brothers, through HAMAS, adopted the traits of 
"revolutionary Islamism" as the foundation for the national struggle, 
patriotism. 
That the model of Islamic Jihad has functioned well in the field of politics is 
proven by the legitimacy acquired by HAMAS. Despite the 1993 
"breakthrough" in which Israel and the PLO reached an agreement for limited 
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Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, the Israeli has not ended. 
HAMAS, for the sake of Palestinian Islamism, has decided to combine the 
two models of Islamic revolution. Aware of the necessity to maintain the 
model of "Islamisation from above", it continues its' struggle against Israel. 
At the same time, it uses the national legitimacy acquired through this 
struggle to contest the PLO on the political level and to pursue and strengthen 
its traditional work of "Islamisation from below". These efforts have only 
increased since Arafat's "treachery" of 13 September 1993 on the White 
House lawn. 
Palestinian Islamists Compared with Militant Lebanese Shi'ites 
Introduction 
In the 1970s and 1980s, members of the two communities increasingly 
articulated their political and socio-economic demands in religious terms and 
explained politics by drawing upon religious historical analogies. In the 1990s 
and beyond, they continued in this fashion, professing to preserve the true 
belief system, uphold traditional ways of life and religious practices, and 
observe strict rules of personal and social conduct. This brand of religiosity is 
popular among the rural poor, the urban underprivileged, and intellectuals and 
professionals. Each movement aspires to improve the living conditions of its 
followers through the formation of a community of believers. For this reason, 
they have developed authoritarian organizations and established clear 
boundaries between them and their enemies. 
In addition to being a counter-response to the forces of modernization and 
secularism, Islamism derived from these two scenarios as the result of crises 
in national identity, the failure of the local political economy, and class 
cleavages. Religion, culture, and nationalism also furnished the basis for 
radicalism. A number of external factors accelerated the rise of the Islamist 
phenomenon. 
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Despite their differences, the two Islamist movements share a number of 
features. This study compares the two religious movements in terms of the 
variables that account for their emergence and compares their structures, 
ideologies, and relationships with the existing power holders. To achieve 
these objectives the study uses an explanatory framework consisting of crisis 
theory and resource mobilization models. This conceptual framework helps to 
point out the common causes and the properties of Islamism in the two 
communities. 
Reaction to Perceived Crises 
The Islamic resistance movement (HAMAS) in the Israeli occupied territories 
formed in reaction to the increasing secularization of the Muslim Palestinians 
and their drifting away from their religious beliefs and practices. HAMAS's 
leadership was dismayed by the "erosion of Palestinian morality", which was 
partly caused by Israel's occupation of Palestine and exposing the 
Palestinians to an alien culture and values. In a similar fashion, the Shi'ite 
Lebanese Islamists were reacting to the growing secularization of their 
community in post-independence Lebanon. 
Much of the criticism of the two Islamist movements was directed against 
symbols of secularization and against those co-religionists who drifted away 
from religious tradition. Certain aspects of modernity were singled out for 
attack, including television, cinema, secular voluntary associations, 
ideologies, and political parties. These have been seen as threats by corrupting 
the young and estranging them from their religious beliefs. For instance, 
HAMAS launched a campaign against owners of liquor stores and movie 
theatres, and those Palestinians who are morally corrupt. In the same vein, 
Shi'ite activists, troubled by the increasing secularization of their community, 
attacked Shi 'ites perceived as disloyal to their own tradition, including those 
who shaved or trimmed their beards, or women who failed to wear the veil. 
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Islamism in these cases also displayed a strong nationalist overtone. Defining 
the nation in exclusive religious terms was a common response to externally 
generated threats to ethnic identity and political integrity. These threats 
included rival religious groups, and secular elite and political movements. 
The two communities share a common belief that their cultural, religious, and 
ethnic identities are endangered by the culture of an alien majority. Such 
threats compelled them to invoke past traditions so as to preserve their 
national existence and their cultural purity, and to put forward demands for 
political independence. The subjugation of the Palestinians and the Lebanese 
Shi'ties to Israel's military occupation induced both groups to employ 
religion as a distinctive marker of group identity in order to counter their 
exposure to Western lifestyles and value systems. 
Intensification of religious sentiments also occurred among the Palestinians as 
a result of Jewish extremist attacks on the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem 
and Hebron. With regard to the Lebanese Shi'ites, throughout the second half 
of the 1970s and the 1980s, the Shi'ite villages and holy places in southern 
Lebanon were often subjected to Israeli military attacks. This situation forced 
the already impoverished Shi' ites to leave their towns and villages in southern 
Lebanon. 
Islamists and Political Economy 
The two Islamist movements were also affected by the state of the economy, 
the level of economic development, and unemployment in both Lebanon, and 
the occupied territories. Mounting unemployment and scarcity of social, 
educational, and health services were linked to the uneven distribution of the 
benefits of modernization. The resulting religious Islamist discourse in each 
of these cases accentuated purity (free from corruption), equality, and 
development as the gifts of a return to religious politics. 
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The deteriorating economic conditions were manifested in the decline of the 
percentage of peasants working in agriculture. After its occupation of the 
West bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel expropriated 52 percent of the West 
Bank land and 40 percent of the Gaza Strip, thus reducing the available land 
for cultivation.527 By the mid-1980s, the percentage of those Palestinians 
working in agriculture dropped to 28 percentage and 17 percent in the West 
Bank and Gaza, respectively. 528 Many of these peasants sought employment 
inside the Jewish state. During the second half of the 1980s and the early 
1990s, the economic conditions inside the occupied territories deteriorated 
further. The massive emigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union and 
the economic recession in Jordan and the gulf region caused conditional 
unemployment among the Palestinians. It was under the gloomy economic 
conditions that on 12 December 1988 HAMAS joined the political scene of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The Lebanese Shi'ite economy experienced a similar trend in the decline of 
the agricultural labor force. Unemployment among the Shi'ites increased in 
the 1980s as a result of the movement toward cash crops and farm 
mechanization. The Shi'ite farmers who continued to use traditional farming 
techniques were unable to compete in this modem environment. Despite the 
fact that 68 percent of the agricultural land is controlled by Shi'ite peasants, 
only 5 .1 percent of the national budget was allocated for economic 
development of these areas. 529 
Islamists and Political Parties 
Islamism amongst the two groups was preceded by the rise of inconclusive 
secular political parties. Like the Palestinians, Lebanese Shi'ite Islamists were 
527 Rubenberg, Cheryl A., "Twenty Years of Israeli Economic Policies in the West Bank 
and Gaza: Prologue to the Antiradar", Journal of Arab Affairs 8, Spring 1989: 35. 
528 Benvenisti, Meron, West Bank Data Report, Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1987, p. 19. 
529 Schbley, Ayla, "Religious Resurgence and Religious Terrorism: A Study of the Actions 
of the Shi'a Sectarian Movement in Lebanon"; Ph.D. dissertation: University of North 
Texas, Denton, Texas, 1988, pp. 103-9. 
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subjected to modernizing secular movements. Post-independence 
advancements in Lebanese communications and transportation eliminated the 
Shi'ite sense of geographic and social seclusion and exposed the Shi'ites to 
outside ideologies.530 During the 1960s, they began to participate in a wide 
range of secular political parties: the Ba'ath, the Arab nationalists, the Syrian 
nationalists, and the Lebanese Communist Party. The failure of these parties 
to ameliorate the living conditions of the Shi'ites prompted Imam Musa al-
Sadr ( the religious and political leader of the Shi' ites) in the mid- l 970s to 
form AMAL. 
The Shi'a Movements in Lebanon 
The emergence of militant Shi'a Islamic movements in Lebanon, in the form 
of the AMAL Movement (an acronym for Alwaj al-Muqawama al-
Lubnaniyya, Groups of the Lebanese Resistance) and Hizbullah (Party of 
God) is of fairly recent origin. 
AMAL 
One can argue that the formation of Amal by Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1974 
marked the beginnings of the rise of militant Shi'a Islam in Lebanon. But 
Imam Musa al-Sadr was not a militant leader, nor was it his intention to create 
a militant type of organization as such. His main concern was to weaken the 
all-powerful traditional leadership of feudal-style landowners such as Kamil 
al-Asad who dominated the Shi'a community of the Jabal Amil area of 
southern Lebanon. AMAL itself was to be al-Sadr's instrument for extending 
and consolidating the position of the clerical hierarchy in J abal Amil at the 
expense of the traditional ruling families. 
530 Norton, Augustus Richard, "Religious Resurgence and Political Mobilization of the 
Shi'a in Lebanon", in Emile Sahliyeh, ed., Religious Resurgence and Politic in The 
Contemporary World, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990, p. 230. 
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The programme of reform which Imam Musa al-Sadr enunciated after two 
months of deliberations by the members of the religious and executive bodies 
of the Higher Shi'ite Islamic Council, and the Rally of Shi'ite personalities 
(presided over by Musa al-Sadr himself) reinforced the image of AMAL as 
being far from radical or militant in character. The Shi'ite working paper 
issued on 11 May 1977, which arose from these proceedings saw only a 
limited secular role for the Shi'ite community in Lebanon.531 The primary aim 
of this new organization was to promote the political and economic interests 
of the Shi'ite community and to reform the Lebanese political and economic 
system.532 AMAL supported Lebanon's territorial integrity, national 
sovereignty, and cultural and religious diversity. 
Ideology 
The ideological bent of AMAL is reformist in nature, with an emphasis on the 
religious foundations of the movement reflecting the continuing influence of 
its founder Imam Musa al-Sadr. 
The first principle as expounded in the Charter of AMAL pertains to matters 
such as the existence of God, some of His attributes, the abstract notion of 
believing in God, and the real meaning of believing in God and Man as the 
measure of divine legislation.533 The second principle, which consists of 
"being committed to [our] legacy and to [gaining] benefit from the 
experiences of other countries of the world",534 shows a clear willingness to 
open with respect to various fields of science and humanities in contrast to the 
inward-looking ideology of Hizbullah. 
The third principle embraces the belief in the complete freedom of the citizen 
(al-muwatin) who is a member of the Lebanese polity. This comprises the 
531 Al-Nahar, 12 May I 977. 
532 Norton, Augustus Richard, Amal and the Shi 'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, 
Austin: University of Texas Press, I 987. 
533 Mithaq Harakat Amal, Beirut: Amal Central Information Committee, n. d., pp. 14-23. 
534 Ibid. p. 27. 
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standard freedoms in a democratic system, namely the freedom of thought, 
religious freedom, the freedom to form associations, and unions. On the other 
hand the AMAL Charter calls for a 'conditional economic freedom' that is 
restricting the economic freedom of the individual in order to safeguard the 
rights of the community. AMAL almost borders on calling for revolutionary 
change in regard to this matter by stating that "the free man does not endeavor 
to accept and justify the world as it is, but rather revolts against its corruption, 
and rejects the tyrants on Earth to realize the real freedom in the worship of 
God. He is the [ embodiment of] revolution in his faith, in his philosophy, in 
his political leadership".535 
The economic component of the AMAL Charter reiterates a theme that the 
Lebanese parties on the left had expressed in the early 1970s, namely, that the 
Lebanese economy was an economy dominated by services. AMAL singled 
out monopoly (al-ihtikar) and usury (al-riba) as evil practices in the Charter, 
with a quotation from Imam Ali against the former. It also proposed a banking 
system as a substitute for usury, described as a partnership for profit and loss 
system (al-mudaraba). The Charter in effect invokes 'the divine message' as 
its foundation for economic policy. 536 
The fifth and sixth principles deal with the patriotic or national character of 
AMAL, and world Zionism respectively. In the case of the former, AMAL 
expresses its strong attachment to "national sovereignty of the homeland". It 
also rejects any kind of external 'worship' over Lebanon.537 Although the 
AMAL Charter is strongly anti-imperialist and anti- Zionist, calling for the 
ending of 'the imperialist presence in the Arab region (the Zionist entity)' it 
refuses to 'isolate' any person or party, but believes, on the contrary, that 
national unity should include all peoples in the 'melting pot' of national 
535 Ibid. p. 41-2. 
536 Ibid. p. 49-50. 
537 Ibid. p. 53. 
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common interest. AMAL denies that it is either sectarian or partisan, and 
shuns sectarian fanaticism. 538 
Similarly, the secular political parties were unable to moderate the rapid 
urbanization of the Shi' ites or to provide them with equality. Like the secular 
movements, AMAL failed to reform Lebanon's political system. This 
situation increased the exasperation of the shi' ites and created a power 
vacuum that was eventually filled by Hizbullah. 
The Palestinian Islamists share a comparable experience. Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza were exposed to secular and traditional politicians in the 
1950s and 1960s. These included the Arab nationalists, the Communists, the 
Ba'ath, and the Jordanian government.539 In the 1970s, they were attracted to 
Palestinian nationalism and the PLO and its factions. The secular and 
traditional political parties' elite, however, were unable to bring about 
solutions to pending problems, because of their political division and 
rivalries. The insensitivity of the PLO to the political and economic 
grievances of its followers inside the occupied territories diminished its 
legitimacy and increased the appeal of Islamism among the discontented. The 
alliance between the PLO mainstream politicians, the middle-class 
intellectuals and professionals, and some older politicians left some salient 
problems un-addressed, including the questions of economic development and 
the place of religion and women in society.540 The negligence of such 
developmental issues led to the creation of a psychological gulf between the 
urban elite and the residents of the rural areas and refugee camps. 
This situation contributed to the rise of Islamism. To many disillusioned 
Palestinians, the stance of the Islamic movement became more attractive. To 
fill the power vacuum created by the PLO's diplomatic immobilism, the 
Muslim Brotherhood founded HAMAS. The creation of HAMAS was 
538 Ibid. pp. 56, 68. 
539 Sahliyeh, Emile, In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967, Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings, 1988, chapter 2. 
540 Ibid. 
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intended to give new image to the conservative nature of the Brotherhood and 
to underline its commitment to the Palestinian cause. 
Hizbullah 
The formation of Hizbullah in Lebanon was clearly tied to the triumph of the 
Islamic revolution of Iran and to Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon. In 
fact until the arrival of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards, who 
numbered around 1,000 in June 1982, ostensibly to fight Israel, and who 
made their headquarters the city of Ba'albek, Hizbullah had previously 
existed simply as an idea in the writings of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. In 
the closing paragraphs of his major political work, Al-Islam wa Mantiq al-
Quwwa (Islam and the Logic of Force), Fadlallah had expressed the hope that 
his book would establish the basis for the formation of an organization like 
Hizbullah. Otherwise he had hoped 'to furnished the ground for new studies 
and new ideas' .541 Little did he know that within three years the Iranian 
revolution would establish a Shi' a Islamic state in Iran, which, in turn, would 
eventually lead to the formation of a Hizbullah in Lebanon in the summer of 
1982. 
The Hizbullah is an umbrella organization of various radical Shi'ite groups 
and organizations, which adhere to a Khomeinistic ideology. The organization 
was established following the 1982 Peace for Galilee War in Lebanon (and an 
increased Iranian presence and influence in Lebanon). The Hizbullah 
organization was established as a body for Shi'ite Islamists, led by religious 
clerics, who see in the adoption of Iranian doctrine a solution to the Lebanese 
political malaise. This includes the use of terror as a means of attaining 
political objectives. 
Toward the end of 1982 Iran sent fighters from its 'Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards' to Lebanon in order to assist in the establishment of a revolutionary 
541 Fadlallah, Muhammad Husain, Al-Islam wa Mantiq al-Quwwa, 2°d ed., Beirut: al-
Muassat al-Alami-1-yah lil-Dirasat Wal-Tawzi, 1981, p. 298. 
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Islamic movement whose members would participate in the 'Jihad', Holy 
War, against Israel. These forces, which were located in the area of Ba'albek 
in the northern Beqa'a Valley, bestowed on the area an Iranian-Islamic 
character and constituted the core of the Hizbullah organization in Lebanon. 
The organization maintains a training apparatus in Lebanon throughout the 
villages and their surroundings, as well as outside of Lebanon. Training is 
aimed at building a reliable manpower source for its military forces as well as 
for its terror arm. 
The spiritual founder of the movement in Lebanon was Sheikh Muhammad 
Hussein Fadlallah who acted as chief Mujtahid- arbiter of Islamic law- of the 
Shi'ite community in Lebanon. With the passage of time, Hizbullah has 
turned into an organization of secondary level groups working on the local 
level led by regional functionaries. 
Ideology 
In contrast to AMAL, the ideological basis and outlook of Hizbullah 
approximates most closely that of Khomeinism and its principle goal of the 
establishment of a pan-Islamic republic headed by religious clerics. If in 
AMAL' s ideology one can barely detect the Shi' a character of the movement 
(with only the not infrequent quotations from Imam Ali revealing its Shi'a 
character in a cryptic manner), in the case of Hizbullah, the influence of 
Iranian Shi' a thought is obvious. The first ideological tenet of Hizbullah, 
following 'the Imam [Khomeini] line (Khat al-Imam)' is the imperative 
struggling against 'imperialism in all its forms', followed by the stand of 'no-
East and no-West, only Islam'. 542 Hizbullah follows Khomeini's thought in 
believing that all disasters that have befallen Muslim countries can be traced 
to foreign imperialists and in particular to the U.S.A. Quoting Khomeini, 
Hizbullah maintains the view that "the original objective of the imperialist 
542 Al-Ahd, 57, 25 July 1985, p. 8; Al-Ahd is the most prominent Newspaper Publication of 
Hizbullah. 
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countries is to destroy the Holy Qur'an and to obliterate it, and to destroy 
Islam and the Muslim ulema (leadership) ... and their plan is to keep [Islamic 
countries] backward, and in the name of encouraging education ... they have 
suppressed religious schools".543 Not unrelated to the first tenet, the complete 
political, economic and legislative unity of all Muslims has been the central 
goal in Khomeini's thought, and this is only possible when an Islamic state is 
established. 
The organization's worldview was first published in its political platform in 
February 1985 as follows: 
* 
* 
The solution to Lebanon's problems is the establishment of an 
Islamic republic, as only this type of regime can secure justice 
and equality for all Lebanese citizens. 
The Hizbullah organization views as an important goal the fight 
against 'western imperialism' and its eradication from Lebanon. 
The group strives for complete Western withdrawal from 
Lebanon, including all of their institutions. 
* The conflict with Israel is viewed as a central concern. This is 
not only limited to the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) presence in 
Lebanon. Rather, the complete destruction of the state of Israel 
and the establishment of Islamic rule over Jerusalem is an 
expressed goal. 544 
Part of this radical ideology is the group's militant approach using terror as a 
means of attaining its goals. Hizbullah decries the existence of Israel ('the 
little Satan'), viewed as foreign to the region and which constitutes a threat to 
Islam and Muslims. The destruction of Israel and the liberation of Jerusalem 
are deemed a religious obligation. The Hizbullah organization justifies the use 
of terror against these enemies as a weapon in the hands of the weak and 
543 Ibid. 
544 ask@israel-info.gov.il IDF Spokesman 'Hizbullah', June 6, 1994. 
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oppressed against the strong aggressor. In an effort to act upon and realize the 
predetermined ideological lines the group's leaders actively plan and 
perpetrate terror attacks against Israel and disseminate Iranian ideology. The 
Hizbullah extends its struggle to areas in Lebanon. 
With the signing of the 'Taif Agreement' in 1989 and the beginning of the 
'Syrian arrangement' in Lebanon, the Hizbullah has been forced to conform 
to Syrian dictates. The Syrian interest in the continuation of terrorist attack in 
Southern Lebanon has enabled the Hizbullah to maintain its unique status in 
the Lebanese arena as the only major military force yet to be disarmed. The 
Syrians have prevented the Lebanese government from harming the military 
capability of the Hizbullah, under the pretext of opposing the Israeli 
occupation, while at the same time enforcing their dictates upon the 
organization during periods when they are interested in calming the situation 
in southern Lebanon (as was the case following 'Operation Accountability in 
July 1993 or the period coinciding with the Asad-Clinton meeting in January 
1994'). 
The Spread of Hizbullah into Southern Lebanon 
As the organizational infrastructure developed, Hizbullah, with Iranian and 
Syrian assistance, began to establish an extensive military network in the 
Ba'albek area. Its militias have since spread into the Shi'ite neighborhoods in 
southern and western Beirut as well as into southern Lebanon. 545 
This network is the principal base of Hizbullah activities as well as for those 
of other radical Shi'ite groups. Thousands of Hizbullah activists and members 
are located in the Beqa'a Valley, Beirut and southern Lebanon. These areas 
also offer a base for the recruitment of additional activists and fighters among 
the local Shi'ite populations. 
545 Third World Quarterly, vol. l 0, no. 2, April 1988, p.p. 697-8. 
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Following the IDF withrrawal from Lebanon in 1985, the Hizbullah 
organization consolidated itself. This consolidation included the establishment 
of strong depots for weapons, recruitment of activists and fighters, and 
widespread aid to residents in Southern Lebanon, with the donation of money, 
equipment, medical supplies, etc. The purpose of the aid was to gain support 
of the local population in favour of the organisation's activities in the South. 
Attacks and Terrorism 
Using cover names such as 'Islamic Jihad', 'The Revolutionary Justice 
Organization' and 'The Islamic Resistance', with the blessings of its religious 
leaders, Hizbullah has carried out a series of high profile attacks against 
American and Multinational Forces targets in Lebanon and Israeli targets in 
the south of the country. Only later did their attacks become more intensive as 
well as demonstrating better planning, especially immediately prior to the 
opening of the peace process. 
In 1991, Hizbullah was responsible for 52 attacks, as compared to 19 attacks 
the organization carried out in 1990. In 1992, Hizbullah launched 63 attacks 
and in 1993, 15 8 attacks, when during the course of 'Operation 
Accountability' they fired hundreds of Katyusha rockets into the Security 
Zone and Israeli territory. 546 
Triumphant Hizbullah 
The party that became notorious in the 1980s for bombing embassies and 
kidnapping foreigners is now preaching against violence. Calling itself "The 
Party of God" and incorporating a gun in its emblem may not be the best way 
546 ask@israel-info.gov.il IDF Spokesman 'Hizbullah', June 6, 1994. 
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to win friends, but these days Hizbullah wants to be loved, by Christians and 
Sunni Muslims as well as its fellow Shi'ites. 
The Israeli retreat from southern Lebanon has certainly brought Hizbullah 
respect and admiration, if not love. Almost every one in Lebanon believes 
that its long guerrilla war, in which hundreds of "martyrs" died, has brought 
them liberation. In the Arab world generally, it is difficult to underestimate 
the psychological power of its achievement. 
Since the establishment of Israel in 1948 and through two full-scale wars in 
1967 and 1973, the Arabs have known nothing but defeat. Not only has this 
colored political discourse for the last two generations, it has become deeply 
embedded in the culture: a constant theme of films, books and poetry. All that 
changed in early June 2000 when Israel withdrew its forces from southern 
Lebanon. "This was the first Arab victory", the Hizbullah spokesman Hussein 
Naboulsi said. "The first time the Israelis have left an Arab land in defeat".547 
The conclusion he would like the world to draw is that Hizbullah's methods 
work and should be copied elsewhere. 
There is, however, still unfinished business with Israel: issues regarding 
hostages, prisoners and, above all, the return of the Shebaa farms, a border 
area claimed by Lebanon which Israel says, and also according to the U.N., 
belongs to Syria. "If the Israelis do not leave that part of Lebanon the 
resistance will continue", Mr. Naboulsi said. But he adds: We're not in a 
hurry. We will wait and see".548 After years of conflict, the Lebanese people 
clearly want peace, and Hizbullah has a lot to lose by resuming the armed 
struggle. 
What began in 1982 as an underground movement during the civil war, and 
quickly earned a reputation as the most daring of Lebanon's armed groups, is 
today very much above ground: it has a television station, a radio station, a 
newspaper, and a website (www.hizbollah.org). One key to its success is that 
it combines guns with good works. When effective government was lacking 
547 B.B.C. World Service News, June 2000. 
548 Ibid. 
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in much of Lebanon it set up its own social security networks, providing jobs, 
health care and education. A European aid worker in southern Lebanon said: 
"During the Israeli occupation, if someone's house was hit by a rocket 
Hizbullah would be round within two or three days to rebuild it". 549 
This has undoubtedly helped it win favor, though critics accuse it of cynically 
ingratiating itself with certain groups. It has also created expectations that 
may be difficult to fulfill. Particularly as central government reasserts itself in 
the south and tries to take over some of Hizbullah's functions. Its welfare, 
cultural and sporting organizations are its main recruiting grounds. Anyone 
can join. They don't have to be committed to all the rules, but they must 
support Hizbullah politically. Once they are in these peripheral organizations, 
volunteers are assessed for loyalty, ideological orientation and discipline, and, 
if they pass the test, may be invited to join the party. A particular personality 
type is said to be favoured: those with good listening skills who will 
implement party decision without question. 
The party claims tens of thousands of members, but key decisions are made 
by a close-knit group of no more thanlO people, headed by Sheikh Hassan 
Nasrallah, who took over in 1992 after the Israeli army killed Sheikh Abbas 
Mussawi. 
At the outset Hizbullah was funded mainly by Iran, to the value of US$500 
million a year in the mid- l 980s, plus unspecified amounts, probably running 
to hundreds of millions of dollars, for weaponry. That has fallen dramatically 
over the years, and today the Iranian government support is thought to be no 
more than US$20 million annually. 550 
Because of Lebanon's unique cultural and religious mix, Hizbullah has 
become more tolerant of opposing views than Islamist groups elsewhere. It 
does not seek to impose its own code of behaviour on other Lebanese, 
although this was not always the case: it used to run "morality patrols" on the 
beach but met with so much opposition that it abandoned them. Today 
549 B.B.C. World Service News, 2 June 2002. 
550 Guardian Weekly, June 8-14, 2000, p. 3. 
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Lebanon is probably the only Arab country where women walk in the street 
not only with their heads uncovered, but some with their shoulders and legs 
uncovered as well. Mr. Naboulsi said: "We don't impose our views on others; 
we let people make their own choice. If you have kids and force them to do 
things, they will hate you. If you are a friend to them they will love you. Islam 
is not a force, its discussion and dialogue".551 Some are suspicious, but Nizar 
Hamzeh, an expert on Hizbullah at the American University in Beirut, 
believes that, up to a point, it is sincere.552 
It accepts freedom and democracy, not for their own sakes but because of 
local conditions, he said. Hizbullah is pragmatic and has decided to form a 
contract with the wicked, but the achievement of the ideal Islamic state will 
always be there as a goal. 
The challenge for Hizbullah is how to recruit non-Shi'as. It has succeeded 
with some Christians and other sects, but those remain few, Hamzeh said. 
It is not just a matter of persuading them to support the party but, ultimately, 
converting them to an ideology that is rooted in the political theories of the 
late Ayatollah Khomeini. To Hizbullah activists, those theories are so 
obviously correct that dialogue, tolerance and avoiding violence will surely be 
enough to win others over. The question is what Hizbullah will do if others 
fail to see the light. 
Conclusion 
As noted earlier: the present leadership of AMAL and Hizbullah have well-
established links with external parties- Syria in the case of AMAL, and Iran 
and Syria in the case of Hizbullah. AMAL, in particular, is inextricably tied to 
the late Asad regime which has utilized AMAL in fighting against the 
Lebanese authorities during the years of 1983-84. This culminated in the 
takeover of West Beirut on 6 February 1984, and the unleashing AMAL 
551 B.B.C. World Service News, 7 June 2000. 
552 Ibid. 
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against the Palestinian refugee camps during May-June 1985, April-July 
1986, and October 1986- February 1987. In all these conflicts the interests of 
AMAL were secondary to those of the late Asad regime in Syria. In fact 
AMAL has become Asad' s most important proxy and has enabled Syria to 
achieve a range of policy objectives in Lebanon.Hizbullah's ties to Iran are 
glaringly obvious in so far as Iran provides both the ideological arsenal, and 
the financial support for its followers in Lebanon. The role of Hizbullah has 
converged with the interests of both Iran and Syria. Islamic Jihad (which by 
the admission of Hizbullah' s leaders553 is Hizbullah' s most important 
operational covert organization) has served Syrian and Iranian interests 
through the capture and release of hostages, thus benefiting both countries in 
their foreign policy objectives. The notion that Syria is on a collision course 
with Hizbullah is itself part and parcel of the Asad regime's campaign of 
disinformation. It has allowed Asad to expand the deployment of his troops in 
Lebanon with Western approval under the pretext of curbing Hizbullah. Yet 
the arrival of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon via Syria 
in June 1982 was largely at Syria's behest and was in accordance with a 
military agreement signed between Iran and Syria.554 In the case of Syria, a 
distinction should be made between Sunni Muslim movements which have 
constituted a threat to the regime, and Shi'a Islamic movements (including 
Hizbullah) which have become a positive asset to the Alawi-minority based 
Asad regime, in Lebanon and the Middle East region as a whole. 
The Shi' a of Lebanon is dominated at present by the AMAL movement and 
Hizbullah in its various forms. This domination is destined to continue as long 
as the Asad regime in Syria and Khameini' s Iran remain the two most 
important external powers in Lebanon. Most probably the majority of the 
Shi' a in Lebanon are not enamored of the leadership AMAL nor by 
553 'Hizbullah: Harakat Askariya am Siyasiya am Diniya (Hizbullah: An Army or Political 
or Religious Movement)? Al-Shira, 17 March 1987, pp. 19-20. 
554 Deeb, Marius, Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis and 
Ideology, Occasional Papers Series, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown 
University, Washington DC, 1986, p. 19. 
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Hizbullah, but they have no choice when the barrel of the gun is the order of 
the day. Shi' a traditional leaders and Shi' a local notables have not 
disappeared. It is highly unlikely that they would ever regain their ascendancy 
as long as the conflict in Lebanon becomes more politically active than ever 
before. Their dominant leaders become increasingly subordinate to the wishes 
of Syria and Iran. 
Organization, Structure, and Resources 
The nature of the political system, governmental legitimacy, and the level of 
popular participation in Islamist movements are factors that affect their 
chances of success. In both cases, Islamism arose in a political climate 
characterized by a relative degree of democratization. In Lebanon, the West 
Bank and Gaza, trade unions, voluntary associations, and political parties and 
movements have been part of the local political landscape. This situation 
enabled the Islamists to operate openly, for the most part. 
Islamism surfaced also in an environment of religious or sectarian conflict. 
Each of the two movements was and is engaged in a power struggle with a 
rival religious enemy. Hizbullah wishes to establish an Islamic society in 
Lebanon, a goal that placed the party in direct conflict with the Lebanese 
Christians; the followers of HAMAS insist on the formation of an Islamic 
state in all of Palestine. The cultures of the Lebanese Shi 'ites, and the 
Palestinians do not distinguish between religion and politics. In Lebanon, 
religion shapes the cultural milieu and delineates the social and political 
identity of the individual. 555 To a large extent the Palestinians function in a 
similar cultural setting. 
In addition to these contextual factors, the two cases were triggered by major 
political developments. Hizbullah's emergence was precipitated by the 
outbreak of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and by Israel's invasion of 
555 Hudson, Michael C., The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon, 
New York: Random House, 1968. 
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Lebanon in 1982. In turn, HAMAS was triggered by the outbreak of the 
Intifada in 1987 and the leading role that the Islamic Jihad played in the 
outbreak of the uprising. 
Despite the impact of these various forces, however, religious radicalism 
among the Shi'ites, and the Palestinians could not emerge unless these groups 
possessed certain distinctive assets and resources to meet the needs of 
adaptation. Charismatic leadership, organizational structures, communication 
networks, manpower, economic assets, political opportunities, and ideology 
were the primary resources that facilitated religious militancy.556 
Aside from the resemblance between the two movements in the areas of 
explanatory variables and structures and resources, other parallels can be 
found at the ideological and political levels. Such similarities include the 
nationalist overtone of the religious movement, the propensity toward 
violence, the admissibility of modern science and technology, the hostility 
towards Westernization, the presence of a millenarian vision, and the call for 
equality. 
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis yields a number of significant observations that tie the 
two Islamist movements together. Firstly, the causes of religious resurgence 
are multifarious. The renewed interest in religion has occurred in respect to 
the far-reaching social and economic changes that interrupted the traditional 
way of life of the Palestinians and the Shi'ites. The economic deprivation of 
these communities; their social exclusion, and political under-representation 
have afforded a suitable environment for the emergence of the phenomenon of 
religious fundamentalism. 
556 Aya, Rod, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective 
Violence", Theory and Society 8, July 1979:39-99. 
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Secondly, these religious groups have opted to deal with maJor social, 
economic, and personal problems by invoking their prophetic tradition. 
Religious leaders mediate issues involving marriage, inheritance, work, and 
property-related disputes. Many of these functions have traditionally been 
performed by the state. In addition, Islamism addresses a variety of political 
questions that are salient to the individual and the society alike. Such 
concerns have included personal freedoms versus regulated social behavior, 
ethno-nationalism, class cleavages, political autonomy, the place of religion 
and women in the society, secularism, modernism, and economic 
development and equality. In a relatively short time, these groups developed 
ideas concerning these core issues. 
Thirdly, Islamism gives the individual Shi'ite, and Palestinian Muslim a sense 
of cultural continuity and national existence and furnishes them with a vision 
for the future. The organizational advantages of the Islamists and their access 
to a sophisticated communication network enable them to include newly 
emerging classes and social groups in the political process. Indeed, these new 
groups find religious symbolism including charismatic leaders and clerics, 
martyrdom in defence of one's cause, egalitarianism, and divine doctrines to 
be valuable assets to buttress their demands for the redistribution of economic 
resources. Religion also avails these groups of a unifying ideology and an 
institution to extend social welfare-related services. 
Fourthly, while providing its followers with numerous benefits, Islamism 
presents a formidable challenge to the forces of secular nationalism. Whether 
it is in Lebanon, the occupied territories, or in the wider Muslim world, the 
Islamists seek to redress the status quo. Their long-term objective is to 
dismantle the existing political and social order and to establish in its place a 
puritan-like society where religion would guide public and private life. 
Finally, although the Islamists aspire to establish their exclusivist state, the 
dictates of political realism would compel them to accept less than their 
ideals. Undoubtedly, the presence of definable enemies will continue to 
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sustain their movements. But the political reality of the existence of Israel and 
the diverse ideology and religious composition of both Lebanon and Palestine 
will compel the Islamists to acknowledge such facts. The absorption of such 
lessons can already be observed. HAMAS has occasionally articulated 
accommodating positions toward Israel, while the Lebanese Shi' ites 
recognize that Lebanon's cultural and religious diversity limit their goal to 
establish an Islamic republic. 
Islam has been a part of Middle Eastern and North African life since the 
seventh century. However, since the 1970s there has been a proliferation of 
Islamic groups who envision rule by Islamic precepts and practices as a 
solution to social, political and economic inadequacies in the region. The 
generation of Islamic ideals was a product of rapid change to Muslim society. 
This occurred as a result of modernization, due to the increase in oil revenue 
in 1973 and 197 4, and later the economic crisis that was experienced in 
countries such as Egypt and Algeria in the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, economic 
disparity, poverty, lack of political participation and corruption, which 
resulted from class formation and the creation of elite members of society. 
On a regional scale, hierarchies of wealth have emerged due to the oil 
revenues in parts of the Middle East, particularly, the Gulf States. 
As a result of these changes in society, people have become disillusioned with 
regimes that have instituted autocratic rule in order to maintain their power 
base. They are blamed for ineptitude and corruption and the inability to find 
solutions for society's ills. This disillusionment is reflected in each of the case 
studies above. Leaving Israel aside, the six other cases are all led by 
autocratic regimes. Labelled corrupt and ineffective, the failure of the 
governments to generate economic development in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Iran and Lebanon has given rise to dissent amongst the populations. 
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Conversely, the Saudi rulers have been accused of elitism, nepotism, and 
moral and economic laxness. 
The Western influence that modernization was perceived to entail, affected 
Muslim societies as this was seen to be a threat to Islamic identity and values. 
The alleviation of this threat was embodied in the return to Islamic principles, 
through rule by Allah. The catalyst for the rejection of the West is apparent in 
the influence that the Iranian popular revolt had when its people abandoned 
the political reforms and policies of the Shah in favour of traditional Islamic 
principles. Although the Iranian revolution was unable to transcend ethnicity 
and national boundaries, its influence was discernable throughout the Islamic 
world. For many, the revolution signalled the opportunity to reject western 
ideologies and mould suitable social, political and economic ideals based on 
Islamic values, which is the primary feature that binds the identity of the 
region. Similarly, Israeli defeats of the Arab world, particularly the 1967, 
have also influenced the proliferation of Islamism as the defeats have been 
blamed on the failure of Arab states that are viewed as un-Islamic. 
The proliferation of Islamic groups in the Middle East and North Africa 
throughout the last three decades was a result of several factors. Firstly, rapid 
change in the organization and development of Middle Eastern society has 
occurred as a result of increased revenue. However, recession has also led to 
socio-economic malaise as class disparity, unemployment and the inability of 
governments to provide financial, educational and employment opportunity 
has impacted on rising population growth. Secondly, there has been increasing 
perception of the autocratic regimes as un-Islamic, corrupt and inept, as well 
as very little political participation for the masses. Finally, the incursion of 
Western influence has been viewed as a threat to Islamic values and identity. 
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CHAPTER 2: ISLAM AS THE SOLUTION 
Introduction 
The political program of the Islamists, who are often inaccurately called 
"Islamic fundamentalists", seeks to restore a heavily idealized old order of 
things. It is driven, in part, by an alienation from the present world system in 
which they consider the Muslim world's position as unjustly marginal in light 
of Islam's past glories. For them, Islam is the solution. Islamists perceive 
Islam to be the answer to social ills. The Qur' an is prescriptive and 
emphasizes social justice and redistribution of wealth. However, like other 
religious doctrines, interpretations are varied. Vandenbroucke notes a 
common theme apparent in the Islamist trend, which is the idea that 
redemption is possible through society's strict compliance to the word of 
God.557 Living by the Qur'an and the Shar'ia (Islamic Law), Islamists believe 
Muslims will be spared from sin and the common ills of society such as 
corruption and economic deprivation. 
Their chief criticism of the nationalist powers that have ruled the Muslim 
countries since independence is that nationalism, though designed to repel 
western military and political domination, did not dare to challenge Western 
concepts and modes of government and reinstate the Islamic tradition (al-
turath). Islamists would like to be viewed as the true anti-imperialist force, 
pushing the struggle a step further by resisting not only the West's political 
hegemony but also its intrusive ideas like liberalism, secularism, and 
globalism. 
557 L. S. Vandenbroucke, Why Allah's Zealots? A Study of the Causes of Islamic 
Fundamentalism in Egypt and Saudi Arabia in The Middle East Review, 16: 1, p. 30-31, 
1983. 
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Regimes U oder Siege 
Opposed to the Islamist program, governments of the Muslim world face a 
triple embarrassment. First, the regimes have been unable to convince their 
people of any outstanding successes in the tasks they proclaimed for 
themselves: the "liberation of Palestine", pan-Arab or pan-Islamic 
reunification, political participation, and social and economic prosperity. 
Second, because they rarely challenged the western worldview, they have 
failed to develop alternative legitimating factors other than an obsession with 
political independence and cultural authenticity. Third, they are relying, more 
and more, on foreign support to stay in power and to fend off their domestic 
opposition or their neighbours' aggressions. That dependence on the West was 
demonstrated most spectacularly in the American-led campaign to retrieve 
Kuwait from Iraqi annexation. It was also confirmed by the West's relief, too 
openly expressed, at the military's interruption of the electoral process in 
Algeria, which threatened to bring pro-Islamist forces to power. 
Hence, most current regimes suffer intrinsic weakness against the emerging 
Islamist challenge. The Islamists gain popular appeal by endeavouring to 
accomplish the very program nationalist regimes had devised but were unable 
to achieve- be it because of the regime's widespread corruption, their 
squandering of oil revenues, their reliance on the West, their more recent 
submission to International Monetary Fund strictures, or their persistent lack 
of interest in tradition. 
In essence Islamists espouse the nationalist's program, translate it into 
religious terms, and promise to achieve it the moment they gain power. 
Islamists thus embody an ambiguous mixture of continuity in policy and 
radical shift in elite identity. Algerian Islamist leader Abassi Madani, himself 
a former militant of the National Liberation Front (FLN in French) which has 
ruled the country since independence, insists that the Islamic Salvation Front 
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(FIS) program is a return to the FLN's "authentic" foundations during the war 
of liberation that ended 40 years ago. Elsewhere, Islamist groups attract 
thousands of militants who had political experience in nationalist, Ba'athist, 
Nasserist, or Mossadeghist parties and who have been disappointed by those 
parties' inability to keep their promises. One Lebanese thinker, Munah 1-Solh, 
noted 30 years ago that Arab elites were basically nationalist while Arab 
masses were religious. The formula may be simplistic, but it is fairly accurate. 
In some sense, the Islamic revival is a kind of elite adjustment to the popular 
preference. 
Because "the FIS is the son of the FLN", it would be a grave error to believe 
that today's Islamist groups originated in those traditional sectors of Muslim 
societies that opposed post-independence modernization policies. 
Sociological surveys in countries like Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon indicate 
that Islamist activists tend to come from university campuses rather than from 
among illiterates. One striking finding is the Islamists' strength in university 
science departments as compared to literary or legal studies. Science students 
feel that their rejection of Western-style modernity stems from a basic 
understanding of where modernity can lead them. They are very critical of the 
traditional religious establishment, which they deem too passive or too 
subservient to the government. Religious intellectuals (ulema), in fact, are on 
the government payroll in most countries. 
Not surprising, Islamist militants generally received lukewarm reception from 
the traditional religious establishment of their countries. In Egypt, ulema at 
Al-Azhar (a religious university that recently celebrated a millennium of 
existence) are generally on the government's side. In Saudi Arabia, most of 
them support Saud family rule and operate as the regime's spokesmen and 
advocates. And in Algeria, most of the religious establishment did not 
participate in the FIS attempt to take power. 
Today's Islamists actually represent the third generation of militants inspired 
by religion. The first was part and parcel of the national liberation movement 
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against foreign domination, and in places like the Maghreb and Iran, 
sometimes represented the largest trend within the movement. When Hassan 
al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, it was conceived as part 
of the Egyptian national struggle against the British colonialists and came to 
represent some 3 million militants in the wake of the 1952 Free Officers coup. 
In Iraq, religious and nationalist supporters of the "1920 revolution" against 
the imposition of British rule were indistinguishable. The Algerian FLN was 
as Islamic as it was nationalistic in its struggle against French colonization. 
After independence, nationalists achieved a monopoly over the state. In most 
Middle Eastern countries, nationalist and secularist military officers took over 
the state apparatus and ostracized the religious elements of the anti-Western 
struggle. Muslim Brothers were killed in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria; Egypt's 
Gamal Abdel Nasser had the leader of the Brotherhood executed in Cairo, and 
the Ba'ath party was extremely tough on religious movements in Iraq and 
Syria. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, the Shah of Iran, and Habib 
Bourghuiba of Tunisia embarked on clearly Western-inspired policies, notably 
in matters of women's rights, public observance of the Ramadan fast, and 
even personal dress. The second generation of Islamic militants was thus 
composed of "martyrs"- those killed, jailed, or exiled by their one-time 
comrades. 
Governments now face a third generation of militants, fostered by the spread 
of mass education and disenchantment with the current regimes. The new 
wave is drawn mostly from well-educated cadres who had some access to a 
Western-style education but who did not find a job easily. They have seen that 
Islamism now has a chance to repeal the nationalist monopoly on power, as 
was demonstrated in Iran and Sudan. It was also nearly won in Algeria. 
Generally speaking, they are more patient than their predecessors about 
attaining political power; they intend to pressure governments to gradually 
implement the Islamic program before directly challenging a regime's rule. 
For example, Islamists in 1980 forced an amendment to the Egyptian 
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constitution introducing Shar'ia, Islamic law, as the main source of legislation, 
and engineered the Shar'ia's actual imposition in Mauritania in 1983 and in 
Pakistan in 1985. They pressured Algeria's FLN to amend the family code in 
1984 and forced changes in Sudan's penal code while General Ga'afar al-
Nimeiry was still in power. Governments have tended to offer concessions to 
reduce the Islamist thirst for power. However, the concessions do not prevent 
Islamist groups from attempting to control professional unions (such as those 
of engineers, lawyers, physicians, and professors) or from creating "Islamist 
areas" where government control is phased out and replaced by direct 
management of public order and provision of social services by the Islamist 
militants themselves. Those area include certain neighborhoods in Cairo, 
some governorates in Upper Egypt, the city of Hama in Syria before its 
destruction by the army, the southern outskirts of Beirut, most of the Gaza 
Strip, and then some of southern Iraq's marshlands. 
It is thus shortsighted to concentrate exclusively on the most spectacular 
Islamist-inspired events, such as the 11th of September 2001, the revolution 
in Iran, the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat, the coup d'etat in Sudan, and the 
results of the Algerian elections. It is just as important to note the points 
Islamists are scoring almost everywhere in pushing governments to adopt 
Islamist measures and to tolerate their hold over professional unions, 
university campuses, and inner-city neighborhoods. Whatever the outcome of 
Islamist attempts to dominate governments, the re-Islamisation of societies is 
proceeding in earnest. That fact is becoming an obsessive worry for non-
Muslim minorities and of secular members of the intelligentsia, though not 
necessarily for the man on the street. Most governments seem unable to stop 
the movement, when they inadvertently accelerate it through indiscriminate 
punishments. 
The movement has gained in particular when natural disasters have struck, 
such as the earthquakes in Tipasa, Algeria, in 1989 and in Egypt in 1992 and 
the 1990 floods in southern Tunisia. Islamists then have been quick to show 
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their efficiency in bringing relief and compassion to the victims, while 
ineffective governments show the overall waning of state authority in the 
Muslim world, with or without an Islamist challenge. Aside from those crises, 
Islamists are offering help to many: distributing photocopies of expensive 
textbooks on campuses, making available free medical treatment, defending 
and serving squatters on the outskirts of cities, cleaning streets, extending 
protection to smugglers and terrorists, and providing all kinds of social 
services. Meanwhile, governments- stuck with impotent and corrupt 
bureaucrats, financial austerity programs, and heavy demographic challenges-
can hardly respond. 
Even while growing, the third wave of Islamism is being diversified. It would 
be a serious mistake to lump Islamist groups together as a monolith. Some 
Islamist groups backed Iraq during the Gulf war; others supported the 
coalition or issued contradictory statements. Some seek the kind of 
honourable behaviour and large appeal they know are necessary to attain 
power, while others operate in small, secretive, violence-prone groups known 
as gama'at. 
In Egypt, for example, most analysts ( and the government in normal times) 
make a clear distinction between the well-established Muslim brotherhood, 
which has won most of the recent professional union elections, and the 
gama'at that attack or kill government officials (as in the October 1990 
assassination of the speaker of parliament), secularist thinkers, and, more 
recently Western tourists. The distinction between those groups, though 
justified, does not necessarily mean that they are nuisance to each other. The 
extremists' methods, paradoxically, enhance the moderate Islamists' 
respectability. In the professional union elections, extremist Islamists do not 
hesitate to help moderate Islamists win a majority of seats. Their combined 
pressure pushes the government to Islamise some policies, in order to 
accommodate the moderates and hit at the extremists. Recent arrests of 
members of the mainstream Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood suggest that the 
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distinction between the two groups is becoming less clear. Governments face 
a Catch-22 dilemma: if they lump Islamists together, they tend to help the 
most extremist; if they distinguish between them, they have to placate the 
moderates with new concessions. 
Islamic groups tend to have ideological values and espouse the 
implementation of the Shar'ia, and a society based on Islam, but they do not 
usually formulate a thorough political agenda. 558 Thus, governments, 
intellectuals and the populations are left wondering just how participatory and 
inclusive an Islamic regime would be. It is apparent from the case studies that 
to some Muslims Islam is perceived to be an alternative, and perhaps the only 
alternative, to political ideologies and autocratic rulers that have existed in the 
Middle East and North Africa. As an identity issue Islam is the common 
thread, which binds the people of the region, and it is to Islam they tum when 
solutions to society's problems are not found in other ways. 
Islamist World View 
The Islamists have a deep interest in international politics. From the Gulf war, 
Islamists have concluded that the West is now more willing to engage in 
military operations in the Muslim world than it was during the Cold War. 
They also draw a lesson about the West from the contrast between the 
handling of the Somali and Bosnian crises: The West is ready to intervene 
militarily when Muslims are killing other Muslims but remains passive and 
hypocritical when (Muslim) Bosnians are killed by (Christian) Serbs. 
To them, Afghanistan (1979-1989) is a success story: Islamists of many 
countries rushed to support their brothers against an atheistic "Western" 
power, the Soviet Union. Indeed, Afghanistan is viewed as a spectacular 
example of Islamists' ability to win a war against an alien expansionist power. 
558 T. D. Sisk, Islam and Democracy: Religion, Politics, and Power in the Middle East, 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1992. 
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Many returnees from the Afghan war of the 1980s play leading roles in the 
most extremist of the groups in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and the Gulf 
countries. They are the infamous "Afghans", the current worst headache of 
those regimes. 
Islamists draw another kind of lesson from the Algerian episode: Do not trust 
local regimes or Western governments when they call for democratic 
elections; when the population shows its preference for Islamist candidates, 
the electoral process is brutally interrupted. As for the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, Islamists are gratified to see the collapse of an atheist power 
that was supporting their leftist rivals in the Muslim world, but Islamists also 
worry about the new opportunities and increased power available to the West 
following the dismemberment of the Soviet empire. 
At home, Islamist groups have succeeded in extracting funds from Islamist-
oriented governments. Iran keeps providing financial and logistical support to 
many groups, and Sudan is certainly sheltering and possibly training 
thousands of militants from around the Muslim world. Yet other governments 
are paying their dues, either out of genuine identification with some Islamist 
group or in reaction to pure intimidation. That dual approach has 
characterized the policy of the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, which 
has bankrolled many Islamist organizations in order to use them against more 
secular regimes in the region. More recently, they have continued generous 
funding to prevent those groups from turning exclusively to Iran for support 
and becoming tools of expanding Iranian influence. 
The Gulf war led to widespread suspicion and sometimes open feuding 
between the Islamist groups that supported Iraq and their Gulf benefactors, 
but not to point of clear-cut repudiation: Gulf governments are still supporting 
some of them out of fear, and wealthy Gulf individuals (including some 
members of the ruling families) are helping fund groups ostracized by Gulf 
governments because they identify with Islamist goals. Islamist groups also 
receive support from Arab expatriates who have amassed wealth in the Gulf. 
342 
More generally, the Gulf war has created side effects that are not usually 
acknowledged in the West. By defeating and maintaining sanctions against a 
secularist regime in Baghdad, the West has indirectly strengthened regional 
powers with avowed religious orientation, be it of the ritualistic, status-quo 
Saudi type or of the Iranian revolutionary model. Iraq's defeat may have fed 
the appetite of Iranian leaders for asserting their influence in the Middle East 
and North Africa. Hence, the Arab governments were reluctant to condone, 
let alone support, new Western military attacks on Iraq in January 1993, as 
well as the current political landscape in Middle Eastern. 
Iraq's defeat (like the Egyptian/Syrian defeat by Israel in 1967) has also given 
Islamist group's strong arguments that nationalist, secular-oriented regimes 
are no match for the West. By contrast, the fear that Islamist groups trigger in 
the West, like the 11th of September terrorist attacks and the Bali bombing 
massacre, offers reason to believe that their attachment to the Islamist 
discourse is efficient. Otherwise why would Western governments be so 
concerned? The idea that the Christian West is panicked by Islam's revival 
therefore plays into the Islamists' hands. Indeed, Islamists surmise that Israel's 
existence as a Jewish- that is, a religious- state explains Israel's success in its 
wars against the Arabs. Islamists often state that Israel wins because it is 
faithful to its religion, and Arabs are defeated because they are insufficiently 
devoted to Islam. That has been an Iranian cliche over the past 20 years, and it 
is now the main argument used by the Islamist group HAMAS against 
Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) "secular" politics. 
Islamists argue that the rich men of the rich societies are to rule the world, 
competing among themselves for a greater share of wealth and power and 
mercilessly suppressing those who stand in their way, assisted by the rich men 
of the hungry nations who do their bidding. The other serve! And suffer. 
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Back to Traditional Values 
As with other religions, some Muslims believe in a strict enforcement of their 
faith. At times, this has led to conflict. In recent years, Western fears of Islam 
have resurfaced with the rise of so-called Islamic fundamentalism. This refers 
to Muslims who believe in a return to traditional values based on the Qur' an, 
but a small minority has come to be associated with violent extremists. Many 
who do not believe in using violence to bring about their aims now prefer to 
use the term Islamist. The term fundamentalism can also be applied to 
religions other than Islam, such as Christian hardliners in the United States 
and Jewish militants in Israel. Additionally, the 15th-century Reformation in 
the Christian church called for a return to the values of the Bible. Reformation 
leaders such as Martin Luther and John Calvin set up their own 'protestant' 
church. 
In recent decades, the Muslim world has seen a revival of Islamism. In Iran 
and Sudan there are Islamist governments. In Egypt, Algeria, Tajikistan and 
Chechnya, militant Islamic groups are involved in an armed struggle against 
the state; while in Somalia and Afghanistan, rival groups are vying for power. 
On the West Bank in Israel, Islamists are challenging the PLO as the 
legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people; in Pakistan, they form an 
influential part of the opposition and in Turkey, Islamist' s have taken control 
of local government in Istanbul and other major cities. 
At various times throughout the history of Islam, its religious leaders have 
called for renewal of the faith and a return to traditional values. As early as 
the seventh century, the founder of the Shi'ah branch of the religion, Ali, 
believed that the ruling caliphs, Umar and Uthman, had drifted too far from 
the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (PBH). 
At the end of the 19th century, there were similar calls from within the 
Ottoman Empire. The industrial revolution had made Christian Europe 
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economically stronger than the Muslim world. Turkish religious leaders 
believed this was because Ottoman rulers had strayed from their faith. 
Instead of returning to stricter form of Islam, the Turkish leader Kemal 
Ataturka ( 1881-193 8) decided to set up a non-religious state based on the 
western model of democracy. The Turkish Islamists, the Welfare Party, now 
considers Ataturk as a traitor to the faith. 
The first modem Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, grew up in Egypt 
in the 1930s as a reaction to compromises with the British that had been made 
by the Nationalist Wafd Party. They were also opposed to Soviet Communism 
and the state of Israel. Most modern Islamist groups have followed the anti-
Westem, anti-Israeli, anti-communist model of the Brotherhood. 
But the most significant event in the rise of militant Islam was the Iranian 
revolution of 1979. There, the Islamic Republican Party of Ayatollah 
Khomeini successfully overthrew the pro-Western regime of the Shah and 
established a regime based on his interpretation of the Islamic 'Shar'ia' law. 
The war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) between the then government of the late 
President Najibullah, supported by the Soviet Union, and Islamist holy 
warrior or 'mujahiddin' provided inspiration for a whole generation of 
Islamists. Young men from Sudan, Egypt, Algeria and other parts of the 
Islamic world fought in the war. They later returned to their home countries 
with stories of how Islam had defeated a modem superpower. 
In addition, many groups such as the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria or 
Gama'a al-Islamiyah in Egypt also serve an important social function. The 
mosques act as center for the local community and give lessons in Arabic and 
the Qur'an. In some places where there is no state health care, there are 
Islamic medical centers. 
Islamism has a powerful appeal because it offers followers a simple solution 
of social and economic hardship based on a return to a strict observance of the 
teachings of Prophet Muhammad (PBH). According to Professor Dawud 
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Noibi, Islamic consultant for the Iqra Trust: 'The religious zeal of the 
Islamists, in the past as in the present, may well have been fired and sustained 
by the directive in the Qur'an, And (know) that this is the way leading straight 
to Me: follow it, then, and follow not other ways, lest they cause you to 
deviate from His way ... ' .559 
Conclusion 
The message of Islamism is capable of attracting a broad spectrum of society 
because it links the core beliefs of Islam, shared by the vast majority of the 
population, with the solution of such basic problems as identity, morality, and 
economics in a rapidly changing society. In an age when secular solutions 
have been discredited by the failures and repressions of earlier governments 
and rapid modernization has meant the introduction of new social problems 
perceived as moral, the promise of a comprehensive "Islamic" solution is 
appealing, even if doubts; concerning details are expressed by many. Many 
Muslims see religion as the major moral force in society, without which 
human beings become animals. The perception of Islam as a comprehensive 
code for all aspects of life, and its intimate connection with both personal and 
national identity, grant the Islamic solution an authenticity no other ideology 
could have. 
Given the acuteness of the anxiety evoked by the problems of modern urban 
society and as long as Muslim fundamentalists are not allowed to test their 
solutions by actual application, it is unlikely these movements will die out. 
Government repression has not succeeded in eliminating Islamic 
fundamentalism, partly because of its ideological legitimacy, and partly 
because religious gatherings cannot be outlawed (though they may be strictly 
controlled), and mosques offer a ready forum for the expression of religiously 
legitimate views that may prove politically volatile. Algeria's decision not to 
559 Bright, Martin, 'Islam: Back to Traditional Values', The Guardian, 28 February 
1995, p. 11. 
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allow a fundamentalist victory at the polls and the incarceration and execution 
of the leaders of the FIS has not extinguished fundamentalism from that 
country.560 Like Egypt's crackdowns on Islamists since the 1950s, which in 
1992 escalated into daily battles in Upper Egypt and the cordoning of an 
entire section of Cairo, suppression appears to lead only to the further 
radicalization of those advocating an Islamic form of government, and leads 
to widespread sympathy among those who would not otherwise be drawn to 
fundamentalism. 
Although the dilemmas regarding identity and alienation are more keenly felt 
by the young, and as fundamentalists move into middle age they may abandon 
some of their earlier dogmatism, there is a ready pool of new recruits to take 
their place. Implementing economic policies that reduce the gap between the 
rich and the poor may help defuse a potentially volatile situation, but they will 
not, by themselves, remove the incentives for seeking societal solutions in 
Islam. The fundamentalist movements have had varied political success, but 
their success at reorienting Islamic discourse toward political and social 
issues has been considerable. The impact of the movements is evident in the 
broader resurgence of Islamism that can be witnessed all over the Muslim 
world today. Although the violent fringes are often discounted as "lunatic", 
the words of the fundamentalists often make a good sense to many people. It 
is unlikely that for some time to come people will easily dismiss Islam as 
irrelevant to social and political life. 
CHAPTER 3: IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERNISATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
As a consequence of Islamist belief that society can be ruled by God, it is 
often argued that Islamists look to the past or the 'golden age' as a way to 
transform their communities. They are not mistaken in seeing Western 
56° Chris Hedges, "Denied Election, Algeria's Muslims Counterattack", New York Times, 
12 May 1993, p. A3. 
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civilization as the greatest challenge to the way of life that they wish to retain 
or restore for their people. The question is then asked: What implication does 
this have for the acceptance of modernization and development? And is it 
compatible with Western democracy? 
Political and social explanations for the contemporary Islamist resurgence 
abound. Most of these, however, are reductionist in that they do not pay 
attention to the religious component of a clearly religious phenomenon. 
Without rejecting its social and political locations, one may believe the 
Islamist resurgence represents a paradigm shift involving a major 
reinterpretation of Islamic sources in the modem world. 
Modernization and Development 
As has been illustrated in Chapter 2 of Part V, modernization has caused 
massive change to Middle Eastern society. This has resulted in creating class 
difference and social inequalities. Nonetheless, there remain great differences 
in the way Islamists view modernization. Some believe only what is written in 
the sources of Islamic doctrine is acceptable, while others accept change and 
adaptation as long as it is not contradict what is in the sources. Therefore, the 
effect Islamists have on innovation and continued modernization can only be 
ascertained by examining the interpretations of different Islamist groups, as 
discussed above in Chapter 1 of Part V. Islamic principles do not necessitate a 
return to the past or the complete rejection of modernisation or the West. 
University of Khartoum Professor Ahmed An Na'im, a leader of Islamic 
reform movement in the Sudan, called the Republican Brothers, has argued 
that a "fundamentalist" retrieval of Islamic law may be reconcilable with 
Western notions of human rights in civil society. Imprisoned without charge 
in 1984 by then Sudanese President Gaafar Numiery, a self-proclaimed 
fundamentalist, An Na'im protested that Numiery's brand of Islamic 
fundamentalism, shared by other Islamist radicals in the Middle East and 
North Africa, was a mistaken attempt to impose the Shar'ia as an antidote to 
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Western neo-colonialism and cultural domination. He argued that the 
elements of Shar'ia invoked by Numiery (and Khomeini)- the prescriptions 
revealed to Prophet Muhammad in Medina dealing with penal law, civil 
liberties and the treatment of minorities and women- promoted a "historical 
dated Islamic self-identity that needs to be reformed". Islamic economic and 
social justice and the exercise of legitimate political power depend upon 
retrieving the Prophet's teaching delivered in Mecca. In An Na'im's judgment 
these provide "the moral and ethical foundation" of the tradition. "The 
Medina message is not the fundamental, universal, eternal message of Islam. 
That founding message is from Mecca", he writes. "This counter-abrogation 
[ of the Medina code] will result in the total conciliation between Islamic law 
and the modem development of human rights and civil liberties". 561 
Rare is the disputant in such a conflict who does not claim to be upholding 
"the fundamentals". Rather, the battle is over what the fundamentals are, 
where they are to be found, and how and by whom they are to be interpreted. 
In demanding the retrieval of the Mecca prophecy, An Na'im concludes, "we 
[Republican Brothers] are the super-fundamentalists".562 
However, it is possible that Islamist activities have hindered the development 
of Middle Eastern countries because regimes have had to counter-balance 
between foreign policy, Western support, aid and influence with the demands 
from Islamist groups for a more Islamic society. Islamists often use rhetoric 
that emphasizes the negative impact of Western values on Muslim life in 
order to gain support. Thus, regimes must try to balance this reaction against 
the need to keep satisfactory relations with Western powers for aid and 
security assistance. For example, the Royal family in Saudi Arabia 
experienced dissent within its population as a result of requiring assistance 
from the Americans in preventing Iraq from Kuwaiti annexation. Similarly, 
the modernist secularist regime in Egypt has been subjected to Islamist 
561 Appleby, R. Scott, 'The Arab Problem and the Islamic Solution', in The Christian 
Century, Vol. 109, no. 6, February 19, 1992, p. 190. 
562 Ibid. 
349 
violence throughout the last three decades directed against its relations with 
the West and its attempts to modernize and develop society. In particular, 
Egypt's Peace Treaty with Israel signed in 1978 cost President Sadat his life, 
dented Egypt's standing in the Arab world and fuelled dissent from internal 
Islamist factions. 
Conversely, the West has an interest in retaining the status quo in the Middle 
East in order to retain political stability in the area.563 This appears 
contradictory to the West's espousal of democracy in other regions. However, 
the introduction of democratic reforms could bring about the installation of 
Islamist states, thereby causing the breaking up of ties with West, which in 
turn threatens the Western interests in the Persian Gulf. Similarly, migration 
issues come to the fore for ex-colonial powers when civil war is a possible 
outcome of democratic elections, as in the case of Algeria. 
There are also two more fundamental problems: the need for real economic 
development in the region and the need to curb the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. Economic despair breeds extremism throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa. Algeria's crisis illustrates this best. Massive 
unemployment and under employment breeds encourage violence, especially 
among the approximately 40 percent of Algerians under the age of 15. 564 
More than forty years of gross economic mismanagement of a potentially rich 
nation is to blame for this disaster. A nation that once fed itself now imports 
most of its food. Algeria will need to produce, by some estimates, more than 
two million new jobs in the next few years just to stabilize the existing high 
unemployment rate. 
More broadly, for decades, and especially smce 1967, the reg10n has 
collectively diverted enormous investment to purchasing foreign-made 
weaponry. For example, Iraq in the 1980s imported well over US$100 billion 
563 Karawan, I. A., The Jslamist Impasse, Oxford: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1997, p. 63. 
564 The Economist, Pocket World in Figures, Profile Books Ltd., London, 1997, p. 88. 
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worth of armaments.565 According to some estimates, as much as 20 percent 
of gross national product is spent annually on military spending, in a region 
with many of the highest population growth rates in the world. Iran, for 
example, has grown from 40 million people at the dawn of the Islamic 
republic; to an estimated 70 million by the end of the 1990s. 566 This is a 
region with an acute shortage of the most basic of human needs- water. 
The enormous regional outlays for arms are particularly worrisome because 
of the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to 
deliver them in the region. The Gulf War highlighted that proliferation threat 
for Americans, but they actually escaped relatively unscathed. It could have 
been much worse. Had Saddam chosen, he could have used chemical 
weapons in his SCUD missiles against Tel Aviv and Riyadh. Had he waited to 
invade Kuwait until 1993 or 1994, one might well have confronted a nuclear-
armed Iraq. One cannot be complacent that in future conflicts the world will 
be so fortunate. 
Both the issues of economic development and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction are very much in the minds of the people of the Middle East. 
They are being discussed in the multilateral talks of the peace process and, 
more importantly, they are being discussed in the debates within Middle 
Eastern society. There is growing debate and interest in economic and 
political reform throughout the region. Democracy is a word that vanished 
from Middle Eastern vocabularies for a long time, but it is now back. It is a 
healthy sign, and should be welcomed. This debate, together with other 
factors analyzed herein, may explain the failure of Arab states to develop 
democracy. 
565 Federal New Service, September 23, 1994. 
566 Ibid. 
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Islamic compatibility with Western Democracy 
The compatibility of Islam with Western democracy has been the subject of 
heated debates for decades, with no resolution in sight. Many Western 
thinkers believe that the Muslim Arab culture, which dominates Arab 
societies, is anti-democratic or "not hospitable to democracy".567 Samuel 
Huntington has noted that democracy is highly correlated with Protestantism 
and well tolerated by the oriental cultures of Hindu and Shinto. However, he 
considers Islam to be hostile to democracy, in part because it does not 
distinguish between religion and politics. Islam has also been portrayed as 
intolerant of alien ideas and diversity of beliefs and values. 
One problem with such generalizations is the confusion between Islam as a 
universal religion and civilization and the non-democratic practices of 
Muslim political leaders in so-called Islamic states. Certainly, Muslim 
despots, many Muslim clerics (ulema), and some radical Islamist movements 
accept the widespread Western contention that Islam and democracy are 
antithetical, but many others have different points of view. 
Islamic law (Shari 'a) is comprised of two basic sources: the Qur'an (a 
revealed text) and the Sunnah (the sayings- hadith- and the exemplary 
behavior of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)). The Qur'an and the Sunna 
advocate the practice of consultation (shura) among Muslims and order the 
Prophet to consult with his companions, 568 thus providing the Islamic concept 
closest to that of modern democracy. Given the nature of shura and the 
diversity of views concerning other philosophical and political matters that 
are closely related to the concept of democracy, Islamists are bound to differ 
about the compatibility of Islam and Western democracy. These differences 
are reflected in fatwa Uudgmental opinions), which allows a wide range of 
political systems to invoke Islam in legitimation of their authority. 
567 Huntington, Samuel P., "Will More Countries Become Democratic"? in S. Huntington 
and Joseph Nye, Jr., eds. Global Dilemmas, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1985. 
568 The Holy Qur 'an, particularly Suras 3 and 42 (3: 159 and 42:38). 
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Opinion is divided among three broad categories. The first, which views 
Islam and democracy as either totally or largely incompatible, is referred to 
here as Islamist or "fundamentalist". Although the term fundamentalism is 
alien to Islamic civilization and can be misleading, it is nevertheless used here 
for want of a better alternative. It implies a rigid, constrictive interpretation 
and strict adherence to the letter of the Shari 'a. The second category finds 
Islam and democracy highly compatible, and will thus be called "liberal". The 
third is an eclectic, intermediate position. It includes diverse interpretations of 
Islam in which only a few democratic ideals and institutions are accepted. 
By its very nature, a fundamentalist interpretation of religion renders its 
proponents, be they Muslims, Christians, or Jews, largely intolerant of 
different beliefs and outlooks, a point of view that is incompatible with 
democracy. By contrast, proponents of Islamic liberalism believe that the 
Shari' a introduced general principles of governance: consultation, justice, 
freedom of faith, and equality among nations and races,569 leaving Islamic 
civilization and religion free to embrace any political system. This liberal 
school was influenced by decades of interaction between the Arab world and 
Western culture, which led to the Westernization of many members of the 
elite in Arab countries. 
The majority of Islamic groups, jurists, and thinkers are ambivalent toward 
Western democracy, neither rejecting it entirely nor fully endorsing it. 
Although they all believe in the unity of religion and state in Islam, and that 
the Shari 'a should be a main source of legislation in Muslim societies, they 
adopt those democratic principles viewed as consistent with Islamic tenets. 
This heterogeneous group holds a wide array of viewpoints on democracy, 
ranging from that of the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood to that of 
traditional, religious Muslim laymen who practice rituals with little 
understanding of the broader issues of religion, philosophy, and politics. A 
569 Jadaane, Fahrni, "Notions of the State in Contemporary Arab-Islamic writings", in 
Ghassan Salame, ed., The Foundations of the Arab State, London: Groom Helm, 1987, 
pp. 141-42. 
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large segment of sheikhs, ulema, and imams (notably in the Azhar of Egypt, 
the distinguished academy of higher learning in Sunni Islam) are also tolerant 
of democracy. In short, although the fundamentalist position is gaining 
ground among the Muslim masses of several countries as an avenue for 
dissent, the belief that Islam and Western democracy are antithetical is by no 
means common to all Muslim thinkers. Advocates for each of the 
multitudinous viewpoints invoke fatwa in support of their position, and 
political culture is dominated by a moderate, middle-ground attitude toward 
democracy.570 However, due to its basic conservatism and resistance to 
innovative ideas and practices, this political culture is not yet hospitable to a 
polyarchic order. Democracy is, after all, a very radical departure from 
centuries old Arab political traditions of authoritarianism and political apathy. 
Although not characteristic of Islam per se, these qualities do create a very 
real, although by no means insurmountable, obstacle to democratization in 
Muslim Arab societies, and it will take them some time to appreciate the 
benefits of democracy over traditional authoritarianism. 
External Forces 
External factors can have a significant impact on the process of social 
transformation. For example, democratic parties and governments in Europe 
contribute to the emergence of democratic institutions in non-democratic parts 
of the continent.571 Some analysts maintain that one such factor, colonialism, 
was instrumental in the worldwide expansion of democracy. 572 The linkage of 
Western economic aid to the implementation of some democratic measures in 
non-democratic states also helped reduce the arbitrariness of autocratic rule. 
However, proponents of this point of view are opposed by "dependency" 
570 In Egypt, for instance, the religious views of al-Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood 
prevail over the fundamentalist views of the militant Islamist movements. 
571 Huntington, S., and Joseph Nye, Jr., 1985, op. cited in note 567 above. 
572 Ibid. for details. 
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theorists who; regard external forces as obstacles to, rather than promoters of, 
democracy in the Third World. 
In Arab countries, the record of external intervention for the purpose of 
promoting or supporting pro-democracy groups is far from consistent. During 
the last three decades, the most powerful polyarchy in the world, the United 
States, either did not try or else failed to foster polyarchy in any Arab country. 
Dahl put the matter plainly: "The policies of the dominant country are likely 
to be influenced more strongly by strategic, economic, and geographic 
considerations than by any special preference for democracy". 573 Thus, when 
the United States intervened militarily in Kuwait and economically and 
politically in other Arab countries, it served to strengthen oligarchies and 
dictatorships at the expense of pro-democracy groups and a potentially 
autonomous national bourgeoisie. 
Conclusion 
Given the overwhelming power of the centralized Arab state over various 
aspects of people's lives, the authoritarian nature of political leadership, the 
strength of kinship and sectarian ties, the absence of a civil society, the 
ambivalence of the majority of Muslim Arabs toward Western democracy, and 
the lack of continuous, strong external support for democracy, there seems 
little chance for Western democracy to develop and prosper in the Arab 
world, at least in the short run. It is true that in four countries - Jordan, Egypt, 
and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait and Yemen- there are signs of movement in the 
direction of democratization. But, even there the movement is slow and 
unsure. Arab polyarchy appears unlikely to evolve until human rights are 
respected; state forces of repression are neutralized or dispersed, and pro-
573 Dahl, Robert A., Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven, Conn., and London: 
YaleUniversity Press, 1989, p. 264. 
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democratic interpretations of Islam (what Leonard Binder calls "Islamic 
liberalism")574 enjoy widespread support. 
A Clash of Cultures 
Islam was never prepared, either in theory or in practice, to accord full 
equality to those who held other beliefs and practiced other forms of worship. 
It did, however, accord to the holders of partial truth a degree of practical as 
well as theoretical tolerance rarely paralleled in the Christian world until the 
West adopted a measure of secularism in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
At first the Muslim response to Western civilization was one of admiration 
and emulation- an immense respect for the achievements of the West, and a 
desire to imitate and adopt them. This desire arose from a keen and growing 
awareness of the weakness, poverty, and backwardness of the Islamic world 
as compared with the advancing West. The disparity first became apparent on 
the battlefield but soon spread to other areas of human activity. Early Muslim 
writers observed and described the wealth and power of the West, its science 
and technology, its manufacturing, and its' forms of government. For a time 
the secret of Western success was seen to lie with two achievements: 
economic advancement and especially industry, political institutions and 
especially freedom. Several generations of reformers and modernizers tried to 
adapt these and introduce them to their own countries, in the hope that they 
would thereby be able to achieve equality with the West and perhaps restore 
their lost superiority. 
In our own time, this mood of admiration and emulation has, among many 
Muslims, given way to one of hostility and rejection. In part this mood is 
surely due to a feeling of humiliation: a growing awareness among the heirs 
574 Binder, Leonard, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1989. 
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of an old, proud, and long dominant civilization of having been overtaken, 
and overwhelmed by those whom they regarded as their inferiors. 
For vast numbers of Middle Easterners, western-style economic methods 
brought poverty and western-style political institutions brought tyranny, even 
western-style warfare brought defeats. It is hardly surprising that so many 
were willing to listen to voices telling them that the old Islamic ways were 
best and that their only salvation was to throw aside the pagan innovations of 
the reformers and return to the True Path that God had prescribed for his 
people. 
The struggle of the Islamists is ultimately against two enemies: secularism 
and modernism. The war against secularism is conscious and explicit, and 
there is a whole literature denouncing secularism as an evil neo-pagan force 
in the modem world and attributing it to the Jews, the West, and the United 
States. The war against modernity is for the most part neither conscious nor 
explicit, and is directed against the whole process of change that has taken 
place in the Islamic world in the past century or more. It has transformed the 
political, economic, social, and even cultural structures of Muslim countries. 
Islamism has given an aim and a form to the otherwise aimless and formless 
resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have devalued 
their traditional values and loyalties and, in the final analysis, robbing them of 
their beliefs, their aspirations, their dignity, and to increasing extent even their 
livelihood. 
There is something in the religious culture of Islam, which inspired in even 
the humblest peasant, a dignity and a courtesy toward others never exceeded 
and rarely equalled in other civilizations. And yet, in moments of upheaval 
and disruption, when the deeper passions are stirred, this dignity and courtesy 
toward others can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and hatred which 
impels even the government of an ancient and civilized country or the 
spokesman of a great spiritual and ethical religion, to espouse kidnapping and 
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assassination, and try to find, in the life of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), 
approval and, indeed, precedent for such actions. 
Therefore, the instinct of the masses is not false in locating the ultimate 
source of these cataclysmic changes in the West and in attributing the 
disruption of their old ways of life to the impact of Western domination, 
influence, precept and example. And since the United States is the legitimate 
heir of European civilization and the recognized and unchallenged leader of 
the West, the Americans have inherited the resulting grievances and become 
the focus for the pent-up hate and anger. 
Nevertheless, the movement nowadays called Islamism is not the only Islamic 
tradition. There are others, more tolerant, more open, that helped to inspire 
the great achievements of Islamic civilization in the past, and we may hope 
that these other traditions in time will prevail. But before this issue is decided 
there will be a hard struggle, in which the West can do little or nothing. Even 
the attempt might do harm, for these are issues that Muslims must decide 
among themselves. And in the meantime one must take great care on all sides 
to avoid the danger of a new era of religious wars, arising from the 
exacerbation of differences and the revival of ancient prejudices. 
In conclusion, the region is poised on the edge of both rising hopes and 
deeply entrenched extremism. Hope needs careful nurturing, while extremism 
needs containment. As we look to the future, progress in the Arab-Israeli 
arena is balanced by emerging crises in North Africa and the Gulf, and some 
worrisome long-term economic and military trends. 
The Islamic Paradigm of Knowledge 
In the modern world, Islamists draw on a treasure of significant insights into 
the dilemmas and options facing them. The sources of these insights, from 
Shariati to Bennabi to Khomeini, may vary in many respects and often differ 
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m fundamental formulations. In Islamic organizations and movements, 
however, Muslims draw on this diversity to construct meaning in uniquely 
modern ways. At the level of practice, in contrast to that of the thinkers, a 
measure of affinity is clearly noticeable in terms of modem Islamic thought 
and practice. It is believable that the idea of a paradigm, proposed by Kuh575, 
is a useful and challenging way of coming to understand this common 
meaning-making exercise. 
Knowledge, Power, and Paradigm 
In his analysis of modern medical, human, and social sciences, Michel 
Foucault has unmasked the power relations inherent in the formation of these 
disciplines. According to him, the attempt of these sciences to understand the 
history, logic, and essence of all phenomena is intrinsically a quest for power. 
The "recovery" of the world by the method of the modern sciences 
contributes to the discovery of a universal, objective, and rational truth. 
However, pitted against earlier versions of truth, this new scientific truth 
commands acquiescence: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that 
is, the types of discourse, which it accepts and makes function as true, 
the mechanism and instances, which enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the status of those who are charged as saying what counts as true.576 
According to Foucault the superiority of objective knowledge over irrational, 
magical, or esoteric insights does not reside in a universal truth witnessed and 
575 Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2"d enlarged ed., "Post-script", 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970. 
576 Foucault, Michel, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77, 
translated and ed., by Colin Gordon, New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, p. 131. 
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attested to by all. Rather, this new discipline of knowing conquered by 
consent, instead of consensus, and subjugated or rejected any alternative 
claims on truth.577 The new order took control through its universal aspiration 
to uncover, dissect, and perceive. Moreover, its imperialistic designs were 
embedded in the very tools exercised. The universal "gaze" of panoptic 
representation, for example, embodied the attempt to redefine the world from 
a supposedly more objective vantage point. In contrast, all other perspectives 
were rendered subjective, parochial, and powerless.578 
While Foucault emphasized the power relations in the formation of 
authoritative knowledge, Thomas Kuhn identified the basic framework of the 
modern scientific disciplines m his discussion of a 
"paradigm". According to Kuhn, a paradigm was elaborated in a specific 
community that embraces certain laws and definitions, exchanges standard 
examples, and shares common values. For initiates in that group, standard and 
well-known examples reinforced its paradigm. Differences of opinion and 
perspective might coexist within a paradigm, even on crucial issues, as long 
as they are based on the acceptance of shared ground rules within a given 
· 579 commumty. 
The regime of scientific truths; have been felt by communities that 
experienced one form of colonialism or another. Science, civilized values, and 
the "white man's burden" belittled, dismantled, and destroyed all local forms 
of knowledge regimes in favour of modernity and its colonial "interpretive 
community". 
While recognizing this destructive role of scientific truth in the past two to 
three hundred years in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, this thesis explores 
the regimes of truths within local communities. In particular, religions and 
577 Ibid. pp. 109-33. 
578 Ibid. pp. 146-50. 
579 Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1970, pp. 182-92. 
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their complex materials provide useful materials in which paradigmatic 
changes may be investigated. They appear to exhibit the same traits as other 
knowledge paradigms. 
Patterns of religious knowledge, whether theology, metaphysical wisdom, or 
esoteric illuminations, can be analyzed as paradigms that exhibit the power to 
determine, authorize, admit, and exclude. Revolutionary developments in 
religious ideas within any historical context may accordingly be seen as new 
paradigms in place of the old. Christian theology, in the wake of nineteenth-
century historical criticism, underwent precisely such a shift in its paradigm 
of religious knowledge. Paradigm shifts, moreover, always imply a power 
differential between the new and the old. Within communities of knowledge 
that try to embrace simultaneously the old and the new, power relations will 
necessarily be marked by both creativity and conflict. 
Scripture-based religious traditions, such as Christianity and Islam, possess 
tangible textual origins for the derivation of religious knowledge.580 Access to 
these origins provides individuals and social groups with the power to work 
out authoritative religious knowledge. The historical development of doctrine 
and practice within these religious traditions may be viewed as a continuous 
cycle of reflection between the origins and present situations and 
circumstances. The present needs to be justified in relation to an ideal past, 
and the past must be made alive in the present. This cyclical relation between 
past and present constitutes both knowledge and power. For Muslims, the 
Qur'an as revelation (wahy) and the normative biography of the Prophet 
(sirah) determine the originating past that must be related to the present. As 
Richard Martin has observed, these features of Islamic tradition provide the 
fundamental terms in which people "get things done in the social and political 
contexts of Muslims".581 By careful selection from these sources, religious 
580 Turner, Byran S., "Origins and Traditions in Islam and Christianity", Religion 6, no. 1, 
Spring 1976, pp. 13-30. 
581 Martin, Richard C., "Islamic Textuality in Light of Post-Structuralist Criticism", in A 
Way Prepared: Essays on Islamic Culture in Honour of Richard Bayly Winder, ed. by 
Farhad Kazemi and R. D. McChesney, New York: New York University Press, 1980, p. 
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actors can formulate a pattern of doctrinal beliefs and ritual practices that 
serves as a paradigm of religious knowledge. Drawn from a wide and 
divergent corpus, particular paradigms become empowered as authoritative 
definitions by religious figures; who have access to, and control over those 
sources and their interpretations. A paradigm of religious knowledge, 
therefore, is not merely knowledge; it is powerful knowledge in Foucault's 
opinion, because it arises out of a "politics of truth". 
The impact of modernisation has endangered both creativity and conflict in 
the formation of religious knowledge. The political power of European 
colonialism and the hegemony of European science created a crisis in the 
Muslim world. Traditional elites in Muslim society, who had access to and 
control over the means of producing religious knowledge, were challenged by 
the emergence of new elites who derived their power from a direct or indirect 
involvement with the West. In this conflict between tradition and modernity, 
however, even members of the new elite turned to the original textual sources 
of the tradition in their quest for legitimation. By reappropriating and 
reinterpreting those sources, they sought a religious authenticity that was 
based upon a new understanding of Islam in the modern world. They 
developed what one prefers to call a modern Islamic paradigm, which is now 
outlined. 
The Modern Islamic Paradigm 
This paradigm has drawn on three centuries of encounter between the Islamic 
and the Western worlds. In the eighteenth century, Sufi orders launched social 
and political resistance movements to colonial powers. In religious terms, 
they emphasized the importance of hadith, Islamic political mobilization, and 
128. 
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a spirituality rooted in the personality of the Prophet.582 When this resistance 
collapsed, it was followed by an Islamic reformism that sought to re-educate 
Muslim intellectuals and demanded political representation from Muslim 
monarchs. Many reformists later joined the nationalists who inherited the 
reigns of power in the new nation-states. As these new nation-states could not 
realize the people's aspirations, an Islamic ideology formulated mainly by 
Egypt's Muslim Brothers and Pakistan's Jamaat-i Islami became the Islamic 
answer to modem worldviews. 
The themes and structures of the modem Islamic paradigm constitute the 
shared meanings of a discursive universe. Although its images and forms 
have distinctive patterns in regional contexts, the commonalities are 
unmistakable. Indeed, Gellner likened standard Muslim beliefs and practices 
to a deck of cards dealt out differently in various Muslim societies.583 In the 
modern period, one believes, a corresponding deck makes up the modern 
Islamic paradigm. 
As John Esposito has observed, Islamic discourse has moved from the 
periphery to the mainstream of the Muslim world. 584 Numerous Muslim 
regimes have adopted the Islamic idiom as a social and political discourse. In 
spite of the failure of the specific political programmes advocated by such 
organizations as the Muslim Brothers and the Jaaat-I Islami, the ideology of 
Islamic resurgence, with its promise of an Islamic society and an Islamic 
state, has captured the imagination of a wide range of social groups in the 
Muslim world. 
The writings of the Muslim Brothers' Sayyid Qutb and the Jaamt-I Islami's 
Abu al Ala al Mawdudi captured the basic elements of the Islamic paradigm 
582 Voll, John Obert, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, Boulder: 
Westview, Press, 1982, pp. 44-49, 87-147. 
583 Gellner, Ernest, Muslim Society: Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. I 00. 
584 Esposito, John L., "Trailblazers of the Islamic Resurgence", in The Contemporary 
Islamic Revival, ed., by Haddad, Val, and Esposito, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1991, p. 44. 
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in the twentieth century. Their teachings were reflected and nuanced by 
others, among them Algeria's Malik Bennabi ( d. 197 6) and Iran's Ali Shariati 
( d. 1977). The modem Islamic paradigm is elastic and malleable enough to 
embrace both the conservatism of Mawdudi and the radicalism of Egyptian 
extremist groups. In other words, divergent and individual groups use the 
ideas to construct their discourses. 
All major ideologues of the new paradigm have had some kind of direct 
exposure to the West. The images of Shariati at the Sorbonne studying for a 
doctorate in sociology and of Qutb as literary critic are linked inextricably 
with the production of the modem Islamic paradigm. Prominent western 
converts to Islam have added ingenious dimensions to the paradigm by 
bringing their own understanding of the West and its possibilities and 
limitations. 585 
The paradigm has been appropriated by an increasing number of modem and 
educated Muslims. In Iran, for example, Khomeini's popularity among the 
mullahs and the masses was matched by Shariati' s appeal among educated 
youth. 586 The paradigm, however, enjoys its widest appeal among the 
educated youth, especially those in the science faculties. Since the new 
Islamic paradigm is constructed at the intersection of the modem West and 
traditional Islam, it is most appealing to students who straddle these two 
worlds. Such support, especially in the science and technology faculties, is 
not surprising, for the most potent symbol of the West is technological 
585 Marty, Martin E., and Scott R. Appleby, "Conclusion: An Interim Report on a 
Hypothetical Family", in Fundamentalism Observed, ed., by Martin E. Marty and Scott 
R. Appleby, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991, p. 825; Gerholm Tomas, "Three 
European Intellectuals as Converts to Islam: Cultural Mediators or Social Critics", in The 
New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, ed., by Tomas Gerholm and Yvgve Lithman, 
London: Mansell, 1990, pp. 275-77. 
586 Ahmad, Mumtaz, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-11 Islami and the 
Tablighi Jamaat", Fundamentalism Observed, ed. by Martin E. Marty and Scott 
R.Appleby, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991, p. 461; 
Arjomand, Said Ami re, "Social change and Movements of Revitalization in 
Contemporary Iran", in New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change, ed. by 
James A. Beckford, Paris: UNESCO, 1986, p. 87. 
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advancement, with which science students come into direct contact. As a 
reaction to this challenge, the paradigm is born. 
The paradigm; is not appropriated by illiterate workers and peasants, for it 
rests on the twin legacies of Islam and modernity, both of which are logo-
centric discourses. The resultant discourse is also logo-centric and thereby 
marginalizes such people. At the same time, the Islamic paradigm is not built 
on Western philosophical foundations or the rational disciplines of Islam. For 
many students of science, contact with the Islamic legacy is tenuous. They 
had only the most random selection from both sources, which ensures that the 
resources of the new paradigm appeared to be almost inexhaustible. 
A key feature of the modern Islamic paradigm is its exclusive focus on the 
Prophet's life. This may sound like a standard feature of basic belief. The 
paradigm, however, focuses on the central importance of the socio-political 
dimensions of the Prophetic ideal. In this image, the political and social 
transformations brought about by the Prophet (PBUH) in seventh-century 
Arabia should be emulated in our own era and the political and social ideals 
of Islam ought to precede the purely religious dimensions emphasized by the 
Muslim legal and mystical scholars. Before the Prophet (PBUH) could be a 
source of ritual guidance or a model for the spiritual quest, he first ought to be 
an example of statesmanship and revolutionary leadership. 
The need to search for ideals in the past was justified by the perception that 
the Muslim world had lost its place in world history. The modern paradigm 
contrasts the ideal with this present malaise in a growing and elaborate map of 
crises facing Muslims. Bennabi posited a view of history moving from the 
spiritual (prophetic) to the rational (Abbasid) and the instinctive (post-
Abbasid), and saw the last element as a negative and irrational abyss from 
which Muslim society ought to be rescued. Shariati asserted that the malaise 
of Muslims was due to their existence in the grip of political oppression, 
economic exploitation, and religious hypocrisy. Mawdudi, on the other hand, 
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attributed the Islamic world's decline to the access10n to power of the 
tribalistic Umayyad dynasty. In general, ideologues emphasized the need to 
diagnose the problems facing Muslims.587 The perception of successive crises 
facing Muslims is illustrated clearly by contemporary history. Islamist 
resurgent ideologues, however, claimed a diagnosis for this decline and 
thereby gained a vantage point in understanding the root problems of Muslim 
society. 
Most of the problems facing Muslims are attributed to an external enemy. The 
modern understanding of Islamic history projects a historical and cosmic 
confrontation between Islam and jahiliyah, the Islamic term for pre-Islamic 
Arabia's ignorance of divine revelation. In contemporary times, the West is 
the chief manifestation ofjahiliyah. The term refers to disbelief in general and 
the rejection of Islamic ideology in particular. Even Muslims who serve the 
national and socialist goals of the nation-state are considered to be part of 
jahiliyah. The demonization of the West does not pardon entirely those 
Muslims who are responsible for the Muslim world's decline. In some trends 
of Islamic thought, the West is still the arch-villain. In addition, however, 
Muslims are "colonizeable", "lax", or devoid of true Islamic consciousness. 
In this manner, the West and its Muslim admirers are regarded as obstacles to 
the realization of Islamic ideals. 588 
The modern Islamic paradigm is rooted in the modern world. From the point 
of view of modernity, it may often seem like holding tenaciously to the past. 
587 Abrahamian, Evrand, "Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution", in Islam 
Politics and Social Movements, eds. Edmund Burke and Ira. M. Lapidus, Berkeley: 
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Social Sciences 9, no. 3, Fall 1992, pp. 325-27; Sachedina, A. A., "Ali Shariati: 
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L.Esposito, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 191-214. 
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Introduction", In the Contemporary Islamic Revival, eds., Haddad, Voll, and 
Esposito, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991, pp. 6-7; Binder, Leonard, Islamic 
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But from the point of view of traditional Islam, it is unmistakably modern. 
Muslim ideologues that, are not uneasy in this position, are suitably placed to 
appropriate the technologies and images of the west to the advantage of the 
new Islamic paradigm. A distinction is made between western technology and 
its social institutions. The former is accepted, especially for its use in 
education and public announcements.589 Unlike the traditional domain of the 
oral khutabah and lesson, which were the prime organs of communication, the 
Islamic resurgence exploits newsletters, magazines, booklets, brochures, and 
pamphlets. While the print media has the potential for a wider audience, its 
effective range is limited by the rate of literacy in particular countries. The 
Islamic resurgence does not avoid the use of personal oral communication and 
eagerly adopted developments in audio and visual technology. This particular 
approach was exemplified in the Iranian revolution when Khomeini's tape-
recorded sermons and statements provided an effective means of 
communication. 590 
The modern Islamic paradigm, however, does not only enJoy access to 
western technology but is prone to draw on the features of western social 
development. For example, the Jamaat-I Islami's argument against liberal 
measures favoring the emancipation of women drew on the worst scenarios of 
abused women and prostitution in the West.591 This critique was used to 
bolster Islamic arguments for traditional family values. In a more 
sophisticated manner, the Islamisation of the social sciences uses the critique 
of Habermas and Foucault to undermine the hegemony of western knowledge. 
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It deftly avoided the possibility that Islamic knowledge is also prone to 
legitimizing the status quo or to at least representing particular relations in 
Muslim society.592 In short, from social institutions to knowledge formations, 
the Islamic paradigm freely fashions an ideal world between the selectively 
appraised decadence of the modern world and the carefully chosen ideals of 
an original Islamic society. 
In principle, the modern Islamic paradigm's ontology consists of two modes 
of reality: the Creator (the ultimate and transcendent God) and created 
reality. 593 This kind of dualism leaves no space for either human or spirit 
hierarchies. The modem obliteration of angels, holy men, and miracles is a 
key feature of the new Islamic paradigm's egalitarianism. 
The paradigm presents Islamism as the perfect system for social and 
individual existence. Perfection in this regard is often perceived as the 
rational foundation of Muslim belief and practice. Both the unity of God and 
the organization of the day into worship slots, for example, are manifestations 
of Islam's rationality. Moreover, it is believed that Islam is a total and natural 
system for human existence. It represents the highest ethical and moral 
manifestation of human civilization as regards the promotion of freedom, 
human dignity, and justice. The human being is inclined by its very nature to 
conform to the system enunciated and illustrated by the Prophet (PBUH). 
Islam's various components interact perfectly with each other and could not 
act in isolation. For example, theft was a moral, social, and criminal act that 
could only be addressed through the integration and simultaneous operation 
of the moral (Friday lecture of admonishment), social (public punishment), 
and criminal ( amputating the right hand) systems. Even in such controversial 
areas as slavery and the status of women, modern writers insist that the total 
592 Winkel, Eric A., "Paradigms and Post-modern Politics from an Islamic Perspective", 
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Islamic solution offered the best possible human answer.594 Unlike nineteenth-
century reformism, there was no overt attempt to show that the ideals of 
western civilization were matched by Islamic culture. Inspired by the strong 
sense of independence sweeping Africa and Asia, the Islamic ideology often 
claimed superiority over the West. The continuing predicament of black 
Americans as freed slaves in North America was cited as an example that 
could be used to incriminate the West. In contrast, it was argued that slavery 
in Muslim societies led to societies wherein slave scholars and dynasties 
flourished. 
The paradigm aimed to promote a "conscientious" individual imbued with a 
new vision, ready to change the course of history. The goal of Islamic 
resurgence training was first and foremost a psychological attitude. Shariati 
called for new intellectuals (roshanfikr) who would take over the leadership of 
Muslim society. Qutb and Said Hawwa awaited the true and believing 
commando (katibah). Bennabi offered a new consciousness of civilization and 
culture (hadarah and thaqafah) to inspire new intellectuals. Like Shariati, 
Bennabi used western notions to identify the role of Islam and Muslims in the 
modern world. All of these individuals, nevertheless, were committed to 
developing new visionaries and new intellectuals. 595 
This new paradigm sought to define and reformulate the meanmg and 
significance of institutional structures in society, including the mosque, the 
home, and the bazaar, all of which were subject to a policy of reform based on 
the ideal history projected onto the first Islamic community. In addition, new 
institutions (schools, welfare organizations, and clinics) were added to the 
traditional. Since the modern paradigm was located firmly among educated 
groups, its major activity was not the communal prayer or the collective dhikr 
but the study circle, discussion forum, seminar, and conference. These new 
meetings confirmed the salvific nature of the modern Islamic paradigm in a 
594 Metcalf, "Islamic Arguments", p. 140; Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South 
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degenerate and decadent world. The traditional activities were convenient 
recruiting grounds for the new paradigm, or, once they had been reclaimed 
and redefined, symbols of its authenticity and legitimacy. 
While the modem Islamic paradigm's appeal is strongest among university 
students, it also has the potential to become the dominant paradigm - the 
"orthodoxy"- in Islamic communities. Student organizations did not always 
popularize the new understanding of Islam, but there were broader historical 
conditions that facilitated its understanding, such as the global village 
tendency of the modem world which ensured that an increasing number of 
people would be affected by what Lawrence called the great western 
transformation. As western norms and values in everyday life affected more 
and more people in the Muslim world, very few Muslims remained 
unaffected.596 Consequently, independent enclaves of traditional Islam 
patterns would only survive as curiosities, for continual contact between the 
West and Islam resulted in the spread of the modem Islamic paradigm. 
Within Islamic societies, however, traditional educational institutions are 
finding themselves in possession of texts and interpretations that are alien to 
an increasingly large numbers of Muslims. From Morocco to the Philippines, 
Islamic institutions face an uncertain future as they lose their vitality and 
continue to nurture Islamic disciplines as icons of the past. Egypt's al Azhar 
University has had to accommodate the demands of successive Egyptian 
governments, while Deobandi institutions in India and Pakistan hold on 
dearly to an Islamic legacy in an ever-shrinking world.597 
The Islamic resurgence, moreover, has come of age and has established its 
own educational institutions. Though earlier attempts to reform al Azhar in 
the nineteenth century were unsuccessful, and 'Abduh's attempts to reform it 
were singularly rejected, in 1962 Saudi Arabia established an Islamic 
596 Lawrence, Bruce B., Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern 
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university with Mawdudi as one of its founding members.598 Other Islamic 
universities have taken educational reform one step further by pointing out the 
integration of the Islamic and the modern. Newly founded international 
Islamic universities in Africa and Asia espouse some form of integration of 
modern and traditional Islamic disciplines. The International Islamic 
University of Malaysia, for example, proclaims that it will 
Cater for students from any part of the world who wish to pursue a 
university education in Humanities, Science, and Technology, viewed 
from an Islamic perspective and fundamentally related to Islamic 
values and principles. 
Such scholars as al Attas, Nasr,599 and al Faruqi ( d. 1986) have formulated 
this integration of Islamisation of knowledge. It was the last-mentioned who 
proposed a whole programme for universities from within the International 
Institute of Islamic Thought.600 The Islamisation of knowledge is the 
intellectual counterpart of the political project of the Islamic resurgence and 
represents the clarion call to subject all modem sciences to Islamic values and 
principles. In the context of this thesis, Islamic educational reform, up to and 
including the Islamisation of knowledge, was the educational 
institutionalization of the new paradigm and contributed to its promotion 
among Muslims. 
The global village of world communities, the weakness of traditional 
institutions, and the emergence of modern institutions favored the modern 
Islamic paradigm's success. Eventually traditional elites, such as Iran's 
Khomeini and Lebanon's Musa al Sadr, adopted the new Islamic paradigm.601 
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Conclusion 
The production of knowledge, according to Foucault, was simultaneously the 
production of power. In the Islamic case, the emergence of a new paradigm 
based on a reinterpretation of the sources of Islam has empowered a new elite 
in the modern Muslim world. Despite its protagonists' loudly proclaimed 
divine intervention, the paradigm cannot be extricated from its particular 
historical location. It began to take shape in the eighteenth century, when neo-
Sufi orders emerged, and has since matured as the Islamic ideology within 
Muslim nation-states. 
The new Islamic paradigm available to the modern intellectual consists of 
fundamental themes, resources, and structures. It posits a belief in an ideal 
history of the Prophet that focuses, first and foremost, on the socio-political 
transformation of society. Islam is an essentially this-worldly system whose 
various components interact perfectly in the right circumstances. The 
paradigm identifies a degenerate present, the main causes of which are the 
West's moral standard, Western surrogates in the Muslim world and Sufism. It 
seeks to redefine traditional Islamic symbols and institutions while 
introducing new forms of religious observance such as the study circle and 
conference. 
Even as they differed in emphasis from one context to another, the themes of 
the paradigm were compelling. The spread of literacy, western domination, 
and its own institutionalization have promoted the paradigm. More 
importantly, as a knowledge claim, it challenged and acquired power over 
traditional patterns of understanding Islam. In local context, the paradigm 
became a key claim to authority among Muslims as it began to play a greater 
role in Muslim organizations and institutions. 
By itself this would not be problematic. However, the divine origin of the 
modern Islamic paradigm is accompanied by a sense of self-righteousness, 
which mirrors that of positivism and other modern ideologies. It is now a 
Cornell University Press, 1986. 
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powerful worldview that perceives itself as locked in a profound battle with 
other ideologies, among both Muslims and the West. As a paradigm it has the 
power to legitimise, explore, and exclude. Simply by force of argument, it 
enables careers, projects, and political campaigns. 
CHAPTER 4: REGIME RESPONSE 
Introduction 
It has become a commonplace to speak of Islamism as a threat to regional 
stability, if not a global threat to Western interests. In the West the term rings 
immediate alarms because it arouses images of violence and fanaticism, 
which despite their validity in particular contexts, distort a complex 
phenomenon. Moreover, governments under domestic pressure from Islamic 
opposition groups appeal to Western fears of Islamism either to emphasize 
their claims to Western economic aid, and/or to avoid the challenges of 
democratization. 
From North Africa to the Persian Gulf, many Arab governments are 
confronting popular pressures - peaceful and violent, Islamic and secular -
for reform. 
The term 'fundamentalism' brutally homogenizes the striking diversity within 
the political and social world of Islam, lumping together regimes, groups and 
individuals with widely differing agendas. It also implies that the 
phenomenon of political Islam, because it conflicts with Western secular 
notion of the need to separate religion and politics, is new and aberrant. Yet, 
the prototype of contemporary Sunni movements - the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood - was founded in 1928, drawing on a long tradition of revival 
and reform in Muslim history. What is new is that Islamic activism, instead of 
being geographically localized, has developed trans-national features made 
possible by modem communications and information technology. 
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Its causes remain primarily internal. However, in countries where Islam is the 
inherited faith of all or most of the population and is constitutionally 
enshrined as the 'primary' or 'sole' source of law, Islamic political activism 
cannot be dismissed as a perversion. For the past 30 years Islam has been a 
key feature of Middle Eastern politics. Those in power used it to bolster their 
legitimacy. It is also used by those in opposition as a language of criticism on 
a wide range of issues relating to culture, the economy and society as a whole. 
Challenging Regimes 
Rising trends of political Islam and popular participation force Muslims to 
grapple with the issue of identity. 
Across the length and breadth of the Arab world, peoples' demands for a 
louder say in the affairs of the state are pushing their way to the top of the 
political agenda. The word dimuqratiyya (democracy) is increasingly on 
people's lips, and autocratic rulers are beginning to respond. 
Meanwhile, another movement of equal importance 1s contending 
successfully for the hearts and minds of millions of Muslims: the resurgence 
of Islam, both as a religion to fulfill spiritual needs, and as an ideology to fill 
a political void. For since its inception, Islam has embodied a total approach 
to life, with its strictures applying equally to private and public concerns. 
'Islam doesn't just stop at the door of the mosque', says a Western diplomat 
with long experience in the region. 'Islam runs right through life, and you 
can't divide it from politics' .602 
It seems clear that Islamic movements hold an advantage in the emerging 
competition for power because Islam resonates so deeply in most of the 
region's countries. The question is not whether Islamic politics will 
transform the Arab world, but how they will do so. 
602 B.B.C. World Service News, April 1993. 
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The real challenge is to mesh Western liberal democracy with the authentic 
bases for an Arab identity, which is the single most important thing that is 
happening in the region. While others see it from a slightly different angle: 
This is a time for questions. People in the Middle East and North Africa are 
tormented between their Islamic identity and the need to catch up with the 
modern world. Not a single Arab country is yet ruled by a government that 
could be called democratic in the Western sense. But both internal and 
external forces are exerting pressures to change this picture. Some Arab 
citizens look outside the region to political liberalization in Eastern Europe, 
Africa, and Latin America, and wonder why the Middle East should be 
excluded from this trend. Others look no farther than their doorsteps, and 
blame their rulers for the poverty, joblessness, and ill health they so often 
face. And some groups seeking change have gotten a significant boost from 
outside. 
All these moves toward broader popular participation in government, while 
arising from different circumstances, have had one result in common: Parties, 
groups, or movements basing their appeal on Islam have been the quickest 
and ablest to fill the newly opened political space. When Islamist activists 
preach through mosques, or educational and social institutions, they are only 
responding to the pulse of the people. They believe that Islam is the glue that 
holds Arab society together. It is the peoples' faith. It is not an alien thing that 
needs bringing to them, it shapes their whole life and mentality. 
That gives Islamist activists a natural advantage. At the same time, there are 
historical reasons why they are now encountering little competition in their 
battle for voters' hearts and minds. The beacon of Communism has been 
extinguished, and the ideological wave of secular Arab nationalism with a 
strong socialist tinge that swept the region 50 years ago has washed up on a 
beach of failure. Secular regimes have not found answers to deep economic 
problems, nor have they resolved the long-festering Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Israel is as powerful as ever, and Arab unity is an even more distant dream. 
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Hence, Islam is all that remains as a moral reference for the people. The fact 
that the fundamentalists are dominant is not because they use terrorism. It's 
because all the other opposition forces are decimated. Arab governments, who 
feared leftist parties in the post-colonial period, often used Islamic groups to 
counter them in order to buttress their own power. Moreover, in the Cold War 
atmosphere, the fundamentalist movement was used in a ferocious way as one 
of the most influential weapons against communism. 
King Hussein of Jordan, for example, gave protection to the Muslim 
Brotherhood at the same time he dissolved all opposition political parties. The 
Jordanian government, argue opposition figures, has systematically worked to 
discredit all leftist ideologies. The only ideology it did not attack, because it 
could not, was Islam. So the only option for people was to join the religious 
forces. 
Thus many regimes that now feel threatened by Islamists were themselves the 
first to legitimize Islam as a political force. To organize a communist group, 
you have to find safe houses. But, to organize an Islamist political group, you 
can meet openly five times a day, in the mosque. That organizational strength, 
developed over decades when secular opposition parties were for the most 
part banned, has proved its value. Islamists represent the core of an active 
movement working systematically and in a dedicated way, while all other 
forces are divided and disorganized. 
Such organization has, of course, been fed by plentiful funds. Wealthy 
religious individuals in the Gulf, some with close ties to their governments, 
have long financed such groups as the FIS in Algeria, HAMAS in the Israeli-
occupied territories, and the radical Jamaa Islamiya and the Islamic Jihad in 
Egypt. Western intelligence agencies charge that the Iranian government also 
has been generous. The money has been used shrewdly. The Islamists have 
invested infinitely more in social projects offering the poor inexpensive 
healthcare, subsidized food, or low cost housing than they have in guns and 
ammunition, and the political impact has been great. 
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The Islamists also have effectively espoused the most popular causes. In 
Saudi Arabia, conservative religious scholars have attacked government 
corruption and nepotism more forcefully than any secular liberal opposition 
group. In Egypt, the Islamists influence sectors of society that are deprived 
and feel insecure, and they move amongst them much more effectively than 
do secular groups to convince them that they can solve their problems. In 
Algeria, The FIS attracted many voters through its outright rejection of the 
FLN-dominated past, rather than through its Islamic platform alone. People 
were scandalized by the inequalities, by injustice, and the FIS asked the right 
questions. 
Encouraged by all these advantages, and eager to press them to the full, 
Islamists across the Arab world have grown triumphalist. As Hassan al-
Turabi- the prominent Islamist behind the Sudanese government, and one of 
today's foremost Islamist political thinkers- puts it, "If you don't allow Islam 
in through the front door, it will come in through the window' .603 
Islamists undermine Islam in the West 
The activities of tiny minority acting m the name of a supposed 
"fundamentalist" interpretation of their religion are defining and damaging 
the perception of Islam among non-Muslims. Every time a Muslim terrorist 
throws a bomb or kills a Western tourist, he adds another brick to the wall of 
hostility between Islam and the West. 
Islamists are those pushing radical Political Islam. The term conjures images 
of bombing the World Trade Center, hard-eyed mullahs preaching holy war 
against the west, and bigoted fanatics with their minds set in the distant past. 
Such Muslims cannot be seen as representative of their 1.3 billion co-
religionists around the world,604 any more than Klu Klux Klan militants typify 
603 Ibid. 
604 See note 3 of Part One, Introduction. 
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American Christians. But they are the products, albeit extremist ones, of a 
movement that is shaking Arab political life to its foundations: Islam as a 
political life. 
The word derives from Christian tradition, but to Muslims it carries little 
meaning. The Protestant religious sense, all Muslims are "fundamentalist", 
because a central pillar of their faith is that Islam's holy book, the Qur'an, 
contains the literal word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH). In the Middle East, only secularists tar all their religious political 
enemies, not just those who do reject as heretical the entire social, 
technological, and economic changes use the term since the ?1h century. 
The influence of such Muslims on their fellow Arabs seems minimal. But the 
revival of Islamic values in private life and the resurgence of Islam in politics 
are growing daily. 
In Saudi Arabia, demonstrators calling for the overthrow of the royal family 
and demanding an "Islamic" government have been arrested. Elsewhere in the 
Gulf, North Africa, Turkey and in even beyond the Muslim world, there have 
been threats by Islamists acting in the name of Islam. 
The backlash is predictable; the suicide tactics of political extremism that 
allies itself with religious fanaticism has been denounced, something almost 
any government is powerless to prevent without draconian restrictions of 
ordinary Muslims. In Egypt, police interrogate any young man with a beard 
who is known to attend mosques. 
Moreover, Islam is driving into predominantly Christian countries in a new 
campaign of expansion and conquest, a bishop at a Vatican synod claimed in a 
warning to his European colleagues. 
Giuseppe Germano Bernardini, Archbishop of Izmir in Turkey, spoke at a 
synod of European bishops on what he said was Islam's growing challenge to 
Christianity, even on its home ground. "The domination has already started 
with petrodollars, used not to create jobs in poor countries in North Africa 
and the Middle East, but to build mosques and cultural centers in Christian 
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countries ... including Rome, the center of Christianity", Bernardini declared. 
"Who cannot see in this a clear programme of expansion and reconquest?"605 
The dire tone of his warning contrasted with repeated overtures to the Islamic 
world by Pope John Paul, whose comments on Islam frequently stress the 
values it shares with Christianity. The archbishop was one of several at the 
synod to express frustration in dealing with the Islamic world. 
Muslims across the world have reacted with outrage to what they see as a 
growing hostility toward their religion and its one billion adherents. They 
accuse the West of demonizing Islam as the new ideological challenge to the 
West after communism. They say that the very word "fundamentalist" is a 
slander against the entire religion. Hence, any good Muslim who obeys the 
precepts and practices of his/her religion is a fundamentalist. 
On the January 11, 2002 front page of the New York Times, United States 
President George Bush is quotes as stating: "Our nation, in our fight against 
terrorism, will uphold the doctrine of either you're with us or against us".606 
This statement has been repeatedly presented as a threat, to the numerous 
independent and non-independent nations of the world, that America's war of 
terror must receive absolute support. 
But the Islamists or fundamentalists, however they are known, have set the 
agenda and they present Muslim governments with a dilemma. Few 
governments, in an age when concern about the suffocating blanket of 
western influence is producing a popular yearning for a return to Islamic 
roots, dare challenge the radicals on theological or political grounds. 
Islam has become extremely defensive; there is little innovative inquiry in al-
Azhar University among the religious elders or in intellectual circles. Few 
political leaders dare say that much "fundamentalist" thought is half-baked. 
And, on political grounds, many are hesitant to challenge a movement among 
605 The New Zealand Herald, Friday October 15, 1999; World Section, p. B3. 
606 New York Times, January 11, 2002. 
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the poor, the have-nots and the less educated, and which represent a 
formidable political challenge to the establishment. Some governments, such 
as Egypt's, are determined to crush the movement by force while quietly 
adopting some trappings of the new Puritanism. Others, such as Jordan, have 
decided to enfranchise the Muslim Brotherhood, rally Islamic moderates and 
build a new theological college to train preachers. 
But all governments run up against deeply held beliefs and attitudes: the 
notion of "martyrdom" has been hijacked by political extremists who can use 
it to sanction suicide attacks on "infidel" targets; the common equation of "the 
West" with decadence, crime and the disintegration of Western - especially 
American - values gives the hardliners a strong hand and makes any political 
identification with the West somehow "un-Islamic". HAMAS, for example, 
draws on political frustration with the peace process; Yassir Arafat is ready 
for a political, but not a religious confrontation. To any Muslim brought up on 
the idea of an "ummah", or international Muslim community, condemnation 
of a brand of Islam claiming to be purer than modern compromises with the 
West is emotionally almost impossible. 
The Fruits of Repression 
In most Muslim countries, decades of repression of nationalist, liberal, and 
Marxist trends left a wide-open depoliticised society, a political and 
intellectual vacuum that is now filled mostly by Islamist militants. Khomeini 
saw his revolution greatly facilitated by the Shah's suppression of republican, 
liberal, and leftist groups. In Egypt, the Islamist Jama 'at have been greatly 
helped by the regime's failure to co-opt the liberal and secular opposition 
with meaningful governmental roles or to organize truly competitive 
elections. In Algeria, the FLN ran a monolithic single-party system, operating 
a political desert of its own making, until the FIS mounted its challenge. 
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The nse of the Islamists has been aggravated by the regimes' own 
complacency, too. After decades of ostracism, Islamists of late have been 
more tolerated than the secular rivals, and have even been encouraged to 
attack and denounce them. Egypt's el-Sadat supported their return to 
counterbalance the Nasserist opposition to his rule, while al-Nimery in Sudan 
tolerated the Islamists and espoused some of their demands while he was 
fighting the Sudanese communist and democratic parties. Islamists were, for 
four decades or so, allies of King Hussein of Jordan against radical 
Palestinians and Arab nationalists. Now, amid the Islamist tide, ruling regimes 
are warily trying to involve secular opposition forces in their defense against 
the Islamist challenge. But mutual suspicion and the weakness of secular 
groups mitigate against a significant bolstering of the regimes' power. 
In retrospect, it seems the real moment to democratize was two or three 
decades ago, when a secular alternative to the ruling regimes remained. Then, 
Islamists were still politically marginal, the political discourse was 
predominantly secular, most elites were Western-educated, governments were 
still able to control societies, the demographic bomb had not yet exploded, 
urbanization was still manageable, and secular parties had not yet been 
discredited. But the regimes were too authoritarian to understand the urgency 
of such a shift, let alone to embrace it; the soviet model was not yet 
invalidated, and the West was much less preoccupied with human rights and 
democracy. 
Today, those regimes face a problem similar to the one many European 
governments experienced immediately after World War II: how to deal with 
large communist parties, representing about 20 to 30 per cent of the 
electorate, when those parties were not ready to commit themselves to the 
basic principles of democratic, peaceful alternation of governments. 
Governments in France and Italy chose to let the communists be represented 
in parliaments and city councils but kept them away from the executive for 
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decades until communist parties were waning from the political scene in the 
early 1980s. 
If today's Middle Eastern governments followed a similar path, they would 
allow Islamist groups to register supporters and elect members of parliament 
to represent their views, represent their ties and constituents, and take over 
municipal or provincial governments. Doing so might expose the Islamists' 
inability to govern or devise economic and social policies that are radically 
different from (let alone superior to) those of the governments in place. 
The governments do not accept that argument. They regard such an opening 
to the Islamists as too risky. Islamist groups might well register more than 20 
or 30 per cent of the vote in a fair and free contest. Such support was 
demonstrated in Algeria's December 26, 1991 elections. The electorate, 
unused to free elections and unaware of what is at stake, could prove to be 
volatile and unpredictable. In a burst of populist enthusiasm, it could put the 
Islamists in power, especially if winning a plurality is sufficient to govern. 
Moreover, while West European countries had a Marshall Plan pumping more 
than US$100 billion ( in today's dollars) into their coffers and benefited from 
legitimate, charismatic figures like Charles de Gaulle etc., who could face 
down the communist challenge, the secular leaders in today's Muslim world 
are hardly inspiring, and no Marshall Plan is available to them. Those who do 
sit on oil riches tend to use them to strengthen their (and their neighbors') 
authoritarian rule rather than to democratize. 
The West, for its part, seems as embarrassed by the Islamist challenge as do 
the local governments. What can the West do beyond its rather successful 
repression of Islamist-inspired international violence? Unqualified support for 
democracy antagonizes local governments and triggers mixed feeling in the 
West. No Western government wants to be faced with President Jimmy 
Carter's misfortune of having "lost" Iran to an obscurantist force through 
democratic means. On the other hand, a policy that punishes any interruption 
of a democratic process - except those in the Muslim countries - is not 
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tenable over the long run. Islamists undoubtedly have a point when they 
compare Western sanctions against Haiti's military junta, Burma's military 
dictatorship, or President Alberto Fujimori's post-coup regime in Peru with 
the West's ill-concealed relief after the coup in Algeria. The West cannot 
indefinitely pursue a policy by which it consoles the leader of the Burmese 
opposition with a Nobel Peace Prize while it embraces the generals in 
Algeria, or condemns Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and Iran's "obscurantist 
rule" while it overlooks other Middle Eastern dictators and absolute 
monarchs. 
To find a realistic way out of their hypocrisy, Western governments should 
consider a few guidelines: First, they should seek to know who the Islamist 
groups are and what they are doing. That cannot be achieved if the West 
views the Islamist challenge solely from the perspective of a security threat, 
nor if it is preoccupied with content analysis of the Islamists' frequently 
contradictory statements. Too often, Islamist groups are lumped together as a 
single threat to Western interests. That is both unfair and self-deluding: it 
ignores the diversity among Islamists and implicitly assumes that they are the 
only anti-Western force in their societies. The West's security-driven 
approach to the Islamists underestimates the societal services they provide 
and the validity of some of their demands. And the West can hardly rely on 
frightened, isolated local governments to properly educate it on opposition 
forces. 
More generally, the west has to learn that its model of the secular nation-state 
is not as universal as it presumes, and other forms of political organization 
may be as valid. Even if the world has ceased to be strategically multi polar, it 
remains so in the cultural sphere. Too often, the Western triumph in the Cold 
War is mistakenly equated with a triumph of Western political and intellectual 
models. 
Some popular "truths" about Islam also need to be revised. Shallow and 
obsessive references to the religion of Islam by Western observers do not 
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explain the lack of democracy in Muslim societies, or the conditions of 
women and the lack of economic prosperity. After all, authoritarianism has 
reigned as the most common form of government from time immemorial, not 
only in the Muslim world but; in such areas as China, Russia, Latin America, 
and much of Europe. Economic mismanagement and squandering resources 
are not peculiarly Islamic features, either; they are all too typical throughout 
the Third World. Moreover, one can even argue that women's status in most 
Muslim countries is better than in many non-Muslim Asian countries. 
Western attacks on Islam and negative media stereotypes of Muslims help 
confirm Islamist paranoia about a supposed Western plot to eradicate Islam. 
Some self-appointed Western "experts" also play into the hands of the most 
extreme Islamists through their excessive characterization of Islam's 
uniqueness as a religion. Islamists, too, would like their fellow Muslim to 
believe that Islam is really too self-contained to adjust to modernity or 
democracy. It is high time to denounce the implicit alliance between old-
guard Western orientalists and new-wave local Islamists on the ill-defined 
presumed uniqueness of Islam. 
Second, the West should encourage the present regimes to gradually associate 
moderate Islamist forces with their governments. The Islamist ideological 
trend can no longer be ignored; Islamists should take part in state's legislative 
bodies and later in the executive branches. To begin, pre-electoral pacts 
should be negotiated between the government and other political forces, 
including the Islamists. The pacts should guarantee that any party, though 
gradual, would not reverse the democratic process. It should never be 
forgotten that most governments and even many secular opposition groups 
have not shown themselves to be any more committed to democracy than are 
the Islamists. In addition, electoral laws must preclude a winner-take-all 
system, which is utterly inappropriate for countries where democracy is too 
fragile to be submitted to such a brutal form of leader selection. 
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Some countries have reached pacts preceding the organization of elections. 
Kuwait produced the Jeddah covenant, Lebanon the Taif accord, Jordan the 
National Charter, and Yemen the Unity Charter. Unfortunately, those 
experiments in gradual democratization, including guarantees for the 
permanence of the process itself, have been victims of manipulation by the 
government, in Yemen's case, or by some mighty neighbor, in Lebanon's. 
Such experiments have not been adopted in larger, more influential countries. 
But neither limitation diminishes the validity of reaching pre-electoral mutual 
guarantees. 
Third, the West should criticize human rights violations and cheating in the 
electoral process whenever they occur. The West has little credibility on those 
issues: Saddam Hussein is justifiability condemned but none of his neighbors, 
some of them no less dictatorial, are so systematically scrutinized. The West's 
discourse on human rights and democracy always seems conditioned on 
strategic considerations. Such conditionality may be legitimate- crusades for 
morality stop where interests start- but then Western governments cannot 
claim a higher ethical standard than those of anti-Western forces. The West is 
selective indeed in its choice of enemies as well as in the United Nations 
resolutions it wishes to see implemented, so it should not be surprised if its 
moral discourse is ridiculed in the Muslim world. 
Fourth, Western states ought to acknowledge that democracy is not 
necessarily built upon a one-person, one-vote system. In complex developing 
societies, established ethic or sectarian group rights are as important as human 
or individual rights. Individualism is not a universal, or a morally superior, 
philosophy; communitarianism is still valid as a shield against 
authoritarianism and arbitrary rule. Hence, the protection of minorities must 
be part of any approach to the Middle East and North Africa. Islam has 
historically provided formulas for maintaining several bodies of legislation 
within the same polity, which apply to individuals on the basis of their 
religious affiliation. If Muslims are to be ruled according to the Shar 'ia, non-
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Muslims need the right to be ruled according to their own legislation and 
customs. Returning to those unique forms of legal and social plurality is 
easier, and possibly more urgent, than creating Western-style pluralism. 
Islamists are more willing to abide by those forms than by Westminster-type 
pluralist politics. 
Fifth, the West must help achieve substantial results in resolving the Arab-
Israeli question. The rapid realization of Palestinian self-determination and 
the eventual emergence of a Palestinian state, are the only antidotes to the 
growing Islamist radicalism among Palestinians. A balanced end to that 
conflict would also help minimize the military control over Arab polities and 
help dispel the deeply held view that the (Christian) West backs (Jewish) 
Israel against (mainly Muslim) Palestinian Arabs. Arab government may be 
preoccupied with issues other than fighting Israel (such as dealing with the 
Islamist challenge to their own rule), but Muslim masses manipulated mostly 
by their governments on this issue in order to deflect problems at home, are 
still very concerned about the Palestinian issue as a case of foreign seizure of 
mostly Muslim land. 
Israel's apprehensions about Islamic groups in the Middle East and the 
Iranian military build-up have of late grown very loud. Yet, Israel for years 
has been playing HAMAS against the PLO, and Hizbullah against the 
legitimate governmental authorities in souther Lebanon. Israel was an 
important actor in the arms-for-hostages exchanges of the U.S. Iran-contra 
affairs, sending arms to Khomeini's Iran. Now, Israel complains about the 
growing Islamist influence it helped foster. 607 
The new cliche of Israeli commentators is to contend that Israel and Arab 
governments should be allies against Iran and Islamism. But Israel has a long 
way to go before it can realize such an alliance. It will have to admit its 
strange relationship to pro-Iranian groups in the past and its tilt toward Iran in 
the Iran-Iraq war; and it will also have to accept the politically pluralistic PLO 
607 Primary Source. The B.B.C. World Service News, during the 1980s. 
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as an interlocutor in the peace process and Palestinian statehood as an 
eventual out come. Israel's posture will also influence how strong the Islamist 
rejectionist challenge to the Arab governments supporting the peace process 
will become. To delay a settlement acceptable to the Palestinians is to 
encourage HAMAS as an alternative to the PLO, and Islamists as a 
replacement for secular Arab governments. The Israeli deportation of 
hundreds of Islamists in December 1992, without any progress having been 
recorded in the peace talks with the Palestinians, has been a blow to Israel's 
credibility, to the peace process, and Lebanon's sovereignty. It tells a lot about 
Israeli nervousness and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's inability to grasp that 
to decapitate HAMAS without offering concessions to the Palestinians is to 
reinforce HAMAS's position in their ranks. 
Finally, the West will need to stop its highly selective approach to military 
intervention. Any Muslim, even one who does not support the Islamists, 
would observe that Western governments have been willing to intervene 
where Muslim were killing or threatening other Muslims (in Kuwait, in 
Kurdish areas, in Somalia, and in Afghanistan) while those same governments 
remain passive where Muslims are killed by a non-Muslim force (in Bosnia, 
in Chechnya, and in Kashmir). In the West, decisions on intervention are 
viewed as the product of varying strategic interests, military feasibility, and 
objectives. But to Muslims, it is at best the application of an old double 
standard. 
Muslims have taken note of the nse of Western, notably American, 
interventionism in the Muslim world over the past decades: Syria (1983 ), 
Libya ( 1986), Iran (1988), Iraq (1990-91 ), Somalia (1992-93 ), Afghanistan 
(2002- ), and currently in Iraq .. While the motivation may differ in each case, 
Muslims recall that their part of the world had not previously experienced 
direct military intervention by the United States (with a minor exception in 
Lebanon in 1958). Westerners thus should not be surprised by a resurgence of 
Muslim xenophobia toward Western interference, even for humanitarian 
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purposes. Islamists are likely to use that xenophobia to challenge, embarrass, 
and eventually topple regimes. Western intervention will only be acceptable if 
they are accompanied by an even-handed approach to the area's problems, 
particularly the Palestinian-Israeli issue and the inequitable distribution of 
wealth among Middle Eastern countries. Otherwise, Western double 
standards, misconceived and selective military interventions, and an obsessive 
emphasis on security in the west's approach to the Muslim world may prove 
to be the push Islamists need to take power. 
Challenge and Response 
The first two decades of the twentieth century saw the direct or indirect 
colonization of the Muslim world by various western countries, thus 
representing one of the bleakest periods of Muslim history. In the inter-war 
years some rays of hope emerged in the Muslim world with the launching of 
various independence movements. This period also saw the rise to 
prominence of two Islamic movements that were to have a major influence on 
the Islamic response to the western challenge for the rest of the century: the 
Ikhwan al-Muslimum in Egypt and the Jama 'at-i Islami in the Indo-Pakistani 
subcontinent. The socio-economic, geopolitical, and intellectual-cultural 
challenge of the west to the Muslim world produced varying responses on the 
part of the Muslim world. While movements such as the Wafd Party or the 
Muslim League represented the "nationalist" response to this challenge, the 
Ikhwan and the Jama 'at were manifestations of the "Islamic" response. 
After more than sixty years of struggle, it is becoming painfully clear that the 
response articulated by these movements to the western challenge is proving 
to be ineffective. Despite some impressive historical achievements, they find 
themselves marginalized in their own countries, having almost no influence 
whatsoever on policy formulation and the intellectual and cultural character 
of society, for these areas continue to be dominated by westernized elites. As 
a result, Muslim intellectuals have started to ask "why?' Why have these 
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movements, which at one time held so much promise and even produced 
some impressive results, failed to respond adequately to the western 
challenge, and what steps need to be taken to remedy the shortcomings? 
Questions of this nature are being asked increasingly in Muslim circles, and 
some possible answers have been offered. 
Khalid Bin Sayeed's Western Domination and Political Islam: Challenge and 
Response explores precisely these questions and issues. The author argues 
that the major shortcomings of the lkhwan and the Jama 'at are their 
commitment to ideological purity, the attendant disregard of political realism, 
and the failure to adhere to the logic of their own thinking.608 Due to these 
shortcomings, Islamists have not been able to diagnose properly the true 
nature of the western challenge and, as a result, cannot formulate an effective 
response. Sayeed goes on to argue that the first step in formulating an 
effective response has to be a clear understanding of the nature of this 
challenge. It is only after this proper understanding has been developed that 
specific Islamic principles can be gleaned from "the world of Islamic ideas" 
and implemented and contextualized in order to give birth to an Islamic 
order. 609 After putting forth this critique, Sayeed analyses the Islamist 
response in three countries: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. These three 
chapters cover familiar territory in that they document events and issues that 
have received mush attention previously. The final two chapters of the book 
are the most interesting, in that one detects an attempt to articulate an 
alternative plan of action that will allow Muslims to respond adequately to the 
West. 
Sayeed's alternative is based on certain key principles borrowed from the 
thought of such prominent Muslim thinkers as Muhammad Iqbal, Ali 
Shari'ati, Abdul-Karim Surush, and fazlur Rahman. According to Sayeed, 
first the Muslims have to realize that each Muslim state has to concentrate on 
608 Sayeed, Khalid Bin, Western Domination and Political Islam: Challenge and Response, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 37. 
609 Ibid. pp. 48-49. 
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its own socio-economic development before one can even begin to talk about 
Muslim unity. In their enthusiasm, Islamists often glorify the concept of the 
ummah, forgetting that one cannot talk of a strong and united ummah if its 
individual constituents are weak. This is an idea that Sayeed borrows from 
Muhammad Iqbal. He then argues that the methodology used by the Muslims 
to implement Islamic principles has to be examined critically and modified. 
Sayeed notes that Muslims must separate "normative Islam" from "historical 
Islam". The implication here is that many of the cultural norms that exist in 
contemporary Muslim societies have nothing to do with Islam and therefore 
are not to be considered as binding and obligatory. Next, Muslims must 
engage in a process of identifying the specific problems that plague their 
societies and then tum to the Quran for guidance, identify the general Islamic 
principles enunciated therein, and then return to the problematical situation to 
contextualise the general Quranic principle.610 Here Sayeed echoes the 
thought of Fazlur Rahman. In his opinion, Muslims can learn valuable lessons 
by studying the methods of mass mobilization used by Ghandi and Mao for 
the purpose of building a healthy modem society. Sayeed credits Khomeini 
for tapping the masses' latent energy and using it to bring about political 
change, but notes that Khomeini failed to use the same resource to bring 
about a socio-economic revolution. 
Even though one may disagree with some of the diagnoses and prescriptions 
regarding the issue at hand, the author has done an admirable job in 
presenting his argument. The book is a valuable contribution to the debate 
regarding the steps Muslims must take in order to respond adequately to the 
western challenge in the coming decades. 
Islam and the Challenges of Democracy 
Devising a secular system that accommodates Islamic Shari 'a is the main 
challenge facing the attempt to win the Islamists to the cause of democracy. 
610 Ibid. pp. I38-39. 
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The subject of Islam and democracy is at the core of the debate between 
regimes and Islamist movements in the Muslim world. Both use it, in fact 
manipulate it, to further their purposes, to rally the support of the population, 
to counter their image in the West that they are anti-democratic and allay the 
'fears' of the West, especially the United States, as to their intentions. Both 
try to affect U.S. foreign policy, to exploit to its own advantage the new 
American activism for democracy and to steer to their benefit the answer to 
the question of when and under what conditions will the Muslim world join 
the democratic revolution. 
In the past several years as a result of events in the ex-Soviet Union, 
developments in Latin America, the growing movement towards privatization 
and the free market economy and the Gulf War, suddenly interest in the 
question of "Islam and democracy" has grown exceptionally in the United 
States. Scores of seminars, conferences to debate the issue were organized. 
Tens of books, pamphlets and monographs were published. Some of course, 
jumped to clamor their long-held and characteristically patronizing orientalist 
premises about the despotic nature of Islam and its basic incompatibility with 
democracy. 
Others, students of the subject, knowing full well the misunderstandings, 
which surround Islam in the West and how the behavior and pronouncements 
of some Islamists and fundamentalist were going to reflect on the perception 
of Islam, became defensive where they could and should have been critical. 
Many of us turned apologists. 
It has become imperative, therefore, in a discussion of Islam and democracy 
to start by asserting that whatever the merit of the case theoretically, it doesn't 
reflect in any way on our position towards the behavior of some of the 
Islamist parties in their bid for power. To condemn unequivocally the killing 
of unveiled women in Algeria, to condemn the targeting of intellectual in 
Algeria, Egypt and wherever else it is taking place, to condemn vehemently 
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the insensitivity to minorities in the Sudan, should be posited as an axiom 
before addressing the question of Islam and the challenge of democracy. 
It is also necessary to reiterate certain basic premises, most importantly that 
there is no monolithic interpretation of Islam and that liberal interpretations 
are just as valid as conservative interpretations and that the freedom to 
interpret is open to every Muslim. To quote no less an authority than Hassan 
al-Turabi: "Private individuals in Islam do not enjoy freedoms, they assert 
them, they have to enjoy those freedoms, they have to speak their mind ... You 
have to worship God by thinking originally and contributing. And you have to 
express that contribution and you have to do it even if the other party, even if 
the government doesn't like it. And you are a better Muslim if you present a 
dissenting view rather than a conforming view. This is the typical Islamic 
education".611 
Killing and otherwise silencing the opposition to conservative, 
fundamentalist, and Islamist interpretations has gone on for too long. Other 
Muslims or students of Islam have been put on the defensive. Islamists and 
fundamentalists have set the agenda and the methodology of the debate. 
Liberal Muslims have in general, felt insecure on Muslim grounds. Most of 
them were Western-educated, knew little about Islam and did not really feel 
the need to learn because they assume that the domains of the political and 
religious were clearly delineated by the traditionalist of the nineteenth 
century. Politics and religion were thought to be two totally different 
disciplines. Liberal Muslims accepted assertions of Muslim ulema like Ali 
Abdel-Raziq that Islam had no political content. They quoted the Prophet as 
saying: "You know better in matters pertaining to your daily life", thinking 
that this settled the argument. They did not appreciate the extent to which 
Islam has a practical political significance for Muslims nor did they face a 
political culture. They historicized and socialized Islam thinking they were 
thus transcending it by relegating it to the domain of the spiritual. And, when 
611 Al-Ahram Weekly, Cairo, May 5, 1994. 
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confronted by Muslim fundamentalists pointing out contradictions between 
their thought and Islam, liberal Muslim thinkers fell back on Muslim 
reformist interpretations to claim legitimacy within the Muslim establishment. 
Thus they allowed the discourse to be hijacked by the conservatives and 
fundamentalist ulema. Many scholars on the subject who were known for 
their liberal interpretations have either been silenced by fear of the 
fundamentalist, or have turned conservative themselves. 
Ironically, the twentieth century has ended with the Muslims rehashing the 
same arguments, which were prevalent at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The question of the compatibility of Islam with democratic forms of 
government was then addressed very seriously, and many thought resolved by 
highly respected Muslim scholars. In fact, in the twentieth century many Arab 
and Muslim countries - Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and other - had democratic 
experience, with parliamentary systems of government, separation of power 
and human rights activists and no one questioned the compatibility with 
various forms of socialist government, without any questions about Islam 
either. 
In fact, until the late 1970s few Muslim intellectuals considered it relevant to 
discuss the subject of Islam and its compatibility with democracy. 
Conclusion 
The governments in Middle East are most greatly affected by Islamist activity 
because of the destabilizing effect violence and terrorism have on the regimes. 
Public support is lost as the Islamists financially sustain the public where the 
government cannot, and politics is in disorder as government officials and 
leaders are targeted for assassination attempts. 
Regimes have responded to the Islamist threat to their stability in several 
ways. In many cases they have used inclusionary tactics where Islamists are 
permitted to become institutionalized and spread their message through 
393 
mosques, educational facilities and other institutions in society. The regime is 
then able to keep a close watch on Islamist development but must also 
incorporate Islamic rhetoric into its dialogue and policies so as to balance the 
societal leaning towards Islam, as was apparent in Egypt under President 
Sadat's rule. 
Conversely, governments strictly control the media and often propagate 
messages in order to legitimize themselves and compromise the Islamists. Co-
optation of the ulema is also another tool used by regimes in order to have 
control over what is dispersed into public discourse and teachings. Ulema 
cooperation is also valuable when the government requires the support of the 
religious leaders in order to carry out its policies. Saudi Arabia has employed 
this type of tactic by making the ulema salaried state employees. The regime 
has then been able to rely on their backing, for example, when the need arose 
for Islamic approval for Western assistance when Iraq invaded Kuwait. "On 
18 January 1991, the ulema described the battle then just beginning as a jihad 
against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, identified as an 'enemy of God"'.612 
In the case of violence and terrorist activity regimes use an exclusionary tactic 
where Islamists cannot participate at any level of society legally. In these 
cases regimes resort to a hard-line policy of repressing Islamists through 
imprisonment, torture and execution. However, as a result of repression there 
is little chance of democracy being able to take hold, so there will always be 
instability within the regime. As a consequence, corruption is rampant in 
order that the incumbent ruler can retain power through co-optation of 
supporters. 
Furthermore, regimes have instituted regional links in order to gather 
information on or restrict movements of Islamists. For insurance, Algeria, 
Egypt and Tunisia made liberal and multilateral agreements in order to obtain 
information regarding Islamist movements and activities. 
612 Karawan, I. A., The Islamist Impasse, Oxford: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1997, p. 32. 
PART SIX: CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
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In times of crisis and historic change, some social groups look to the past to 
find out how to cope with the present. In the Middle East and North Africa, 
dissatisfaction with the present and fear about the future have led some 
groups to develop a restorationist image of society. The phenomenon most 
often associated with this view of history and society is what is more recently 
called Islamism. 
The thesis analyses that Islamism can be interpreted as a theocratic totalitarian 
political ideology bent on establishing a pious Islamic state wholly based on 
the radical interpretation of Islamic Shar 'ia law by the Islamists. The thesis 
describes Islamists as those who wish to use political Islam to organize and 
guide society as a total way of life, which encompasses not only social life but 
also politics and economics. Anchored in a religious creed, Islamists are a 
radical utopian movement closer in spirit to communism, fascism and nazism 
than traditional Islam. They advocate that Muslims true to God's message 
must reject the status quo and build entirely new institutions. They see 
Islamism as the basis of a political system touching both the spiritual and 
temporal aspects of life. Whatever the problem, Islamism is their solution. 
Islam 
It has been argued that Islam begins with an understanding of the deep and 
abiding appeal of traditional Islam, a religion, which today has close to a 
billion adherents. Their loyalty to Islam is quite amazing: Muslims rarely 
leave their faith in favour of another one. 
It argues that Islamic problems began during the Renaissance in Europe. The 
religion of Islam is essentially a religion of success; it is a winners' religion. 
The Prophet Muhammad fled from the city of Mecca in A.D. 622. By 630, 
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only eight years later, he was back in Mecca as a ruler. The Muslims began as 
an obscure group in Arabia and within a century ruled a territory from Spain 
to India. In the year 1000, Islam was on top no matter what index of worldly 
success one looks at- health, wealth, literacy, power. This association became 
customary and assumed: to be a Muslim, was to be a favourite of God, a 
wmner. 
The trauma of modern history that began almost 200 years ago involved 
failure. This began when on 1 July 1789 Napoleon landed in Alexandria, 
Egypt, and has continued since then in almost every walk of life- in health, 
wealth, literacy, culture, and power. Muslims are no longer on top. Then, they 
were masters of the world, and now they are not even masters of their own 
destiny. The thesis presents that there have been three main responses to this 
trauma. Three main efforts to make things right again: secularism, which 
means openly learning from the West and reducing Islam to the private 
sphere; reformism, which means appropriating from the West, saying that the 
West really derives its strength by stealing from Muslims, therefore Muslims 
may take back from them, a middle ground; and Islamism, which stresses a 
return to Islamic ways but in fact takes hugely and covertly from the West-
without wanting to, perhaps, but still very much doing so. 
Islamism 
It has been argued that Islamism is an ideology that demands man's complete 
adherence to the sacred law of Islam and rejects as much as possible outside 
influence, with some exceptions such as access to military and medical 
technology. Islamism is imbued with a deep antagonism towards non-
Muslims and has a particular hostility towards the West. It amounts to an 
effort to tum Islam, a religion and civilization, into an ideology. 
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The word "Islamism" is highly appropriate, for this is an "-ism" like other "-
isms" such as fascism and nationalism. Islamism turns the bits and pieces 
within Islam that deal with politics, economics, and military affairs into a 
sustained and systematic programme. As the leader of the Muslim Brethren 
put it some years ago, "the Muslims are not socialist nor capitalist; they are 
Muslims." I find it very telling that he compares Muslims to socialists and 
capitalists and not to Christians or Jews. He is saying, we are not this "-ism," 
we are that "-ism." Islamism offers a way of approaching and controlling state 
power. It openly relies on state power for coercive purposes. 
Islamism is, in other words, yet another twentieth-century radical utopian 
scheme. Like Marxism-Leninism or fascism, it offers a way to control the 
state, run society, and remake the human being. It is an Islamic-flavored 
version of totalitarianism. The details, of course, are very different from the 
preceding versions, but the ultimate purpose is very similar. 
Islamism is also a total transformation of traditional Islam; it serves as a 
vehicle of modernization. The ideology deals with the problems of urban 
living, of working women and others at the cutting edge, and not the 
traditional concerns of farmers. As Olivier Roy, the French scholar, puts it, 
"Rather than a reaction against the modernization of Muslim societies, 
Islamism is a product of it".613 Islamism is not a medieval programme but one 
that responds to the stress and strains of the twentieth century. 
In has been argued that Islamism is a huge change from traditional Islam. One 
illustration: Whereas traditional Islam's sacred law is a personal law, a law a 
Muslim must follow wherever he is, Islamism tries to apply a Western-style 
geographic law that depends on where one lives. Take the case of Sudan, 
where traditionally a Christian was perfectly entitled to drink alcohol, for he 
613 Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam, Paris: Le Seuil, 1992. 
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is a Christian, and Islamic law applies only to Muslims as in the days of the 
Moors of Spain. But the current regime has banned alcohol for every 
Sudanese. It assumes Islamic law is territorial because that is the way a 
Western society is run. 
It has also been noted that Islamism has few connections to wealth or poverty; 
it is not a response to deprivation alone. There is no discernible connection 
between income and Islamism. Rather this movement is led by capable 
people; coping with the rough and tumble of modern life. The ideology 
appeals primarily to modern people; it's fascinating to note how many 
Islamist leaders (for example in Egypt, Turkey and Jordan) are engineers and 
physicians. 
Islamism is by now a powerful force. It runs governments in Iran, Sudan, and 
was in Afghanistan until recently. It is an important force of opposition in 
Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority. It is 
estimated that some small minority of the Muslim population worldwide is 
Islamist. But it is a very active minority and it has a reach that is greater than 
its numbers. Islamists are also present in the West, and particularly in the 
United States, and, to an stunning extent, dominate the discourse of American 
Islam. 
The Islamists' success in Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan show that were they to 
come to power elsewhere, they would create enormous problems for the 
people they rule, for the neighborhood, and for the West. Their reaching 
power would lead to economic contraction, to the oppression of women, to 
terrible human rights abuses, to the proliferation of arms, to terrorism and to 
the spread of a viciously anti-American ideology. These are, in short, rogue 
states, dangerous first to their own people and then to the outside world. 
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Islamism is not one ideology. Inside the same society, several directions of 
Islamism can be found, and these are seldom cooperating. Groups of 
ideologies in Islam that want to use the Shar'ia to its full extent, meaning that 
secular forms of governments and institutions are considered foreign to a true 
Muslim society. 
People belonging to an Islamist group, call themselves, and are called by 
others 'islaamiyy for men and 'islaamiyya for women. Both men and women 
are called Islamists in English. 
The four central motifs in Islamism: 
Differences 
Islamists are strongly concerned with social differences between the rich and 
the poor world, as well as inside the Muslim communities. As responsibility 
for the poor and the needy is central to Islam, any situation with unevenly 
divided wealth and many poor people is unacceptable to a zealous Muslim. 
Islamists react towards the West for its reluctance to address the poverty of 
the world, and towards the rich in their own societies, who are considered 
equally reluctant. 
Cultural Problems 
Islamists feel that they are losing their culture; that Western clothes, values, 
social patterns, political structures, language and identity are replacing what 
there once was. Islamists reject many elements of the modem culture (but 
accept a lot); such as those they feel are superfluous and dangerous. 
In many countries, the growth of Islamism must moreover be seen m 
connection with an inferiority complex towards the prosperous West, which is 
not only felt by Islamists, but many Muslims. 
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The Golden Age 
All Muslims are well aware that they were the superior military and cultural 
force in the world for centuries; the reversed situation in the modern ages 
hurts the pride of Muslims. 
Many Muslim countries have tried to copy both the capitalist system, and 
others the socialist system, but all have seen little but marginal success. 
Islamists are working for re-establishing a third alternative: the political 
system that once made their society grow from unknown tribes into world 
rulers in few a centuries. 
In order to achieve this, the Islamists are not rejecting modern technology, but 
are very concerned about implementing it on a grand scale in an Islamist 
society. And because of the technology, the Islamists believe that the coming 
Islamist society will be an even better society than the one of the Golden Age. 
However, there are no Muslim sources indicating that the Islam of the Golden 
Age was as strict and conservative as the Islamists believe. All indications 
show that it was the liberal Islam that paved the ground for cultural, social 
and military achievements of those days - values foreign to all major 
Islamist groups. Hence, there is reason to say that the Islamist idea of the 
Golden Age is a dramatic falsification of history. 
Moreover, the Muslims of the Golden Age were often pragmatic in the sense 
that they borrowed solutions from other cultures, both from the lands they 
conquered as well as neighbour states. Except for the Islamists' fascination 
with modern technology, they have almost only negative attitudes towards 
culture and values outside the Muslim world. 
Political Alternative 
Islamism has been implemented as a real political alternative in modern 
times. Several countries have implemented Islamist politics: principally Iran 
and Sudan, but also to some extent Pakistan and Libya. Saudi Arabia has had 
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an Islamist politics for a long time, but it is not regarded as Islamist by many 
because of the differences between the rich and the poor. 
But the large numbers of problems these countries have faced have, to a large 
extent, discredited Islamism. What has been represented as good solutions for 
economy, safety and welfare have not yielded the promised results. In many 
cases, the situation has worsened compared with the time before the 
implementation of Islamism, as is the case of Sudan, Pakistan and Iran. 
On a smaller scale, but just as important in many countries, are all the small 
welfare institutions that Islamists have set up in rural areas and in poor 
neighbourhoods in the cities. These institutions have served people often left 
out of state run services, like health care and support for unemployed. It is not 
clear however, if the Islamists run these with sincerity or because these 
institutions have proven effective to spread their ideology. 
General Characteristics 
Islamism is a phenomenon primarily taking place in cities, and the most 
prominent members are young people with higher education, often with a 
modest background and often with parents living in the countryside. Islamists 
often have a feeling that, despite the efforts they have put into their studies, 
they have not managed to climb very much socially, and that the jobs they 
were aspiring for are given to people with good social connections but fewer 
qualifications. 
Islamists do not see themselves as revolutionaries, in the sense that a 
revolution will turn the society upside down and create new social structures 
from scratch. The revolution that Islamists hope for is the one that will bring 
old values back, and wipe out all degenerated elements in the modern society. 
But Islamism is just as much a fight against what they perceive as old, rigid 
values, still found among many Muslims living in rural areas. Islamists seek 
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to bring people of the rural areas into the modem age, at the same time as they 
fight for preserving many old values they believe cities dwellers are losing. 
For quite some time, Islamists' political programmes were simple and basic: it 
was based on the Shar'ia. But demands from rulers, intellectuals and people 
have forced the Islamists to concretize the actual content in their politics. 
Sayyid Qutb, one of the main characters of Sunni Islamism, in response has 
stated that this content would be clarified through the practice of Islamism, 
which was a statement that Shar'ia was not clear on all points, and that man 
had to base his decisions on more sources than just it. 
In economical politics, most Islamists defend a system close to the social 
democracy practised in many European countries. When Islamists diverge 
from social democracy it is more often in the direction of capitalism, which is 
the case with FIS in Algeria, than in the direction of communism. The most 
specific Islamist view on economics is the refusal of interests on loans and 
deposits. Instead banks should work as investment organizations earning 
money from real profits. There have been attempts to establish such banking 
systems, but in some cases the results have been catastrophic, as in Egypt in 
the 1980's.614 
The Islamist view on women are variable, but in many cases the structure of 
the Islamic organizations, along with the political programmes, have made 
many women join the Islamists in order to liberate themselves. It is quite 
common that Islamists defend the woman's right to work and to have political 
and social influence. But in general, Islamist groups see men as belonging 
more to life in society, while a woman's primary obligation is towards the 
family. Therefore, seclusion of women; is rarely professed by Islamists. 
Islamists are not democrats, even if there have been successful attempts at 
making the Islamists part of a democratic structure, as in Jordan and for a 
brief period in Turkey, but yet, Islamist programmes are not in favour of 
dictatorship even if this has been the temporary result of Islamism in Iran and 
614 Kazarian, E. The Failure of Islamic Banking in Egypt, London, 1991. 
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Sudan. Dictatorship can be transitory, but the ideal structure in an Islamist 
society is the system of Shura, where the leaders are in frequent contact with 
the entire society, and ask about their needs, and for their ideas, and are 
obliged to show respect for what they are told. Islamists have shown little 
ability to define structures that will prevent the leaders in the shura system 
from starting to rule as dictators. 
Islamists have in many cases been involved in violent acts. The reason for 
resorting to such means appears to be the same over and over again: the 
Islamists try to change the rulers and men of power through intellectual 
means, but as this seldom leads to anything and as there are seldom any 
democratic channels to use, violence has been the last resort. 
But during the last three decades violence seem to have become an intrinsic 
part of the Islamist ideology, and the will to use violence doesn't need much 
provocation anymore. This seems to be the situation for some groups both 
inside and outside the region. 
Islamism's most enduring feature remains its capacity to provoke anger, 
frustration and fear. Most Islamist groups seek to create a climate of fear 
through seemingly indiscriminate barbaric acts of violence against innocent 
members of society throughout the region. Their terrorist actions are sudden, 
violent, and highly publicized. 
Unlike conventional warfare and guerrilla insurgencies, terrorism is primarily 
an urban phenomenon carried out by small cells of individuals who rarely 
battle government troops. Most Islamist groups seek to create a climate of 
fear through seemingly indiscriminate acts of violence. As a lone Islamist in 
protest at a specific government policy can perpetrate terrorism. 
The problem of finding an appropriate military response further distances 
terrorism from warfare among nation-states. Deterrence, pre-emption and 
retaliation take on new meaning when applied to Islamist groups. Deterrence 
rests heavily on rationality. But the rationality posited in how governments 
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react to each other's policies cannot be applied to Islamist groups that use 
suicide tactics. It is likewise difficult to deter an enemy whose objective is to 
activate an escalating cycle of violence. Identifying who perpetrated a given 
incident is often difficult, as is locating the Islamists' base of operations. 
Islamists can move quickly from one location to another, making intelligence 
on their whereabouts outdated. They can merge easily into urban areas, thus 
ensuring that any retaliatory or pre-emptive attack will result in the death of 
innocent civilians. 
Unquestionably, each terrorist attack upon American, Western, or Israeli 
citizens and facilities becomes an assault upon national pride and honour. The 
emotional impact of watching terrorists' hold, abuse, or kill innocents is 
understandably great. The public demands action, and no president or prime 
minister can walk away from the event. In this charged atmosphere, the 
distinction between threats to national security and threats to national honour 
is blurred. While the public may not always recognize a national security 
threat, it certainly can see the death and destruction inflicted by Islamist 
terrorists on September 11, 2001. 
The gist of the Islamist ideological current is that neither nationalism nor 
socialism has been able to deal with the challenges facing the Muslim world. 
Restoring faith and discipline, with the associated values, and rekindling the 
fervor that characterized early Islam, as Islamists see it, are considered key to 
a revival that will restore dignity to the people of the region. Revealingly, they 
vaunt Islam as the best ideology not the best religion, therefore exposing their 
focus on power. By nature, Islamism is anti-democratic and aggressive, anti-
Semitic and anti-Western. Outside their own movement, Islamists see every 
existing political system in the Muslim world as deeply compromised, corrupt 
and mendacious. 
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It has also been argued that Islamists have charged their governments not only 
with corruption, impiety and neglect of the national culture and heritage, but 
also with disrupting traditional national society in the name of modernization 
without providing the promised benefits in compensation. Inherently, 
Islamists argue that basic values have been destroyed. The city has corrupted 
the soul. But poverty is more pervasive than it ever was in traditional times. 
The wealth of the few is more ostentatiously flaunted. And yet the developed 
world surges ahead: mocking the house of Islam. This is the language of the 
new antithesis- Islamists, turned against the former national synthesis- current 
dictators, of modernity and authenticity and carrying the banner of resurgent 
political Islam. It analyses that these moments of confrontation and challenge 
to a former synthesis do not arrive by chance, and it is no accident that 
Islamism is radiant in the Middle East and North Africa since the end of the 
twentieth century. Such times occur when the current order is in difficulty, 
and no longer is a source of stability and satisfaction. Thus, it has been argued 
that, when order, identity and resources collapse, believers flock back to their 
religion and seek in it not just a means of salvation in the after life, but also an 
answer to unsatisfactory conditions in the earthly life. Conversely, economic 
mismanagement, rising populations, urbanization and unemployment have led 
the disenfranchised, marginalized and disillusioned to use Islamism as a tool 
in order to protest against the state. However, the educated middle classes 
have often employed Islamism in an attempt to gain political participation or 
to emphasise the inadequacies of inept and corrupt governments. Islamism, 
therefore, in the Middle East and North Africa has had its greatest impact in 
its attempt to destabilize regimes. 
It has been argued that Islamism poses serious problems for such autocratic 
Muslim governments throughout the region. Their failure to uphold civil 
liberties renders them illegitimate in the eyes of their citizens. When such 
regimes are aided by Western powers, the problems become internationalized. 
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Islamists have taken note of the nse of western, notably American, 
interventionism in the Muslim world over the past decades: Syria (1983 ), 
Libya (1986), Iran (1988), Iraq (1990-91 ), Somalia ( 1992-93 ), and currently 
in Afghanistan and, again, in Iraq. While the motivation may differ in each 
case, Islamists recall that their part of the world had not previously 
experienced direct military intervention by the United States. Westerners thus 
should not be surprised by a resurgence of Islamist xenophobia towards 
Western interference, even for humanitarian purposes. Islamists are also likely 
to use that xenophobia to challenge, embarrass and eventually topple regimes. 
The rise of Islamism 
The rise of Islamism in the last decades of the twentieth century was as 
spectacular as it was unforeseen. The decline of religion in Islamic societies 
had begun in the nineteenth century as a result of secular political movements 
for modernization. At a time when the decline seemed irrevocable, the sudden 
emergence of groups "swearing by the Qur'an alone, calling for Jihad, and 
drawing their activists from the world's great cities" was bewildering. 
Initially the leftist intellectuals considered Islamism merely a species of 
religious fascism, while for the liberals the Islamists were reactionary fanatics 
harking back to the Middle Ages. As the movement expanded, the ideologues 
of Left and Right changed their tunes: Marxist thinkers of every stripe, 
casting about for mass support, began to credit Islamist activists with 
"socialist virtues", while the conservatives approved of their preaching of 
"moral order and obedience to God". Islamism appeared as perhaps the 
outline of an Islamic civilization within the multicultural world of the coming 
century. Islamism, in the Middle East and North Africa, replaced the 
nationalism of the previous generations who had fought colonialism and won. 
It has been pointed out that Islamists are clusters of varied social groups, with 
different agendas, and that if they coalesced they could seize power. The two 
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core social groups were the "urban poor" and the "pious middle classes". The 
first consisted mainly of the young immigrants born after the wars of 
independence, with no memory of colonialism, who; unlike their parents, 
were literate and had social expectations that were not met. The second were 
the majority of the middle classes, for whom Islam had a deeper resonance 
than the Western ideologies of the undemocratic, often corrupt, and 
incompetent political elites that governed them. Both groups had sensative 
feelings of social frustration and impotence, and "the latter used the former to 
seize power," as happened in Iran in 1979. 
According to Gilles Kepel, the three most influential ideologues of Islamism 
were Sayyid Qutb, a leader of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt who was 
imprisoned by Nasser and executed in 1966; the Pakistani thinker Maulana 
Maududi; and the Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khomeini. Only Khomeini 
succeeded in seizing power, partly due to social and historical circumstances, 
and partly because he was an astute politician. He broadened his constituency 
to include the secular middle classes, whom the Shah had alienated, as well as 
the bazaar merchants. He presented a moderate, inclusive image and avoided 
specific programmes. 
In general the Islamist discourse was ambiguous: strong on religious, moral, 
and political ideas but vague on social plans. The main argument was that all 
the problems of Muslim societies stemmed from the fact that they were not 
truly Islamic. Khomeini called the state of the world jaheliyyah (the age of 
ignorance/darkness, before the advent of Islam). Western ideologies-
nationalism, Marxism, socialism- had resulted in poverty and tyranny; 
salvation would come through a return to the golden age of Islam, the Prophet 
Muhammad's seventh-century Medina polity. He opposed the mostazafin (the 
weak, the oppressed) to the motakabberins (the arrogant rulers) and urged the 
former to rise up against the latter. 
Khomeini's message resounded throughout the Islamic world. It's rhetoric and 
Islamic symbols encouraged Islamists in other countries to rise up against 
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their regimes and install Islamist rule. The Islamisation of Khomeini's Iran 
has alerted its neighbours to the possible assertion of Islamist quests for 
power, and throughout the rest of the world the idea of revolutionary Shi' ism 
had become a reality. Two crucial events further contributed to the spread of 
the movement: the death of Gamal Nasser in 1970, bringing an end to the 
Arab nationalism he embodied, and Khomeini's success in toppling the Shah 
and establishing an Islamic republic in 1979. 
The spread of Islamism 
The Islamist discourse found an echo among sections of the intelligentsia in 
other Arab countries, who saw it as a counterweight to communism and at 
first tolerated it. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was among them, not 
knowing that the Islamists would end up assassinating him. Some Western 
intellectuals among them French philosopher Michel Foucault also backed 
Khomeini, believing that he would be a Gandhi figure who would retire to his 
aerie in Qom and be a spiritual guide. They were in for a rude awakening. 
Upon gaining power Ayatollah Khomeini established a theocracy, suppressed 
all opposition, brought back the hijab (veil, covering) for women, and did not 
fulfill promises of liberation and equity. He changed the country's democratic 
constitution, which the Shah had flouted, thereby causing his own downfall, 
to give the clerics absolute power. To be fair, the eight-year war with Iraq, 
instigated by the evil Saddam Hussein, did not help. 
If Islamism succeeded in seizing power by revolution in Iran, elsewhere its 
adherents hoped to succeed by democratic means. In Pakistan, Maulana 
Maududi's project was democratic. In Algeria, the Islamic Front of Salvation 
was certain to win the 1992 elections, which were canceled to prevent such an 
outcome. As a result the group fragmented into factions; the appalling 
atrocities and massacres of innocent populations by the splinter group the 
Armed Islamic Group (G.I.A.) alienated the pious middle classes, driving 
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them to negotiate with the government for democracy and reform. In Egypt, 
the radical group that broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic 
Jihad, has been responsible for campaigns of violence and random murders. 
The 1997 massacre of tourists in Luxor was its last major terrorist act. 
In 1974, the price of oil skyrocketed, and Saudi Arabia used some of its 
unprecedented wealth to acquire political clout, spreading Wahhabism- its 
own brand of Islamic fundamentalism- through mosques and Islamic schools. 
It is worth remembering that the majority of the September 11 hijackers were 
Saudis, as are Osama bin Laden and many connected to Al Qaeda. Also 
noteworthy is the Saudi influence among the Taleban. Wahhabism is a small, 
formalist sect, born in Egypt in the nineteenth century, opposed to Sufism and 
Shiism and all other spiritual doctrines of Islam. When Saudi Arabia was 
created after World War I, ibn Saud, the governor of Hijaz, became the 
absolute ruler of the new country. Saud was a Wahhabi and declared 
Wahhabism the official religion. He established the strictest interpretation of 
Sharia law, calling for the oppression of women and punishments such as 
hand cutting and beheading. In the Gulf States, Islamism thrives among the 
dislocated young, whose livelihood depends on a single, diminishing source: 
petroleum. Should these Islamists succeed in toppling the present pro-Western 
regimes, a period of instability and strife might spread through the whole 
region. 
The roots of Islamism 
It is important to note that Islamic fundamentalism is not homegrown, that it 
was born from the encounter of Muslim intellectuals with Western doctrines. 
The modern Islamic paradigm has drawn on three centuries of encounter 
between the Islamic and the Western worlds. In the eighteenth century, Sufi 
orders launched social and political resistance movements to colonial powers. 
In religious terms, they emphasized the importance of hadith, Islamic political 
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mobilization, and a spirituality rooted in the personality of the Prophet.615 
When this resistance collapsed, it was followed by an Islamic reformism that 
sought to re-educate Muslim intellectuals and demanded political 
representation from Muslim monarchs. Many reformists later joined the 
nationalists who inherited the reigns of power in the new nation-states. As 
these new nation-states could not realize the people's aspirations, an Islamic 
ideology formulated mainly by Egypt's Muslim Brothers and Pakistan's 
Jamaat-il Islami became the Islamic answer to modem worldviews. 
The themes and structures of the modem Islamic paradigm constitute the 
shared meanings of a discursive universe. Although its images and forms 
have distinctive patterns in regional contexts, the commonalities are 
unmistakable. Indeed, Gellner likened standard Muslim beliefs and practices 
to a deck of cards dealt out differently in various Muslim societies.616 In the 
modem period, a corresponding deck makes up the modem Islamic paradigm. 
As John Esposito has observed, Islamic discourse has moved from the 
periphery to the mainstream of the Muslim world. 617 Numerous Muslim 
regimes have adopted the Islamic idiom as a social and political discourse. In 
spite of the failure of the specific political programmes advocated by such 
organizations as the Muslim Brothers and the Jaaat-I Islami, the ideology of 
Islamic resurgence, with its promise of an Islamic society and an Islamic 
state, has captured the imagination of a wide range of social groups in the 
Muslim world. 
The writings of the Muslim Brothers' Sayyid Qutb and the Jamaat-iI Islami's 
Abu al Ala al Mawdudi captured the basic elements of the Islamic paradigm 
in the twentieth century. Their teachings were reflected and nuanced by 
615 Voll, John Obert, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1982, pp. 44-49, and 87-147. 
616 Gellner, Ernest, Muslim Society: Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, p. 100. 
617 Esposito, John L., et al., The Contemporary Islamic Revival, Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1991, p. 44. 
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others, among them Algeria's Malik Bennabi (d. 1976) and Iran's Ali Shariati 
( d. 1977). The modern Islamic paradigm is elastic and malleable enough to 
embrace both the conservatism of Mawdudi and the radicalism of Egyptian 
extremist groups. In other words, divergent and individual groups use the 
ideas to construct their discourses. 
All major ideologues of the new paradigm have had some kind of direct 
exposure to the West. The images of Shariati at the Sorbonne studying for a 
doctorate in sociology and of Qutb as literary critic are linked inextricably 
with the production of the modern Islamic paradigm. Prominent Western 
converts to Islam have added ingenious dimensions to the paradigm by 
bringing their own understanding of the West and its possibilities and 
limitations.618 The paradigm has been appropriated by an increasing number 
of modern and educated Muslims. In Iran, for example, Khomeini's 
popularity among the mullahs and the masses was matched by Shariati' s 
appeal among educated youth.619 The paradigm, however, enjoys its widest 
appeal among the educated youth, especially those in the science faculties. 
Since the new Islamic paradigm is constructed at the intersection of the 
modern West and traditional Islam, it is most appealing to students who 
straddle these two worlds. Such support, especially in the science and 
technology faculties, is not surprising, for the most potent symbol of the West 
is technological advancement, with which science students come into direct 
contact. As a reaction to this challenge, the paradigm is born. 
The paradigm; is not appropriated by illiterate workers and peasants, for it 
rests on the twin legacies of Islam and modernity, both of which are logo-
centric discourses. The resultant discourse is also logo-centric and thereby 
618 Marty, Martin E. et al., Fundamentalism Observed, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1991, p. 825; Gerholm, Tomas, et al., The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, 
London: Mansell, 1990, pp. 275-77. 
619 Ahmad, Mumtaz, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-11 Islamic and 
the Tablighi Jamaat", in Fundamentalism Observed, ed. by Martin E. Marty and Scott R. 
Appleby, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991, p. 461; Arjomand, Said Amire, 
"Social Change and Movements of Revitalization in Contemporary Iran", in New 
Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change, ed., by James A. Beckford, Paris: 
UNESCO, 1986, p. 87. 
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marginalizes such people. At the same time, the Islamic paradigm is not built 
on Western philosophical foundations or the rational disciplines of Islam. For 
many students of science, contact with the Islamic legacy is tenuous. They 
had only the most random selection from both sources, which ensures that the 
resources of the new paradigm appeared to be almost inexhaustible. 
From Marx and Nietzsche to Heidegger and Sartre, Western thinkers have 
therefore been the inspiration oflslamist ideologues of various hues. Thus the 
radical Islamist groups behind terrorist campaigns are more akin to the Red 
Brigade and the Baader-Meinhof gang than to anything connected with real 
Islam. 
Policy Implications 
There is a great battle under way for the soul of the Muslim world. This battle 
is not between the West and the Muslim world; the West is a bystander. It is 
essentially a battle between Muslims, between the Khomeini and Atattirk 
dispositions. Which one is likely to prevail? It is strange to observe that the 
lively, new ideas in Kemalist Turkey are Islamist ones, whereas the lively, 
new ideas in Islamist Iran are secular ones. This points to the turmoil and the 
dynamic developments taking place in the Muslim world. 
Despite the fact that the West is a bystander, on the outside, but it must protect 
its interests. To start, in devising strategy towards Islamism the West must 
very specifically distinguish between Islam and Islamism. It is about 
developing a policy toward Islamism, not Islam. States do not have policies 
towards religions, but they do respond to ideologies. The Western 
governments and the Western public must be clear about this distinction. 
The calamities committed by Al Qaeda and the Taleban, and the political 
failure of radical Islam in Iran, Sudan and elsewhere mean that the Islamist 
movement will have much difficulty in reversing its trail of decline and 
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isolation. The region is poised on the edge of both rising hopes and deeply 
entrenched extremism. Hope needs careful nurturing, while extremism needs 
containment. Perhaps the last word should be left to Revelation, "Whoever 
kills a human being, shall be looked upon as though he had killed all 
mankind".620 It is obvious that the Islamists have not adhered to this 
fundamental Qur' anic belief. 
6?0 - The Qur'an, chapter 5, verse 32. 
POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD 
·. SPAIN ITALY 
From North Africa to the Persian Gulf, many Arab governments are' 
confronting popular pressures - both peaceful and violent, Islamic 
and secular - for reform 
Current forms of Government 
- Limited multiparty system 
- Autocratic military regime 
- Constitutional Monarchy 





Political liberalisation underway involving 
moderate Islamic and/or secular political 
groups 







* Political freedoms were suspended in 
January 1992 to prevent electoral victory 
by lslamists 
** Government makes room for popular 
participation through local committees 
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: Islamic Salvation Army 
: Afwaj al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniyah, an 
Acrynym for Groups of the Lebanese 
Resistance 
: The Committee for the Defense of 
Legitimate Rights 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine 
Declaration of Principles 
Islamic Salvation Front 
National Liberation Front 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
Armed Islamic Group 
An acronym for Harakat Al-Muqawama 
Al-Islamiyya- Islamic Resistance 
Movement in the Palestinian Territories 
: The Movement for an Islamic Society in 
Algeria 
High Committee of State 
Israeli Defense Force 
International Monetary Fund 
Members of Parliament 
Movement for Democracy in Algeria 
Movement of Islamic Renaissance 
Islamic Movement Tendency 
The Organization of Islamic Countries 
Peace Be Upon Him 
Palestinian Communist Party 
Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
United Nations 
United National Leadership of the 
Uprising 














: Governance of God 
: Monopoly 
: Islamic Revivalism 
: Islamists 
: Charity 
: Described as a partnership for profit 
and loss system 
AI-Muwatin : Citizen 
AI-Nakbah : The Catastrophe 
Al-Qaedah : The base, foundation 
AI-Sahwa al-Islamiyyah : Islamic awakening 
AI-Salibiyyah al-Alamiyyah: World Crusaderism 
AI-Umamiyyah : Internationalism 
AI-Usuliyyah al-Islamiyyah: Islamic Fundamentalism 
'Alim : Scholar, doctor of theology 
Amal : Hope 
Aman : Security 
'Aqa'id : A set of beliefs 
Ashaheed :Martyr 
Ba'ath : Resurrection 
Baraka : God's blessing in the world 












allegiance to a prince (Amir) 
: The spirit of innovation, heresies, heretical 
: A literal translation of 'fundamentalism' in 
Persian 
: Islamic state 
: Successor to Prophet Muhammad as a 
leader of the Muslim community. 
: Considered worthy of protection 
: Literally "sermonizing", call, Preaching 
: Judgmental opinions 
: Jurist 
: The innate human nature, the recipient of 
revelation 
: Civilization 
: The recorded tradition about the words and 
deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions, compiled into six 








































ninth Century AD. 
: Pilgrimage 
: Permitted by God 
: Zeal, courage, bravery 
: Prohibited by God 
: Freedom Party 
: Party of God 





: Muslim Brotherhood 
: Overturing, revolution 
: Uprising 
: Apostate 
: Godlessness, idolatry, Imperialism 
: Group, community, collective, 
Brotherhood, 
association 
: Islamic Group, Islamic Brotherhood 
: Strive, holy war 
: Soldier of God 
: The true and believing commando 
: Unbelief, infidelity, apostasy 
: Committee 
: (Arabic) West 
: The Theses of the Islamists 
: Deliverer 
: (Arabic) East 
: Opposition 
: Praxis 
: A genuine Muslim who unconditionally 
and unequivocally believes and practices 
'The Five Pillars oflslam'. 
: Independents, but partisans of the jihad 
: Fanatic or religious extremist 
: Renaissance 
: System 
: The holy book of Islam as the Word of 
God as revealed to, and recited by, Prophet 
Muhammad 
: Charging interest, usury 
: Treatise of Oneness 




































: Followers of the pious ancestors 
: Prayer 
: Fasting 
: The creed 
: Islamic law 
: Religious or an elderly respected man 
: The family of sects in Islam which regard 
Muhammad's son-in-law and cousin, Ali, 
as his rightful successor. 
: Priests 
: Polytheism or infidelity 
: Branch 
: Consultation 
: A pejorative code word for communism 
: Normative biography of the Prophet 
: Mystic, mystics 
: Traditions, which is the Prophet's day-to-
day practices 
: One who considers as a follower of the 
Authentic Sunna- followers of mainstream 
or orthodox Islam as opposed to the Shi' a 
and other sects. 
: Chapter 
: Chapters, which are in metrical form 
: Transmission and Preaching 
: Oneness. Negates the governance of man, 
class, and race. It is the elimination of 
systems based on human independence in 
earthly affairs from the governanc of God. 
: Culture 
: Heritage, Islamic tradition 
: Religious intellectuals/leaders, clerics, 
learned men, Islamic scholars 
: Community of believers or the Muslim 
nation 
: The Middle Nation, which avoids the 
extremes in its spiritual and worldly 
















Zakat (Zekat, Zeakah) 
: Fundamentals, sources, basics 
: Bases, foundations 
: The Fundamentals of the Religion 
: Fundamentalism 
: Unity 
: Revelation, i.e. the Quran as a revelation 
: Required by God 
: Awakening 
: Day of Judgement 
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